Tosaka Jun (1900-1945) and Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977) appear to occupy opposite sides of modern Japanese discursive space. Tosaka represents the Marxist critique of Japanese particularism, while Takeuchi is famous for developing a narrative of Asian resistance to European universalization. They were also intellectually active during different time periods and hence responded to distinctive concrete political circumstances. Thus it is not surprising that, although there has recently been a publication comparing Tosaka and Maruyama Masao,¹ there has been almost no attempt to bring Tosaka and Takeuchi in dialogue with one another. However, when we examine 20th century East Asia and Japan in the context of a history of incorporation and competition in the world of global capitalism, Tosaka and Takeuchi’s respective works appear united in attempting to understand and resist this process. Moreover, their respective eclecticism enabled them to grasp aspects of capitalist modernity at a deeper level than many of their contemporaries. Specifically, each of them in some way addresses the problem of modern temporality. I contend that Tosaka and Takeuchi each problematized a reified notion of time specific to capitalist modernity and attempted to propose an alternative temporality of action. Because of their critique of linear time, scholars have compared both Tosaka and Takeuchi to Walter

However, apart from the critique of linear time, which is not unique to Benjamin, each of them affirms one aspect of Benjamin’s thought. Benjamin characteristically brings together an eschatological vision of history, which we see in Takeuchi, and a critique of capitalism along with an emphasis on the present, which we find explicitly in Tosaka.

Through their discussion of time, Takeuchi and Tosaka each deal in some way with what we might call the possibilities, necessity and impossibility of resistance and the creation of a different future. Tosaka develops a temporality of the present based on the mode of production and places emphasis on the now rather than on future possibilities. Takeuchi notes the constraining and enabling nature of the logic of modernity, but one of the possibilities that this logic produces is eschatology or the negation of history. In his view, resistance to the logic of modernity aims at the goal of a new type of universality. However, unlike Tosaka, Takeuchi only vaguely gestures at the relationship between ideologies of universality and capitalism and thus his vision of resistance is locked within the antinomies of regional divisions, such as Europe and Asia. As Takeuchi himself notes, had Tosaka lived longer, he would have probably labeled him as another proponent of Japanese ideology. Towards the end of this essay, I gesture towards a synthesis of Takeuchi’s eschatological vision and Tosaka’s emphasis on the mode of production.

**Capitalism, Time and Reification**

Takeuchi and Tosaka responded to the world of global capitalism and below I attempt to outline some of the conceptual parameters of the logic of capital, especially in so far as they relate to temporality. Among the various transformations accompanying capitalist modernity, the revolution concerning time is of course central. Following Walter Benjamin, Peter Osborne has linked modern temporality to an “abstraction which parallels that at work in the development of money as a store of value (abstract-labor time).” Osborne’s remarks suggest that the nature of modern temporality is connected to larger processes related to capitalism, and more specifically, reification.

Reification originally referred to Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism, where he points out that in capitalist society, “a definite social relation between men assumes (annimmt)...the fantastic form of a relationship between things.” But Georg Lukács develops the concept to signify more general appearances and conceptual oppositions in capitalist society. The various oppositions that appear in capitalist society are modes of reified thought because they present themselves as existing independently of social and historical context.

With the rationalization and commodification associated with capitalism, people begin to frame their thinking and experience in a number of conceptual antinomies such as those between subject and object, abstract and concrete and so on. These antinomies are intimately related to the two sides of the commodity form, exchange value which brings heterogeneous things under a common measure and use value which is closely related to lived experience. In Chris

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5. We must separate Lukács theory of reification from criticisms of false consciousness. In Lukács view, it is not the case that people willfully misrepresent relations in order to promote their interests. Rather, it relations themselves that “assume (annimmt)” relations between things and produce the appearance of various conceptual oppositions.
Arthur’s words, “the value form of the commodity posits a split between value as the identity of commodities premised on an abstract universal posited through equivalent exchange and their enduring particularity, differentiating them from each other as use values.”

Osborne’s above analogy between time and money already inti- mates the link between the exchange value side of the commodity form and abstract time as the background of historical continuity and historicism. He explains this point again with reference to Benjamin, “Historicism trades the living remembrance of a historical present for the re-establishment of an abstract continuity with the past in a natu- ralized and merely chronological form.” This abstract continuity is premised on a series of qualitatively indistinguishable now-points, which parallel the qualitative indifference of commodities from the standpoint of exchange-value.

However, as mentioned above, capitalism does not just involve the standpoint of exchange value or equivalence. Equally important to the commodity form is the side of difference or use-value. Unlike exchange value, use-value represents concrete experience and is often associated with authenticity or particularity against the homogenizing forces of modernity. With respect to temporality, the use-value side may represent a type of experiential time that cannot be conceptual- ized.

Moishe Postone stresses that Marx’s concept of capital and the opposition between use value and exchange value has a philosophical significance that is largely overlooked. Not only does capitalism condition philosophical antinomies, but the dynamic of capital is analogous to modern philosophers’ foundational a-temporal concepts. Like Spinoza’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, capital is logically prior to subject and object and refers to a temporality of a different order. Postone explains this point by making a comparison to Hegel’s Spirit:

For Hegel, the Absolute, the totality of the subjective-objective categories, grounds itself. As the self-moving “substance” that is

7. Osborne op cit., 140.
“Subject,” it is the true *causa sui* as well as the endpoint of its own development. In *Capital*, Marx presents the underlying forms of commodity-determined society as constituting the social context for notions such as the difference between essence and appearance, the philosophical concept of substance, the dichotomy of subject and object, the notion of totality, and, on the logical level of the category of capital, the unfolding dialectic of the identical subject-object.8

Capital represents a dynamic that incorporates both sides of the opposition between subject and object, appearance and essence, and other various modern dichotomies and philosophers from Spinoza onwards have mimicked the relationship between capital and its concrete oppositions by positing some type of ontological source that precedes differentiations between subject and object and even between different types of subjects. This would represent what Lukács calls the attempt to “overcome bourgeois society in thought (*gedanklich zu überwinden*).” 9 Philosophers who posit some type of fundamental realm before subject and object often describe this source in terms of eternity or an alternative temporality, as in the case of Heidegger’s “authentic temporality.” Of course, the point of Lukács analysis is precisely that bourgeois society cannot be overcome in thought and the various attempts to do so end up reproducing the very antinomies that they were supposed to overcome.

