Abstract

　　The fundamental significance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of space in his early masterpiece, Phenomenology of Perception (hereafter referred as PhP), has been largely underestimated, if not completely ignored, in the literature of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. This underestimation can be traced back to the received view that space problem is not the primary theme of PhP, but only a touchstone for the general theses Merleau-Ponty wants to defend. This paper tries to argue that even space problem is not the chief concern of PhP in the thematic sense,  it has fundamental importance in the argumentative sense. We will show that the chief concern of PhP is to establish the primitive openness of human consciousness towards the world through the intermediary of body by characterizing the existential structure of human being as “being-in-the-world”. We will argue in this paper that the primitive structure of being-in-the-world is ultimately revealed through an integrated spatial archaeology which is nothing but Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of space. The spatial archaeology of the lived body establishes the rootedness of consciousness in its body, while the spatial archaeology of the perceived world further reveals the primordial hold of the body on its world. Only by this integrated spatial archaeology can the general thesis of “being-in-the-world” be finally established. Towards the end of the paper, we will explicate the argumentative significance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of space by clarifying the fact that space is one of the primordial expressions of our being-in-the-world.

Abstract

　　Hegel’s criticism of Fichte in the DS announces the end of the unity of transcendental philosophy, though it does not cause this end. Despite of its crucial importance in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, the rational content of the Hegelian criticism remains unexplained. The present paper is only concerned with Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s Sittenlehre in the DS. In particular, we will argumentatively reconstruct Hegel’s rejection of Fichte’s model of causality with respect to the fundamental concept of self-consciousness. We will argue that both Fichte and Hegel approach the theme of non-objective and concrete self-consciousness in two different ways.

Abstract

　　Cézanne’s painting is regarded by Merleau-Ponty as a sort of modern thought. By refuting with the approach of investigation that analyze the painter’s work in light of the influences by his personal hereditary traits, Merleau-Ponty brought forth a positive understanding on Cézanne’s longtime pondering before painting. That is to say, the pondering means not the hesitation or indecision, but rather a sort of doubting and inquiring into the world and the relation between man and his surrounding world. This doubting shows that in the painter’s work, there is already an original reflection upon the world and the being in the world, which is in a silent, indirect and implicit mode. This primordial thinking reveals, for Merleau-Ponty the possibility of a pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical manner of investigation of philosophy, which the philosopher would call “implicit ontology”. By revealing this ontological character of painting with the illustration of Cézann’s work, this paper finally points out that, Merleau-Ponty’s inquiry to the non-philosophy field in the late period forms a new possible way to approach the mute substructure of the primordial world, and to make philosophy rebirth and have a new interpretation in a sensible manner of reflection, and it will finally contribute to his pursuing of “the logos of life-world”.

Abstract

　　As a fundamental concept of the Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality is typically expressed as “all consciousness is consciousness of something”. In the introduction of L’Etre et le néant, Sartre criticizes both transcendent perception and immanent perception, the two kinds of consciousness distinguishes by Husserl in accord to their different norms of givenness. As for the former, because the phenomena cannot be all given in one perception, as Sartre names it as “the infinitude”, it is always possible to doubt the existence of the transcendent object. therefore, Sartre believes that it is wrong for the phenomenologist to reduce the existence of the transcend object to the series of its mode of existence. As for the latter, Husserl’s model of “noesis-noema” has turned out to be problematic in many aspects. Sartre holds that when Husserl treats noema as a non-reality, the correlate of noesis, thinking that its existence lies in being perceived, Husserl “totally betrays his own principle”. These two criticism outline Sartre’s understanding of intentionality. For him, because of the different nature of consciousness and its object---no matter the transcendent object in the outside world or the inner consciousness, the consciousness cannot be dissolved in its object, making itself as an absolute movement away from the self, even though this movement must toward something other than itself.
The pure movement away from itself represents the peculiar feature of consciousness for Sartre, namely the absoluteness, which is regarded as the starting point of his theory of consciousness. The present paper tries to trace the argument of this starting point through the analysis of the concept of intentionality. We will firstly focus on the meaning of intentionality in Husserl, particularly the infinite nature of Adumbration and the paradox of the model of “noesis-noema”. After that, we will analyze Sartre’s criticism toward Husserl’s point of view in this respect. Finally, the paper will stress on the significance of the absoluteness of consciousness in Sartre’s theory.

Abstract

　　This paper is initiated by the strangeness of structure of Plato’s Phaedrus, and the controversial character of love discussed within, as well as what love got to do with rhetoric on earth. I examine the difference of human inner structure underlies those three speeches, which makes them intrinsically apart from each other. Then explore what happen to soul throughout love and rhetoric. Lastly, conclude that love and rhetoric both are chances for soul to recollect Reality as they call for people to transcend one self and impact others. More than that, as long as, and only when the “charioteer” of soul takes the key role, that love and rhetoric could awake the driving forces approaching Reality.  

　　Key Words: Plato, Phaedrus, Love, Rhetoric, Soul

Abstract

　　The Analects focuses on the theme of how an exemplary person (jun zi 君子) should cultivate himself. In the Analects, the Master speaks of exemplary persons in so many situations that the reader easily obtains an impression of what constitutes an exemplary person. However, one perplexing passage regarding the exemplary person is found in the Analects (2.12). Due to its extreme succinctness, the Master’s remark, jun zi bu qi 君子不器, which has been interpreted in many ways by ancient Chinese commentators and influential English translators, is enigmatic, not merely grammatically, but also literally. The principal aim of this essay is to make the Analects 2.12 clear and try to offer a constructive interpretation of this passage. In order to show the meaning of jun zi bu qi as a positive attitude of Confucius, I outline the interpretations of some ancient Chinese commentaries and famous English translations, and then propose an interpretation of jun zi bu qi that yields a consistent reading of the Analects after a brief grammatical analysis. The conclusion of this paper is: as the perfect and complete manifestation of Confucian humanism, a jun zi should not be a mere specialist but rather a comprehensive vessel (qi) in li, for once a jun zi is such a specialist, then he is not worth the name of the exemplary person, and he is nothing but an ordinary utensil devoid of characteristics.

