Enlightenment and Autobiography in Japanese Modernity

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It is no exaggeration to say that to talk about “Enlightenment” in our country is to talk about Fukuzawa. —Maruyama Masao

1. Enlightenment and “Individual Autonomy”

What is it to think about Enlightenment today, especially in East Asia? It is often pointed out that Enlightenment thinking is a universal phenomenon, but the spirit of Enlightenment is a unique invention in eighteenth-century Europe. For example, Tzvetan Todorov explains it as follows:

To begin with, we cannot help but note that Enlightenment thinking is, in fact, universal, even though it cannot be observed everywhere at all times. This is not only a matter of the practices that presuppose it, but also of a theoretical awareness. Traces can be found of it in India in the third century BCE in the precepts addressed to emperors and in the edicts issued by the latter. They are found again with the ‘freethinkers’ of Islam from the eighth to tenth centuries; in Confucianist renewal during

the Song dynasty in China from the eleventh to twelfth centuries; and in
the movements against slavery in black Africa in the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries. Let us enumerate, in no particular order, a few
characteristics of this thinking from the most varied places. […]

These multiple developments attest to the universality of Enlighten-
ment ideas, over which the Europeans had no monopoly. And yet, it was
in Europe in the eighteenth century that this movement gained momen-
tum and that a great synthesis of thought was formulated that later
spread across the continents: first in North America, then in Europe
itself, in Latin America, in Asia and in Africa. One cannot help wonder-
ing why in Europe and not, for instance, in China? Without attempting
to find a definitive answer to this difficult question (historical changes are
hugely complex phenomena, with multiple, even contradictory causes),
it is worth noting one characteristic that existed in Europe and nowhere
else—namely, political autonomy, that of the collectivity and of the indi-
vidual. Such individual autonomy was situated in Europe within the
framework of society and not outside of its confines (as was the case for
the Indian “renouncers,” mystics in Islamic countries and Chinese
monks). What characterizes the European Enlightenment is that it pre-
pared the way for the emergence of both these notions, individual and
democracy, together.²

The idea of “individual autonomy” that is presented here as unique to
European Enlightenment has become a kind of cliché. This idea fre-
quently appears, however, when we examine modern Enlightenment in
East Asia. For example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the leading Japanese thinker
of Enlightenment, advocated “independence and pride,” and the idea of
“individual autonomy” was almost an obsession in modern Japan.

Then, should we pick up this idea once again today? Does it lead us to
thinking more clearly about Enlightenment? It is true that we are still in
the spirit of modern European Enlightenment, but it is no longer neces-
sary to reduce the spirit of European modern Enlightenment to the idea
of “individual autonomy?” What we need, instead, is to historicize and

Books, 2009), 129–133.
deconstruct the spirit of modern European Enlightenment, and to invent a new understanding of Enlightenment that can criticize the cliché of “individual autonomy.” This is because we discern a power-relationship in the idea of “individual autonomy.” With the recognition that an individual or a group is not autonomous, a relationship of obedience in human beings, states, and culture is produced. This power-relationship is obvious in Enlightenment in East Asia. East Asia of nineteenth and twentieth century possessed a self-consciousness as being not fully autonomous vis-à-vis modern Europe, wherein it intentionally created a division in its inner reality between what is more and what is less autonomous, and forced the latter to obey the former. That is why we must be sensitive to the power-relationship of Enlightenment when we talk about it in East Asia today.

2. Enlightenment, Religion, and China

We start our consideration from Kant, because he is the thinker who defines “individual autonomy” as an exit [Ausgang] of Enlightenment. His essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” starts as follows:

*Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.*
*Immaturity* is the inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of another.

The enlightened state of maturity that Kant describes is a state in which one can freely exercise “the public use of man’s reason.” In contrast, immaturity is a comfortable state that one does not think for oneself, but lets others think on behalf of him- or herself. However, what is this immaturity that is opposed to Enlightenment? What does "immaturity" mean? I argue that it is nothing but religion.

I have portrayed *matters of religion* as the focal point of enlightenment, i.e., of man’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity.\(^5\)

Why was it religion? Kant said, “religious immaturity is the most pernicious and dishonourable variety of all.”\(^6\)

Then what attitude toward religion was needed? Kant asserted as follows:

> But as a scholar, he is completely free as well as obliged to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts on the mistaken aspects of those doctrines, and to offer suggestions for a better arrangement of religious and ecclesiastical affairs.\(^7\)

This is an exemplary case of what Kant describes using the phrase “the *public* use of man’s reason.” That is to say, traditional ecclesiastics say, “Don’t argue [räsonieren], believe,”\(^8\) while enlightened ecclesiastics say, “Argue as much as you like, but believe.”