**The Discourse of Modern Japan**

While the above comments represent the general framework of conceptual life in capitalist modernity, we can more historically contextualize the work of Takeuchi and Tosaka in what Karatani Kojin calls the discursive space of modern Japan. Karatani divides this discursive space into four positions, 1. Bourgeois modernization, 2.

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Imperialism, 3. Asianism and 4. Marxism. Positions 1 and 4 emphasize universality while positions 2 and 3 emphasize Japanese particularity.\textsuperscript{10} He claims that the general tendency of early Showa Marxism, and of Fukumotoism in particular, was to stress universality and Tosaka critically inflects this general trend from within Marxism whereas Takeuchi attacks universality from a more eclectic perspective.

Both Tosaka and Takeuchi criticize abstract universalism, and their critiques are enmeshed in a larger current against Marxism and science. In 1935, Kobayashi made a critique of Marxist universalism that is characteristic of his times:

> When an ideology is imbued with a universal aspect, resisting every distinct interpretation advanced by individual writers, we encounter “socialized thought” in its primary form. Our young writers could not help being intoxicated on this strange new substance...Never before had writers labored to create, relying so on ideas and theories; again, never before had writers so completely ignored their actual, physical lives. It is not just that they had forgotten how to embody or to internalize an idea. Rather, being intoxicated on a system of thought too bloodless to allow any real internalization or embodiment, the Marxist literary movement had no essential significance apart from its intoxicating effect.\textsuperscript{11}

In the context of our above discussion of reification, Kobayashi and his followers attack the exchange value side of the commodity form and affirm some type of concreteness.

Philosophers of the Kyoto School embarked on a project that overlapped with Kobayashi’s. However, like German idealists, they do not only criticize abstract universality; these philosophers attempt to overcome the duality between the abstract and the concrete in some


type of primordial logic that escapes everyday categories and yet is grounded in something like everyday experience. Nishida Kitaro both represents and anticipates this trend during the Showa period. Since Tosaka and Takeuchi both engaged Nishida’s philosophy, it might help to deal with his particular response to reification. Nishida resists the rationalizing tendency of concepts, but at the same time, he avoids the simple affirmation of particularity or feeling interpreted as sensation. Thus perhaps turning Hegel on his side, he develops the “concrete universal” (具体的一般者), which stresses the myriad relations that make a thing what it is. The most encompassing concrete universal would be the space of absolute nothingness, which cannot be determined by anything exterior.\footnote{See Sylvain Isaac’s discussion in “Basho et Individu chez Nishida,” Philosophie, No. 79.} This is not the place to go into a full discussion of Nishida’s philosophy, but we should keep in mind that his concept of the space of absolute nothingness, like his concept of pure experience, represents a realm before the subject-object distinction and is an attempt to overcome the reified antinomies of modern capitalism in thought.

Nishida’s attack on the distinction between subject and object also implies a critique of linear time. He makes his point with respect to his concept of pure experience in the following manner:

> The present of pure experience is not the present in thought, for once one thinks about the present, it is no longer present. In the present as a fact of consciousness there must be some type of temporal continuity (時間的継続). The focus of consciousness is at all times present...\footnote{Nishida Kitaro, The Study of the Good, Masao Abe and Christopher Ives trans., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 6.}

Notice that Nishida’s attempt to combat abstract time, in some sense anticipating Heidegger, develops a phenomenological perspective, one that affirms a pre-reflective experiential unity. In this pre-reflective unity, the present must be continuous and yet not pass
away. Tosaka Jun’s analysis of time can be understood as a response to the above phenomenological understanding.

**Tosaka’s Critique of Nishida**

We can begin our discussion of Tosaka by focusing on an essay in which he specifically targets Nishida’s philosophy, “Is the ‘Logic of Nothingness’ a Logic: On the Methodology of Nishida’s Philosophy.”

In short, he charges Nishida with developing merely a philosophy of “subjective awareness,” rather than a philosophy of matter itself. He concedes that there is something similar to dialectics in Nishida’s thought, given the way in which he moves between opposites such as subject and object. However, he notes that Nishida’s dialectics is merely subjective. In Tosaka’s words:

...Nishida’s philosophy...considers how dialectics can be consciousness or how dialectics can be thought (this of course is a thing made conscious or conceptualized) as a problem and does not make dialectics itself a problem. It is probable that the place from which dialectics establishes its meaning is consciousness/awareness and this happens through nothingness, but this does not imply that the place where dialectics is established is consciousness or self-awareness.