　　Key words: qi 器, a vessel, jun zi 君子 (an exemplary person), self-cultivation

Abstract

　　This essay takes a close look at Bernard Williams’ criticism of the city-soul analogy in Plato’s Republic, which “has dominated the discussion of its subject ever since.”(Myles Burnyeat). I start with reviving Williams’ arguments to elucidate the genuine challenge to Plato’s theory of justice by introducing city-soul analogy. The second part of this essay aims to show that Williams’ critics, such as Jonathan Lear, G.R.F. Ferrari, and Nobert Blössner have not successfully solved the problems Williams brought forth in his article. Finally, I call attention to a neglected aspect of the city-soul analogy, i.e. the predominance of reason in Plato’s theory of justice. By carefully analyzing Plato’s account of justice and briefly addressing the discussion about philosopher-kings in Book V-VII, I argue that Plato actually defines justice as the rule of the reasoning part. With this new definition of justice, the city-soul analogy will be shown philosophically accountable within the whole argumentative structure of Republic.

Abstract/p>

　　This paper is intended to approach the question of whether Thomas Scanlon’s moral contractualism, just as he claims, constitutes a powerful alternative to any consequentialist moral theory. By focusing on the structure of his contractualism as well as his treatment of some relevant issues, I try to show that Scanlon fails to fulfill the purpose he specifies for himself.

Abstract

　　When Merleau-Ponty discusses the embodied consciousness, he often deals with the actions that a subject takes with different tools. According to Merleau-Ponty, the action which is directed by motor intentionality covers every sort of activity, and the vehicle body can be understood as a system of motor or postural functions, or body schema. However, when we pay attention to the tool itself and the relation between embodied consciousness and tool in action, we can focus on those actions once again. This paper describes the absorbed and unskilled actions that a subject takes with a tool. A beginner in his unskilled action tries to project towards the tool. The tool doesn't fall into the bodily space, and the body schema does not change. It is necessary for the beginner to represent the tool. The object is not directly projected by the vehicle body, but is affected through the agency of the tool. The beginner appears to posit a novel situation around him, in which the subject keeps the tool at his disposal. When a beginner is used to his tool, he becomes an expert and the unskilled action turns into an absorbed one. One of differences between an expert and a beginner is that they have different worlds by reason of different vehicles of being-in-the-world. In the absorbed action, the instrument has been incorporated into the bodily space and become one element of functional system or of the body schema. The object is something towards which the new system including the body and instrument leads, and the instrument in the system is not necessarily represented.

Abstract

　　Ben-ti (本体) and Kung-fu (功夫)are two basic concepts in Li-xue(理学), Ben-ti refers to the a priori of the moral practice while Kung-fu means the effective way to access to Ben-ti. Therefore, through further clarification of Ben-ti and Kung-fu we are able to penetrate into the core of Li-xueand grasp its meaning and structure. Moreover, Kung-fu is the central issue of Yang-ming’s practical philosophy. Itis, as a matter of fact, the root of his discussions about morality. Yang-ming asserted in his late years that “the ontological Xin-ti(心体) is neither good nor evil; it is the function of Yi(意volition) that makes good or bad intentions. Conscience（良知） is able to distinguish the right from wrong, while the elimination of moral badness and the conducting of moral action depend on the sound reasoning.” Such phrasing is called by later scholars Yang-ming’s “Four Sentences,” which is the whole point of his philosophy. This teaching has very much to do with the core concepts of his moral system such as Ben-ti, Kung-fu, Xin-ti(心体), and Xing-ti（性体）. Different approaches of understanding towards this teaching lead to different schools of the post Yang-ming’s philosophy. In view of the importance of this teaching, the author therefore wants to elucidate the structure and meaning of this teaching by examining into Four Sentences. In so doing we hope to better understand how Yang-ming reached his Zhi-liang-zhi (Conscience Making致良知).

Keywords:
Conscience（良知）,Ben-ti（本体）， Kung-fu（工夫）,Xin-ti（心体）, Xing-ti（性体）

Abstract

　　The aim of this paper is to introduce Robert Brandom’s Inferentialism(Inferential theory of meaning) and Fodor and Lepore’ compositionality objection, and to protect Inferentialism from the objection based on compositionality.
　　According to Inferentialism, To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences in which it is involved. However, Fodor and Lepore oppose Inferentialism by offering the compositionality objection. They argue that compositionality is needed to explain productivity, systematicity and learnability of language, meaning is compositional. Since inferential role is not compositional, however, meaning is not an inferential role. Against Fodor and Lepore’s objection, I present Brandom’s responses and develop my own views.

