Papers from the 2014 University of Tokyo - University of Hawai‘i Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy

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Hawai Island
In August 2014 we convened the third iteration of the University of Tokyo-University of Hawai‘i Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy. The general theme of the institute was “a sense of place.” Our group consisted of some 25 students from both institutions, together with four instructional faculty and four other participants from other U.S. institutions. The first two weeks of the Institute consisted of formal lectures in one of our Mānoa seminar rooms by Professors Nakajima Takahiro and Kajitani Shinji from UT, and Roger T. Ames and Masato Ishida from UH. We explored topics on Chinese universality in the work of Tang Junyi, Watsuji Tetsurō’s *Climaticity*, and other canonical texts from both the Eastern and Western traditions. We had a special opening ceremony and lecture by Sam Gon III, Senior Scientist and Cultural Advisor at The Nature Conservancy of Hawai‘i, who also guided us on the Halapepenui Trail with a visit to the Wao Akua.

The first and second Summer Institutes in the previous two years had focused on the themes “Person” and “Praxis.” As an extension of the first two years, we understood the focus on “Place” as “where” the “person” becomes through “praxis.” The sense of place or the sensitivity to topos is fundamental to philosophical activity, and a wide range of philosophical applications arose such as the analysis of the regionally positioned subject, geographically informed body, climatically constituted values and forms of life, not to mention applications in the philosophy of nature and environmental ethics. In the third week we took up residence at the Kilauea Military Camp in the shadows of
Kilauea Volcano, and through interactive sessions, workshops, and local tours, we enjoyed together the spirit of what we may call a comparative geo-philosophy. We had keynote lectures by Miyagawa Keishi, Peter Hershock, and Chris Lauer, and joined the Ho’okupu ceremonies at Pu’uKohola Heiau located at Kawaihae, Kohala.

The exploration of this topic of “place” during the Institute was so inspiring that it has been carried over to become the organizing theme on the Eleventh East-West Philosophers’ Conference to be convened May 25-31, 2016. Contemporary philosophical uses of the word “place” cover considerable conceptual ground, centered on a distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place’ that was formalized by geographer-philosopher Yi-fu Tuan, who suggested that “place incorporates the experiences and aspirations of a people” over the course of their moral and aesthetic engagement with sites and locations. Building on this distinction, we might say that spaces are openings for different kinds of presence—physical, emotional, cognitive, dramatic, spiritual, and so on. Places emerge through fusions of different ways of being present over time, a meaning-infusing layering of relationships and experiences that imbue a locale with its distinctively collaborative significance. Place also implies sustainably appreciated and enhanced relational quality.

Humanity takes up space and purposefully transforms it, but is not unique in doing so. Other species reshape the spaces they occupy to serve their purposes: birds create nests, bees create hives and beavers create dams. In this regard humanity is no different from other species. What seems to be uniquely human, however, is the disposition to qualitatively transform spaces into places that are charged with distinctive kinds of significance and meaning. For many indigenous peoples, the relation to “place” has traditionally been so intimate that to be forced off the land is to be forced out of themselves, cut off from part of what makes them who they are. But contemporary urban residents develop similar senses of the dynamic and recursive relationship between who they are and where they are, and among even those who are most globally mobile, recognition persists of the
significance of a ‘house’ being transformed into a ‘home.’ Humanity is thus a place-making species.

Yet the place-making propensities of humanity seem from the outset to have been inseparable from questions about our place in the world—the place of ‘humanity,’ of ‘my people,’ and of ‘me’ personally. One result of these questions has been the crafting of complexly imagined cosmologies and narratives of “promised lands” and “paradises” beyond the horizon of present experience. Another result, on the other hand, have been concerns growing out of the recognition that our places in the world are not equal and that being present together in some common social, economic, or political space does not necessarily endow us with equivalent opportunities for participation and contribution. At times, these concerns about equity and justice have led to the crafting of “non-places”—utopias—as means to establishing trajectories of hope that might lift us out of opportunity- and dignity-denying places.

With the third year of the UTUH Institute behind us, we are now looking forward to the fourth year in August 2015 that will be convened in Tokyo and Kyoto on the theme of “language,” which is not only spoken in physical space but transforms space into a place where people live. By reconsidering language, therefore, we wish to deepen our understanding of place as well.

Roger T. AMES
Masato ISHIDA
I. Papers by Institute Faculty
1

The “Where” and “When” of Translating Chinese Philosophy

Roger T. AMES

In this essay, I will argue that the now standard vocabulary we use to translate Chinese philosophical texts perpetuates a sense of literalness and familiarity while at the same time betraying its reader to the extent that it transplants the Chinese corpus into a cultural soil—a worldview and a commonsense—that is not its own. Friedrich Nietzsche in *Beyond Good and Evil* reflects upon how a specific worldview is sedimented into the very language that speaks it:

The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation.¹

Nietzsche is certainly not endorsing the strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language determines thought and cognitive categories—that is, a linguistic determinism that would argue our languages necessarily constrain us to think in a certain way. Rather, he is simply observing that languages and their syntaxes over time become invested with the prevailing insights into what makes the human experience meaningful for any particular cultural tradition. Simply put, languages and

their structures tend to reveal the default worldviews and distilled commonsenses of the cultures they speak, making philosophy importantly an archaeological enterprise. Said another way, our languages “speak” us as much as we speak our languages, disposing us to entertain experience in one way as opposed to another, and prompting us to ask some questions, and not others.

Reflecting on how languages such as French and German came to be gendered—“la table” and “le soliel”—for example, Nietzsche allows that “when man gave all things a sex he thought, not that he was playing, but that he had gained a profound insight . . .” In fact, the work of Nietzsche himself is a strong object lesson in the very interpretive problem that he ponders. Our languages want to speak from their own narratives, and tend to resist new ideas in proportion to the disjunction of these ideas with what has gone before. Commonsense is conservative. Thus, when Nietzsche attempts to critique a persistent transcendentalism within the cultural experience of the Abrahamic traditions that has become entrenched in its languages, he must himself turn to and rely heavily upon rhetorical and literary tropes rather than the more “literal” language—that is, metaphors rather than more literal meanings—precisely because he is frustrated, compromised, and even betrayed by the heavily committed language in which he is attempting to give voice to his revolutionary ideas.

There is an important distinction we might “borrow” from the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, between langue (language) and parole (speech), between the evolved, theoretical and conceptual structure of a language system that is shaped by an aggregating intelligence over millennia and that makes speech possible, and the application of any natural language in the individual utterances we make. We pluralists need this distinction to reinforce our claim that


3. I am “borrowing” this distinction from Saussure because I do not want to endorse the kind of structuralism that would allow for any severe separation between langue and parole, instead siding with the sentiments of Mikhail Bakhtin who would see these two dimensions of language as mutually shaping and evolving in their always dialectical relationship. Utterances gradually change the structure of language, and the changing structure orients and influences the utterances that it makes possible.
the Chinese language has not developed and does not have available to it either an indigenous concept or a term that can be used to capture the Abrahamic notion of “God,” while at the same time allowing us to insist that the same Chinese language has all of the semantic and syntactic resources necessary to give a fair account of such an idea. What we are saying about this absence of “God” in the langue of the Chinese language accounts for the want of a Western conceptual vocabulary to adequately speak Confucianism. We cannot say “li” in English, or in German either, although we can (and will) say lots about it in both languages.

More recently, and specifically in reference to the classical Chinese language, the distinguished British sinologist Angus Graham concludes that in its reporting on the eventful flow of Chinese qi cosmology summarized most concisely in the Great Tradition fascicle of the Book of Changes, “the sentence structure of Classical Chinese places us in a world of process about which we ask . . . “Whence?” and also, since it is moving, “At what time?” Graham is saying here is that any perceived abstract and theoretical coherence in the emergent order of things assumed in Chinese cosmology has a real tendency to also be historicist and as such has to be qualified by both a location and by a particular time in its evolution. When Graham asks after human nature within the context of Chinese cosmology, for example, beyond the question of “what is it?” he must also ask “where and when did it mean this?” because human nature is properly conceived of as an ongoing and evolving process rather than as some essential “timeless” property or endowment. Indeed, a cosmic order that includes human nature while being understood in general and persistent terms, must also be qualified by what is more local and specific. For Chinese cosmology, in the ongoing process of the transformation of the world around us, neither time nor place will be denied. The implication of Graham’s insight into Chinese cosmology is that all of the rational structures that might be appealed to in expressing an understanding of the human experience—that is, the theories, concepts, categories, and definitions that we might reference—are themselves made vulnerable

in degree by the always changing organs of knowing and the shifting objects to which they are applied.

In fairness to the new translations that have appeared over the past generation, we must ask the question: At the end of the day, can European languages, freighted as they most often are with a historical commitment to a substance ontology—what Jacques Derrida has called “the language of presence”—actually “speak” the processual worldview that grounds these Chinese texts? Can texts such as the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing*) and the *Daodejing* be translated into English and still communicate the worldview that is invested in them? And more to the point, how do we propose to address the problem of locating the Chinese texts within their own implicit worldviews?

If Ludwig Wittgenstein is insightful in asserting that the limits of our language are the limits of our world, then it follows that in order to understand Chinese philosophy on its own terms, perhaps we need more language. The self-conscious strategy of translating Chinese philosophy must be to go beyond translation itself by attempting to enable students of Chinese philosophy to read the seminal texts and gradually develop their own nuanced understanding of a set of critical Chinese philosophical terms. The premise is that there is no real alternative for students but to cultivate a familiarity with the key Chinese vocabulary itself. Indeed, formulaic translation can in the long run be counterproductive by encouraging students reading these texts to inadvertently rely upon the usual implications of the terms in translation rather than on the range of meaning implicit in the complex and organically related, original ideas. When one reads “Heaven” in a text rather than *tian* 天, one is reading it very differently.

By way of analogy, if we reflect on our best efforts to read Greek philosophy, in developing a detailed understanding of some of the classical Greek philosophical terms—*logos, nomos, nous, physis, kosmos, eidos, psyche, arche, alethea*, and so on—we are able to get behind our own uncritical Cartesian assumptions and, at least in degree, read classical Greek texts on their own terms. In a similar way, by identifying, refining, and appropriating a glossary of key terms around which the Chinese texts are woven, students will be better able to locate these seminal works in their original philosophical landscape,
and carry this ability over to their reading of other translations as well.

The alternative to attempting as best we might to take the
tradition on its own terms is to participate in a further colonializing
of Chinese philosophy begun by well-intended but “mission-driven”
missionaries some centuries ago. Such an uncritical approach places
the uniqueness, heterogeneity, and intrinsic worth of the local aesthetic
and cultural narrative of Chinese philosophy at real risk, and to
inadvertently interpret this tradition’s fairly recent encounter with the
vocabulary of the Western academy to be its defining event.

It is in this effort to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms
we must begin by attempting to provide an interpretive context that
will hopefully sensitize the reader to some of the ambient, persistent
assumptions that have made the Chinese philosophical narrative
significantly different from our own. It is these presuppositions that
inform the philosophical vocabulary and set parameters on its meaning.

Are we then to understand these generic cultural assumptions
as essential and unchanging conditions of Chinese cosmology?
Of course not. But in setting out the interpretive context, the only
approach to these canonical texts more dangerous than seeking out and
relying upon such generalizations is failing to do so. Making cultural
comparisons without the hermeneutical sensibility necessary to guard
against cultural reductionism is undertaken at the risk of overwriting
these texts with our own cultural importances, and in the process,
making a world familiar to us that is not familiar at all. Abjuring the
consideration of such generic features is not innocent because the
default assumption would be the fallacy of “presentism:” that is, the
belief that the evolving Chinese worldview is no different from our
own contemporary understanding of world order.

As a way of respecting the unique cultural context, we must
be clear. There is little profit in replacing one set of problematic
translations with yet another equally contestable series of renderings.
Rather, we must prompt and encourage students to reference the
original vocabulary with the hope that in the fullness of time they
will begin to appropriate the Chinese terminologies themselves—tian
天, dao 道, ren 仁, yi 義, and so on—and thereby develop their own
robust understandings of them. Ultimately for students who would
understand Chinese philosophy, *tian* 天 must be understood as *tian* 天, and *dao* 道 must be *dao* 道.

In our earlier forays into translating the Chinese canons, David Hall, Henry Rosemont, and I have developed a structure in these translations that includes a philosophical introduction, an evolving glossary of key philosophical terms, and self-consciously interpretive translations. In describing our translations as “self-consciously interpretive,” I am not allowing in any way that we are recklessly speculative or given to license in our renderings, nor that we are willing to accept that we are any less “literal” than other translators. On the contrary, we would insist that any pretense to a literal translation is not only naïve, but is itself an “objectivist” cultural prejudice of the first order. Just as each generation selects and carries over earlier thinkers to reshape them in their own image, each generation reconfigures the classical canons of world philosophy to its own needs. We too are inescapably people of a time and place. This self-consciousness then, is not to distort the Chinese philosophical narrative, but to endorse one of the fundamental premises of this commentarial tradition—that is, textual meaning is irrepressibly emergent, and that, like it or not, we are not passive in the process of interpretation.

At a general level, I would suggest that English as the target language carries with it such an overlay of cultural assumptions that, in the absence of such “self-consciousness,” the philosophical import of the Chinese text can be seriously compromised. Further, a failure of translators to be self-conscious and to take fair account of their own Gadamerian “prejudices”5 with the excuse that they are relying on some “objective” lexicon—a resource that, were the truth be known, is itself heavily colored with cultural biases—is to betray their readers not once, but twice. That is, not only have they failed to provide the “objective”

5. Hans-Georg Gadamer uses “prejudices” not in the sense that prejudice is blind, but on the contrary, in the sense that our prejudgments can facilitate rather than obstruct our understanding. That is, our assumptions can positively condition our experience. But we must always entertain these assumptions critically, being aware that the hermeneutical circle in which understanding is always situated requires that we must continually strive to be conscious of what we bring to our experience and must pursue increasingly adequate prejudgments that can inform our experience in better and more productive ways.
reading of the text that they have promised, but they have also neglected
to warn their unsuspecting reader of the cultural assumptions that they
have willy-nilly insinuated into their translations.

To state the problem in a more complex way, we have been
given to relentlessly theorizing the Chinese tradition according to our
Western philosophical assumptions, shoehorning Chinese concepts
into categories that are not its own. We are given to pondering: “Is
Mohist utilitarianism agent-neutral or agent relative?” but it would
not occur to us to ask if John Stuart Mill is a Mohist. Again, we are
given to inquiring: “Is Confucian ethics an Aristotelian aretaic ethic or
a Humean-inspired sentimentalist ethic? but it would not occur to us
to ask if Aristotle, and Hume too, are Confucians.