In other words, Nishida’s philosophy “is not able to think existence itself, but only the ‘logical meaning’ of existence.” To some extent, Tosaka’s critique of Nishida echoes, Kobayashi’s critique of Marxism, in that once again the charge is abstraction and an inability to grasp physical existence or matter. But where Kobayashi seems to stop at a type of psychological analysis of the lure of abstraction, Tosaka attempts to ground such thought in a historically specific social form,

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namely capitalism. Against Tanabe Hajime, Tosaka claims that Nishida’s philosophy is not some type of anachronistic affirmation of the gothic. Rather, it is the expression of a romanticism peculiar to capitalist culture:

There is nothing more appropriate to support the cultural consciousness of modern people of culture [than modern romanticism]. In this philosophy, the...capitalist education of modern people finds a representative of its cultural consciousness of freedom. This becomes its philosophy of cultural liberalism (as opposed to economic and political liberalism). Herein lies the popularity of Nishida’s philosophy.17

He points out that Nishida is unable to think the conditions of the possibility of his own categories such as the space of absolute nothingness or pure experience, just as the political liberal fails to understand that his conception of humans as free finds its conditions in forgetting the historical specificity of capitalist domination.

Tosaka’s critique is extremely powerful, but when he attempts to produce a theoretical framework that can explain the conditions of his own philosophy as well as Japanese ideology, he reproduces aspects of Nishida’s thought; to some extent, he replaces the concept of pure experience with a concept of everyday practice. Recall that Nishida shunned the abstraction of concepts and attempted to bring philosophy back to experience and nothingness, both of which are intimately linked to practice.18 Tosaka will move away from what he perceives as Nishida’s abstraction and subjectivism by developing complex interpretations of concepts at the opposite side of this antinomy, such as objectivity, matter, and existence. This gesture has led scholars such as Christopher Goto-Jones to contrast Tosaka with Miki Kiyoshi and describe the former as “a dignified intellectual who remained true to his materialist convictions.”19 Tosaka would have probably enjoyed

17. Tosaka no Tetsugaku, 23.
18. See for example, his example of the consciousness of the climber or of the musician, Study of the Good, 6.
this description, but we shall see below that his “materialism” belies most notions of matter, especially when he deals with the concepts of space, time and everydayness. The difficulty in understanding Tosaka’s position is that he wants to avoid both the reification associated with the natural scientific perspective and the subjectivism of phenomenology, which he would associate with Nishida’s position.

Tosaka and the Antinomies of Matter, Space and Time

In both his essays on space and on time, Tosaka tells a story of the history of philosophy that echoes that of Heidegger. Recall that Heidegger claimed that the presocratics, such as Heraclitus and Parmenides were able to think Being before Socrates and Plato pushed it into oblivion. Tosaka repeats this story, but gives it a materialist twist. He claims that although presocratic philosophy circled around the problem of space, “after Socrates....existence broke free from the limitations of space and became a relatively formless and spiritual existence.” Tosaka calls for a return to matter and space, but he separates his conception of these terms from the physical interpretation and asserts that he is after a “philosophical conception of matter,” which is actually a concept of existence. Pace Kant’s critical philosophy, he invokes a concept of objective existence:

By investigating in this manner, one can determine what exists and what is the thing that exists. This is not a concept {the subjective (主観) is just something distilled from this} but something natural that is

21. Ibid. 226.
“there” at the level of cosmological time (the concept of objective is actually just a philosophical abstraction from this thing).22

He contends that the objective precedes the subjective from the perspective of cosmological time23 and then explains the emergence of subjectivity from the movement of some type of objective and natural dialectic. Among other things, by positing the unity between the subjective and the objective in a more fundamental movement of existence, Tosaka accounts for the possibility of the knowledge of objective reality. He stresses that, unlike in Kant, on his view, the thing-in-itself as matter actually exists in space and time.

In the above essay, Tosaka appears to expound a fairly orthodox Marxist epistemology stressing objectivity and he invokes a type of cosmological time, which supports a materialist narrative of the emergence of consciousness. However, in his essay “On Space” (1936) and his famous article “On the Principle of Everydayness,” published in 1934, he grounds all types of time and space, perhaps excluding cosmological time, in everyday space and time, which is the space and time of practice and history. This will make his theory of objectivity more malleable; unlike cosmological time or space, these times and spaces are linked to historical practice.

In his discussion of time, he writes:

Historical time is the fundamental concept of temporal things. And within that—without overemphasizing or understating it—is the division.24

Tosaka develops a theory of temporal divisions or periodization and thus he distinguishes his idea of historical time from the empty homogenous time of the natural sciences, where divisions are arbitrary. Unlike natural time, historical time is divided into periods

22. Ibid. 233.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. (“Nichijosei no genri”) 98. Robert Stolz was kind enough to share his unpublished translation of this essay with me.
“according to its own contents.”

Tosaka further explains his point by comparing history to the natural sciences. In Tosaka’s view, both in the natural sciences and in history, totality precedes differentiation at the individual level. In other words, the individual period, in both historical and natural scientific time, gets its meaning with respect to the totality of time. However, in natural time there is no space between the part and the whole, “for example the phenomenon of the earth’s rotation becomes a standard, because it is given as fixed by the totality of the earth’s rotation.” Thus there is no gap between the part and the whole and thus the individual can be derived from the totality. In the case of historical time on the other hand, each period has a character, which is associated with a particular configuration (Konfiguralität) or gestalt. He contends that because of the role of character or configuration of periods, they cannot be simply subsumed under the totality of historical time and thus each historical period “freely expands and contracts.”

Tosaka affirms science and objectivity while at the same time separating natural and social structures or periods. In short, character (性格) distinguishes social structures and history, but it does this because of its intimate connection to human practice and agency. In Tosaka’s view, historical time is the time in which “people live.” “It is the time of our lives...” At this point, Tosaka turns to the concept of the everyday and to the present.

