UTCP講演会 "Moral Disagreement"終了しました
東京大学駒場キャンパス101号館2階 研修室 [地図]
Prof. Zed Adams（New School for Social Research)
The existence of widespread and persistent moral disagreement is too obvious not to have fallen under every one' s observation. When it comes to questions about eating meat or sleeping around, even friends with similar backgrounds often disagree about what is morally right and wrong. When one extends one's gaze beyond one's close acquaintances, the depth of disagreement is even more striking. Many who have reflected on such disagreement have concluded that it implies that we should be skeptical of the very idea of moral truth. Ironically, however, others have thought that the very intelligibility of moral disagreement presupposes the possibility of moral truth. Drawing upon recent work in the philosophy of language, I argue that this impasse can be circumvented by attending to the nature of disagreement itself and the variety of forms it can take. By attending to the specific form of persistent moral disagreement, we can see both the centrality of truth for moral discussion and debate as well as a truth in moral skepticism.
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