Abstract

　　Descartes’ Optics, in spite of its natural scientific appearance, can be situated in the history of the philosophy as an important text of the perception theory. Since the sense of sight is traditionally regarded to have the intimate relationship with the knowledge which begins in perception, optics implies commonly accepted attitude to the science in 17th century. The essential difference between the optics of ancient ages and that of Descartes consists in whether the fundamental explanation model is efficient-causal mechanism or not, and this change offers certain philosophical changes which is quite radical. Firstly, both the world as external object and human being as sensing body are equally subordinated to the objective law of nature. Secondly, in the course of the perception, everything exchanged is not any material which has various qualities, but just operation-movement which has only extensional quality. Then the corporeal image has double sense, that one is image as inner corporeal movement of the body and another is image as an effect of the movement. The world becomes a sign which is realized geometrically. However, behind the superficial necessity of the world, there is fundamental arbitrary nature between the law and its phenomenon, and this gap is a place for God. Lastly, the mind, the real place of perception, is not subordinated such objective law, but totally different substance than body. It causes a difficult problem which perception theory would have to solve in a different relation between the body and the mind.

Abstract

　　In this paper, my thesis is the complementarity of duty ethics and virtue ethics, I would like to start by discussing some criticisms on modern duty ethics and then analysing some defects of traditional virtue ethics. Unlike some advocates of virtue ethics today, our concern is not on rejecting duty ethics and accepting virtue ethics instead. Of course, we need to listen to virtue ethicists, but I think virtue ethics is not alternative but complementary to duty ethics. Our conclusion is that there is a kind of complementarity between duty ethics and virtue ethics, but the structure of the complementary relation is so complicated that it demands some more discussion in detail.

Abstract

　　In Spinoza’s physics, there is a controversial concept, that is, the simplest body. In order to explicate this concept this paper makes a comparison between Spinoza’s physics with Descartes’, focusing on similarities rather than differences. The main assertions are as follows. First, the simplest body is the perfectly solid body which is Descartes’ concept in Principles of Philosophy (PP). Second, the constitution of Spinoza’s The Short Treatise on Physics corresponds with the constitution of PP. The latter is arranged from kinetics of solid bodies to a kinetic of fluid bodies, and the former is arranged from the simplest body to the composite body. Third, this order can be understood as concretization. The simplest body or the perfectly solid body is the highest degree of abstraction. Forth, this abstraction is categorized into two kinds of abstraction, abstraction of the exterior and abstraction of the interior. The simplest body is a result of these two kinds of abstraction.

Abstract

　　The aim of this paper is to understand the relation between Merleau-Ponty’s criticism against classical concepts of sensation and Husserl’s sensation, especially in Logiche Untersuchungen (“LU” hereafter). In LU, Husserl posits sensation (Empfindung) as non-intentional experience (nicht-intentionales Erlebnis) which is merely a psychological status lacking any reference to object. Whether this sensation as non-intentional experience falls under Merleau-Ponty’s criticism or not is the main topic of this paper.
　　According to Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie de la perception, sensation is what the “classical analyses” uses as a “building-block” which they consider as a minimum unit or atom of perception, when they reconstruct perception on the basis of “objective world”. According to Merleau-Ponty, the ‘classical analyses” distort sensation in two ways: one is to make it purely subjective, to treat it as an impression; the other is to make it purely objective, to treat it as a quality of fully determined object.
　　In Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, on the other hand, sensation (Empfindung) belongs to non-intentional experiences and is a reell content of act. This sensation as non-intentional experience constitutes the substructure of act but are not itself intended, not the object in the act. In Husserl’s Apprehension-Content Scheme, sensation plays the role of content, which constitutes intentional experiences with apprehension.
　　Based on these examinations, this paper has investigated the relation between Merleau-Ponty’s criticism against the concepts of sensation in classical analyses and Husserl’s sensation in LU, and has showed  there is no essential conflict between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl regarding sensation: First, they reject the “objective world”, consequently constancy hypothesis, the theoretical ground for the “objective world”, and sensation as quality, the theoretical product of constancy hypothesis. Second, even with regard to impression, which shares many characteristics with Husserl’s sensation in LU, there is no contradiction between the two philosophers, because Husserl’s sensation is placed in a deeper realm of consciousness, namely in non-intentional experiences, which is not investigated in PP, because Merleau-Ponty’s purpose in “The Classical Prejudices and the Return to the Phenomena” is, as the title says, to return to the phenomenal field, the field of non-intentional experiences in LU.
　　This sheds light on the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. There has been many guesses about Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology: some said it was critical, others said friendly, still others said in-between. Now we have had the actual investigation about the relationship regarding sensation, and it turns out to be more fundamentally related than it first looks, even comparing PP with LU, the first work of Husserl’s static phenomenology. This may allude to the fundamental commonness between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Husserl’s, for which a further investigation is needed.

Abstract

　　Alston think that Deontological Conception of Justification (DC-of-J) should presuppose that what requires a subject to have justification for belief is belief-state itself. He argues that beliefs are involuntary, so that belief cannot require a subject to have justification for belief itself. DC-of-J fails if Alston’s argument right. In my thought, DC-of-J does not have to presuppose that only belief-states can require the justification for beliefs. What require a subject to have justification for beliefs in deontological sense are our knowledge-states. So, the fact that beliefs are involuntary does not affect the success of DC-of-J.

Abstract

　　In this paper, I analyze two simple poetic texts to show some basic categories of the discourses on culture in general. My analysis starts from structuralist point of view, but arrives at a turning point in which the structuralist perspective is obliged to give way to another theoretical orientation. This turning point is the metaphor of night, which seems to constitute every historical narrative on culture. Where does such a necessity come from? What does such a metaphor mean in the cultural discourse? It is to this kind of questions that I try to give answers.