Tosaka contends that the present period is only “freely expandable and contractable within the bounds of necessity” and this means that the present can be thought of alternatively as the now, today, or the present era. However all of these divisions of different length are

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid, 100, A period “is determined first as a part of the totality of periodizations in historical time.”
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. Tosaka uses the German term, Konfiguralität, which Robert Stolz notes is associated with gestalt psychology.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
“governed by the principle of today or the principle of everydayness.”31 But what determines the principle of everydayness or today? Anticipating Althusser, Tosaka claims that all eras are determined in the last instance by the mode of production. Moreover, “because of this ‘in the last instance’, the various characters in history begin to result in a determinate form because of the material relations and the forces of production. This is the genealogy of character in history.”32 In other words, the mode of production defines the character of a period. However, the mode of production is a structure that must constantly be reproduced by human action and thus can only be deemed quasi-objective. Tosaka switches between stressing its objective force and its malleability. This of course is linked to his two-pronged project of stressing the constraining nature of the present mode of production and a practice designed to overcome it.

He does not discuss the latter as much, but we can get some hints from his comments about the mediation of class and his emphasis on the corporeal to formulate a critique of phenomenological time. To some extent, we can understand the Kyoto School philosophers attacking abstraction from the standpoint of an originary experience or phenomenology. Tosaka on the other hand states, “our consciousnesses may indeed live in the phenomenological concept of time, but it is equally obvious that our bodies (shintai) cannot.”33 Tosaka uses the mind-body distinction to stress the difference between practice and conceptualization. The totality of a period splits in way that seems to be irrecoverable, since he affirms that people of practice and contemplative people seem to live in different temporalities. Towards the end of his essay, he notes that for

contemplative “people living” (思弁的な生活者) with a great amount of leisure time might have many different present periods because “the present, one in which the concept of today is necessary, really never impinges on their lives. If today is bad, tomorrow may be

31. Ibid. 101.
32. Ibid. 99.
33. Ibid. 101.
better. Opposed to this, in a broad and practical sense, for the “work-
er (rōdōsha),” the work absolutely must be done today. And so, for
them, the present is brooded over and becomes the concept of
today—with history thus confined to the level of practice, the present
draws nearer until it is “today.” And thus the principle of today, the
principle of everydayness, uniformly governs historical time. Precisely
this is the spirit of history.34

To explain his point, Tosaka gives us an example that seems to
invert Heidegger’s theory of being-towards-death. He notes that
when he does not have any work to do, time appears infinite and he
has no reason to live in the present. However, when he has a task at
hand, he suddenly realizes that today’s work cannot be done tomor-
row and the thought of finitude enters our world, which forces him to
live under the principle of everydayness. Note that unlike for
Heidegger, finitude is linked precisely to living in the everyday rather
than breaking out of it.

Tosaka’s above citation suggests that “contemplative people”
engage in a temporality of misrecognition. In other words, if we
assume that the principle of everydayness is objective, people in classes
that have more leisure would appear to live in many presents, but they
would still be governed by the principle of everydayness and yet not
know it. There would be a gap between the temporality of their expe-
rience and the period in which they lived. On the other hand, workers
broadly defined, that is, people who have a task at hand, would realize
the distinct quality of today as opposed to tomorrow and the prin-
ciple of the today would govern their actions.

But in the end, Tosaka cannot explain the antinomies between the
temporalities of those who work and those who do not. What
appeared as a general or uniform principle has ended up depending on
one’s individual condition. His use of himself as an example renders
the interpretation that I attempted in the previous paragraph prob-
lematic. When one has work, one is under the principle everydayness

34. Ibid. 101-2.
and when one does not one is in a different present. To remedy this problem Tosaka would need a fuller account of how totality in the present serves to constitute a principle of everydayness in relations to class, the mode of production and the commodity form. Tosaka himself notes after giving us the above example of his work that “if left uncorrected this is an insufficient model of the relationship between my individual self and society, or as a member of a class, or again, a single day of today and a single day in world history.”

This insufficiency may be related to the production of an antinomy between actuality and possibility in the present. As we have seen above, the present of those with leisure was pure possibility and Tosaka eventually purges possibility from his principle of everydayness. He writes, “To sum up, the principle of everydayness is the principle of reality and practice (jissensei); we should remember that it is not the principle of possibility (kanōsei).” In a note, he brings out the antinomies of this position more clearly:

Normally, people think that principles come under the aegis of possibility. Thus they can only imagine principles of possibility. But in this case, history becomes totally without principles. Is this not the case in the many instances when people think of history as irrational?

35. Ibid. 102 To some extent the above inadequacy stems from an ambiguity in Tosaka’s reading of capital between an abstract determination of capitalism at the level of the commodity form and the more concrete level of class. Harry Harootunian expresses this ambiguity clearly in his analysis of Tosaka. On the one hand, custom, which is intimately linked to the everyday: ...obeys the logic of the commodity form. Careful to suggest that custom was not an economic, political or cultural phenomenon, as such, but acted as a generalized and common phenomenon, it behaved like the commodity form, by penetrating all levels of the social formation. (Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, 121-122.) The generalized nature of custom expresses the commodity form, but at the same time, as Harootunian notes, character is politics, “which...is driven by social relations and classes.” (ibid. 140) Hence in Tosaka’s framework the relationship between the level of the commodity form and class antagonism amounts to the relationship between custom and the character of a period.


37. Ibid.
This could be a materialist response to the Kantian antinomy between freedom and necessity in that Tosaka denies Kant’s spontaneous freedom of reason. He places practice on the side of principles of facts (jijitsusei) and of reality (genjitsusei) and one is tempted to connect these to necessity.\(^{38}\)

Harootunian helpfully brings out some of the political implications of Tosaka’s point:

People experienced everydayness day to day, yet the presumption of achieving some sort of utopian possibility did not have the same substantial reality as daily experience. In fact, it had no reality whatsoever even though it was ranked with daily experience. Its presence invalidated a theory based on everyday actuality and made its practice entirely impossible.\(^{39}\)

Tosaka links the present with a specific character, which we can connect to modernity. Because the so-called utopian possibility of transforming the present into a qualitatively different type of present lies at the root of Marxism, to the extent that Tosaka purges possibility from everydayness, he appears to reject such a project. However, on the other hand, Tosaka notes that character, which is rooted in the present, is driven by class struggle, and so seems to show that the present itself is conflicted and points beyond itself.

