« Prev | Next »

UTCP Colloquium:Recent Issues in Philosophy of Language

Registration Required Finished
17:00-19:30, Monday, June 25th, 2018
The University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus, Bldg. 18, 4th Floor, Collaboration Room 1

UTCP Colloquium:Recent Issues in Philosophy of Language

Language: English and Japanese

Naoya Fujikawa(藤川直也) (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Speaking of nothingness

Paolo Bonardi (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Salmon, Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint

Kohji Ishihara (The University of Tokyo) & Takayuki Suzuki (The University of Tokyo)


Naoya Fujikawa,
Speaking of nothingness

The word `nothing‘ is used as a quantifier, and that’s it: In particular, it is a big mistake to treat `nothing' as a singular term---Such a Carnapian view is recently criticized (cf. Oliver and Smiley, 2013; Priest, 2014, Jacquette, 2015). Indeed, it is not difficult to find cases where the word `nothing' is used as a singular term (for example, `nothing comes from nothing'). Then, what does it refer? In this talk, first, I criticize Oliver and Smiley (2014)’s claim that `nothing' as a singular term is an empty term that fails to refer to anything. Secondly, I examine the view that `nothing' can be used to refer to the absence of everything, which is understood as the complement of the mereological sum of all objects (cf. Casati and Fujikawa 2015; 2017).

Casati, F. and Fujikawa, N. (2015). `Better than Zilch?', Logic and Logical Philosophy, 24(2), 255-264.
Casati, F. and Fujikawa, N. (2017). `Nothingness, Meinongianism, and Inconsistent Mereology', Synthese, online first publication.
Jacquette, D. (2015). Alexius meaning: The Shepherd of non-being. New York: Springer.
Oliver, A and Smiley, T. (2013). `Zilch', Analysis, 73:4, 601-613.
Priest, G. (2014). One, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paolo Bonardi, Salmon,
Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint

Since 1987 a debate has been going on between Nathan Salmon and Stephen Schiffer regarding a puzzle, devised by Schiffer (1987, 2006, 2016), about Salmon’s (1986, 1989) Millian-Russellian theory of belief reports. The goal of my talk is threefold: to show that Salmon’s (2006) solution to Schiffer’s puzzle (which consists in disallowing the move from ˹ believes that β˺ to ˹ believes β to be such that it˺) and Salmon’s (2006) argument for this solution are not entirely convincing; to raise a new puzzle, originating in ideas from Jennifer Saul & David Braun (2002), which achieves the same results as Schiffer’s puzzle but to which Salmon’s solution is inapplicable; to show that the import of both puzzles is not the failure of the aforesaid move (as Salmon maintains) or of the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports (as Schiffer maintains), but is the failure of Frege’s Constraint, in terms of which modes of presentation (guises, pleonastic propositions, etc.) are defined.

Braun, D. & J. Saul (2002). Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111: 1-41.
Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
_________ (1989). Illogical Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 243-285.
_________ (1995). Relational Belief. In P. Leonardi & M. Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine: New Essays, 206-228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_________ (2006). The Resilience of Illogical Belief. Noûs 40: 369-375.
Schiffer, S. (1987). The “Fido”-Fido Theory of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 1: 455-480.
_________ (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40: 361-368.
_________ (2016). De Re Subtleties: Response to Nathan Salmon. In G. Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Download PDF

« Prev  |  Next »
  • HOME>
    • Events>
      • UTCP Colloquium:Recent Issues in Philosophy of Language
//Page Top