

UTCP Colloquium : Recent Issues in Philosophy of Language

コロキウム：言語哲学の諸問題

(language: English and Japanese)

使用言語：英語・日本語

17:00-19:30, June 25, 2018 (2018年6月25日17時-19時30分)

Venue: The University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus, Bldg. 18, 4th Floor, Collaboration Room 1

(東京大学駒場Iキャンパス18号館4階 コラボレーションルーム1)

Registration <https://goo.gl/forms/UKFW64YP6F6GHyZb2>

Naoya Fujikawa(藤川直也) (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

Speaking of nothingness

Paolo Bonardi (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

Salmon, Schiffer and Frege's Constraint

Organizers: Kohji Ishihara (The University of Tokyo) & Takayuki Suzuki (The University of Tokyo)

Abstracts

Naoya Fujikawa, *Speaking of nothingness*

The word 'nothing' is used as a quantifier, and that's it: In particular, it is a big mistake to treat 'nothing' as a singular term---Such a Carnapian view is recently criticized (cf. Oliver and Smiley, 2013; Priest, 2014, Jacquette, 2015). Indeed, it is not difficult to find cases where the word 'nothing' is used as a singular term (for example, 'nothing comes from nothing'). Then, what does it refer? In this talk, first, I criticize Oliver and Smiley (2014)'s claim that 'nothing' as a singular term is an empty term that fails to refer to anything. Secondly, I examine the view that 'nothing' can be used to refer to the absence of everything, which is understood as the complement of the mereological sum of all objects (cf. Casati and Fujikawa 2015; 2017).

References

Casati, F. and Fujikawa, N. (2015). 'Better than Zilch?', *Logic and Logical Philosophy*, 24(2), 255-264.

Casati, F. and Fujikawa, N. (2017). 'Nothingness, Meinongianism, and Inconsistent Mereology', *Synthese*, online first publication.

Jacquette, D. (2015). *Alexius meaning: The Shepherd of non-being*. New York: Springer.

Oliver, A and Smiley, T. (2013). 'Zilch', *Analysis*, 73:4, 601-613.

Priest, G. (2014). *One*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paolo Bonardi, *Salmon, Schiffer and Frege's Constraint*

Since 1987 a debate has been going on between Nathan Salmon and Stephen Schiffer regarding a puzzle, devised by Schiffer (1987, 2006, 2016), about Salmon's (1986, 1989) Millian-Russellian theory of belief reports. The goal of my talk is threefold: to show that Salmon's (2006) solution to Schiffer's puzzle (which consists in disallowing the move from ' α believes that ϕ ' to ' α believes β to be such that ϕ it') and Salmon's (2006) argument for this solution are not entirely convincing; to raise a new puzzle, originating in ideas from Jennifer Saul & David Braun (2002), which achieves the same results as Schiffer's puzzle but to which Salmon's solution is inapplicable; to show that the import of both puzzles is not the failure of the aforesaid move (as Salmon maintains) or of the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports (as Schiffer maintains), but is the failure of Frege's Constraint, in terms of which modes of presentation (guises, pleonastic propositions, etc.) are defined.

References

Braun, D. & J. Saul (2002). Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations. *Philosophical Studies* 111: 1-41.

Salmon, N. (1986). *Frege's Puzzle*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

_____ (1989). Illogical Belief. *Philosophical Perspectives* 3: 243-285.

_____ (1995). Relational Belief. In P. Leonardi & M. Santambrogio (eds.), *On Quine: New Essays*, 206-228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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