But this is not simply a Western imposition. During the second
half of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century, Japanese
and then Chinese and Korean intellectuals, at once enamored of and
overwhelmed by Western modernity, created a sinitic vocabulary to
appropriate and give voice to the conceptual and theoretical language
of Western academic culture. Hence, this problem of theorizing
and conceptualizing China is as true of contemporary East Asian
intellectuals as it is of their Western counterparts, speaking as they do
a vernacular language—their own parole—transformed in important
degree by its encounter with the cultural imperialism of a dominating
Western modernity—a Western langue. Even while speaking their own
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages they are often deploying a
largely Western conceptual structure.

6. Kwong-loi Shun has recently made much of this asymmetry in his article, “Studying
Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections” in *Journal of Chinese
Philosophy* (September 2009) Vol. 36 no. 3, p. 470:

[T]here is a trend in comparative studies to approach Chinese thought from
a Western philosophical perspective, by reference to frameworks, concepts, or
issues found in Western philosophical discussions. This trend is seen not only in
works published in the English language, but also in those published in Chinese.
Conversely, in the contemporary literature, we rarely find attempts to approach
Western philosophical thought by reference to frameworks, concepts, or issues
found in Chinese philosophical discussions.

7. Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated
In reflecting on the “when” of translating Chinese philosophy, there is a recent confluence of circumstances that is promoting a reevaluation of the classical corpus. First, a continuing series of truly dramatic archaeological digs in China are providing us with earlier versions of extant texts that have not suffered the distortions unavoidable in some two thousand years of transmission. These finds are also offering us access to recovered textual materials that disappeared from sight millennia ago. And the documents as they continue to surface are requiring a revision of our previous understanding of the principal philosophical works that are defining of the classical period, and that have served as canonical texts ever since.

At the very least, these newly available resources provide a compelling reason for the retranslation of the selected excerpts from the seminal texts included in this present volume. However, if possible, in addition to the reevaluation made necessary by these new and exciting archaeological finds, there is yet an even more pressing reason to take up the project of retranslating these texts. Until recently, most professional Western philosophers have been notoriously uninterested in any claims on the part of proponents of Chinese thought that there is much of philosophical significance in the texts of ancient China. Indeed, it

through modern Chinese literature, Liu 劉禾 probes the “discursive construct of the Chinese modern:”

I am fascinated by what has happened to the modern Chinese language, especially the written form, since its early exposure to English, modern Japanese, and other foreign languages. . . .The true object of my theoretical interest is the legitimation of the “modern” and the “West” in Chinese literary discourse as well as the ambivalence of Chinese agency in these mediated processes of legitimation. (pp. xvi-xviii).

Pointedly alluding to Foucault’s concern of the role of power relations and authority in the process of cultural translation, Liu cites Talal Asad as offering certainly an apposite critique of the British ethnographic tradition, but also a critique that has relevance to cultural translation broadly:

To put it crudely, because the languages of the Third World societies—including of course, the societies that social anthropologists have traditionally studied—are “weaker” in relation to Western languages (and today, especially to English), they are more likely to submit to forcible transformation in the translation process than the other way around. The reason for this is, first, that in their political-economic relations with Third World countries, Western nations have the greater ability to manipulate the latter. And, second, Western languages produce and deploy desired knowledge more readily than Third World languages do. (p. 3)
can be claimed that geographical rather than philosophical criteria continue to be invoked to exclude entire philosophical traditions from a proper investigation, and as a consequence, profoundly “philosophical” texts are not being treated as such within the sanctum of professional philosophy. One need only to wander through the philosophy section of a bookstore to see what is included and what is not.

But why are these Western-trained philosophers necessary in the introduction of Chinese philosophy into the Western academy? While undeniably one of the requisites of a successful translation of a classical Chinese philosophical text into Western languages is philological expertise in the classical Chinese language and a developed understanding of Chinese culture, it is equally true that such a translation requires an understanding of the Western philosophical discourse serving as the target language of the translation. In the absence of the contribution of trained philosophers, these Chinese texts have been translated and interpreted initially by missionaries, and more recently by sinologists. Indeed, to date much of the early Chinese corpus has only incidentally and tangentially been engaged by professional philosophers.

This assertion is meant neither to impugn the usually good intentions of the missionaries nor to pretend that there is any substitute for the sophisticated philological, historical, literary, and cultural sensibilities that we associate with good sinology. In fact, if there is an indictment to be made, it is to be directed against professional philosophy in our higher seats of learning that, in its practices as well as its own self-understanding, has been slow to abandon the assumption that philosophy is exclusively an Anglo-European enterprise.

Lest the honesty of this observation offend only the missionaries, the sinologists, and those Anglo-European philosophers whose crime has been nothing more than a singular interest in their own traditions of thought, there is indeed a broader complicity in this charge. That “philosophy” as a professional discipline defines itself largely as Anglo-European is a claim that is as true in Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, Nairobi, and Boston, as it is in Cambridge, Frankfort, and Paris. For many reasons—certainly economic and political factors included among them—philosophers who go about
their business within the academies outside of Europe have themselves not only acquiesced in the persistent and exclusive claim of Anglo-European philosophy to have a monopoly on their discipline, but have moreover worked assiduously to make European philosophy the mainstream curriculum in the best of their own home institutions. In this sustained process of self-colonization, indigenous traditions of philosophy—Chinese, Japanese, Korean, South Asian, African, and yes, American too—have been marginalized, while the heirs to British Empiricism and Continental Rationalism have continued to wage their battles on foreign soil. That is, if indigenous Asian, African, and American philosophies have been ignored by Western philosophers, they have also been significantly marginalized within their home cultures. William James was almost right when he began his 1901 Gifford lectures at Edinburgh by admitting that “To us Americans, the experience of receiving instruction from the living voice, as well as from the books of European scholars, is very familiar. . . It seems the natural thing for us to listen whilst the Europeans talk.” The only caveat offered here is that James would have reported on the imaginaire of professional philosophy more accurately—a self-understanding that is alive and well a century later—if he had included the Asian and African philosophers along with the Americans as the seemingly “natural” audience for European philosophy. The challenge of our own “where” and “when” in translating Chinese philosophy is to extend Wittgenstein’s argument that the limits of our language are the limits of our world to the professional discipline of philosophy itself, and to argue that the self-circumscribing limits of our discipline sets untoward constraints on our own philosophical world.

From Climaticity (Fūdo) to Ethics (Rinrigaku):
Watsuji Tetsurō on the Externality of Human Ex-sistence

Masato ISHIDA

I

Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), one of the ‘Kyoto School’ philosophers broadly construed, was not only an academician but an influential public intellectual of his time. Born in Himeji City, Hyōgo Prefecture, he spent most of his childhood in western Japan, moved to Tokyo to attend First High School, and graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1912. His first book *A Study of Nietzsche* was published the following year in 1913. He started his professional career as a professor at Tōyo University in 1920, was also appointed professor at Hōsei University in 1922, and then moved to Kyoto Imperial University in 1925 where he was subsequently promoted to full professor in 1931. Watsuji returned to Tokyo Imperial University in 1934, his alma mater, and remained Professor of Ethics until his retirement in 1949.

There is no way to summarize Watsuji’s diverse and voluminous writings on philosophy, literature, history, religion, art, world cultures, East-West comparative studies, and so forth. Among his well-known works are: *A Study of Nietzsche* (1913); *Søren Kierkegaard* (1915); *Revival of Idols* (1918); *A Pilgrimage to Ancient Temples* (1919); *A Study of the History of the Japanese Spirit* (1926; sequel in 1935); *The Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism* (1927); *Ethics as the Study of Human Being* (1934); *Climaticity: A Study of Human Existence* (1935); *Mask and Persona* (1937); *Ethics* (1937-1949, 3 vols.); *Personality and Humanity* (1938); *Closing the Nation: Japan’s Tragedy* (1950); *A History of Japanese Ethical Thought* (1952); *A History of Buddhist Ethical Thought* (1963). He published popular works for the
general reader as well as scholarly works that were more intended for specialists.

It would be natural to ask whether a core philosophical thesis can be identified in Watsuji’s vast array of writings. Clearly, his popular writings do not involve intense conceptual technicalities as found, for example, in Nishida Kitarō’s works. Nonetheless I suggest that there are fundamental insights that recur in a bulk of Watsuji’s writings. The purpose of the brief discussion below is to shed light on a few of them rather than attempting to address Watsuji’s many cultural observations that have often received criticism. The central idea I focus on is the externality of human ex-sistence – the prefix ex meaning ‘out of’ or ‘beyond’ and sistence deriving from sistere in Latin, i.e. to ‘stand’ or ‘place’ – which implies that no social structure resides ‘inside’ the mind and that human existence is, therefore, essentially ‘in-between-ness (aidagara).’

II

The first line of this thought can be found in the opening pages of Climaticity: A Study of Human Existence (Fūdo: Ningengakuteki Kōsatsu), a now classical work published in 1935. At the outset of inquiry, Watsuji proposes that we consider the fundamental structure of human existence in relation to climate and culture, though what he means by this is much deeper than it initially appears. A brief passage on sensory perception already casts illumination on his view. If we go out into the cold on a winter day, Watsuji suggests, we do not form judgments about weather based on ‘sensations’ discussed in traditional Western philosophy. Instead perception is nothing but a direct disclosure of the externality or outsideness of human existence:

We directly feel, not the «sensation» of the cold, but the «coldness of the open air», or we feel the cold air itself. […] When we feel the cold, we are ourselves already abiding in the chilliness of the air outside. That we relate ourselves to the coldness means nothing but ourselves having our being outside in the cold. In this sense,
our mode of being, as Heidegger emphasizes, characterizes itself by our being outside (ex-sistere), and therefore by intentionality.¹

As the passage makes clear, Watsuji rejects the notion of ‘sensation.’ There is no sensory medium that lies between the perceiver and the perceived. Prior to being conscious of individual sensory objects, reflective mental acts, and so on, which are abstractions from more fundamental experience in Watsuji’s view, we are directly aware of the cold weather outside. There is a primal sense in which we always have our own being outside in the world.

The analysis derives partially from Watsuji’s critical reading of Heidegger. During his study abroad in Germany 1927-1928, which included travels to various parts of Europe, Heidegger’s Being and Time [Sein und Zeit] emerged, a work that Watsuji examined immediately. As one may recall, Heidegger’s Dasein has an irreducibly triadic temporal structure. Human existence, a being toward future for Heidegger, assumes its own past, whence an authentic self can be called for in the present. Thus human existence spans future, past, and present at once, without which its very structure falls. It follows that Dasein does not dwell in the present from which it takes an imaginative journey into past and future when it experiences time.

Watsuji develops a similar though wider analysis with a stronger focus on the spatial nature of human ex-sistence. Not against or contradicting Heidegger’s concept of temporality, he thinks that human existence in its spatial dimension literally spreads itself across the entire living space, which must ultimately include the society. On the smaller end of the scale, perception does not take place ‘inside’ this or that mind. But on a much larger scale, human existence is never contained in a point of space in Watsuji’s view any more than Dasein, which ex-sists across future, past, and present, is enclosed in the present. We may say that Heidegger’s temporal ex-sistence was generalized by Watsuji to capture the spatial externality or outsideness of our being in the world.

III

In its proper meaning, then, perception is not veiled within sense-data as if the experiencer was contemplating her internal mental states. This observation characterizes Watsuji’s philosophical thinking in many different ways, although he does not consider it an entirely original view. In fact he calls our attention to an interesting counterpart in Spinoza’s metaphysics. The following passage, which appears in Watsuji’s Ethics (Rinrigaku), demonstrates his brilliant interpretation of continental rationalism. After introducing the distinction between res cogitans and res extensa in Descartes, he sets forth to discuss Spinoza:

When Descartes distinguished sharply between res cogitans and res extensa at the beginning of early modern philosophy, space was entirely separated from the subject and was made an essential qualification of the object. [. . .]. However, we must not forget that Spinoza wasted no time in emphatically denying this view. Following Descartes, Spinoza also distinguished res cogitans and res extensa, or cogitatio and extentio. In Spinoza, however, these two are not considered independent substances but rather refer to the ‘attributes’ of one and the same substance, God.2

From this Watsuji moves on to point out that God in Spinoza is extended in a dual sense, i. e. as both natura naturans and natura naturata. Since extendedness is an attribute of God, and because an attribute must refer to the way God acts, natura naturans must act as extendedness. Eventually, what is extended for Spinoza is God himself, not each creature, which is a modus of God, or, to make a further step, it is both the cause and effect of the creative act that must be extended. Thus Watsuji continues:

This leads to the thought that extendedness as an attribute is the extendedness of the active Creator, while extendedness as a modus is the extendedness of the things created. Extendedness

in Descartes referred only to the latter. For Spinoza, the extendedness of the former sort is more fundamental and, hence, is of greater importance. Herein we can see self-active spatiality (shutaitekina kūkansei) grasped in accordance with the self-active Creator.³

The bold move adumbrated in these words is that human existence partakes in this ‘self-active spatiality,’ which also means that no human subject can be collapsed into a small bounded space occupied by the material body alone. If we wish to reconstruct ethics, therefore, one way to proceed is to free Spinoza’s concept of Creator from medieval theological doctrines and to revive it as a space of life. A thought like this was already dimly present in Watsuji’s Climaticity. Inspired by Friedrich Ratzel, Watsuji writes: ‘What then would become of the ‘space of life’ if we take it up from the standpoint of self-active life? It must become nothing but a living space (ikeru kūkan), a self-active space (shutaitekina kūkan). This is just what we aim at [in this work].’⁴

IV

Brought under this light, the wide and ambitious scope of the philosophical ideas in Climaticity becomes more visible. Given this framework, the body cannot fail to be ontologically and functionally co-extensive with the mind. Body and mind, which are always outside, must share one and the same outreaching and interpenetrating identity. Furthermore, human ex-sistence becomes part of the ex-sistence of the greater self-active space from which human solidarity receives its being. For this reason, Watsuji also writes that ‘the in-between-ness itself (aidagara sonomono),’ a living sub-structure of the whole, ‘moves beyond itself into the future.’⁵ The world is by no means an abstract three-dimensional space – it is living flesh and blood with primordial

3. Watsuji Tetsurō Zenshū, vol. 10, p. 176. (The emphasis on ‘self-active spatiality’ is Watsuji’s.)
extendedness. Based on such a consideration, a profound meaning is given to the concept of climaticity: ‘Such self-active corporeality (shutaiteki nikutaisei), as we may call it, is climaticity.’ What Watsuji understands here by climaticity is certainly different from ‘climate and culture’ in the ordinary sense.

The close scrutiny of the body or corporeality deserves special notice from the viewpoint of contemporary philosophy. Two years after Climaticity was published, Nishida Kitarō remarked that traditional Western philosophy had overlooked the significance of the body. ‘There has not been a view,’ Nishida says, ‘that thinks of the body philosophically.’ In this respect Watsuji’s grasp of the body as a fully incarnated, self-active body-mind not only proves his foresight but may well have drawn Nishida’s astute attention years before Merleau-Ponty and others started to thematize the body in contemporary Western philosophy. In Climaticity, Watsuji had already declared: ‘Hence what becomes the crux of the problem is the insight that the body (nikutai) is not merely a physical thing (buttai). Namely, the problem becomes that of the self-activeness of the body (nikutaino shutaisei).’ The same view is echoed in Ethics, too, Watsuji’s later celebrated work: ‘The body (shintai) is not simply an object in the same way other material objects are, for it is something originally self-active (shutaiteki-narumono). [. . .]. Further, without this self-active flesh (shutaiteki nikutai), no human relationship whatsoever can obtain.’

