UTCP 講演会

Moral Disagreement

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2011年1月21日(金曜日) 17:00-19:00東京大学総合文化研究科・教養学部(駒場キャンパス)101号館2階研修室

使用言語:英語

参加無料 事前登録不要

Adams さんは、倫理学、社会哲学を専門とされていますが、前回の UTCP 講演会 "How to Argue for Color Relativism"(2010 年 1 月 19 日)では色彩の哲学について発表されたように、幅広い関心領域をお持ちの研究者です。今回の講演では、日常的に幅広く見られる道徳的判断の不一致にかかわる問題を、言語哲学的観点を取り入れながら検討される予定です。

[Abstract]

The existence of widespread and persistent moral disagreement is too obvious not to have fallen under every one's observation. When it comes to questions about eating meat or sleeping around, even friends with similar backgrounds often disagree about what is morally right and wrong. When one extends one's gaze beyond one's close acquaintances, the depth of disagreement is even more striking. Many who have reflected on such disagreement have concluded that it implies that we should be skeptical of the very idea of moral truth. Ironically, however, others have thought that the very intelligibility of moral disagreement presupposes the possibility of moral truth. Drawing upon recent work in the philosophy of language, I argue that this impasse can be circumvented by attending to the nature of disagreement itself and the variety of forms it can take. By attending to the specific form of persistent moral disagreement, we can see both the centrality of truth for moral discussion and debate as well as a truth in moral skepticism.