No doubt, to introduce “reason” into the sphere of religion constitutes a process of European modern secularization. As J.G.A. Pocock points out in *Barbarism and Religion*, there is surely an encounter with Chinese thought in the background of this process.\(^9\) That is, China, which can constitute this world without God, is represented as a state of maturity, as getting out of religion.

In this sense, the Enlightenment movement of eighteenth-century Europe is not necessary a spontaneous one. Todorov considers that Europe could develop the spirit of Enlightenment because of its own “diversity,” which is different from China which monopolizes everything.\(^10\) However, in fact, without China as an external world, without China as a model of

\(^5\) Ibid., 59.
\(^6\) Ibid., 59.
\(^7\) Ibid., 56.
\(^8\) Ibid., 55.
secular Enlightenment without God, the European Enlightenment would never have been possible.\textsuperscript{11}

3. Disquiet of Reason

If that is the case, we could say that the spirit of the modern European Enlightenment has acted as if it were universal, with the erasure of China as its condition of possibility. However, it has been always haunted by the “disquiet of Reason.”

Is reason (logos or ratio) first of all a Mediterranean thing? Would it have made it safely to port, with Athens or Rome in view, so as to remain until the end of time tied to its shores? Would it have never broken away, in a decisive or critical fashion, from its birthplaces, its geography, and its genealogy? \textsuperscript{12}

Derrida does not refer to China in this text. However, for Derrida, reason is not rooted in a specific land. It sails across every ocean in the world. So he does not exclude China in his hetero-genealogy of reason. Through reading Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” Michel Foucault said, “the Critique is, in a sense, the handbook [ship’s logbook] of reason that has grown up in Enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{13} If we keep Foucault’s phrase in mind, we can see that Derrida tries to critique this characterization of reason, as something that can voyage across the world. However, the voyage of reason is full of danger. It always faces the crisis of “running aground” or “grounding.”\textsuperscript{14} In this crisis or danger, how can we “save the honor of reason”? Derrida finds the answer in “translation.”

In a Latin language, therefore, already burdened with translations, already

\textsuperscript{11} Todorov never forgets the Chinese Confucian education that deeply influenced philosophes of 18th Century Europe. Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 132.


\textsuperscript{14} Jacques Derrida, \textit{Rogues: Two Essays on Reason}, 121.
bearing witness to an experience of translation that, as we will later see, takes upon itself the entire destiny of reason, that is, of the world universality to come? 15

It remains to be known, so as to save the honor of reason, how to translate. For example, the word reasonable. And how to pay one’s respects to, how to salute or greet, beyond its latinity, and in more than one language, the fragile difference between the rational and the reasonable.16

Reason calls for translation, and its honor could be saved by translation into other languages. Reason does not only have a genealogy of translation from the Greek “logos” to the Latin “ratio,” the German “Vernunft,” and the French “raison,” but also has another genealogy from the Greek “nous” and Latin “intellectus” to modern notions. In addition, reason might have a hetero-genealogy relating with “risei” in Japanese or “li” in Chinese. In other words, the reason that leads Enlightenment faces its own plurality through translation. And even if it is a hidden name, China is the sine qua non for this reason.

4. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Confucianism

We turn here to Enlightenment in Japanese Modernity. According to Maruyama Masao, the leading figure of Enlightenment in Japan is Fukuzawa Yukichi, because it is he who succeeded excellently at repeating modern Western Enlightenment. For example, he repeated the “independent individual” of Todorov and “maturity” in the Kantian sense as follows:

Moreover, the outward circumstances of national wealth and power are not irrevocably fixed by nature’s decree. They can be changed by the diligent efforts of men. Today’s fools can become tomorrow’s sages. The rich and mighty of the past can become the poor and weak today. There are

15. Ibid., 119.
16. Ibid., 159.
not a few examples of this in both ancient and modern times. If we Japanese will begin to pursue learning with spirit and energy, so as to achieve personal independence and thereby enrich and strengthen the nation, why shall we fear the Powers of the West? Let us associate with men of truth [reason], and be rid of those who are not. We shall achieve national independence only after we achieve personal independence.\textsuperscript{17}

Independence means to manage one’s own personal affairs and not to have a mind to depend upon others. The person who can himself discern the right and wrong of things, and who does not err in the measures he takes, is independent of the wisdom of others. The person who makes his own livelihood through his own physical or mental labors is independent of the financial support of others.\textsuperscript{18}

The phrase “[to] be rid of those who are not [men of reason]” is very interesting, because it shows that Fukuzawa thoroughly puts off those who seem unreasonable to him.