It was not necessary for Watsuji, however, to underscore the novelty of his view. As was the case with the reading of Spinoza, Watsuji, a remarkable interpreter of Western philosophy, had no difficulty in

apprehending the significance of the body in Nietzsche’s works. In *A Study of Nietzsche* (1913), Watsuji’s first published monograph, he observed how important the body was for Nietzsche:

Nietzsche expounded on the «respect for the body» again and again. […] The remotest and the nearest past of organic change blend into each other in the body producing a complex harmony so as to form a lively, ongoing, concrete activity. […] True, it is the working of cognition that generated the «representation of the body». But cognition is a faculty of the body, not a power belonging to a psychic entity. In the absence of the representation of the body, there still is the body, the power that creates representations.10

Watsuji points out in the same study that the ‘I’ or ‘ego’ for Nietzsche ‘is nothing but imagined to be the subject to which the sense of power belongs’ such that the initial sense of the ‘I’ is in fact ‘a faith in the one-and-the-sameness of the body,’ which is then ‘immediately dissociated from the body and is made a substance.’11

On such an account each human being emerges at the intersection of a multitude of complex self-active workings and operations constituting a holistic environment, none of which being deprived of extendedness or outsideness. In Watsuji’s view, ethics is the ‘study of human beings (*ningenno gaku*).’ As a result, the fundamental externality of human ex-sistence not only bridges between climaticity and ethics but probes for future grounds of ethical inquiry. Once principles of ethics crystalize in individual consciousness, as it were, they can be felt internal to or inherent in the individual mind, but starting from the ‘ego’ or ‘I’, Watsuji thinks, puts the horse before the cart. From sensory perception to deep moral feelings, nothing dwells ‘inside’ the mind, nor are there individuals that must struggle to ‘reach out’ to others. Moral agents are always outside in the climatized world, a fact ethics must begin with.

When confronting European modernity, the universality represented in Chinese philosophy got lost its overwhelming power in East Asia. In contrast with the universality shown through modern science and philosophy in Europe, the traditional universality in China turned to be “Chinese universality.” In this turnover of values, how could Japanese and Chinese philosophy imagine the universality? It was not a simple prolongation of modern universality into East Asia, but a transformed one. We might call it “earthy universality.”

Lecture 1 “Place of Japan: ‘New Universality’ in Modern Japanese Philosophy”

In this lecture, I dealt with two Japanese philosophers: Miyazawa Kenji (1896-1933) and Suzuki Daisetz (1870-1966).

After leaving Pure Land Buddhism, Miyazawa converted into Kokuchūkai (国柱会 National Pillar Society) based upon Nichiren sect. He hoped to realize social welfare as Buddhist utopia in this world. However, he was dissatisfied with Kokuchūkai and tried to establish a new community for “earthy men.” It was called as “Rasu Earthy Men Association” (1926.8-1927.3) in which Miyazawa challenged to combine natural science and religion redefined in Genius Loci. By thinking that “religion gets tired and is substituted by science, and science is cold and dark” (1926), Miyazawa needed to build a bridge between the universality of natural science and the locality of religion.

In contrast to Miyazawa, Suzuki defended Pure Land
Buddhism to find a possibility of “earthy spirituality.” By referring to local saints called as “myōkōnin,” he elaborated the dimension of the mysterious in the midst of modernized Japan and regarded it as a place of resistance to the statism. He said that “regardless of the East or the West, Political system should be mainly based on liberty which derives from spiritual liberty.” (1947) As for religion, he preferred religion existing in the earth. He said, “Though religion is said to come from heaven, its essence exists in the earth.” (1944) As a modern intellectual, Suzuki knew the power of Christianity that had a notion of heavenly “transcendence,” but he tried to find an earthy universality in Buddhism.

Needless to say, Heidegger also talked about “earth” as a Nazi propagator. When modern Japanese philosophers considered earthy universality, what type of difference could we find from Heideggerian philosophy? In my sense, the earthy universality in Japanese philosophy never appropriated Japanese “Geist” as some essence of Japan, but it opened up a transformable and trans-universal aspect of Japanese “spirit.”

*Lecture 2 “Tianxia as a Place of Chinese Universality: Contemporary Debates”*

We can find a seeking for new universality in contemporary Chinese discourses. For examples, Zhao Tingyang and Xu Jilin are trying to redefine the traditional concept of “All under Heaven 天下.” This concept has been completely marginalized since the reception of European concept of the “world.” The concept of “All under Heaven” presupposed China as a center while other countries and cultures were disposed around China according to their degrees of civilization. However, in modern universality of the “world,” China became one of the pieces.

It would be misleading if we just understand the current revival of “All under Heaven” as a mere problem of hegemony. It involves a deep questioning about the conditionality of European modernity. It is time to think of unconditional universality, in which Chinese or European
particularities are not lost, but become important parts. Nonetheless the demand of “All under Heaven” seems naïve from the philosophical point of view, because it does not check or criticize its own foundation. We have to ask if heaven is still a stable place for this new universality.

Following the history of Chinese philosophy, we can find a deep doubt on the stableness of Heaven. Sima Qian asked if the heavenly way was correct or not in Shiji. Confucius that “Heaven has ruined me,” even though he decided not to blame Heaven in the Analects. Xunzi radically interrogated a possibility of weak normativity for human beings, without appealing to Heaven as a strong and transcendent foundation. He came to emphasize the separation between Heaven and Human.

In Tang dynasty when Buddhism occupied a new position of universality, Han Yu tried to reconstruct Confucian teaching. However, even Han could not simply revive the notion of Heaven, because it was already broken in the setting of normativity. Instead of appealing to Heaven, he introduced genealogical lineage or tradition, which would be defined as “daotong 道統” afterwards.

If we take philosophical doubt on Heaven shown in Chinese intellectual history seriously, how can we consider the stableness of “Tianxia” in today’s circumstance? I would like to pose “earthy universality” and consider a possibility of “weak normativity” once again.

Lecture 3 and 4 “Chinese Universality in Tang Junyi”

We had better call in mind that the problem of universality has been repeatedly questioned in different forms in modern Chinese philosophy. By analyzing the possibilities and limitations of the discourse of Tang Junyi, one of the main figures of New Confucianism, I would like to locate a possible clue to how we might approach this problem in the age of globalization.

In chapter five, entitled “Philosophical Scientific Consciousness and Moral Reason,” in Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason [文化意識與道德理性] Tang tries to constitute universality in a unique
First of all, as an example of the universality, he describes abstract concepts like *li* [principle: 理], giving a psychological account of their process of emergence out of our experience. However, he is not satisfied with this psychological explanation of the emergence of abstract concepts, because it seems for him to lack universality as long as it adheres closely to psychological subjectivity. Instead, he proposes two different simultaneous approaches to universality. On the one hand, he regards these concepts as what objectively exist apart from subjectivity, while, on the other hand, he interprets *xin* [heart/mind: 心] not only as what is subjective, but as what objectively exists.

In this point, he not only thinks of modern western philosophical reasoning on universality, but consciously shifts it into a Chinese philosophical setting. When he talks about *li*, for example, he immediately introduces a Neo-Confucian setting — especially that of Zhu Xi — in order to think of its two features, subjective and objective. *Li* belongs simultaneously to the interiority of *xin* and to the exteriority of objective matters respectively. He knows that it is insufficient to give a firm foundation to universality of *li*, if we only refer to its objective existence in exterior matters. Insofar as *li* belongs to *xin*, we have to think of the universality of *li* based upon the “subjectivity” of *xin*. This is a very basic philosophical setting in Neo-Confucianism, and he repeats it in his seemingly modern approach to constituting universality, even though there was a difficult problem like others’ *xin* or intersubjectivity in Neo-Confucianism.

However, as a modern philosopher, Tang goes beyond Zhu Xi. He tries to apply his concept of universality based upon morality in the field of science. As far as science aims for universality by transcending “private desires,” it is also rooted in morality and has a “good” nature. Nonetheless, as far as morality is concerned, Tang is not satisfied with science. The main problem for him is the immorality of “applied science.” The research on scientific truth must be originally based upon morality, but it cannot prevent applied science from being used for private purposes. Then, he concludes that “research on scientific truth cannot eradicate human desires.” (Tang 1958, 349)

This conclusion seems to suggest a tear or split in Tang’s idea
of a universality based upon morality. Even if we can realize morality in both myself and others intersubjectively, the process of universalization inevitably yields an immoral result. On this point, all Tang can do is simply ask scientists to become much more moral. (350) In other words, facing the immorality of applied science, he comes to understand that there is a fundamental possibility of rupture in Zhu Xi’s philosophical setting of the enlargement of self-cultivation to realize universality. Or at least we can say that he hesitates to stick to the idea that a universality based upon morality can be immediately realized. He has a modest philosophical sense to recognize the difficulty or limitation in a universality based upon morality. Facing this difficulty or limitation, he starts to think that universality should be supported by something other than morality.

For Tang, two of the elements which support universality based upon morality are “education and culture” [教育文化]. This notion of “education and culture” is a modernized version of the traditional Confucian ethico-political value of “cultivating transformation of people by teaching” [教化]. He thinks that “the ideal democracy still contains the former Chinese way of ruling through ritual, moral personality, and virtue” [禮治、人治、德治]. (289) However, he never advocates a return to the past Chinese way of ruling, by abandoning democracy. On the contrary, in order to maintain democracy, he wants to “realize the ideal of the past Chinese way of ruling,” in which “all people become sages through the cultivating transformation of teaching.” (290) Here, we should bear in mind that such an ideal never existed in past China. Tang knows that it is a future ideal that he tries to find in the Chinese past. We could say that the universality Tang considers is a Chinese universality which combines western universality in China with a re-invented traditional Chinese type of universality in a highly strained way.

Chinese universality becomes more problematic, when Tang places it in an international framework. For him, the most important concept to realize “world peace” is “a state under heaven” [tianxia guojia: 天下國家]. We are facing the concept of tianxia [天下] again.

In the curious concept of “a state under heaven,” he combines universality with the state. We could say that he does not propose a
cosmopolitanism which denies the state, but rather a cosmopolitanism supported by the state which finally transcends existing states.

This reminds us the Kantian concept of “world republic,” though Tang never refers to Kant. Rather, in this respect, he mainly thinks of Hegel. According to Tang, Hegel tried to place the state above all else. Hegel only aims to “gloriously develop” his own state and approves that the conquest of the other states is not immoral. Such thinking never achieves “world peace.” Contrary to Hegel, then, Tang advocates the importance of “love of other states.” Here, it is easy for us to find a structure similar to that mentioned above in the constitution of universality. This is a repetition of the enlargement of self-cultivation in Neo-Confucian thought.

On this point, we come to face a crucial difficulty. If the other does not approve such self-cultivation, in other words, if the other does not have such a “moral responsibility” to “affirm and respect that the other loves his state,” what should we do? This appears to mark a limit in Tang’s “absolutely universaliz[ing]” process. Put differently, if there is someone who does not want to understand or approve “education and culture,” Tang’s Chinese universality based upon morality is then subject to an irreparable split. At this limitation, what Tang can do is to repeat the importance of “education and culture.”

In sum, Tang’s Chinese universality based upon morality can be maintained by cooperation with others or other states that have already been morally cultivated or will be able to be morally cultivated through “education and culture.” No matter how ambiguous the concept of “education and culture” might be, he has no other way but to appeal to it.

**Concluding remarks**

We have a custom to think of universality from above, but now in the situation of confronted universalities, we are expected to think of it from below. It would be “earthy universality” instead of “heavenly universality.” It is sure that the notion of earth has had complicated significances including Heideggerian one. By paying sufficient attention
to them, we will be able to find a clue to the coming universality.

References:

Lecture 1


Lecture 2


Lecture 3 and 4


Introduction

How do we know that something is good or bad? If animals have no sense of goodness and badness, no feelings of guilt or conscience, and act purely on instinct, we should probably assume that normativity is based rather on a kind of intellectual capability. But this lecture addresses emotion as basis for normativity from a phenomenological perspective. By “phenomenology” I don’t mean that of Husserl, Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, but of Hermann Schmitz, who is famous for his phenomenology of body and emotion, and developed a unique legal philosophy from this viewpoint. First, as an introduction, I deal with the “good-ought-problem” and “know-do problem” in order to clarify the significance of affective experience for the discussion of normativity. Then, I explain Schmitz’s phenomenological theory of emotion and normativity. After that, I will apply it to the religious dimension and to the problem of freedom.

1) The Basis for Goodness and Badness

The Justifiability of “Good” and “Bad”

First, let’s think about the following ethical questions and the answers to them:

- Are we allowed to tell a lie in order to help others? – Rather “Yes”.
- Are we allowed to kill a person in order to save the lives of ten
people? – Rather “No” or difficult to give a clear answer.

- Are behaviors based on egoism always bad? – “No” or “That depends on”.

- Can we do anything if we do not do harm to others? – Rather “No”.

We do not have to reach an answer that all human beings can agree to, and when we discuss in detail, for example, why or in which case it is true, it must be difficult to agree with each other, but in giving just simple answers, not so much argument seems to be needed. Then, how do we get the answer? Through judgment after theoretical considerations based on a certain philosophical principle like utilitarianism, eudemonism, hedonism, no harm to others? Or rather through intuitive judgment? When the former is the case, more intelligent and educated people could give a right answer, but anyone – whether she or he is intelligent or not – can give the same simple answers such as “Yes”, “No”, “Difficult” or “That depends on”. The ability to know something is good or bad seems more intuitive or less based on intelligence.

There is a good material to think about this question. It is a scene from a crime film directed by Michael Mann in 2004: a contract killer Vincent (played by Tom Cruise) pretending to be a business man, will visit his “clients” whom he was ordered to kill overnight. So Vincent hires a taxi driver Max (played by Jamie Foxx) for the night because he was impressed by Max’s skill at navigating the streets of Los Angeles. When Max waits at the first stop, a fat man falls onto the cab roof and Vincent has to reveal himself as a hitman, he threatens Max to put the body in the trunk and drive him to the next targets. This is the conversation between them in the car.