Abstract

　　TBA

Abstract

　　We may assent to the question, ‘Has science been successful?’, without any doubts. Although we do not articulate well what the success of science is, no one may oppose this very success. Then we may be going to have another question on this fact: In virtue of what have we been able to successful in science? What kinds of factors caused this success?
　　My thesis in this paper is that these are just begging the question. We have to accept that this success is fundamental, rather than try to explain how to succeed. Reference and approximate truth do not have any explanatory abilities, but merely corollary phenomena originating from the success of science, on the contrary. What we can only do is just describing these phenomena.

Abstract

　　S. A. Kripke provides his position and interpretation on the matter of rule-following and private language dealt with in Philosophical Investigation of L. Wittgenstein in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. His view known as Kripke’s Wittgenstein is presented by his skeptical paradox and skeptical solution and here his anti-realistic position is clearly expressed.
　　I will first reveal, in this paper, the problem of his skeptical paradox in terms of his postulation of determination of meaning in logical point of view for meaning-ascriptive sentences. It will be argued that not only is the condition of logical determination of meaning required for meaning-ascriptive sentences but his skeptical solution itself would not be also sustained if that condition turned out to be correct. In the course of it the difference of object-linguistic and metalinguistic sentences will be given.
　　After showing Kripke's skeptical paradox and solution have problem I'll give the idea, which is much borrowed from Pettit's, of what is the fact of matter in virtue of which the meaning-ascriptive sentence is true. It will be revealed that the facts of matter in virture of which meaning-ascriptive sentence is true are complex, that is, composed of genetic, psychological, experiential facts. I'll explicate this realistic view of meaning-ascription is closely related to its nature of being formed and understood only within linguistic community, and so can't be sustained beyond the community. Finally I'll discuss some of the characteristics of meaning-ascription which are generated from the linguistic nature of it.

Abstract

　　In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In section 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In section 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In section 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense, and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In section 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense.

Abstract

　　Recently, there have been various movements that attribute a new meaning to the standard interpretation concerning Hume’s epistemological necessity. One is a skeptical realism that interprets the epistemology of Hume as realism. The other is a quasi-realism that is also a new interpretation based on the standard interpretation. These two readings have been paid an attention to Hume scholars for two decades. My aim in this paper is to show the interpretative arguments and the limitations of these new interpretations. In doing so, I shall compare two philosophers who represent this New Hume Debate: Galen Strawson and Simon Blackburn.
　　I shall explicate the three different positions emerging in their recent arguments: ‘positivist’, ‘skeptical realism’, and ‘quasi realism’. We shall then look at the difference between Strawson’s ‘relative idea’ and Blackburn’s ‘Projectivism’ concerning the external object and the idea of necessary connection. Furthermore, I shall then show what is at issue when the skeptical realist and quasi-realist argue each other. Finally, I shall examine a literal meaning of the idea of the necessary connection and external object in the Treatise in order to see what Hume is really getting at.

Abstract

　　The foundation of Bergsonian philosophy is the concept of pure duration which is first presented in Time and Free Will : An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.(Essai sur les doneés immédiates de la conscience, DI, 1889) Pure duration is considered to be distinguished from homogeneous space in which material objects are juxtaposed. The first purpose of DI is to establish the dualism of pure duration and space. This dualism imply a place where our perception remain, although it is not clearly stated in the text. The place must be memory and recollection. Thus there are two different kinds of multiplicity in memory: the multiplicity of conscious states and the multiplicity of material object. The multiplicity of conscious states cannot be counted without the symbolization in space. We can apprehend the multiplicity of conscious states, whenever we avoid representing it in space. It is successive, heterogeneous and qualitative, whereas the multiplicity of material object is juxtaposed, homogeneous and quantitative. The multiplicity of conscious states presents the idea of pure duration. Pure duration is the multiplicity which is successive, heterogeneous and qualitative in memory.

Abstract

　　There are not a few studies which enrich Heidegger's thought and our life as well. However, Heidegger's concepts have been unavoidably accepted in the ineradicable traditional way of thinking and ordinary usage. Without the true understanding of his words, we can never get into the core of his thinking. Among his keywords which arouse the misunderstanding for him, I will focus on the 'meaning' in this paper.
　　Heidegger's early thinking is called a 'thinking of meaning of Being'. In general the pervasive understandings of 'meaning of Being' contribute to the interpretation which tacitly frames Heidegger's thinking into 'transcendental epistemology in traditional way'. However, 'Being [Sein]' is different from 'beings [Seiende]', and it is why we can never treat the Being as the same as beings, so to speak as the things from which a meaning can be read off.
　　For explication of meaning of Being, I begin with Wittgenstein who stands in totally different horizon. The question of 'meaning' is most frequently asked in language critical tradition as well as in phenomenological tradition. Although Wittgenstein stands in the heart of the language critical tradition, he goes beyond the tradition at the same time. Especially the late Wittgenstein tries to criticize his own early thinking as 'Augustinian (metaphysical)' and consigns the concept "meaning" into question. Here, I will compare the two masters to find out the true sense of ‘meaning of Being’. It will be shown that it can not be true that Heidegger's thinking presupposes dichotomy between subject and object, and that therefore, it can not be a modification of modern epistemology. Heidegger had the critical mind against metaphysic in common with Wittgenstein, and so Heidegger's thinking can not remain in the horizon of transcendental philosophy in traditional way.