Then, what is the enemy of Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment? As Christianity was for Kant, Fukuzawa chose Confucianism as the enemy. Fukuzawa spoke of Confucianism or Chinese teaching in his \textit{Autobiography}.

The true reason of my opposing the Chinese teaching with such vigor is my belief that in this age of transition, if this retrogressive doctrine remains at all in our young men’s minds, the new civilization cannot give its full benefit to this country. In my determination to save our coming generation, I was prepared even to face single-handed the Chinese scholars of the country as a whole.\textsuperscript{19}

The main audience for Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment is “young men.” He tried to save them from the poisoned “immaturity” of “Chinese teaching”

and educate them as independent and “mature” upon receiving Western civilization. Maruyama also pointed out that the enemy of Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment was Confucianism.

Fukuzawa Yukichi is the greatest thinker of Enlightenment from the end of the Edo Period through the beginning of Meiji. By appealing to “Western Learning,” he devoted himself to importing and dispersing European civil culture which could serve as material for the construction of a new Japan on the one hand and, on the other, he intended to break down feudal consciousness deeply rooted in the Japanese nation. Thus, the greatest barrier to his intentions was nothing more or less than Confucianism.20

However, why was it Confucianism? If Fukuzawa repeated modern Western Enlightenment as such, he should have picked and conquered religions such as Shinto and Buddhism that were popular among the Japanese people. In fact, what Fukuzawa recognized as Japanese religion is not Confucianism, but rather Shinto and Buddhism. Why did he choose Confucianism as the enemy of his Enlightenment?

5. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Religion

It is necessary to clarify Fukuzawa’s attitude toward religion. He understood religion in its modern, Western meaning, i.e., as the belief in one’s interiority. In Japan, what deserves to be called religion in this sense is only Buddhism. However, Fukuzawa regarded Buddhism as a powerless teaching absorbed by political authority.

Religion works within the hearts of men. It is something absolutely free and independent, not controlled in any way by others or dependent upon their powers. But while this is the way religion ought to be, such has not been the case here in Japan. Some people claim that, originally,

religion in Japan consisted of Shinto and Buddhism. But Shinto never became a full-fledged religion. Even though it had its theories in the past, for hundreds of years now—even since it became mixed with Buddhism—its original character has been obliterated. [...]

No matter how one looks at it, the religion that has since ancient times represented one portion of Japanese civilization is Buddhism, and only Buddhism.

However, Buddhism, too, has belonged to the ruling class, and has depended upon the patronage of the ruling class, ever since its introduction. [...]

Buddhism has flourished, true. But its teaching has been entirely absorbed by political authority. What shines throughout the world is not the radiance of Buddha’s teaching but the glory of Buddhism’s political authority. [...] From this, then, we can conclude that the monks have been slaves of the government; indeed, we can even conclude that at present there is no real religion in Japan.21

Fukuzawa concluded that “at present there is no real religion in Japan.” So was it Confucianism that had captured the hearts and minds of the Japanese? No. As Maruyama points out, Confucianism was not widely received in Japan.

If you ask how widely Confucianism as an organized philosophical system was received by the Japanese or how deeply its power regulated the lives of ordinary people in Japan, it is difficult to suggest that its influence was great, even in the Tokugawa Era, regarded as the peak of Confucianism.22

Instead of Confucianism, what grasped the hearts of Japanese people was religious custom based upon Shinto and Buddhism. Even if it is not a religion in the sense of belief, i.e., from the perspective of Western modernity, it is a religion as practice.23 Once again, let us read Fukuzawa’s

23. As for the distinction in Japan between religion as belief and religion as practice, see Isomae
Autobiography. He looked back on his childhood and said as follows:

When I grew a few years older, I became more reckless, and decided that all the talk about divine punishment that old men use to scold children was a lie. Then I conceived the idea of finding out what the god of Inari really was.

There was an Inari shrine in the corner of my uncle’s garden, as in many other households. I opened the shrine and found only a stone there. I threw it away and put in another stone which I picked up on the road. Then I went on to explore the Inari shrine of our neighbor, Shimomura. Here the token of the god was a wooden tablet. I threw it away too and waited for what might happen.