M: You threw a man out of a window.
V: No, I didn’t throw him. He fell.
M: Well, what did he do to you?
V: What?
M: What did he do to you?
V: Nothing. I only met him tonight.
M: You just met him once and you kill him like that?
V: What, I should only kill people after I get to know them?
N: No, man.
V: Max, six billion people on the planet, you are getting bent out of shape because of one fat guy.
M: Well, who was he?
V: What do you care? Have you ever heard of Rwanda?
M: Yes, I know Rwanda.
V: Tens of thousands killed before sundown. Nobody’s killed people that fast since Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Did you bat an eye, Max?
M: What?
V: Did you join Amnesty International, Oxfam, “Save the whale”, Greenpeace or something? No. I off one fat Angeleno, and you throw a hissy fit.
M: I don’t know any Rwandans.
V: You don’t know the guy in the trunk either.
M: Man.
V: Okay, if it makes you feel any better, he was a criminal involved in continuing criminal enterprise.
M: What are you doing? You’re just taking out the garbage?
V: Yeah, something like that.

This argument between a good person and a bad person seems very plausible. What Vincent says is quite rational and persuasive, difficult to refute, while Max cannot argue against Vincent well and remains ineloquent. Is something wrong with this? Is badness more justifiable than goodness? Still, we think that Max is right, at least we know he is a “good” person, even if it is difficult to explain in words. Then we should ask how we can know Max is “good” and Vincent is “bad”?

The “Good-Ought” and “Ought-Do” Problems

In discussions of the basis of normativity, people used to refer to the so-called “Is-Ought problem” (or “Hume’s law”): it is impossible to derive normative statements (what ought to be) from descriptive statements (what is), because the two have completely different dimensions of
existence. But in my opinion, this is not a serious point here. Admitting
goodness and badness can belong to facts, as is possible from the
phenomenological viewpoint according to which the world we live
is formed not only from objective entities, but also from subjective
qualities like meanings and values, we can rightly maintain that we
ought to do what is good. Then “is” and “ought” are connected directly
here.

However, there is a prevalent presupposition which appears
quite natural, but needs to be asked: Ought we to do what is good,
because it is good? And ought we not to do what is bad, because it is
bad? This might be called “Good-Ought problem”. But this reasoning
or justification is very questionable. First, it is not clear how we know
why something is good or bad, and even if this is clear, one would
believe in this reasoning, only when one is a good person. Conversely,
a bad person would think that he ought to do what is bad, because it
is bad, and probably, there is no sufficient reason why one has to be a
good person. So there is an unfillable gap between “good” and “ought”.

There is another more serious gap: supposing a person is
somehow absolutely sure of what is good and she / he is a good person,
and so thinks that she / he ought to do it, does she / he actually do it?
That we ought to do something does not mean that we actually do it.
This can be called “Ought-Do problem” which we often face in our
daily life. We might think we should stop smoking or go on a diet, but
we cannot do that. You see a kind of unfairness and think something
must be done against it, but it is difficult; you might expect somebody
to take action, or you know it is you, but actually you do nothing. How
can this gap be filled? Only sufficient knowledge would not be enough.
We often put more value on objective knowledge, for more general
validity of the correctness, but however much we might know, for
example from the TV news or newspaper articles about serious disasters
or accidents, that itself would not lead us to any action and could leave
us just as indifferent to them. For action, for personal engagement, we
need “affective connectedness” thereto. So the basis for normativity is
to be sought in affective experiences, or the subjective conditions of our
existence.
2) **Emotion as a Normative Principle**

Body and Emotion in the Phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz

In so far as norms such as rules and laws are social, collective and objective, the basis for normativity should be found in what is shared among members of a group or society (that can be all human beings). So it seems to be very difficult to find it in affective experiences such as emotions or bodily sensations, because they are personal, individual, and subjective. However, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim shed light on the collective, social aspects of emotion, and for Martin Heidegger, emotion (*Stimmung*) was something like an atmosphere that falls upon us from the world and it indicates a mode of *thrownness in the world* (*Geworfenheit*). In this line, German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (1928-) developed a comprehensive theory of body and emotion.

Schmitz claims emotion is an *atmosphere* that prevails in space, in the sense that it is not a state of mind or an “inner” world, but *outside* us in our surroundings. So he discusses the objectivity as well as the subjectivity of emotion: we know that a person is sad, angry, etc. and, according to Schmitz, this is not our reasoning of the state of others, but we actually “see” their sadness or anger, i.e. it is a direct perception of emotion as an external object. On the other hand, we know ourselves that we are sad, angry, etc., and we feel emotion as our own subjective condition experienced as bodily feeling. So Schmitz defines emotion as “atmosphere in space that catches us by the body”.

Emotion, from this perspective, is not only a phenomenon in physical space, but has itself a sort of spatiality. Phenomenology has dealt with various types of space appearing according to modes of experience. Usually, space means a three-dimensional space that is measurable as well as dividable, stable and static, but this type of space is accessible only through the sense of sight and touch. It can be called visual-tactile space. But through other sense organs, space shows a totally different structure. A space experienced without sight, darkness, or a space that appears through hearing and smelling, i.e. sound, silence, aroma, also has a sort of volume, a spatial entity that is unmeasurable,
undividable, unstable and dynamic. The spatiality of emotion as atmosphere, which is similar to this type of space, emerges through the whole body, and Schmitz names it *Gefühlsraum* (*emotional space*).

How is this emotional space accessible? According to Schmitz, it is *leibliches Spüren*, spontaneous feeling not through any sense organ, but experienced with a certain sort of spatiality on or in one’s own body. For example, when we are relaxed, we feel ourselves widened. In excitement we feel ourselves expanding. In fear and shame, we feel our body smaller. This is called *leiblicher Raum*, which might be translated as *bodily space*. This is also an unmeasurable, undividable, unstable and dynamic space like *Gefühlsraum*. The difference between *Gefühlsraum* and *leiblichem Raum* is, according to Schmitz, the locatability of its origin: *leiblicher Raum* has its origin at one’s body as the point from which the space unfolds, while *Gefühlsraum* appears from the space surrounding one’s own body.

Legal Emotion and Forefeeling

Usually we think we have emotions, but from Schmitz’s perspective, they are rather autonomous, and it could rather be said that “emotions have us”. We always find ourselves already involved in a certain emotion, as Heidegger regards emotion (*Stimmung*) as a phenomenal form of *thrownness in the world*. In addition to this autonomy, emotions have a power that makes us follow them and act in a certain way, which is called *authority* by Schmitz. This power connects us personally with what we should be engaged in. So, without emotion we would be indifferent to everything.

According to Schmitz, there is a specific emotion called *Rechtsgefühl* (*legal emotion*) which tells us normative value *Recht* und *Unrecht*: *Recht* means right, just, legal, fair, appropriate, etc., while *Unrecht* indicates wrong, unjust, illegal, unfair, inappropriate, etc. Schmitz claims that there are two kinds of legal emotion: the one is *Zorn*, umbrage, anger which tells us that an *Unrecht* happened; the other is *Scham*, shame which tells us that we are in *Unrecht*. But every culture has developed the sensibility for *Vorgefühl* (*forefeel*) which foresees the possible burst of the main legal emotions – anger and shame – and
Emotion as a Place for Normativity

prevent it. Forefeels of anger are respect, caution, reticence, moderation, etc., and those of shame are shyness, bashfulness, obligation, hesitation, etc. Such a structure of emotional space gives a certain grade of stability with flexibility where everyone can live with his own sensibly nuanced attitudes toward what concerns him personally. Only in this way would life be worth living.

3) **Normativity in the Religious Dimension**

From the phenomenological viewpoint of Schmitz, religion is not a matter of belief, but a matter of experience: what is essential for religion is not God, but the divine (das Göttliche) and religion is defined as “behavior from being affected by divine atmospheres”. Divine atmospheres are totally overwhelming and too powerful to withstand. Such atmospheres are experienced as strong emotion like fear, awe, menace, sublimity, rapture, ecstasy, fascination, excitement, anger, shame, grief, despair, regret, amazement, wonder, comfort, etc. Moreover, climatic phenomena (thunder, storm, sunrise), landscape and unusual things (huge tree or rock) can also take on something divine, i.e. overwhelming, sublime, fascinating, frightening and so on.

According to Schmitz, divine atmospheres are too powerful for humans to resist, and they need more stable relationship with it. God and religion are regarded as the measures of controlling such an overwhelming atmosphere: god is an embodiment of the atmosphere in a figure, form or character which is more or less personalized so that it is easier for humans to deal with it. Religion is institutionalized for the preservation and reactivation of divine atmospheres through ritual, music, pictures, décor, and architecture (form, color, sound, light).

This phenomenological theory enables us a better understanding of the diversity of religion: the type of deity is understood according to the sort of divine atmosphere. Furthermore, not only what is named “God”, but all kinds of entities which evoke overwhelming emotions can be taken into account (angel, demon, saint, ancestor, natural things, living humans with charisma, stars, etc.). Relativism can be better taken into account here, because affectedness
by the divine is a temporal, personal and local experience, so the divinity of atmosphere is neither general nor eternal, but always changeable and specific. Consequently, religion is in essence pluralistic, and Schmitz places more value on polytheism than monotheism in so far as it is considered only possible as a conceptual abstraction rather than as lived experience.

As the relationship with atmosphere is the fundamental aspect of human existence, religion is understood in association with our daily life. For Schmitz, “Dwelling (Wohnen) is a culture of emotions in the enclosed space, where the human arranges the relationship with the uncontrolled atmospheres, so that he could live with them in a certain degree of harmony and balance.” In this sense, religion is to be also regarded as a sort of Dwelling-in-the-World. Moreover, this phenomenological theory can cover not only so-called religion, but also something religious, for example in politics, technology, and also the fields related or similar to religion such as art, music, architecture, theater, politics, entertainment, social movements, etc.

4) **Freedom as Feeling and Normativity**

Starting from the affective connectedness or subjective conditions of our existence, which is considered more fundamental than objective ones, the problem of freedom can be argued differently. Determinism and indeterminism are the opposite positions which always come into discussion for the possibility of freedom: determinism claims that everything is determined by prior events regulated by physical law, fate, divine providence, omnipotence and omniscience of God. Indeterminism insist on the contrary. Determinism is supposed to be incompatible with freedom, but regardless of which position is correct, both positions refer only to objective conditions including physiological processes in the body, and so does freedom: Freedom means here free will associated with choice determined by one’s will, and this choice is seen as an action which can be observed and analyzed from an objective viewpoint. And here it is only asked whether we can be free or not in principle, i.e. the objectively verifiable general
possibility of freedom.

However, the more serious question to us is when we are free, or why we are sometimes free and sometimes not. Freedom here is not an objective condition, but a subjective one, so we should rather say that we feel free or don’t feel free – it may be an emotion or physical sensation. Schmitz maintains that freedom is that of Gesinnung which means affect-related attitude: for example, even a sensation such as pain is not only a passive experience that we just have to undergo, but has also an active aspect that we can deal with: we tend to be involved in acute pain with a groan, but we can also try to let it go and stand it calmly. We sometimes lose ourselves in fury, but can also control it and take some distance from it. Whether or how we feel free depends on how we communicate with emotions or physical sensation, and that is not directly or necessarily related with freedom of choice or will.

As norms are what direct or regulate human actions, fewer norms seem to give us more room for choice and freedom. But this is only the case from the objective viewpoint which associates freedom with choice. If emotion or atmosphere has a normative quality and freedom consists in Gesinnung as the attitude toward affective experiences that constitute the basis of human existence, normativity is not contrary to freedom. Far from it, we develop and direct our will and hope through being embedded in such normative conditions of life, and freedom is only possible on the basis of them.

Closing Remarks

When we get an insight into the significance of emotion or affective experience for human existence, we can understand various connections between space, the body, dwelling, religion, normativity and freedom. From this perspective, we should rethink the prevalent belief in freedom in the modern age. It is true that humans were released from many restrictions such as religion, convention, class, many physical and natural limitations, partially through science and technology, partially through the change of social and political systems, but that all of these primarily concern freedom in the objective sense. Today, freedom
means rather being rootless, undirected, undecided, arbitrary and unstable. We should rather consider this situation from the subjective aspect, then whether we feel free or not depends on how we cope with it as attitudes toward affective experiences there.

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II. Papers by Participants
At the end of the summer institute, Reverend Miyagawa asked us to interpret the famous passage from the fascicle, “Genjōkōan,” in the Shōbōgenzō (Dōgen 1990, p.54-55):

仏道をならふといふは、自己をならふ也。自己をならふといふは、自己をわするゝなり。自己をわするゝといふは、万法に証せらるゝなり。万法に証せらるゝなりといふは、自己の身心および他己の身心をして脱落せしむるなり。

These four lines succinctly elucidate the ways in which one achieves enlightenment, and it is allegedly one of the most difficult passages in all of Dōgen’s writings. In this essay, I will interpret this dense passage with a special emphasis on the relation between 自己 jiko and 万法 banpō.

1. Textual Analysis of “Genjokoan”

‘Genjōkōan’ is considered one of the ‘big three’ fascicles along with ‘Bendōwa’ and ‘Busshō’ in Dōgen’s writings. Its prestigious status can be substantiated with the historical fact that Dōgen kept editing this fascicle for nearly two decades. Even without this knowledge, one can immediately sense the significance of this fascicle in reading it, insofar as the fascicle begins with the philosophically significant notions, such as 自己 jiko, 万法 banpō, and 仏道 butsudō. While
these notions appear throughout the fascicle, ‘自己 jiko’ especially stands out, as it appears nine times in “Genjōkōan” alone. Although this fascicle is abundant with other philosophically important notions and metaphors, considering the notion of self is central to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, one way to wrestle with this dense fascicle is to analyze the ways in which Dōgen illuminates the notion of self (jiko).

What is striking about Dōgen’s references to jiko in ‘Genjōkōan’ is that it is repeatedly juxtaposed with ‘万法 banpō,’ another key term that can be translated as ‘the myriad dharma.’ According to Mizuno Yaoko (1990, p. 53), banpō is comparable to 諸法 shōhō or all dharmas, but it refers especially to the dharmas that one considers dwell outside his/her self. Thusly understood, the relation between self and the myriad dharma becomes clear: The juxtaposition here represents the classic duality between subject and object, which is often embodied in the duality of self and 万物 banbutsu (ten thousand things) in the contexts of East Asian philosophy. Once this point is made clear, it begins to make sense that banpō, which appears six times in this particular fascicle, is without an exception paired with either 自己 jiko or われ ware, as its primary function is to draw our attention to the contrast.