【keywords】Heidegger, meaning of Being, temporality, time, Wittgenstein

Abstract

　　Heidegger configurates the existentiell and the existential significance of the impending finitude of existence in his masterpiece Being and Time. I want to present, here, some commentaries on his concept of death. Distancing myself from the positions interpreting it irrespective of a literary sense, I have held, from start to finish, the position where what Heidegger discloses by means of “forerunning into death” can be sought after only from death of the mortal which announces the primordial finitude of human existence. I have selected eight theses characterizing Heidegger’s concept of death. They does not correspond exactly to the five characteristics of death that Heidegger himself organized----“ownmost”, “non-relational”, “not to be outstripped”, “certain”, “indefinite”, which have been investigated much so far. First, I elucidate five theses which are disposed in order to guide us gradually from everyday interpretation of death to authentic understanding of death. Then, on sixth thesis, it is discussed what forerunning into death discloses existentielly including a matter of relations of indefiniteness of the potentiality-for-being to others. On seventh and eighth theses, it is investigated what forerunning into death discloses existentially and how it is related, mainly in “What is Metaphysics?”, to anxiety, the nothing and the Being.

Abstract

　　Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that the hypothesis of the modularity of morals (MMH) was worth serious consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence and moral performance are best explained in terms of moral modules – evolutionary ancient, fast-acting, automatic, emotionally-based reactions to particular types of socio-moral experience (Haidt & Joseph 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea, which is nascent, on various interpretations, in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH and whether the postulated modules are best conceived as perceptual and Fodorian or emotional and Darwinian; and whether assuming that MMH is true has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. Advocates of MMH can be read as making several distinct normative ethical claims, among them, that accepting MMH provides reason for greater moral tolerance, and possibly that we might wish to conceive of a well-developed moral agent as someone who tunes in a moderate way -- but does not turn way down or off -- all the innate moral modules. One reason is that the modules are adaptations. We model a morally mature modular agent as a “Mencian-agent,” since Mencius the great Chinese philosopher who plays in relation to Confucius the role that Plato plays in relation to Socrates or Plato play to Aristotle in the West -- comes closest to the ideal being floated with his “four sprouts” view. The idea is that the right way to build virtue is to take the four sprouts Tian (Heaven, now “Mother Nature”) endows us with and grow them. We sketch some reasons to worry about suggesting that a Mencian agent is the right ideal. This re-connects the cognitive science of morality with normative ethics in a particularly vivid way that involves the reassertion of the “is-ought” problem. We explain in a new way what this problem is and why it won’t yield because of the plasticity of human nature and the realistic options to “grow” and “do” human nature is multifarious ways.

Abstract

　　This presentation examines the complex temporality of the late landscape paintings by Paul Cézanne, mainly through Whitehead’s concept of nature. The central point of Whitehead’s idea was to conceive nature as an event and a passage. In 1957-58, Maurice Merleau-Ponty lectured on the natural philosophy of Whitehead. Later, in Eye and Mind (1961), he tacitly applied Whitehead’s notions to his interpretation of Cézanne. In recent years, Jonathan Crary presented a model of perceiving the corporeality/temporality of the painter, and clarified the dynamic movement of Cézanne’s paintings, following Merleau-Ponty.
　　However, Crary’s description has lacunae with respect to the dimension of how Cézanne confronted the temporal gaps between discontinuous moments. That is the problem of painting as action by brushstrokes. Crary’s history of modern perception misses the point of how to depict the painting not by eyes but by hands. My aim is to show how Cézanne’s painting opens to the action of connecting different moments of nature.
　　To show this aspect, I attempt to decompose the temporality of painting through some photographic and cinematographic techniques such as photo-collage and time-lapse. Through this procedure, the naturalistic character of Cézanne’s painting would be replaced by the incessant re-connections of heterogeneous events.

Abstract

　　The young Heidegger expressed his philosophical position as “A-theism”. This is generally considered as the manifestation of separation from his theological origin (Herkunft). Due to this generally accepted assumption, Sartre classified him into the group of atheistic existentialists. But Heidegger’s atheism is completely different from Sartre’s atheism, and to make this difference clear is very important to understand Heidegger’s thought.
So my aim to focus upon Heidegger’s atheism is as follows: 1. If we analyze the process of his atheism’s formation in detail, we can give a persuasive explanation of the sequence of Heidegger’s relation to his own theological origin rather than separation.2. On one hand the principle of atheism expresses Heidegger’s attitude toward theology, on the other hand it gives an answer to the Heidegger’s important question: How does Got get into philosophy? For, what the modern death of Got or the end of theological questions mean is not that these old questions have become “meaningless,” but that the way they were framed and answered has lost plausibility. So modern western philosophy is not unburdened and unguided by any theological questions, but it should be a confrontation with the binding of theological questions.

Abstract

　　Jainism is characterized by non-violence (ahiMsA). Jainism requires steadfastly observe the five vows, which include non-violence. In spite of their strict attitude against non-violence, the practice of fasting unto death or sallekhanA is praised as holy-ritual in Jainism. Famous sociologist Emile Durkheim referred to this ritual in his work.
This presentation discusses the ritual of sallekhanA, based on the TattvArthAdhigamasUtra and its old commentaries. When necessary, the typical work on the rules of layman called RatnakaraNDazrAvakAcAra is also referred to. Firstly, I will outline the classification of death in Jainism. Death in Jainism is roughly divided into the categories “death of a wise man” and “death of a fool”. What this outline makes clear is that sallekhanA corresponds to “death of a wise man”. Secondly, I will consider the meaning and definition of sallekhanA. This consideration shows that the meaning of the word sallekhanA is interpreted as “to thin the passions and the body properly”. The process of this ritual is also concretely explained. Thirdly, I will consider sallekhanA in Jaina texts. This consideration makes clear that not only monks, but also layman are encouraged to perform sallekhanA.
From the worldly standpoint, sallekhanA is often seen as suicide. Therefore, finally, I will analyze the difference between sallekhanA and suicide in Jainism. This analysis makes clear the following point. With reference to violence, Jainism regards intentions more important than results. This theory is applied to sallekhanA to distinguish it from suicide.