The implications of Tosaka’s position are made clear by a brief comparison with Benjamin. On the one hand, much seems to unite Tosaka and Benjamin. They both reject abstract homogenous time, they both emphasize the present, and they both affirm the mystery of the everyday.\(^{40}\) However, Benjamin’s concept of redemption (Erlösung) implies a link between the claims (Anspruch) of the past

\(^{38}\) Ibid. A full comparison to Kant goes beyond the scope of this paper and would need to grasp Tosaka’s interest in post-Newtonian science which deals with a different idea of principles and necessity. While Tosaka makes references to Einstein, it is unclear how he links this to his theory of practice.

\(^{39}\) Overcome by Modernity, 143.

\(^{40}\) Tosaka uses the term “the secret of history (rekishi no himitsu).” See Tosaka Zenshū vol. 3, 101.
and future possibilities. Peter Osborne explains this point cogently as he compares Benjamin to Heidegger:

The disrupted narrativity of the paradoxical ‘present as now-time’ is more radically differential, more radically futural, than the [Heideggerian] concept of repetition will allow, however differentially construed.

To some extent, Tosaka lays the foundation for thinking this type of radically different future by noting a rupture between the present and future. However, his remarks about possibility seem to belie the thrust of Benjamin’s politics of time, which is a project that aims to disrupt “the linear time-consciousness of progress in such a way as to enable us, like the child ‘to discover the new anew’ and, along with it the possibility of a better future.”

Of course, we must think this “better future” in conjunction with Benjamin’s famous statements about blasting history out of the continuum of homogenous empty time and the eschatological dimension of his thought. The better future is not a future which can be mapped on or marked in terms of empty time; it implies a change in character or period in Tosaka’s terms. We will return to this issue in our discussion of Takeuchi.

There may be aspects of Tosaka’s work that hint at eschatological vision, but in order to complete such a gesture he would need to develop a theory of capital that encompassed a specific type of temporality and vision of history. He seems to invoke such a conception when he notes that when he has an important deadline for his essay, he is thus subject to law of everydayness and historical time. Here Tosaka describes a type of domination in capitalist society which is

42. Osborne, op cit., 179.
43. Ibid. 150.
more general than class struggle, such as the movement of society to greater levels of productivity and the acceleration of time with respect to the everyday. While this process is intimately linked to the production of surplus-value in which class plays an integral role, it represents a tendency that governs the whole of society and indeed of capitalism in general. In the next section, we shall see Takeuchi deal with capitalism at a higher level of abstraction, but in a non-Marxist framework.

Takeuchi and Modernity

Takeuchi Yoshimi did much of his writing after the war and thus the context of his works is different from Tosaka’s. He expressed his interest in Tosaka’s critique of Japanese ideology, but also said that if Tosaka were alive during the post-War period, he would have considered Takeuchi another proponent Japanese ideology. In post-War Japan, Takeuchi’s unique project was to revive elements of pre-War ideologies associated with fascism, such as pan-Asianism, to develop a theory of resistance to Eurocentric universalism. But paradoxically, some of Takeuchi’s arguments overlap with Marxist cultural analysis. Rather than developing a general theory of historical materialism, Takeuchi is fundamentally concerned with the European invasion of Asia and how this characterizes an epoch, namely modernity.

Although Takeuchi uses the term modernity rather than capitalism, as Christian Uhl helpfully points out, Takeuchi had read Marx’s Das Kapital based on Takabatake Motoyuki’s translation. Uhl cites the following passage in which Takeuchi describes his experience:

44. As Osborne has suggested in his essay "Marx and the Philosophy of Time," the antithesis between work and time is precisely what is at stake in Marx’s analysis of the transition of from capitalism to socialism. (See Osborne’s discussion of disposable and labor-time, "Marx and the Philosophy of Time," Radical Philosophy 147 January/February 2008 15-22.) In other words, the political necessity to which Tosaka points may be precisely a call to change the structure of time, such that people are no longer governed by the capitalist principle of the everyday.

I decided that this is a book that I must read and it is one of the few cases when I had the feeling that I was transformed through the reading. I read Takabatake’s translation during my third year in college. I read a few pages everyday and it took me the whole summer to finish it. Through reading *Das Kapital*, my eyes were opened. I was usually afraid of the terror of logic. I realized how silly the textbooks were. I thank *Das Kapital* for my mistrust of all infusion, explanations and digests.\(^{46}\)

Uhl points out that Takeuchi was relatively apathetic to Marxist economics, but it maybe precisely this distance that enabled Takeuchi to deal with Marx and capitalism in a manner different from mainstream Marxism. The above quote illustrates the seriousness of his reading and that there was some type of transformation involved.\(^{47}\) In another autobiographical note, “Nourishment during My Youth,” he only mentions *Das Kapital*, repeats the above point about the importance of reading the original and stresses that what he learnt from Marx was logic.\(^{48}\)

We have little evidence as to the type of logic that Takeuchi learnt from Marx; we can only speculate. Moreover, the discussion in the first section of this paper suggests that Marx’s logic is itself linked to the logic of capital, which various philosophers, from Hegel to Nishida, express in reified form.\(^{49}\) Regardless of the extent of his