Bearing in mind that this juxtaposition represents the subject/object duality, I would like to analyze the passage from ‘Genjōkōan’ that we studied at the summer institute. This passage consists of four short sentences that elucidate the process of reaching enlightenment. The first sentence reads, ‘仏道をならふといふは、自己をならふ也’:

Aitken and Tanahashi (1985, p. 70) translate, ‘To study the buddha way is to study the self,’ while Abe and Waddell (2002, p. 41) translate, ‘To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one’s self.’ The point of the first sentence is rather clear: The learning of the Buddha Way involves the learning of the self. As the first sentence establishes the importance of self-learning for enlightenment, the rest of the passage is devoted to portraying the actual process of self-learning. The second sentence, ‘自己をならふといふは、自己をわするゝなり,’ paradoxically

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1. In the footnote, Mizuno writes that banpō is ‘equivalent to all dharmas, but particularly everything that one considers outside one’s self.’ (諸法と同じものであるが、自己の外のものと考えているものごとのすべて。)
declares that the study of the self involves the forgetting of the self, and
the third sentence, ‘自己をわするゝといふは、万法に証せらるゝなりゝなり’, elucidates it further by asserting that forgetting the self involves being verified by the myriad dharmas. Finally, the fourth sentence concludes, ‘万法に証せらるゝなりといふは、自己の身心おおよび他己の身心をして脱落せしむるなり’, as it proclaims that to be verified by the myriad dharmas is to drop off one’s body and mind as well as the bodies and minds of others. As we can see, the last three sentences of the passage exemplify a dialectical development in the dichotomy of self and others: first, the confirmation of the self; second, the negation of the self through others; and finally, the reconciliation of the dichotomy.

Emphasizing this dialectical development in understanding the above passage, the traditional reading of this fascicle advocates the nonduality of dualities. Their claim is that dualities exist in the phenomenal world for the deluded, but the enlightened transcends them and sees the oneness of all. Thus, this awareness, the nonduality of dualities, is considered crucial for enlightenment, and accordingly, the self and the myriad dharmas are unified as one, highlighting that all beings drop off their bodies and minds to be one.

This traditional view is helpful in interpreting another sentence from “Genjōkōan,’ ‘自己をはこびて万法を修証するを迷とす、万法すゝみて自己を修証するはさとりなり,’ which appears a few sentences before this particular passage. Just as the rest of the fascicle, this short sentence is not easy to translate. What makes this sentence particularly difficult to translate is that it is not clear as to whose self is being referred to in the second half of the sentence. Abe and Waddell (Dōgen 2002, p.40) interpret that “jiko” that appears in the second half is identical with the first one, as they translate, ‘Practice that confirms things by taking the self to them is illusion: for things to come forward and practice and confirm the self is enlightenment.’ Similarly, Nishijima and Cross (Dōgen 1994, p.27) assume that the second self is the same as the first one in their translation: ‘Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad dharma is delusion. When the myriad dharmas actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state of realization.’ Aitkin and Tanahashi (Dōgen 1985,
on the other hand, deviate from the previous translations, as they interpret that the second sentence is about the myriad dharma: ‘To carry yourself forward and experience myriad things is delusion. That myriad things come forth and experience themselves is awakening.’ The discrepancies are due to their assumptions about the subject and object structure in the above sentence. The first sentence indicates that the dichotomy exists between the self and the myriad dharmas, because one is still deluded. However, given that enlightenment is achieved in the second sentence, the boundary that separates the self and the myriad dharmas is blurred, making it possible to translate ‘jiko’ as either one’s self or those of the myriad dharmas. In short, the discrepancies in translation show the translators’ hidden preferences in emphasizing one ‘self’ over the other equally acceptable alternative ‘self.’

2. Application of the Philosophical Analysis

Up to this point, I have elucidated the dichotomy between subject and object as the key to understanding the particular passage from the fascicle of ‘Genjōkōan.’ However, what does it really mean to say that the dichotomy between subject and object disappears, or the boundary that separates the self from others is blurred?

While this is not an easy question to answer, I would like to assert that the nonduality of all does not entail the state of homogeneity that breakdowns the differences. Instead, the nonduality should be described as a harmony rather than a unity. Although the ideas of unity and harmony are often conflated and considered synonymous, a harmony, unlike a unity, requires multiple elements without collapsing their differences. In other words, unity assumes homogeneity, but a harmony would not be possible without differences. I believe that enlightenment should involve this awareness that differences need not be dissolved in order to achieve a nonduality.

To be more specific, let me introduce Sueki Fumihiko’s Nihon Bukkyō no Kanōsei (The Possibility of Japanese Buddhism) to illustrate my point. In this book, Sueki develops his own theory of others (tasharon他者論) to contemplate on the compatibility between
ethics and religion. While his theory is not directly related to Dōgen’s philosophy, it is not completely unrelated either, insofar as many of his ideas were born out of the questions posed by the movement of Critical Buddhism that challenged the traditional interpretation of Dōgen’s writings. Critical Buddhists, in their efforts to proliferate the ethical implications of Buddhism in general, criticize the nondualistic and all-encompassing reading of Dōgen’s writings. According to them, such interpretation collapses the division between enlightenment and delusion, thereby simultaneously eliminating the distinction between good and evil. In response to this criticism, Sueki reconsiders the role of Japanese Buddhism in contemporary society by showing the possible ways Buddhism can respond to the contemporary ethical issues. The discussion of transcendent others emerges from this context: While Sueki’s theory of others (2011, p.29-35) mainly pertains to the dead, he also extends the argument to irreconcilable others, whose normative values are so different from one’s own that mutual understanding is extremely difficult. In dealing with such transcendent others, Sueki argues that religion can show the shortcoming of ethics, namely its hidden but problematic assumption that human beings share similar interests and values. Sueki’s claim is that ethics may be more productive if we begin with a different assumption, that there are irreconcilable differences that render mutual understanding extremely difficult, if not impossible. Hence, the task of religion is to help us change our attitude and cultivate a new level of humility that enables us to see that our ethical values are more arbitrary and less certain than we originally presumed. Nonetheless, the goal is not to succumb to nihilism: Rather, he suggests that we set aside and provisionally transcended our own values so that we can accept the existence of transcendent others.

I believe that Sueki’s theory can help illuminate what it means to dissolve the boundary between subject and object. My position is that this acceptance of irreconcilable differences is close to the nonduality of all that establishes a harmony rather than a unity. A harmony, like a musical chord, brings together different others, as it preserves the differences rather than dissolving them. Bearing this in mind, I would like to conclude this short essay by revisiting the sentence,'自己をはこびて万法を修証するを迷とす、万法すゝみて自己を修証
するはさとりなり.’ The first part of the sentence can be interpreted to mean that our attempt to understand others with our own values is a delusion. The second part elucidates the nature of true enlightenment, as it shows that enlightenment takes place when we allow the myriad dharmas to come forward instead, only to awaken our own conscience to welcome the irreconcilable differences and accept our own biases and limitations in doing so. Hence, practice is our labor in listening to the voice we cannot hear, while enlightenment is like hearing the voice of our own conscience in the act of listening.

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**Human Beings, Human Becomings, and the Question of Personhood**

Yui FUJITA

What makes a “self” – a single human being – a person? And how should we understand our notions of “self” or “person” in the context of the relationships we are born into, and go on to form, during our lifetime? In this paper, it is my aim to compare two such conceptions of self and personhood by engaging with what I have chosen to call Vellemanian Kantianism (David Velleman’s interpretation of Kant as described in his paper, ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’) (1999) and Amesian Confucianism (Roger T. Ames’s interpretation of Confucius as described in his book, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*) (2007). As can be seen, I will not be engaging with the issue of “what Kant really thought” and “what Confucius really thought” about these topics, deferring instead to modern interpretations. I will begin by describing the salient aspects of Vellemanian Kantianism and Amesian Confucianism, go on to describe their convergences, and end by reflecting on the divergences between these two accounts.

**Human Beings: Vellemanian Kantianism**

At the heart of David Velleman’s interpretation of Kant is the distinction between two sides of the ‘self’ or ‘will’– the intelligible aspect and the sensible aspect. The latter is the will (or empirical ‘self”) which we recognize as ‘myself/my will’ in our daily lives and the former can only be understood conceptually as the ideal (noumenal) ‘self/will’. (1999, p, 346-8) In Velleman’s words, ‘Kant is not here envisioning one will causally governing another: after all, the sensible and the
intelligible are supposed to be two different aspects of one and the same thing. Rather, Kant is envisioning the purely intelligible will as a paradigm or ideal established for the sensible will.’ (1999, p. 347) Thus the intelligible will is not “a thing” per se, but something which the will that acts in our daily lives strives towards. What constitutes personhood – the ‘true and proper self of a person’, ‘the person as he is in himself rather than as he appears’ (1999, p. 348) – for Velleman’s Kant is this rational will. Velleman reminds us that central to Kant’s conception of the rational will is its ‘intelligible aspect [...] as a faculty of acting on lawlike maxims’ (1999, p. 347), but he repeatedly argues for and emphasises the idea of rational will as a broader ‘faculty’ or ‘capacity’, in connection to personhood. He states that the ‘rational will’ which lies at the heart of personhood is ‘a capacity of appreciation or valuation – a capacity to care about things in that reflective way which is distinctive of self-conscious creatures like us,’ ‘the capacity to be actuated by reasons,’ the capacity to have a good will.’ (1999, p. 365) Hence, he resists the idea that the ‘rational will’ is to be associated with what we might term “rationality” or “reflective reasoning” itself, shifting the emphasis to the capacity persons have to be self-reflective, to be rational, to reason, or even to act on lawlike maxims. It is this capacity or ‘rational nature’ which, for Velleman’s Kant, constitutes a person’s ‘true and better self’ (1999, p. 365). Put more simply, it is the self’s capacity to think or reflect on its present condition and in one sense to establish a certain distance from its day-to-day empirical existence (even if only ideally) – but also in Velleman’s definition, to care about them through this – that makes the “self” a “person”.

This conception of personhood is also carried through to Kant’s distinction between what has dignity and what has a price. (Velleman 1999, 367-70) Things which have a price are qualitatively comparable to each other and thus interchangeable or replaceable; their value can be thought of along a single scale. Things which have dignity, however, each have a value which is unique and inimical to that of any other. Hence, they are not comparable to each other, and therefore neither interchangeable nor replaceable. As Velleman explains, it is one’s ‘rational nature’ (the capacity for self-reflection defined above) which has dignity, whereas it is the sensible/empirical aspects of a person (e.g.
physical features or personality traits) which have a price. Although in one sense, since all persons have dignity and are in that sense equal, this does not mean that they can, on that basis, be considered the same or interchangeable. This is precisely what is ruled out by the fact that they have dignity. Whereas things with a price can be used as a means (for someone to achieve a certain outcome or something they desire), what has dignity should not (qua self-existent ends, appreciated as they are, for what they are in themselves) be so used. (1999, 357-360)

Hence, as Velleman states, ‘[y]our singular value as a person is not a value you are singular in possessing; it’s rather a value that entitles you to be appreciated singularly, in and by yourself.’ (1999, p. 370) Following from this, the only sense in which persons are comparable to one another is with respect to the features and traits (such as hair colour or personality traits) which are also possessed by other persons. (1999, p. 364-5, 368-9) From here, Velleman develops his own theory using Kant as a foundation. (1999 365-373) He states that the dignity of each person warrants at the very least respect (recognition of their dignity), and at most elicits love, towards one another. (1999, p. 366)1 Whereas the bare personhood (‘rational will’) of a self is enough to warrant our respect for of them, it is the empirical features of a person (or, as Velleman puts it, ‘the way he wears his hat and sips his tea […] the way he walks and the way he talks’ (1999, p. 371) as expressions of someone’s personhood (or “true self”) which might call forth in us a feeling of love for them.

Vellemanian Kantianism therefore suggests that we consider personhood as being defined by the capacity to be reflective and to care, as stated above, ‘characteristic of self-conscious creatures like us.’ (1999, p. 365) It is here that we encounter the problem of universality. What remains problematic about Velleman’s interpretation of Kant, by his own admission,2 is that he gives no reason or justification why

1. The full sentence runs, ‘I regard respect and love as the required minimum and optional maximum towards one and the same value.’

2. Cf. Velleman 1999, p. 366: footnote 90. ‘I am sneaking Kantian universalization into my account by speaking in the abstract of a capacity for valuation, and then speaking about the attitude of this abstract capacity toward particular instances of itself. I would need to offer a fair amount of argumentation in order to earn the right to this manner of
one-“self” (e.g. me) should admit that the people I see around me also have the ‘rational nature’ that I attribute to myself. He is thus mentions in a footnote that he is, ‘sneaking Kantian universalization into [his] account.’ (1999, p. 100, footnote 90) If this is so, there is as yet no explanation as to why I should think that they are other persons with a rational will (or capacity to reflect or care) who have dignity, and therefore, no reason why I should respect, let alone love, them.

**Human Becomings: Amesian Confucianism**

Amesian Confucianism can in many ways be seen as running counter to some of the central tenets of Vellemanian Kantianism. Let us begin with the following statement which neatly illustrates this:

In reading Confucius, there is no reference to some core human *being* as the site of who we *really* are and that remains once the particular layers of family and community are peeled away. That is, there is no “self,” no “soul,” no discrete “individual” behind our complex and dynamic habits of conduct. Each of us is the irreducibly social sum of the roles we *live* – not *play* – in our relationships and transactions with others. (Ames 2007, p. 96)

In other passages, which further support this central claim, we find the following: ‘the *ti* body does not carry with it the superordinate notion of “self” or “soul” – some ghost in the machine’ (2007, 110), ‘any putative “individuality” must be understood as [...] an abstraction from these concrete, native, and primarily acquired conditions.’ (2007, p. 144) There are therefore two respects in which the two positions differ: the notion of the individual ‘self’ as an (in reality non-existent) abstraction from the lived reality of its embeddedness in society and the notion of speaking.’

3. The full sentence runs, ‘[i]ndeed, any putative “individuality” must be understood as either an abstraction from these, concrete, native, and primarily acquired conditions, or an achieved distinctiveness cultivated in one’s relations with others that makes one an identifiable object of deference.’ (Ames, 1999, p. 144)
the ‘true ‘self’ or ‘the human being as the site of who we really are.’ The central claim of Amesian Confucianism is that what is taken to be an “individual self” is always already embedded in a network of relations: the concept of “self” and the concept of “collective” or “community” (as well as what those concepts stand for) are co-implicated – one cannot stand without the other, they emerge together.’ (2007, p. 98)

As Ames writes in his discussion of a passage by Herbert Fingarette, ‘[Fingarette] is unwilling to abstract and reify the notion of a person and locate it outside of the wholeness of the personal experience itself that is lived through the roles and relations with others as constituting our concrete social reality’ (2007. p. 125) This emphasis on the relationality of personal experience over an abstract, reified notion of person is also very much a feature of Amesian Confucianism. Building further upon this, Amesian Confucianism suggests that we become persons through actively ‘embodying’ our specific roles and relations, e.g. as a mother, brother, friend, teacher – we are ‘situated human becomings who grow and realize [our]selves as distinctive persons through a sustained commitment to [our] always-collaborative, transactional roles within the nexus of family and community.’ (2007, 105) In fact, persons are not something we ‘really are’ but something we are constantly becoming through living in our communities and acting as a mother, brother, friend, or teacher.