Abstract

　　TBA

Abstract

　　To be announced.

Abstract

　　Heidegger’s early ontology has inner contradiction. It not only led himself to his philosophical ”turn” in 1930’s, but also has been the source of creativity for important philosophers who criticized him for ignoring the Other or radical contingency. This paper aims at systematic explanation of this contradiction and deduction of its possible solutions mainly by interpreting ”Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”(1929). Firstly, I will show the trilogical structure (existence, Being in general, and other worldly entities) of early Heideggerian ontology, and secondly make clear the cause of its inconsistency as the necessary result of his early genetic method. Finally, I will try to suggest three different solutions which would be aspects of topological thinking by later Heidegger.

Abstract

　　There is a lot of controversy on the rising of Song-Ming-li-xue (宋明理学) in East-Asia, particularly on the government school of Zhuzi-xue (朱子学) . Some of the disputants are in line with Zhuzi-xue, but others object to him more actively.
A typical example of rejecting Zhuzi-xue in China is Yangming-xue. In fact, we can also see various objections in other countries of East-Asia which did adopt Zhuzi-xue as a government school. For example, LEE Toegye (李退渓, 1501-1570) and YAMAGA Soko (山鹿素行,1622-1685).
Generally, Toegye in Chosôn (朝鮮) had been known as an orthodox researcher of Zhuzi-xue, and his criticism on Yangming-xue is known as one component of his orthodoxy. But his standpoint on Zhuzi-xue is not adherence to it. This moderate dispute is the result of deepening the theory of Zhuzi on the arguments on Ri-Ki (理気).
YAMAGA Soko was a leader of the Japanese Kogaku school (古学派). He had some sympathy for Zhuzi-xue, however, he criticized him from the viewpoint of Kogaku. His objection is more active than that of Toegye, and it is based on a concept of Identity.
Both of these thinkers reject Yangming-xue in the same light. What makes them criticize him and appreciate Zhuzi-xue despite the fact that he exhibits the same problems as Yangming? What is the aim of their criticisms? This presentation is going to reflect on the two thinkers: ideas, their understanding of the notion of “approach (格)”, and about the final goal of their theories.

Abstract

　　Heidegger’s lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is notable for the argument about the ontological structure of living things and the thesis ‘the animal is poor in world [weltarm]’. However, his argument has various ambiguities and difficulties. We can recognize the matter as a result of the fact that Heidegger is not persistent in his own position “metaphysics (of human-Dasein)”. We should begin with a transcendental question such as “What kind of understanding of being [Seinsverstehen] do we project when we identify living things’?” This presentation attempts to reinterpret his text as an answer to the question.

Abstract

　　The relation between perception and concept is a traditional philosophical topic which has repeatedly been discussed in the history of philosophy. Recently, there is a remarkable controversy as to whether the intentional content of perception is conceptual or non-conceptual. Only very few philosophers, however, have attended to this debate from a phenomenological perspective. My aim in this paper is to develop an argument against John McDowell’s conceptualism, which is a position to claim that perceptual content is thoroughly conceptual, from a phenomenological standpoint, especially depending on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in his Phenomenology of Perception. First, I’d like to introduce McDowell’s conceptualism and check out the main points of his claim. Subsequently, I will make it clear that McDowell’s conceptualism has unreasonably taken no account of the need of shifting our attention in making perceptual judgments. Then, in section three, I will carry out a phenomenological reflection on the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I’m going to argue that, in order to understand the need of shifting our attention in making perceptual judgments, we have to recognize the ambiguity of our attitude towards perceptual content. Unfortunately, it is impossible to understand this ambiguity from McDowell’s perspective, for he describes our attitude towards perceptual content alternatively as something determined or undetermined. According to conceptualists, however, intentional contents mustn’t include any non-conceptual element in them from the very beginning. So, in section four, I will show that non-conceptual perceptual experiences, which present something indeterminate to us, do commonly have intentionality, by making a phenomenological reflection on an instance of everyday illusions. In the final section, I’ll point out a relation between non-conceptual content and motor intentionality (intentionalité motrice), which suggests the significance Merleau-Ponty’s body schema theory might have for the inquiry on the relation between perception and concept.

Abstract

　　How to treat the religious dimension in Confucianism is a problematic issue in modern Japan. If one stresses it strongly, Confucianism would be arranged in a line with other religions like Christianity and Buddhism. However, modern Japan needed to use Confucianism as a base of moral, so it must be differentiated from religion. We can find such an orientation to make Confucianism a doctrine of “moral” in major scholars of Chinese thought and Japanese thought at University of Tokyo such as Inoue Tetsujiro, Hattori Unokichi, and Watsuji Tetsuro.
Nevertheless, the religious dimension in Confucianism is never overlooked. Moreover, those who advocate the doctrine of moral in Confucianism tried to re-appropriate the religious dimension in it at the same time. For example, Hattori Unokichi, a sinologist at University of Tokyo, turned to regard the religious dimension as a “philosophical religiosity.”
What is the purpose of the re-appropriation of religiosity in moral? It should be an effort to set up Japanese “civil religion” in a Rousseaunean sense. In order to clear up the meaning of this complicated amalgam of religion and moral in modern Japan, we examine Japanese interpretations of the exemplified phrase concerning a religious notion of “prayer” in the Analects.