When the season of the Inari festival came, many people gathered to put up flags, beat drums, and make offerings of the sacred rice-wine. During all the rounds of festival services, I was chuckling to myself: “There they are—worshipping my stones, the fools!”

Thus from childhood I have never had any fear of gods or Buddha. Nor have I ever had any faith in augury and magic, or in the fox and badger which, people say, have power to deceive men. I was a happy child, and my mind was never clouded by unreasonable fears.24

It is obvious that the popular “religion” in Japan at that time was Shinto and Buddhism. If so, why did Fukuzawa regard Confucianism as the enemy of Enlightenment?

6. The Structure of Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment and Autobiography

In order to answer this question, we have to consider two things. One is the unique structure of Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment, and the other is its political meaning.

Let us examine the first. When we read Fukuzawa’s Autobiography, we have the impression that Fukuzawa himself was never enlightened. As

Fukuzawa said, “my mind was never clouded by unreasonable fears,” Fukuzawa depicted himself as mature and not in need of any Enlightenment, even in his childhood. There is no history of personal enlightenment. There is no story of inner struggle. Saeki Shoichi suggested that Fukuzawa had no “interior Ego.”

Fukuzawa is a cheerful and flexible writer. He continuously published a volume of works in an almost enjoyable format. Although he was almost a born writer, I think he never worried about the problem of the expression of the Ego. He was indifferent to the continuously trembling interior Ego that awaits the moment of airing out or becoming fixed.\(^{25}\)

Instead, Fukuzawa showed an excessive attention to the body and a sense of distance that could be symbolized by the word “fun.”

Ōsaka generally has a warm climate, and there was no difficulty for poorly-dressed students in the winter time. In the summer, indeed, we found it almost necessary to live without clothes. Of course, in class and in the dining room, we wished to appear somewhat respectable, so we wore something—usually the haori, or loose overgarment, next to the bare body. That was an odd sight—how a person of today would laugh to see it! \(^{26}\)

I was born in a poor family and I had to do much bodily work whether I liked it or not. This became my habit and I have been exercising my body a great deal ever since. […]

Originally I was a country samurai, living on wheat meal and pumpkin soup, wearing out-grown homespun clothes. Here I was trying to fit myself into the excessive care of the city-nourished with imported flannel clothes and many nostrums of civilization. It was ridiculous. My poor body must be dismayed by this unfamiliar amount of care and coddling.\(^{27}\)

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Shortly after the insurrection in the tenth year of Meiji, when the whole country had settled down to peace and people were rather suffering from the lack of excitement, on a sudden inspiration I thought of writing an argument in favor of the opening of the national diet. Perhaps some would join in my advocacy and might even stir up some interesting movement.

I wrote an article and took it to the editors of the Hōchi—this was before I had my own newspaper. I said to them, “if you can use this piece as an editorial, do so. I am sure the readers will be interested. But, as it stands, it is too obviously my writing. So change some wording to hide my style. I will be fun to see how the public will take it.”

Fukuzawa’s attention to the body comes as no surprise if we recall that he studied medicine under the supervision of Ogata Koan. However, while Fukuzawa spoke at length about care of bodily health, the “interior Ego” seldom appeared. If we dare to define his “interior Ego,” it must be a “laughing” Ego that takes distance from his own deeds.

What is apparent here is that Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment has a characteristic of pragmatic functionality and play, which resists interior depth. This is precisely what Maruyama Masao tried to grasp as Fukuzawa’s philosophy.

If we try to find a Western philosophy which is closest to Fukuzawa’s way of thinking, it must above all be pragmatism. Fukuzawa says that every cognition is regulated by a practical end (“standard of argument”) and that the value of a thing is not in its immanent nature, but is determined by its function in the concrete environment, by saying that “the thing is not valuable, but the function is so.” This idea is nothing but that of pragmatism.

We have just confirmed that every single one of Fukuzawa’s major propositions is conditioned recognition, and it must be understood parenthetically. This is a characteristic of his thinking that continuously

28. Ibid., 319.
29. Maruyama Masao, “Philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi” (1947), in Maruyama Masao, Philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi, 82.
fluidizes any perspective. In this sense, we can say that the affirmation that life is play is his biggest proposition in parenthesis.30

In this regard, Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment was not a simple repetition of the modern Western one. It showed another possibility for Enlightenment in East Asia, i.e., the pragmatic and “shallow” Enlightenment that does not appeal to interiority.31

Therefore, Fukuzawa had to make Confucianism the enemy of Enlightenment, because Confucianism explored interior depth in its own way and moralized it in order to give a foundation to the practical dimension. In other words, if the power of Enlightenment bestowed on Confucianism had been exerted, the “shallow” Enlightenment overcoming Western Enlightenment would have been erased.