This stands in direct opposition to the Vellemanian Kantian claim that there is an intelligible (ideal) and empirical aspect to the rational will (self), the former constituting both personhood and a person’s true self, abstract from all societal relations of the empirical world. Thus we can see that from the perspective of Amesian Confucianism, what constitutes personhood on the Vellemanian Kantian account – the ‘rational will’ or ‘reflective capacity’ which is possessed by every individual human being and which has a value incomparable to that of any other – is precisely the kind of abstract individuality which Amesian Confucianism denies the existence of. There is no such “true self” of which we can speak, abstracted and standing apart from its relations with “others.” There are only the roles we are and live with respect to “each other,” the persons we are constantly becoming. However, it is precisely because of this
inseparability of self and society that Amesian. Confucianism does not encounter the first Vellemanian Kantian problem of needing to explain why other "selves" are also persons – there is no self without other selves, one's self is inextricably bound up with that of others, one's personhood is created out of one's interaction with other persons. As Ames states, the "self" is thus understood as 'an evolving configuration of relationships' (2007, p. 124) rather than a discrete individual. In that sense, unlike Vellemanian Kantianism, Amesian Confucianism comes with an inbuilt sense of universal applicability with respect to persons and their lived context.

**Convergences**

Thus far, the Vellemanian Kantian and Amesian Confucian accounts of personhood are directly opposed to one another, with the latter providing an account of personhood which does not encounter the problem of universality unaddressed in the former. However, despite the manifest differences, there is one thing which we have touched on in Vellemanian Kantianism which is in fact common to both accounts: the self-reflective nature of persons, their capacity to reflect or project beyond their given circumstances or relations. Putting aside for the moment the question of whether or not we grant that this reflective capacity is constitutive of personhood, we will now compare the Vellemanian Kantian conception of the ‘core of reflective concern’ (1999, p. 366) which emerges in Velleman’s thesis about the nature of love, with the Amesian Confucian account of xin (心) and xing (性) (2007, p. 138-145). Through this, I hope to show how close these positions come to each other, while nevertheless diverging.

The distinction between xin and xing is introduced by Ames through a discussion of the *Mencius*. All persons have a xin (heatmind), and it in fact possesses ‘a given incipient propensity for moral conduct.’ (2007, 138) Were it not for the fact that Mencius states that the heartmind (xin) is a bodily organ, we find ourselves not far from the rational will as the ‘capacity to have a good will’ (1999, 265) of the 'Vellemanian Kantian view. As we have seen, Velleman claims that
this capacity is the seat of personhood and the true self, what we respond to with respect, an abstract, ideal concept of the kind Amesian Confucian account of personhood rejects: ‘a mere concept or idea […] something that we know about him intellectually but with which we have no immediate acquaintance.’ (1999, 371) But he also states that it is the same capacity which we recognise when we love others: ‘what we respond to in loving people, is their capacity to love […] what our hearts respond to is another heart.’ (1999, 365)

*Xing*, on the other hand, is the ‘creative process of change, growth, and refinement’ which is ‘rooted in the heartmind (*xin*)’. (Ames, 2007, p. 138) As we have seen in the preceding section, it is this *xing*, this process of human becoming, which is constitutive of personhood on the Amesian Confucian account: ‘Mencius […] wants to reserve the category of *xing* to include only those among such tendencies that when fully cultivated make us distinctively human” (2007, p. 142), “the ethical sensorium (is) rooted in the heartmind (*xin* 心) […] is then articulated across the particular narrative of a distinctively human life as a collaboration between person and world to become one’s *xing* 性.’ (2007, 143) In fact, Velleman’s explains that what *evokes* our love for particular persons is not the rational will but the ‘the manifest person, embodied in flesh and blood’ whose ‘looks or acts or works […] are symbols of a value that isn’t theirs but belongs to the inner – or, as Kant would say merely intelligible – person.’ (1999, p. 371) The manifest person, their ‘rendition of humanity’ which ‘communicates a value that is perfectly universal,’ (Velleman, 1999, p. 372) can be paralleled with the *xing* through which the *xin* is articulated. This brings us surprisingly close to the role-ethics of Amesian Confucianism. Taking the example of the student and teacher, Velleman claims that love between persons ‘opens one’s eyes to what the other really is,’ that is, ‘one’s student or teacher, who is to be dealt with professionally.’ (1999, p. 362) Hence, Vellemanian Kantian love is a moral emotion which can only be evoked by and manifested through the empirical aspects of the person, such as, in Amesian Confucian vocabulary, the roles that they live.

To approach this issue from the other side, for Amesian Confucianism, there is no such thing as a rational will or person...
abstracted from all relations. However, even though one can never truly abstract the self from those relations, relationally-constituted persons still possess a capacity for self-reflection which arises precisely out of our relational selves. Think of those moments during which, although we may reflect as a mother or a teacher (and though we cannot cast off those roles), we also reflect upon ourselves as mothers and teachers with some sense of critical distance. In reference to Tang Junyi’s interpretation of xing, Ames states, ‘the degree of self-conscious freedom and creativity’ (2000, p. 130) and ‘the reflexive and self-conscious existential project’ (2000, p. 131) are taken to be distinguishing features of the human xing. We might therefore identify the rational will as being inextricably linked to the relationality which constitutes our everyday experience. Furthermore, the Vellemanian Kantian rational will is the capacity for self-reflection, but self-reflection itself can only be exercised in a processual and dynamic way – an idea which does not seem so distant from the Amesian Confucian concept of a ‘human becoming.’ When unsure what role we ought to live with respect to another, Vellemanian Kantian respect can serve as a minimum starting point. In this way, we might be able to integrate the inherently communal and social aspect of the Amesian Confucian personhood (and its inbuilt universal applicability) with the reflective capacity definitive of Vellemanian Kantianism.

**Conclusion: Divergences**

However, this bringing together of Vellemanian Kantianism and Amesian Confucianism should only be thought of in terms of limits – as curves forever approaching but never reaching their points of convergence. The crucial dividing factor cannot be ignored. If we were to prioritise the Vellemanian Kantian impulse over the Amesian Confucian one, we would claim that although the sensible world is (and our sensible selves are) relationally constituted, the seat of our

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4. An idea kindly suggested to me, in a slightly different context, by Sydney Morrow during the 2014 University of Tokyo-University of Hawai’i Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy.
personhood lies ultimately in each of our rational wills/capacities for self-reflection, even if this capacity cannot be severed from the sensible/empirical world. If we were to prioritise the Amesian Confucian impulse over the Vellemanian Kantian one, we would claim that although the relationally-constituted self has a capacity for self-reflection, what makes that self a person is not that capacity but rather the relationally-constituted and processual nature of their existence.

We have thus travelled rather far from what Ames or Velleman (let alone Kant or Confucius) argued for in their philosophical works, but have attained a fuller picture of what it means to be a self, a person, and exist in relation to one another - one that embraces both the reflective and social nature of human existence. The decision now rests with the reader as to which fundamental philosophical intuition (if either) they might choose to side with.

References:


Fudo, Phenomenology, and Interpretation

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The influence of Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* on Watsuji Tetsuro’s *Fudo* (風土), which means simply “climate” but has been translated as *Climate and Culture*, is explicit and well-known. On one hand, *Being and Time* provides an inspiration for Watsuji’s phenomenological approach, and on the other hand, Watsuji maintains that *Being and Time* exhibits a fundamental bias—the privileging of temporality over spatiality—that *Fudo* aims to address. In *Fudo*, the spatial structure of human existence is exhibited through a focus on climate as a basic feature of the human world. While Heidegger of *Being and Time* does not examine climate, Nietzsche—with whom Watsuji was very well acquainted and about whom he wrote an influential study—had an arguably obsessive interest in climate. Claims regarding the effects of climate on the human body, and thereby culture and thought, are widespread in Nietzsche’s works, and are accompanied by frequent remarks in letters and notes about the effects of climate upon his own troubled health.

Watsuji’s conclusions regarding the determining effects of climate on human culture are close to the sort that we would expect from Nietzsche, while his account mostly follows the phenomenological method of *Being and Time*. And yet, one of the features of *Being and Time* that brings it closest to much of Nietzsche’s thought, the foundational status of *interpretation* as a conditioned but relatively flexible frame for the disclosure of the world, is not a major theme of Watsuji’s work.

Here I would like to suggest that Watsuji’s relative neglect of the hermeneutic dimension of *Being and Time* is implicated in a weakness of *Fudo*: the interdependence of human culture and climate
is articulated with a bias toward climate as providing limitations within which the human world develops and is disclosed, and the converse—a presentation of the social world as providing the limits of intelligibility within which the phenomena of climate are disclosed—is relatively neglected.

Watsuji writes: “When we feel the cold, it is not the ‘feeling’ of cold that we feel, but the ‘coldness of the air’ or the ‘cold’.” (1961, p. 3) Not only do we not merely feel a ‘sensation’ of cold, but being cold usually means “we stiffen, or we put on warm clothes, or we draw near the brazier.” (p. 5) Watsuji’s compelling phenomenological descriptions present the features of climate in relation to a social world consisting of specific practices according to which cold is encountered, not as a ‘thing’ or sensation, but as integrated into a holistic field of practical intelligibility. Nonetheless, he draws back from recognizing that just as a culture develops clothing and shelter in response to climate, climate is always already encountered in light of the intelligibility of a social world. Climate not only informs the disclosure of a social world, but is disclosed according to the intelligibility supported by a social world.

**Nietzsche on Climate**

Ecce Homo contains the following:

The *tempo* of the metabolism is strictly proportionate to the mobility or lameness of the spirit’s *feet*; the “spirit” itself is after all merely an aspect of this metabolism. List the places where men with *esprit* are living or have lived, where wit, subtlety, and malice belonged to happiness, where genius found its home almost of necessity: all of them have excellent dry air. Paris, Provence, Florence, Jerusalem, Athens—these names prove something: genius *depends* on dry air, on clear skies—that is, on a rapid metabolism, on the possibility of drawing again and again on great, even tremendous quantities of strength. (Nietzsche 1961, p. 240)

This is representative of much of the tone of Nietzsche’s discussion
of climate, which he suggests profoundly impacts physiology and thereby culture. He maintained that his own health was significantly dependent on climate, and his letters evidence a long search for an appropriate environment and occasionally deep satisfaction with a certain place. Preceding the above passage from *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche writes: “The slightest sluggishness of the intestines is entirely sufficient, once it has become a bad habit, to turn a genius into something mediocre, something ‘German.’ The German climate alone is enough to discourage strong, even inherently heroic, intestines.” (Ibid.) Given the probably satirical tone of some of *Ecce Homo*, the bombastic claims of these passages, and Nietzsche’s appreciation for explanatory and evaluative reversals (such as the suggestion that the highest human achievements are conditioned by the contingencies of weather and its effect on digestion), it is hard to gauge Nietzsche’s earnestness.

Nietzsche does seem to believe that climate has a direct effect on physiology, as is evinced by statements regarding his own constitution, and he often proposes physiological bases for cultural conditions. However, the causal relationship between climate and culture, mediated by physiology, is nowhere in his works formulated as provocatively as *Ecce Homo*. In, for instance, *Human All Too Human*—a much earlier work—Nietzsche suggests a merely metaphorical relationship between climate and culture. Cultural periods are compared with climatic zones, and European modernity is identified with a temperate climate in relation to which the tropical past, in which “the most raging passions are brought down and destroyed by the uncanny force of metaphysical conceptions, [and] we feel as though we were witnessing the crushing of tropical tigers in the coils of monstrous serpents.” (Nietzsche 2005b, p. 113) In *On the Genealogy of Morality* an allegorical confrontation with *ressentiment* and the concealed origins of values prompts the cry “bad air! Bad air!” (1967, p. 28)

Such metaphorical references to climate are probably used to support or suggest a description of values from an evaluative standpoint “beyond good and evil.” *Ressentiment* is not evil (this is the very language of *ressentiment*) but stifling. The strife between pre-modern metaphysics and human passions is inevitable within a certain cultural climate, in relation to which temperate modernity
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does not represent normative progress. When Nietzsche asserts a literal, causal relationship between climate and culture, the aim is more or less the same: to guide a revaluation of values. To place the 'highest values' into a causal relation with the most contingent features of the world is to reveal to contingency of those values.

Incidentally, in *The Antichrist* Nietzsche claims that Buddhism is a “positivist” religion, “beyond good and evil,” as concerned with suffering rather than sin, and that it delivers “without promising anything” the relief that Christianity promises. (2005a, p. 17) “These physiological conditions [an oversensitivity that follows rich culture] give rise to *depression.* The Buddha took hygienic measures against this, including: living out in the open, the wandering life, moderation and a careful diet” and so on. (Ibid.) Buddhism is “positivistic” because it shares with Nietzsche the recognition that neurosis is not well resolved by tangling with its content, but by addressing its contingent, material ground.

There are at least two ways to read Nietzsche’s conceptions of the relationship between climate and culture: one, in terms of *naive reductionism*—the assertion that cultural conditions are nothing but the expression of material conditions, including climate; or two, as *experimental reductionism*—hypothetical revaluations of value in terms that stand on terms outside of the revalued evaluative standpoints. I will return to the relation between these two approaches, but here would like to note only that I believe that Nietzsche is at least *often* engaged in the latter approach.

At the heart of reductive genealogy is a basic paradox. The claim that the highest values devalue themselves in nihilistic modernity means, for instance, that the “will to truth” leads to a discovery of the historical conditions of the disclosure of truth, such that the status of the truth dependent upon such conditions is called into question. This presents a neat paradox described even in Nietzsche’s early work: “How did reason come into the world? As is fitting, in an irrational manner, by accident. One will have to guess at it as at a riddle.” (1960, p. 81) The riddle consists of the notion that it is only by means of inquiry dependent upon reason that the origin of reason is discovered. The problem is an issue of interpretive self-reference: the conditioned is a condition for an interpretation of the conditioning.
Similarly, climate is evaluated always in terms of a conditioned physiological disposition that supports a particular interpretive perspective. There is no unconditioned standpoint from which climate can be evaluated, and it always already informs our evaluations. Despite the appearance of naively reductive assertions, I take Nietzsche’s commitment to conditioned interpretation as a basic and at least generally consistent feature of all but his earliest thought.

Watsuji on Climate

Watsuji’s claim that climate informs the development of culture are similar to Nietzsche’s but his methodology follows the phenomenology of *Being and Time*. He intends to show that the phenomena of climate are encountered in everyday life not as mere forces, or as sensations, but as integrated features of the life-world. This is presented through his rich phenomenological descriptions. The aim is to establish climate as an *existential*, to use Heidegger’s language, fundamental feature, and *limitation* of human existence. For Watsuji, climate provides a space in which the development of culture is possible: “We have discovered ourselves in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free creation.” (1961, p. 6) The phenomenological descriptions of *Fudo* are put in service of what, to follow my terms above, is more clearly identifiable as reductive than Nietzsche’s formulations of the relation between climate and culture.