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\(^{47}\) Takeuchi made a couple of other similar statements. In a short note entitled “What Books One Should Read,” the only two books he mentions by name are his translation of *Lu Xun’s Selected Works, A Collection of Lu Xun’s Critical Essays* and Marx’s *Das Kapital*. He also advocates that one should read other original classics and, along with the above quote, this suggests that Takeuchi saw something in Marx that contemporary Marxists did not. Ibid, vol. 13, 26.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Takeuchi was of course familiar with many of these philosophers and it is in the context of a philosophical circle that he embarked on reading Marx. In another autobiographical note, “Old Courses,” he begins by narrating his disappointment about not being able to join a “philosophy group” and how this created what he calls a “philosophy complex.” (*Takeuchi Zenshū*, vol. 13,
understanding of Marx, we can see that, in his essay, “What is Modernity,”50 Takeuchi expresses the logic of the commodity form in an unsystematic manner and makes several references to capitalism. Unlike Tosaka, Takeuchi does not have that many essays devoted to philosophy or Marxism, but he gestures towards some type of comprehension of capitalism in the his essay, “What is Modernity?” Although he misrecognizes the logic of capital as the logic of Europe, this misrecognition points to a process operating at a higher level of abstraction than class conflict. He explains the movement of European imperialism with reference to a logic of self-expansion.

The constant activity to be their own selves makes it impossible for them (Europeans) to simply stop at themselves. They must risk the danger of losing the self in order for the self to be itself. Once liberat-

23-4) Before this he had read Nishida’s Study of the Good, Stirner, Nietzsche and made a failed attempt to read Kant. (23) Interestingly, it was his reading of Marx that enabled him to overcome this complex. He makes the following somewhat cryptic comment:

“I read Takabatake’s translation of Das Kapital and I feel that part of this remains in my bones even today. Rather than economic mechanisms, I found charming the logic with which he analyzed and reconstructed economic mechanisms. The charm of the inference of his expressions is that of Edgar Allan Poe...At the very least, I was now freed of the fear that I could not understand philosophy if I did not understand German.” (ibid. 24-25)

Uhl claims that the above passage shows that Takeuchi looked at Das Kapital as expressing a “literary charm (Reiz),” thus showing Takeuchi’s commitment to literature at an early stage. (Uhl, 356). In this way, Uhl argues that Takeuchi went against Maruyama’s thesis about the effect of Marxism as “the first structure of logical thinking.” Although Uhl brilliantly demonstrates Takeuchi’s position with respect to literature in his middle and later works, it is unclear whether “literary charm” is what is at stake here. The key evidence for this is of course the reference to Poe, but we are not sure what, according to him, produces charm or excitement in Poe. If a response to Maruyama is involved here it may be subtler and imply the blurring of the boundaries between literature, philosophy and logic. In other words, the inference in Marx’s expressions produces the same type of charm or interest (omoshirosa) as that of Poe.

ed, people cannot return to their originally closed shells; they can only preserve themselves in activity. This is precisely the spirit of capitalism. It grasps the self in the course of its expansion through time and space. The notion of progress, and hence the idea of historicism, first came into being in modern Europe.51

Takeuchi’s Europe behaves like Marx’s capital, which must expand to remain itself. Moreover, he connects European invasion, the spread of capitalism and the misrecognition of history as evolutionary progress.

Europe’s invasion of the Orient resulted in the phenomenon of Oriental capitalism, and this signified the equivalence between European self-preservation and self-expansion. For Europe this was accordingly conceptualized as the progress of world-history and the triumph of reason.52

Imperialism presents itself as global historical progress or the triumph of reason, and like anti-colonialists, Takeuchi’s fundamental concern is resistance (teikō) to such domination. But writing in post-War Japan, he sees the significance of European imperialism not just in terms of political sovereignty. Like post-colonialists, he stresses that liberation movements themselves reproduce aspects of European hegemony53 and describes this processes as objectification. Thus Takeuchi explains that even “resistance could not change the thoroughgoing rationalist conviction that all things can ultimately be objectified and extracted...through resistance the Orient was destined to increasingly Europeanize.”54

The problems of objectification, extraction and reification bring us

51. Ibid. Eng 55, J, 14
52. Ibid. Eng, 55, J14.
back to the exchange value side of the commodity form. Takeuchi’s critique of objectification leads him to question historical temporality. He attacks homogenous empty time from the standpoint of a more concrete temporality as he makes the following comments about history and Europe:

Europe is first possible only in this history [the history of capitalist imperialism] and history is first possible in this Europe. History is not an empty form of time. It includes infinite instants in which one struggles against obstacles so that the self may be itself, without which both the self and history would be lost.55

Takeuchi develops a vision of history that involves a fundamental rupture; the origin of history itself lies in the dynamic of modernity. This is a critique of history in the Kantian sense in that he notes that the conditions of the possibility of history lie in the logic of self-expansion. He stresses that although this history may present itself as empty time, in reality it conceals a more fundamental struggle. The infinite or unlimited moments represent the possibility of resistance, which Takeuchi conceives in the regional antinomy: the Orient versus Europe.

There is an asymmetry between the two standpoints of struggle, namely Europe and the Orient since the latter represents struggle against the conceptual parameters that frame conflict in the present world. Christian Uhl and Richard Calichman have each pointed out the links between Takeuchi’s theory of Oriental resistance and Nishida’s philosophy of nothingness.56 Takeuchi asserts that the Chinese writer Lu Xun, whom he champions as a master of resistance, embodies a type of nothingness. But unlike Nishida’s space of absolute nothingness, Takeuchi/Lu Xun’s nothingness emerges in the midst of modernity and resistance.