7. The Political Meaning of the Exclusion of Confucianism

There is one more reason for Fukuzawa to make Confucianism the enemy of Enlightenment. By excluding Confucianism, Fukuzawa intended to exclude China and Korea. This is the political meaning of Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment. In his Autobiography, it is easy for us to find his disdain for China and Korea.

Applying this personal experience to a greater problem, I might say a few words about present-day China. I am sure that it is impossible to lead her people to civilization so long as the old government is left to stand as it is. However many great statesmen may appear—even a hundred Li Hung-changs—we cannot expect any marked improvement.

But if they break up the present administration and rebuild the whole nation from the foundation up, probably the minds of the people themselves would change, and these new minds may acquire the initiative to direct their way toward a new civilization. I cannot guarantee that this will work out as well for China as our Restoration did for us, but for the

30. Ibid., 112.
31. In this respect, it is worth comparing Fukuzawa to Hu Shi, the Chinese pragmatist. However, this comparison will be realized in a future study.
purpose of insuring a nation’s independence, they should not hesitate to
destroy a government even if it is only for an experiment. Even the
Chinese should know whether the government exists for the people or
the people exist for the government.\footnote{Fukuzawa Yukichi, \textit{The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa}, 277.}

For Fukuzawa, the reason for the political downturn of China and Korea
at that time was solely the influence of Confucianism. In order to escape
from its influence and reach “Cultural Enlightenment,” they have to con-
sider the “Meiji Restoration” as the ideal model.

Maruyama Masao summarized this political attitude of Fukuzawa as
follows:

Whereas Yukichi always resisted the thinking based upon anti-foreignism
or xenophobia, he was always the severest hard-line interventionist for the
diplomatic problem of Korea and China. These two attitudes seem con-
tradictory, but they were united into a single intention in Yukichi’s mind.
It is noteworthy that what united them was nothing but his anti-Confu-
cian consciousness. […]

It is not difficult here to find that his severe criticism against past Japan
that was developed in his books like \textit{An Encouragement of Learning} or \textit{An
Outline of a Theory of Civilization} was repeated in the criticism against
China. That is why he asserted that “the reform of Korea is to exclude the
underside of Chinese Confucianism and to realize the civilization that is
daily renewed,” so “the authority of the reform has to be prepared to do
the reform as a divine vocation not only for the sake of Korea and Japan,
but also for the development of worldly common civilization.” And when
the battle between Japan and Qing China went along, he said that “this
war is called as a war between Japan and Qing China, but \emph{in fact it is a
war between civilization and barbarism or between enlightened and unen-
lightened, the result of the war should be related to the momentum of the
daily renewed civilization}.” So he took the severest hard-line opinion,
claiming that Japan should never stop the advance of its army until it
reaches Beijing. We can say that the Sino-Japanese war attested in the
most explicit way the combination of independence, freedom, and state
sovereignty in Yukichi’s thought was possible through the mediation of his anti-Confucianism. As Maruyama points out sharply, Fukuzawa’s attitude of “anti-Confucianism” is directly connected with his stance on the political reform of China and Korea, and this extends to the Sino-Japanese war. In other words, because it made Confucianism the enemy of Enlightenment, Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment had a range of political meaning not only for Japan, but also East Asia. Therefore, we have to say that Fukuzawa’s Enlightenment is nothing but “de-Asianization” from its debut.

8. Conclusion

As Maruyama said, Fukuzawa should be seen as a representative of modern Japanese Enlightenment. If so, the “reason” to conduct his Enlightenment was grounded violently on the shores of China and Korea. Nonetheless, could this “reason” cruise another ocean route, because there is another possibility than modern, Western Enlightenment? If we did not situate Confucianism as the enemy of Enlightenment, if we criticized Confucianism with modern Western civilization and brought out the conditions of possibility for Confucianism, the configuration of modern Japanese Enlightenment would have been radically changed.

When we consider Enlightenment in East Asia today, we have to ask how to criticize the Enlightenment of Confucianism and Western modernity as a whole. For this question, the thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi is one that we must overcome.

33. Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Critique of Confucianism” (1942), in Maruyama Masao, Philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi, 30–33.