Asserting the interdependence of climate and history, Watsuji states that: “From the very first, climate is historical climate. In the dual structure of man—the historical and the climatic—history is climatic history and climate is historical climate.” (p. 10) But this interdependence does not indicate a mutually causal relation. Watsuji writes: “It is often said that not only is man conditioned by climate, but that he, in his turn, works on and transforms climate. But this is to ignore the true nature of climate. We, on the other hand, have seen that it is in climate that man apprehends himself.” (p. 8) Further:

Climate is seen to be the factor by which self-active human being
can be made objective: climatic phenomena show man how to discover himself as "standing outside" (i.e., ex-sistere). The self discovered by the cold turns into tools devised against the cold, such as houses or clothes, which then confront the self. (p. 12)

Climate is therefore a basic limitation and condition of human existence. Culture develops in relation to this background that can never be brought entirely into the field of culture. We confront climate by way of our responses—e.g., clothing and houses—but it is for us always under-determined by the practical intelligibility in terms of which we encounter it.

I believe that Watsuji’s commitment to the otherness of climate supports the taxonomy of climatic-cultural types that constitutes the bulk of the work. It follows from the displacement of one of the basic features of Heidegger’s phenomenology: its fundamentally hermeneutic character, which it shares with much of Nietzsche’s thought. Leaving aside the question of the plausibility of Watsuji’s cultural taxonomy, I suggest that he under-emphasizes a basic dimension of our encounter with climate: its disclosure through an always already established intelligibility grounded in cultural practices.

The Mahayanist concept of emptiness that explicitly informs Watsuji’s later Ethics is present only in the background of Fudo and might support a revision of the relation between climate and culture. As in his Ethics, where he develops a dialectic of negation informed by the concept of emptiness, according to which community and individuality are interdependent, Watsuji might have proposed a dialectical interdependence of humans and climate. Fudo reveals that Watsuji already at the time of its writing has conceived at least embryonically the Nishida-influenced dialect of emptiness that he

1. In Ethics, Watsuji writes, for instance: “On the one hand, the standpoint of an acting ‘individual’ comes to be established only in some way as a negation of the totality of ningen. An individual who does not imply that meaning of negation, that is, an essentially self-sufficient individual, is nothing but an imaginative construction. On the other hand, the totality of ningen comes to be established as the negation of individuality. A totality that does not include the individual negatively is also nothing but a product of the imagination. These two negations constitute the dual character of a human being. And what is more, they constitute a single movement.” (1996, p. 22)
later develops in his *Ethics*:

Human existence, through fragmentation into countless individual entities, is the activity which brings into being all forms of combination and community. Such fragmentation and union are essentially of a self-active and practical nature and cannot come about in the absence of self-active entities. (p. 9)

And elsewhere similar language is used to describe climate: “In the dual structure of man—the historical and the climatic—history is climatic history and climate is historical climate.” (p. 10) However, the interdependence of climate and culture is constrained by the primarily determining status of climate in the relationship, which would not be sustained in the kind of mutually-determining emptiness dialect between the individual and community articulated in *Ethics*. Presumably, Watsuji considers climate to be independent of human existence, but, as I have suggested, this neglects an important dimension of the phenomenology of climate: we do encounter climate always as framed by our already-established practices.

**Conclusion: Interpretation, Phenomenology, and Reductionism**

In the preface to *Fudo*, Watsuji states: “From the standpoint of the dual structure—both individual and social—of human existence, [Heidegger] did not advance beyond an abstraction of a single aspect.” (1961, p. vi) For Watsuji, that one aspect, Heidegger’s *Dasein*, designates only the individual side of human existence. Given *Being and Time*’s general neglect of social phenomenology and ethics, and the discussion of *das Man*, and identification of authenticity in terms of individuation, the case for the charge of a bias is strong. However, *Dasein* is not a *self*. Heidegger’s phenomenology is hermeneutic such that disclosure is always interpretative, and *Dasein* is interpretive disclosure in a general sense that includes practical acts and non-discursive intelligibility, such as is exhibited in the use of tools. *Dasein* is a phenomenologically
irreducible interpretive perspective, conditioned by the understanding provided by a historically-developed social world, but singular, and responsible for its interpretive way of being. For Heidegger, such a perspective is a condition for the disclosure of self as well as community.

Nietzsche similarly presents interpretation, especially as normative evaluation, as a historically and socially-conditioned condition for an intelligible world. But unlike Heidegger’s attempt at a systematic articulation of the structures of interpretation, Nietzsche experiments with reductions in which a provisional explanation of the conditions of the human world is articulated from a possible and provisional interpretive frame. Nietzsche’s explanations are at least sometimes intended to merely reveal interpretive possibilities, or reevaluations.

Watsuji’s *Fudo* shares Nietzsche’s concern with climate and many features of Heidegger’s phenomenology, but it does not maintain the fundamental status of interpretation exhibited in the works of Heidegger and Nietzsche. This, I believe, is why Watsuji does not consider climate as much from the side of culture as he does culture from the side of climate. For Heidegger and Nietzsche, the conditions for anything to appear as anything are the conditions of the interpretive perspective. Heidegger attempts to describe these features as encountered from within the interpretive perspective—for instance, thrownness and projection, or mood—and Nietzsche reveals such conditions through experimental reductions and aporetic accounts of interpretive self-reference.

Watsuji aims to present climate as one of the basic conditions of an interpretive perspective, but not entirely from *within* an interpretive perspective. In other words, phenomenologically stated, there is no cold but the cold that, as Watsuji describes well, we recognize in the actions of “[putting] on warm clothes, or [drawing] near the brazier.” (1961, p. 5) There is—from a phenomenological standpoint—no cold beyond this cold, which we know through clothes and dwellings, or in their recognized absence. Of course, this leads to an apparent contradiction of exactly the sort that both Nietzsche and Heidegger describe:2 we know cold only in terms of practices that respond to the

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2. One of Heidegger’s formulations of this contradiction appears in the second division
cold, but if there was no cold there would be no such practices. The
two sides can, and I think should, be identified as mutually-arising,
but this does not resolve the contradiction encountered in interpretive
reflection that aims to interpret the conditions for interpretation. This
aporetic hermeneutic structure is absent from Watsuji’s account, and
its absence supports a neglect of one of the two directions in which
culture and climate are mutually disclosing.

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*of Being and Time*: “In being a basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly
lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as
this basis. Thus “Being-a-basis” means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being
from the ground up. This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness.” It
itself, being a basis, is a nullity of itself.” (1962, p. 330). Heidegger’s point is that Dasein
is always as its basis—its concrete conditions, defined by ‘thrownness’—over which it
never has ‘power.’ In terms of reflexivity, this means that we discover that we cannot fully
disclose our own being, which includes the conditions for the possibility of disclosure.
A common theme in Chinese poetry is separation, be it from friends, family, or lovers. In this essay I will examine two poems about separation, Li Bai’s “Mountain Pass Moon” [關山月] and Du Fu’s “Moonlit Night” [月夜]. One is a genre piece, the other intensely personal, but both, I hope to show, reveal paradoxes that are brought out by separation. “Mountain Pass Moon” highlights paradoxes of space and perspective while “Moonlit Night” relies on paradoxes of time and being and nonbeing. These paradoxes will not be resolved but will be shown to be important aspects of the poems under discussion, and it is in part their embrace of these paradoxes, even if it is unlikely that Li Bai or Du Fu had them in mind, that makes these poems great.

“The road up and the road down are one and the same.”

There are two parallel paradoxes in Li Bai’s “Mountain Pass Moon.” The first is that space is that which divides and unites us. As the quote from Heraclitus suggests, it is a matter of perspective. And one way to shift that perspective is through poetry. The second paradox is that Chinese poems about separation, while oft sorrowful and full of yearning create a feeling of connection and togetherness. Just as space simultaneously divides and unites, one and the same poem can evoke at the same time the feelings fitting those two situations.

“Mountain Pass Moon” is a border poem in which a man has

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1. The texts and translations of the poems can be found at the end of this essay.
been sent to fight barbarians at the frontier, leaving his lover behind. There seems to be little hope of return—“From the battleground, / No one has been seen returning” [由來征戰地, 不見有人還]. The speaker and his lover are separated by space, a space he is unlikely to pass back through. But while people don’t return, thoughts do [思歸多苦顏]. And not just thoughts, but the wind from the frontier that blows through the Jade Gate Pass also heads down the Baideng Road [長風幾萬里, 吹度玉門關], to be met by the sighs of the lover who was left behind [高樓當此夜, 歎息未應闐].

This exchange is doubly one-sided. The sighs of the lover express her feelings of sorrow; the wind from the pass is merely cold (perhaps representing the invading barbarians) and does not convey the feelings of the soldier. Yet it is one-sided in another way as well—the sighs of the lover will not actually reach the pass, but the long wind may very well reach the tall towers back home. The futility of communication only causes a deeper, fuller sense of separation and loneliness.

But against this loneliness and separation one has the existence of the Baideng Road and the poem. The road up is the road down; similarly, the road away is the road back. Though in the poem, the Baideng Road seems to lead one in only one-direction, in fact one could return over it. The same road that took the soldier away could well bring him back again and it is over the same road that letters would be sent back and forth.

Similarly, the poem which expresses such a powerful sense of loneliness and separation needs an audience. So far I have rather naively been reading it as if the speaker were a soldier even though like many Chinese poems there is no speaker specified. While much of the poem takes place on the frontier, and could very well be seen by a soldier stationed there, the last two lines could not be. The soldier may very well imagine that his lover that very night is thinking of him and sighing, but she could just as easily be already asleep. But the poem does not read as if he is merely speculating. This, however, does not mean that instead of being written from the perspective of a soldier, it is written from a third-person, objective perspective. Rather, it is written from a combination of the two. While the view is as sweeping as a third-person, omniscient narrator’s would be, the perspective, the
emotion is very much in the first person. And I think this is not merely a point of style. Poems need readers as much as they need poets. And just as the poem is written as if the poet were the soldier, it is written as if the audience were the lover who was left behind. While in real life there would be no guarantee that the poem would be read either by the lover or a reader, the poem is written as if there is such a guarantee. Thus the paradox that while the poem is about separation, and conveys those feelings, it also conveys the feeling of making a connection. And a connection is indeed made when the poem is read, both with the reader and the reader as the lover. By reading the poem as the lover, one feels both the couples’ sorrow and their joy in successfully communicating that sorrow. Thanks to the poem, the Baideng Road that separates them also becomes the road that unites them.

With “Mountain Pass Moon,” we focused on space and the paradoxes that followed. But space is not the only thing that causes separation: time does so as well. With “Moonlit Night”, the focus is on time and its related paradox: how being and nonbeing interpenetrate. This paradox is particularly acute with regard to time since the present, which now is, looks towards the future, which is not yet, but derives much of its meaning from its past, which is no more. Therefore I will move onto our next poem: Du Fu’s “Moonlit Night”.

“Being and nonbeing, nonbeing and being” (pace Parmenides)

One of the ironies of Chinese criticism is that while so many of the poems belong to genres with well-established conventions, critics want to read the poet’s life into the poem. “Mountain Pass Moon,” obviously, belongs to the genre of border poems. The poem is not about Li Bai’s life and to appreciate it, one needn’t know anything about Li Bai or his times. Describing a situation that could have occurred at nearly anytime in Chinese history and therefore is pointedly not about any particular situation, the poem effectively stands outside of time. There is also a static, timeless feeling to the people involved. The soldier and his lover might both grow old, but their feelings for each other will
not change. That is one reason he does not imagine what his lover is
doing and why a third-person perspective is convincing.

The same cannot be said of many of Du Fu's poems. His poems
are often intensely personal, though at the same time deeply tied with
the larger events of his time. They simultaneously chronicle his life and
the fate of the Tang dynasty, both of which undergo changes in Du Fu's
poetry. Therefore, to understand “Moonlit Night” we must understand
the circumstances surrounding the poem. Whether or not he actually
wrote the poem during the time it is claimed to have been is immaterial.
What is important is to read it as if it were written then.

In “Moonlit Night”, Du Fu is held captive in Chang’an by
An Lushan’s forces, longing to join his wife and children whom he
left safe in Fuzhou. Those are the two points between which he moves
imaginatively: Chang’an, which his children do not remember, and
Fuzhou, where he has scarcely been. And he can only move between
those places imaginatively for the way has been lost.

That is literally true: it is unclear how Du Fu can flee to
Fuzhou and his family. Unlike in “Mountain Pass Moon,” there is no
road that connects them. There is no equivalent to Baideng Road that
connects as it separates. The separation here seems complete. “But what
about the moon?” one might ask, “While it may not separate, surely it
connects?”

Certainly many commentators believe it does, and have
consequently taken the title of the poem to indicate that the poem
was written during the Mid-Autumn Festival, when one would
traditionally gaze at the moon. According to them, Du Fu would
therefore know that his wife was looking at the moon as he was. And
using the moon to connect people who are apart is a popular trope:
“Mountain Pass Moon,” after all, in addition to having the moon in the
title, begins with the moon coming out from behind the mountains.
One might easily think Du Fu was doing something similar, or even
going further—while the moon in “Mountain Pass Moon” is seen from
the border, the moon in “Moonlit Night” is seen from Fuzhou. It seems
the moon connects Du Fu to his wife and children even more than it

2. Most of the information about the circumstances is drawn from David Hawkes’ A Little
Primer of Du Fu (Oxford University Press, 1967).
In Li Bai’s poem, as already noted, while the emotion is first-person, the descriptions are those of a third-person narrator. This is how the speaker can be the soldier at the border and yet know that his lover is also looking at the moon, sighing for him. Du Fu’s poem, however, remains firmly in the first-person. Du Fu does not actually know if his wife is looking at the moon or if the evening mist is dampening her hair. They are lovely images, wonderful attempts to create a connection, but ones he knows do not work. This is shown by how he follows up each description of his wife.

In the first case, after describing his wife looking at the moon, Du Fu turns to his children, who are far-away and unable to remember Chang’an. Their inability to remember Chang’an has two clear, poignant meanings. First, they cannot remember Chang’an and the long peace it represents. All they can remember is turmoil and disorder. This makes them pitiable. But second, as David Hawkes observes, Chang’an stands for Du Fu. His children are unable to remember him, from whom they are separated. This makes Du Fu pitiable and points towards additional, more important meanings of those lines, meanings that lie in what is not said.

Unlike his children, Du Fu can remember Chang’an; he can remember when its name—“Long Peace”—was not a cruel joke. But that Chang’an is gone. The memory of that no longer existing past makes the present even more sorrowful and points to the second way in which the way has been lost: the Way of proper governing is no more and all under heaven is disordered.

That, however, does not exhaust those lines. For Du Fu also remembers his children in Chang’an, their innocence and their safe, secure lives. Such is not the case now. They have grown up, for even in a short time span children alter greatly. They may now be as unrecognizable to him as he is to them. Even worse, their lives are not safe, but quite precarious. He can imagine them safe in Fuzhou, but he knows all too well that they may not be. These lines that are ostensibly about his children, turn out to be about him—his memories, his worries—instead. Therefore it becomes clear that while the first two lines may be written as if he knows what his wife is doing in Fuzhou, it
is in fact the product of his imagination.