So what does this mean for history and what could the political consequences of such a resistance to abstract time be? Nakajima Takahiro has brought to our attention Takeuchi’s eschatological view of history, which implies a negation of modern temporality and the birth of a new possibility. Specifically, Nakajima points out that in Takeuchi’s “Note to Volume 9 of the Complete Works of Takeda Taijun,” he explicitly endorses an “eschatological view of history” in which future emancipation is linked to liberating the past.\(^\text{57}\) The famous scholar of Chinese literature, Ito¯ Toramaru notes that Takeuchi gets this eschatological view from Lu Xun and explains it in the following manner:

Although some may laugh at me, I think that Takeuchi’s critique of “modernization theory (kindaishugi)” was an effort to “conceptualize post-War scientism (or Marxism) subjectively from the inside” through bringing in the “moment of eschatology,” which he grasped in the midst of writing his *Lu Xun*.\(^\text{58}\)


\(^{58}\) Ito¯ Toramaru, *Rojin to shumatsuron: kindai rearisumu no seiritsu* (Lu Xun and Eschatology: The Establishment of Realism), (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1975), 273. Cited from Nakajima Takahiro op cit, 229 footnote, 3. Itō’s remarks bring us to the difficult issue of the relationship between Lu Xun and eschatology, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, Nakajima devotes the conclusion of his forthcoming book to this issue and it is worth mentioning his provocative analysis here. Nakajima focuses on Lu Xun’s prose poem, “Wild Grass (Ye cao),” which Takeuchi calls the essence of Lu Xun’s work. (See Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Yasō kaisetsu” (An Interpretation of “Wild Grass”) in *Takeuchi Zenshu*, Vol. 1. 317-330, 324). He cites a number of passages, which evidence Lu Xun’s eschatological view, but of particular interest to us here is the following citation in which Lu Xun proposes an antinomy between the creator and the rebellious warrior:

“The rebellious warrior appears amongst human beings. He jumps to his feet. He sees with his own eyes the form of all things and the existence of all the dregs and ravaged tombs. He
Itō explicitly notes that eschatology goes against the temporality of progress presupposed by modernization theory and evolutionary discourse. In Derrida’s terms, “Eschatology breaks teleology apart.” Osborne glosses this passage in relation to Benjamin’s messianic time and his explanation helps to unpack the relationship between eschatology and a critique of modernization theory.

remembers all deep and eternal pain. He faces layers of accumulated congealed blood. He deeply understands all that is already dead, living, will be born in the future and is about to be born. He has penetrated the play of creation. With respect to the common people of the creator, namely the human race, he may let them flourish or he may extinguish them.

The creator is a coward and is shamed and at this point, hides. In the eyes of the warrior, heaven and earth change color.” (Lu Xun, Yecao qianxi (Wild Grass with preliminary notes) Shi Shangwen and Deng Zhongqiang eds (Hubei: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1982) 166-7. Cited in Nakajima Takahiro, “Tsubuyaka haha no koe: sokyü to oi” (The Voice of a Murmuring Mother: Rotting Quickly and Age), unpublished manuscript, 4.

The opposition between the creator and the warrior mimics the relationship between history and that which is outside it. The warrior understands the play of the creator and aims to negate and transform it. Lu Xun expresses eschatology with the scene in which the creator hides, leaving the future of the human race indeterminate. Moreover, this is not something that Lu Xun laments; rather this is the possibility of liberation. Nakajima focuses on the role of the creator and stresses the difference between Lu Xun’s eschatology and Christian eschatology:

“One cannot understand Lu Xun’s “eschatology” as a teleological system such as Christian eschatology in which the end of the world or final judgment implies the end of history=goal of history. In Christianity, through the end, God revives the meaning of all things and human salvation is made into a program. However, in Lu Xun’s case, he hopes for salvation without God based on the exclusion of the cowardly creator who is implicated in crime.” (ibid, 5)

Following Nakajima we come to the conclusion that in Lu Xun’s case, eschatology implies the negation of the creator and the radical transformation of the current dynamic of existence. We can read Lu Xun’s negation as paralleling the possibility that people negate history by creating a new world out of, in both senses of the phrase, the contradictory dynamic of capitalism. This brings us back to the last line of the above passage from “Wild Grass” in which there is indeterminacy between destroying the human race and allowing them to flourish. It appears that these two are the same act viewed from different standpoints. Annihilating their present existence creates the conditions for something better. The negation of history is the beginning of freedom.

Only if Messianic time remains exterior to history can it provide the perspective of a completed whole (without the predetermination of a teleological end), from which the present may appear in its essential transience.  

The key structural feature of messianic time and eschatology is that the goal of history or its completion is outside of history rather than a product of some internal and necessary development. This is the sense in which, coming close to our discussion of Tosaka, eschatology invokes a possibility which is strictly speaking impossible within the framework of ordinary time. Thus like Heidegger’s idea of death, we deal here with the possibility of impossibility. However, because in the cases of Takeuchi and Benjamin this possibility of impossibility occurs at a historically specific social level rather than at a merely individual level, we must ground the negation of history in the contradictory logic of the present society, namely the logic of capital. In other words, the death of history must be entwined with the death of capitalist modernity.

Takeuchi attempts to ground the production of history in a specific epoch and to the logic of European expansion in particular and so we could conclude that the end of history would imply the end of this logic. Towards the end of his famous essay, “Asia as Method,” he points a way out of the logic of Europe through Asian resistance. He explains his position in the following manner:

...the Orient must re-embrace the West, it must change the West itself in order to realize the latter’s outstanding cultural values on a greater scale. One must create universality through such a counter-attack (巻き返し) of culture and values. The Orient’s power must change the West in order to take to a higher level, the universal values that were produced by the West.  

