The 51th meeting of Tokyo Colloquium of Cognitive Philosophy:
Co-organized by the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Tokyo and The Study Group for Philosophy of Action

Date & Time: Friday, 12th December, 2014, 18:00-20:00
Venue: the 14th Building, Room 710 on the 7th floor, Komaba

Presenter: Chienkuo Mi ( Soochow University )
Title: What Is Knowledge? Virtue Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy

Abstract:

子曰：「由！誨女知之乎？知之為知之，不知為不知，是知也。」
The Master said, “You, shall I teach you what knowledge is? When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it - this is knowledge.” (The Analects of Confucius, “Wei Zheng”: 17.)

“Apt belief, animal knowledge, is better than belief that succeeds in its aim, being true, without being apt. Apt belief aptly noted, reflective knowledge, is better than mere apt belief or animal knowledge, especially when the reflective knowledge helps to guide the first order belief so that it is apt. In such a case the belief is fully apt, and the subject knows full well.” (Ernest Sosa, Knowing Full Well: 12-13.)

In this paper I examine the role that reflection plays in knowledge. I argue that a notion of reflection grounded in ancient Chinese philosophy can help us understand second-order knowledge or reflective knowledge in both the accounts of Confucius and Ernest Sosa. I also argue that reflection can help us understand the most ideal kind of knowledge. I begin my paper by laying out Confucius's and Sosa's accounts of knowledge, while at the same time drawing the reader's attention to their common concern with reflective knowledge. Next I draw on an account of reflection from Confucius and elaborate on it. With this account of reflection in hand, I return to Confucius's and Sosa's accounts of knowledge and show how this account of reflection can help those accounts of knowledge.