Abstract

　　The release of atomic energy was one of the great achievements of science and technology, and yet at the same time, one of its catastrophes. Japanese people were able to imagine atomic bombs before the catastrophic experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet, for a long time, many people didn’t know about the public image of the atomic bomb in wartime Japan.
　　My intension in this paper is to capture the public image of science and technology by looking at the public view of atomic energy and, more specifically atomic weapons, before they became reality. Japanese people envisioned the atomic energy as a scientific dream, however they suffered at the hands of the atomic bomb at the end of the WWII. What distortion could we find between dreams and reality? I will analyze the images of atomic energy in Western and Japanese literatures and examine how these images mean to Japanese.

Abstract

　　Memory erasure might be the ultimate human desire. Using propranolol (a non-selective beta blocker) which is prescribed to patients suffering from PTSD, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, seems to allow this desire to become reality. However, memory manipulation or memory erasure causes ethical questions. One of the serious questions is the criterion for numerical personal identity. Fortunately, using propranolol does not disrupt numerical personal identity, because propranolol does not threaten psychological continuity, and only dampens the link between memory and emotion. On the other hand, new technologies, like U0126, ZIP and the elevation of transgenic αCaMKII can threaten personal identity, although they might also be able to help PTSD patients in the future. From an ethical point of view, we need to pay attention to such new technologies more carefully in order to see whether or not they threaten personal identity.

Abstract

　　In his seminal book Action in Perception, Alva Noë powerfully advanced “the enactive approach” about perception. According to enactivism, perception is not something that passively happens on us, but something we actively do. Noë sought to depict perception not as a process on the opposite side of action, but as one which itself is a sort of action. To develop such a view, Noë did not just treat perception in the context of action, but rather treat action as an essential component of perception. At the core of Enactivism, there lies “the constitutivist thesis”: the content of perceptual experience is constituted by sensorimotor knowledge or sensorimotor skills.
　　In this paper, I shall critically examine Noë’s constitutivism and conceptualism about perceptual content. First, I will outline Noë’s Enactivism. Second, I shall introduce Prinz’s and Clark’s criticisms about Noë’s constitutivist view. Through this we will see a limit and deficit of Noë’s constitutivist view. Third, I will connect this argument to McDowell’s conceptualism about perceptual content. I shall explore a different formulation of the constitutivist thesis from Noë’s through an examination of “the dual stream model” proposed by Milner and Goodale. The revised thesis claims that the content of perception is constituted by cognitive skills which can be recognized as a kind of conceptual capacities. The thesis opens up the possibility to revise the notion of conceptualism toward further investigations.

Abstract

　　P.M.S Hacker summarized characterizations of meaning by later Wittgenstein in three points. According to it, meaning is something “(i) being, or being determined by, its use; (ii) being what is explained by an explanation of its meaning, which in turn is said to be a rule for its use; and (iii) being what is understood when an expression is understood”. I agree with him and accept his summary. In this paper, I try to clarify the relations of these three characterizations and, through it, show the Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning. In section 2, I will explain Wittgenstein’s conception of use and understanding. According to Wittgenstein, we must see the actual uses, not an object corresponding to an expression or one’s internal states when it is understood, if we want to understand the meaning of it. In section 3, I will show that Wittgenstein thinks an expression must have its correctness conditions of uses, by seeing his discussion about rule-following. This raises the question what kind of correctness conditions the word “meaning” has. I section 4, I argue this question by explicating Wittgenstein’s conception of explanation of meaning and contend that, according to Wittgenstein, the concept of meaning is something that classifies uses of expressions. Note that the conception of meaning as something that classifies uses of expressions does not in itself give the nature or the essence of meaning or use. An explanation of the meaning of an expression is itself a practice and has its own context. We must see the uses of the explanation in order to understand the meaning and the uses of an expression.

Abstract

　　In this paper, I mainly discuss the relation between philosophy of mind and ethics, dealing with a concrete example: animal ethics. First, I will examine a recent proposal by Martha Farah. She claimed that we can infer a mental state from observing a brain state. Second, I will criticize her conclusion for some reasons from a functionalist point of view. Third, I mentioned a possibility that neuroscience might reveal that animal mentality is so different from our mentality that it cannot be easily compared to ours. Finally, I will imply a possibility that we might have to revise ethics when we tried to take animals into it because of the difference.

Abstract

　　Based on examination of healthcare, a definition of QOL is produced:

A person’s QOL at the moment of estimation is measured according to how wide the scope of choices available to the person is: the essential measure of a person’s QOL is the person’s actual capability at the moment.

　　Though in healthcare the physical and mental aspects of QOL are principally focused upon, we cannot separate those aspects from others, which are connected seamlessly or contiguously. When we measure QOL, the object of measurement is environment, in the sense in which environment is the set of all circumstances, people, things, and events around a person influencing her/his life.
The definition of QOL in healthcare can be generalized, based on which a general definition of well-being can be obtained:

A person’s well-being is measured as the integrated sum of her/his capability that is and will be actualized during a certain period of time.

　　By “relational ethics”, I refer to the ethical viewpoint that ethical codes vary depending on the remoteness, or closeness, of relationship among the parties involved. The principle of ‘live-by-helping-each-other’ is dominant among people in close relationship, while the principle of ‘live-and-let-live’ among people in remote relationship. The two principles coexist in each human relationship.
Sustainability of well-being can be explained based on the two principles. Future generations are not like bands coexisting with us, but like those reproduced in a band and cared for by elder members of the band. Nevertheless, scholars have been discussing the intergenerational ethics based only on ‘equity’, which is a conception belonging to the live-and-let-live principle. Introducing a complimentary conception ‘generativity’, which expresses our positive attitude of caring for future generations under the live-by-helping-each-other principle, we shall be able to explain why, and how, we should seek the sustainability of human well-being.