60. Osborne, Ibid.
61. “Asia as Method,” in What is Modernity: Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi, Richard F. Calichman trans 165, Japanese text in Takeuchi Yoshimi, Nihon to Ajia 469. For full citations of these texts see footnote 47.
Because, unlike Tosaka, Takeuchi makes little attempt to connect his analysis systematically to capitalism one could easily formulate a liberal interpretation of the above passage. In other words, Takeuchi may merely advocate spreading the values of freedom and equality that originated in the West. This would be in line with Naoki Sakai’s reading which stresses that “as Takeuchi has given up an emancipatory ideology, he can be all the more effectively critical of modernity despite his commitment to certain modern values.”62 The suppressed premise here is that to entertain the utopian dream of negating modernity, would lead one to “fall into the trap set up by modernity.”63

This brings us back to the problem of utopia with which we ended our discussion of Tosaka. On Sakai’s reading of Takeuchi, he cannot think outside of modernity and moreover, he thought of emancipation as a modern trap. Clearly, much hinges on the definition of modernity, but if we draw on Tosaka’s categories, we can call it the character of an age that is produced by a specific social form, namely capitalism.

Takeuchi describes taking universalism to a “higher level,” which could entail the production of a radically different type of universality, one whose possibility occurs in capitalist modernity, but whose realization requires its negation.64 In other words, this would be a universality that is not opposed particularity. Of course, such a discourse goes beyond Takeuchi’s own text because he does not ground the

63. Ibid.
64. Here we come to the difficult question of whether post-capitalist society would be “modern.” Following Postone’s categorical analysis of capitalism, the concepts of the enlightenment such as equality are intimately connected to the commodity form and post-capitalist society would radically transform such ideals. Thus it would be misleading to speak of modernity after capitalism. However, Marxists who separate modernity and capitalism often speak of socialism as a realization of modern or Enlightenment ideals. For an attempt to make this case see, Ellen Meiskins Wood, *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States* (London: Verso, 1991).
existing opposition between particularity and universality in the commodity form, capitalism and a specific type of labor. Rather, he thinks of this opposition in terms of regional divisions and then imagines a universality that transcends them. In this sense, we would need to combine Takeuchi’s formulation of a new universality with Tosaka’s idea of a period, a new character, which would imply perhaps a rethinking of notion of character as well.65

Conclusion: Pregnant Eschatology

Takeuchi, and perhaps Tosaka, seem to affirm the possibility of an alternative to the present, which suggests not the alternative modernities that we hear of today, but an alternative to capitalist modernity which would be a global project. The dream of an alternative to capitalism appears anachronistic today and we can partially explain this with Harootunian’s point that after the 1960s, the radical possibilities of the Showa period gradually gave way to sterile notions of civil society and liberalism, which were symbiotically related to post-War governmental policies.66 One could of course continue Harootunian’s analysis into our global present, stressing that even if Marxist analysis remains alive in sequestered regions of academia, the fall of actually existing socialism has all but extinguished hopes of a radically different future.

We can gain further insight into this ideological trend away from utopia by noting the way that Ernst Bloch distinguishes between ideology and utopia in his 1968 essay “Ideologie und Utopie.” Among other things, he notes that utopia is a dream but is a “dream that must

65. This is a problem with the discourse on the mode of production, since the conception of a series of “modes” itself expresses the exchange-value dimension of the commodity form and risks anachronistically reading a concept of totality associated with capitalism onto previous periods.
not be suspended in air and never is suspended merely in air—it is not created by an individual head. Rather, it has something to do with the times, which prepares the next society or is already pregnant with it (bereits mit ihr schwanger ist).”67 Using Bloch’s terms, we could say that the loss of faith in actually existing socialism has caused people to accuse Marxists of faking a gigantic pregnancy. There appears to be no tendency to a radically new society.

Clearly the old narratives of the working-class as the inevitable subject of history are now thrown into doubt, but Moishe Postone suggest ways of thinking of the contradiction of capitalist as possibly productive of something radically new and thus vindicating eschatology and pregnancy. Specifically, the possibility of a post-capitalist society stems from the contradiction between wealth and value. In particular, value as measured by labor-time continues to govern capitalist society even though, with increasing technology, direct-labor ceases to be the main source of wealth.68 Put differently, capitalism makes wage-labor increasingly obsolete, while at the same time making it necessary.69 This contradiction allows the possibility of reorganizing the production of wealth in a way not dominated by wage labor and the value

68. See also Moishe Postone, op cit. 297-298. See also, Osborne, “Marx and the Philosophy of Time,” op. cit., 21.
69. Some would contend that this is a Eurocentric vision of capitalism, since as Aijaz Ahmad points out, many places in the Third World, such as India are home to labor practices that mimic early stages of capitalism. [See Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations and Literature (London: Verso, 1994)]. However, focusing on the global dimension of capitalism would probably reveal a more complex story. Specifically, capitalism will produce the dual tendencies of the value form in various places even on the periphery of the global capitalist system and these places are themselves divided into urban centers that are looking increasingly like “first worlds” and agricultural hinterlands. [For a discussion of this process, see David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, New ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2006 (first published, 1982) esp. chapters 12 and 13) and more recently, Arif Dirlik, Global Modernity: Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007)]. The above logic of the simultaneous making obsolete and making necessary of wage labor results in the increasing inability of the urban centers’ to absorb migrant workers from the hinterlands. This phenomenon is clearly manifesting in China, where the government has recently attempting to implement more coherent welfare policies.
form and would bring social pregnancy and eschatology together; the birth of this new society implies the end of the logic of history as capital. All of this highlights the importance of Tosaka’s question of the now. The task for Marxism’s future is perhaps to bridge the gap between the abstract level of the analysis of capital, which reveals eschatological possibilities or the possibility of its overcoming, and the realm of everyday experience, where the categories of capitalism have been naturalized to the point where alternatives are almost unthinkable.