Abstract

To be annouced.

Abstract

　　As von Wright (1972) points out, the study of preference logic faces the problem that almost every principle proposed as fundamental to one preference logic may be rejected by another one. Mullen (1979) observes that this problem arises from the mistaken belief that concept construction of preference can satisfactorily be carried out in isolation from theory construction. In this talk, we propose a new version of preference logic (CEUMPL) based on conditional expected utility maximisation (CEUM) theory, which can furnish a solution to this problem. CEUM can be a valid decision rule for decision makings under certainty, risk, uncertainty and ignorance. CEUM has the merit of covering such a wide scope. We provide CEUMPL with a Domotor-type (1978) semantics that is measurement-theoretic. From a measurement-theoretic viewpoint of decision theory, there is a tradition to explain an agent's beliefs and desires in terms of his preferences [and vice versa]. This explanation takes the form of a representation theorem of CEUM: if [and only if] an agent's preferences satisfy such-and-such conditions, there exist a probability function and a utility function such that he should act as a conditional expected utility maximiser. The "if" part of each representation theorem of CEUM can provide the measurability conditions of an agent's preferences for his beliefs and desires. Domotor’s representation theorem is the only known one of CEUM that has the "only if" part. So only by virtue of Domotor's representation theorem, we can explain an agent's preferences in terms of his beliefs and desires via CEUM. We provide CEUMPL with a model by developing the idea of Naumov (2006) and provide CEUMPL with a proof system by developing that of Segerberg (1971). The semantics of Packard's (1975) preference logic is also based on CEUM.
But this logic is incomplete. CEUMPL, on the other hand, has the merit of being not only complete but also decidable.

Abstract

　　This study aims to consider the idea of “genealogy,” which would be a key word to describe characteristics of indigenous Hawaiian culture. Appealing strongly to Hawaiian sensibilities, this concept appears repeatedly in literature, history, and political discourses, revealing their views on life and death. It puts a person in a chain of life, a continuance of life, and collective memory. We will consider how this idea has been expressed differently in different ages by referring to three examples: First, we will focus on a creation myth “Kumulipo” and see its central motif of an increase in life. Second, we will review a historical anecdote from the latter half of the 19th century to understand the politics of genealogy in the Hawaiian kingdom. Third, we will look at the contemporary Native Hawaiian movement, where indigenous nationalists often use the term “genealogy” as a watchword. To consider their identity politics, we need to understand the cultural concept. At the end we will conclude that the idea of genealogy offers the key to an understanding of Hawaiian views of life, death, and the world.

Abstract

　　In his recent work The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007), Jesse J. Prinz proposes a moral theory which implies moral relativism. Based on the idea of moral emotionism, he relativizes morality to an individual or a culture. Such relativization seems to obscure the difference between morality and local custom or convention. Yet, through close examination, it becomes clear that Prinz’s relativistic morality has a distinctive feature and is not assimilated to convention. The main difference consists in that, while alternative patterns of behavior to convention are known, those to morals are not necessarily known. I will prove this by comparing Prinzian moral concepts with two different notions of convention, namely, David Lewis’ notion of convention and Ruth Garrett Millikan’s notion of “natural convention”.

Abstract

　　This presentation discusses the meaning of the sacred tree “扶桑fusang” motifs on the walls of the family tombs in Eastern Han, China. This is mainly a reinterpretation of “fusang” on the central homage pavilion scene in the Wu Liang shrine (created in A.D. 151), using some ancient Chinese texts and contemporary images taken at tombs.
Eastern Han Shrines were structures for ancestor worship ceremonies of “filial piety (xiao)”. At first sight, the “fusang” motif has no relationship to the shrine. But in fact motif was very important for representing the family tomb’s magical meaning of “filial piety”. I will examine the meaning of this motif from the point of view of the dedication of space to “filial piety” in Eastern Han.

Abstract

　　What is a national cinema in modern Korea? Is it a film produced in the national language or by a national subject? This paper seeks to elucidate the dual concepts of the “national / colonial” subject by focusing on propaganda films from the late colonial Korea.  Through this examination, this paper traces both the building and collapse of the meaning of (post-)colonial national cinema. 
I investigate the meaning of being a national soldier (kokumin?) embedded in Korean films made during the colonial period and examine how the phenomenon of 'overcoming the melancholia' is manifested in such colonized male subject. Central term employed is Georgio Agamben’s “state of exception” like the war and how it affects the formulation of a national subject. Of course, Volunteer (Jiwonbyung, 1940) directed by a Korean colonial subject An Suk-Young was made during a period when collaboration was not an exception, but a requirement and a norm. This paper argues that the colonial male bodies were undergoing drastic changes from the late 1930s. These changes were, for the most part, triggered by the new possibility of becoming imperial soldiers. Korean males were able to make strides toward becoming imperial/nation subjects (kokumin) through a remolding process termed conversion (tenkō). But kokumin was a hierarchical notion, with Japanese(ness) privileged in the order of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the fulfillment of remasculinization for colonial males was limited to the boundary of the colonial divide.   
Though a propaganda film, I am interested in how a film like Volunteer is able to leap over the restraints of the colonized body through the ruptured moments of Korean subject’s melancholia. Melancholia can be summed up by such affection:  “I have lost something very important, but I don’t know what I have lost.”  This was a representative emotional state of the colonized. For a colonized male subject, becoming a volunteer soldier meant not only a overcoming of this symptom, but also a rare opportunity of decolonization. Ironically, these volunteer soldiers will soon constitute the ruling class of post-colonial Korea after the Japanese Empire’s dropping off.