While lines 3-4 of the poem use the nonexistent past to illuminate the present, lines 7-8 look forward to the future, when crying has ceased. Here too, while Du Fu is imagining what others are doing (or in the case of his children not doing), he is actually speaking of himself. He imagines his wife has been crying; he knows he has been. As before, imagining what others are doing gives voice to Du Fu’s own feelings, which remain unsaid.

Thus these last two lines, like lines 3-4, are also full of being and nonbeing. As before, Du Fu is using something that is imagined and is not (his wife’s tears/his children’s memories), to give voice to what is (his own tears/memory). What is given words, is what is not, and what is not said, is what is.

Yet one should not think lines 7-8 and lines 3-4 overly similar, for there is a crucial difference. Lines 3-4 stressed memory and the power of the past to affect the present. The order and safety of the past makes the disordered, insecure present especially awful. In contrast, Du Fu puts the last lines into the future, which is not yet, to shed light on what is now, namely his current sorrow and tears. It partly does so straightforwardly, by implying his present sorrow based on his dried up tears. But the future also affects the present more subtly.

There is a famous passage in the Huainanzi about a man who discovers a horse, a stroke of seeming good luck that turns bad, then good, and so on. The story concludes, “Therefore, good fortune can become bad, bad, good, transforming without end, deep and impenetrable.” [故福之為禍, 禍之為福, 化不可極, 深不可測也]. Du Fu would probably want to qualify this. His capture, the fall of the Tang, are all bad fortune. Nothing that might happen can change that. But the future, as the story suggests, can determine what sort of misfortune his capture and the capture of Chang’an are. By imagining a future in which he is reunited with his wife, Du Fu is hoping that the separation is temporary, not permanent. Thus in a very real sense the future determines the meaning of the present.

Du Fu would also want to qualify the story from the Huainanzi

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in another way. He would emphasize that previous bad fortune leaves behind traces in present good fortune. The tear tracks [淚痕] dry up, are no longer visible, but it is their nonbeing that emphasizes that things will never truly be the same again and add poignancy to the reunion. So even as Du Fu is imagining a happy future that gives hope to his sorrowful present, he also shows that present suffering will ineluctably shape the future.

When I discussed “Mountain Pass Moon” the paradox of how one and the same poem could convey feelings of separation and togetherness was due to the relation between poet and reader. The same is true with Du Fu’s paradoxes of being and nonbeing. While understanding that the poem deals with the relation of the present to the past and future and necessarily concerns being and nonbeing, there is more to it than that. Unlike “Mountain Pass Moon,” Du Fu’s poem is open-ended. This is easily obscured from us since we know that Du Fu did in fact see his wife and children again, making the final two lines not just hopeful imaginings. But at the time he supposedly wrote the poem that was not the case. He had no idea if he would see them again. This is reflected by the poem’s implicit audience: Du Fu himself. Where “Mountain Pass Moon”’s audience was supposedly the lover, and thus the reader as lover could bring a sense of completion to the poem, the reader as Du Fu cannot. Instead, the reader stands with Du Fu in his present, moved by his past, looking towards his uncertain future, immersed in both being and nonbeing.

*Inconclusive Unsystematic Postscript*

At this point I often like to conclude with some wild words, perhaps suggesting how these paradoxes of time and space run through many Chinese poems or that separation is somehow inherently paradoxical. Such conclusions hope to sum up what went before and point out new areas to explore. But those wild words would be overly hasty here. For instance, there are many varieties of nonbeing: the nonbeings of the past, the future, fictions, holes, 無, 虛, and so on are all different. And there are also many types of perspectives. So while
they are things to look out for in future poems, saying more than that would be rash and risk equivocation.

Instead, a more modest conclusion is called for. It is simply while many poems have been written of separation and could have taken advantage of the paradoxes we have encountered and discussed, Li Bai and Du Fu, in their different ways, did so and in doing so, perhaps have changed how we view the separations we experience in our own lives. With Li Bai, we can realize that we can make what divides us unite us as well; with Du Fu we can know that we and our relations are unfinished beings, constantly shaped by the nonbeing that surrounds us.

Appendix: Poems and Translations

關山月
明月出天山，
蒼茫雲海間。
長風幾萬里，
吹度玉門關。
漢下白登道，
胡窺青海灣。
由來征戰地，
不見有人還。
戍客望邊色，
思歸多苦顏。
高樓當此夜，
歎息未應聞。

“Mountain Pass Moon”
The bright moon comes out of Tianshan,
Boundless amidst a sea of clouds.
The long wind for how many li,
Blows through the Jade Gate Pass.
Since the Han, the Baideng Road,
Barbarians peer from Qinghai Lake.
From the battleground,
No one has been seen returning.
The garrison stares at the border,
Thoughts return, many sad faces.
In a high tower this very night,
A sigh, unanswered.

月夜
今夜鄜州月，
閨中只獨看。
遙憐小兒女，
未解憶長安。
香霧雲鬟濕，
清輝玉臂寒。
何時倚虛幌，

“Moonlit Night”
Tonight, a Fuzhou moon,
In a boudoir, looking.
Far from pitiable son and daughter,
Unable to remember Chang’an.
Fragrant mist, hair dampened,
Pure light, the jade arm is cold.
When will it go through the empty window,
雙照淚痕乾。  And shine on tear-traces dried?
“Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space...The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do...Sonorous or vocal components are very important: a wall of sound, or at least a wall with some sonic bricks in it...radios and television sets are like sound walls around every household and mark territories”

Home, for Deleuze and Guattari, is something more of a vibration than it is a place. Home has more to do with what is produced by some sort of dwelling than the dwelling itself. Home is not a house or an abode, but is the refrain- the rhythms and sequences that emerge out of chaos and tie us to previous moments and histories. The origins are always arbitrary but the process is not; it becomes coextensive with the personalities that arise from it. Home is always in the middle of nowhere, but we know we are there when things are in tune and when more or less predictable patterns of life supplant the weariness of whistling one’s territorial song in increasingly polyphonic zones- like the neighborhood, community or society. Home is more sensational and active than it is something to be passively sensed. It is an aesthetic and a practice. It is only quite narrowly a category among places because homes have more to distinguish themselves from one another than they have in common with each other. That they each have a unique refrain is about all that they can share. It is not the nest, but instead it is the song that delimits territory.

2. Ibid, 312.
In this short essay I pull from a few (quite different) insights to argue that an understanding of what homemaking produces is more important than gaining a sense of this particular place. The relationship among nests and songs is a complicated one, but these two things are critical to the process of edification. Here, I am being somewhat technical about the use of edification rather than referring to its more common, didactic moral/intellectual register. Edification, like both edifice and edify, comes from the two Latin roots aedis (dwelling) and facere (to make). There are many ways to get a sense of place from homes, but edification opens up pedagogical angle to the process of homemaking. It suggests that home making is coextensive with the making of one’s self.

This use of edification is not consistent with a cultural history that suggests that the objects around us are, for example, what Heidegger refers to as “standing reserve.” He, like I am here, challenges the idea that objects are for our ordering. Objects too have the capacity to change and influence behaviors. And because every place is comprised of different things, the refrains that are emitted from them each have a different signature. While it could be said that every place is unique, none are as unique as home.

This word unique is not supposed to be used as though it were a matter of degree, but because all places are unique in a materialist sense, home is more unique in that it has no single operative logic. There is no place like home. Its arbitrary origins establish this. Every home’s operative logic is born of the concatenation of patterns and habits that thread their way back to the “fragile center.” Home distinguishes itself from other categories of places like the office, the gym, or the café because home is the only place where we are (potentially) completely responsible for the arrangement of things that, in turn, condition the

3. I was drawn to this word in a lecture by Stanley Cavell. He was describing Thoreau’s Walden when he showed offhandedly links edification to the physical process of building. See, Cavell, Stanley., 1986. “The Uncanniness of the Ordinary.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Stanford University. 3 and 8 Apr. Lecture. 112.
possibilities for our behaviors. By contrast, institutional sorts of places (or perhaps all but home) are contrived on account of a logic that precedes them: an office is built for working, a restaurant is opened for eating, etc. We have a sense of place at these locations because they were given and for the most part, they are intentionally affective. Because no person comes into being of their own intention, edification suggests getting the upper hand on intentionality— to build one space among many others that provoke, discipline and intend specific patterns from us.

John Dewey says that we are our habits. Further, he writes that, “We cannot change habits directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by a intelligent selecting and weighting of items which engage attention and influence desires.”

Lembros Malafouris, as part of his approach of “distributed-cognition,” uses the example of a speed bump. We could say that if a “slow” sign alone were able to change the habits of drivers it would be magic— something common experience supports. By contrast, a speed bump changes the environment and patterns of movement in ways that the raw intentionality of an admonitory sign cannot. In his words, “in the human engagement with the material world there are no fixed attributes of agent entities and patient entities and no clean ontological separations between them...Agency and intentionality may not be properties of things; they are not properties of humans either; they are the properties of material engagement.”

His argument, and I think it is a good one, is that the mind is not something located in the cranium. That is merely a brain. Instead, the mind is distributed and includes all the things that contribute to phenomena— of which a human and its brain are merely a part. A speed bump changes habits, it changes minds, and for a brief moment, it changes a person so that a particular phenomenon emerges from the entire assemblage. The same is true for


every object in a house. It becomes a question of the phenomena that emerge.

What Malafouris says of things and people in terms of “material-engagement” resonates with Karan Barad’s idea of phenomena, which “are the ontological inseparability of objects and apparatuses.” Building on the ontology inherent to Niels Bohr’s quantum physics, she introduces the term “intra-action” to capture the entanglement that is constitutive of phenomena. What Bohr discovered “is the fact wave and particle behaviors are exhibited under complementary— that is mutually exclusive—circumstances.” At the atomic level it became apparent that any instance of behavior is a singular expression bound up in the tools, methods or approach used to measure it. There is no truth that lurks beneath a representation. A representation is merely a phenomenon that occurs with objects and their tools of measurement. This is not necessarily a metaphor. It is this particular kind of indeterminacy that underlies the ethics and validity of ethnographic inquiry, for example. Is there any way to do an interview or interact with other people or things without projecting an apparatus on the object of study? What is truth in ethnography? Bohr’s ontology points in the direction of indeterminacy.

An underlying indeterminacy is not necessarily nihilistic. Rather it redirects a fetish for sources, truth and causation to a more productive focus on sequence, continuity and improvisation. For Barad, “agency is about response-ability, about the possibilities of mutual response, which is not to deny, but to attend to power imbalances.” Indeterminacy, then, is an opening for agency in a scheme that otherwise conceives of power structures as hierarchical, and deterministic. Indeterminacy can be thought as freedom from imposition. It renders unbalanced powers as points in ambivalent sequences rather than rungs in ordered hierarchies. We have to be careful though, because agency is

Edification of Living Spaces

not formal, it is performative. That is, the performance goes both ways. What appears as an opening for agency in a social hierarchy, needs to be reframed with regard to the home because *intra-action* cuts away at all formal ‘possessions’ of agency— including that which a person might feel it has over the space it calls home. A sense of place depends on the apparatus we use to measure objects. Because our representations are singularities, we are probably better off looking at what is produced of a home rather than just the way it makes us feel. It could feel *natural* and that should alert us to a potential problem. Edification is an attempt to attend to this phenomenon.

I suggest that the home is unique on account of our responsibility for the arrangement of things, however, it is often the case that our apparatus of measurement is not from a fragile center, but could be from elsewhere— no less arbitrary but perhaps with a catchier (if parasitical) refrain. For example, in *The Birth of Biopolitics* lectures, Foucault shows how a neoliberal governmentality changed the face of politics and tilted things toward an economic epistemology. Whereas once before, the home was a metaphor for patriarchy, neoliberalism ushered in a conceptual framework that conceives of enterprises— all the way up and down. “...what is private property if not an enterprise? What is a house if not an enterprise? What is the management of these small neighborhood communities...if not other forms of enterprise?”

While this is, of course, not the only ‘apparatus of measurement’ we can see how if the home is a phenomenon that steps to the rhythms of “enterprise,” homemaking is likely to harmonize with it. This threat to overcode the “fragile center” haunts Deleuze and Guattari’s passage that opens this essay. It is fragile because there are so many ways that we could mistake one measuring apparatus as the *natural* order of things.

This mistake is at the heart of the question over power imbalance. The concept of home *qua* enterprise is only a threat to agency if it is taken for granted that the home is below and society is above. To naturalize an economic hierarchy is to make both its order and its imposition invisible. It is to permit another to mark its territory and drown out a home’s refrain with another tune. This is why the home

requires a more careful look than other places. Edification does not necessarily require that the home is out of tune with community, nor that it syncopate the fabric of society. It does require an acceptance of indeterminacy, because the alternative is be unwittingly deterministic.

Neoliberalism or other ideological ways of life, do not directly change habits, but like Dewey suggests, they “...can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by a intelligent selecting and weighting of items which engage attention...” In sketching out a concept of edification I am trying to call attention to our measuring apparatus. It would affect the way that we evaluate and place objects in our home, ultimately shaping our mind and habits. Is it consumers who put things in homes or is it consumerism? Who has the upper hand on intentionality? But this apparatus needs to be attended to contrapuntally with the observation of the objects themselves. What does a television, piano or microwave do to the patterns of life? At a point it does not matter how we accumulate objects, it is enough to ask the question what do they do? To take Malafouris seriously would mean that they are all part of the mind. These are ontological questions. Neither the object nor the apparatus are in a position of superiority. They are both part of phenomena.

Many things compete for residence in the mind, so it should bear out that some apparatuses and objects are better than others. While I will hold that any idea that is a non-naturalized concept of homemaking is edifying, I want to conclude with one elegant solution to the problem of “drawing the circle” around home. Some stitch together a tune and “organize a limited space” about their families and ancestors. This is not to offer up Family as the organizing logic of home, but more interestingly, a shared edification as the thread of the tune. Families can center a home in the present and diachronically. They can produce themselves, building through self-reference. All edification is building through self-reference, but if it is a family that is involved in the self-reference then it may be productive of benefits rather than order. Rosemont and Ames neatly contain value judgements in their handling of family relationships. They explain that where others translate Chinese family relationships with the words “superior” and “inferior,” they opt for the words benefactors and beneficiaries to underscore the notion that these roles can be shared in one moment or
they can change over time.¹²

The rigidity of hierarchies ignores the *intra-action* that takes place whenever a relation intensifies. Hierarchies ascribe agency. The elegance or simplicity of a family-centered apparatus for observing the home is that the intensity of benefit falls on the relation itself. I think that Rosemont and Ames flatten hierarchies into sequences by deciphering relations in terms of benefits. Conversely we could ask, *what is a hierarchy but a mere sequence with the addition of coercion?* Taken seriously, a family-home is a refrain that produces benefit. For Deleuze and Guattari, no less than Rosemont and Ames, coercion not compatible with home. To put it another way, a sense of home cannot be produced in a place that produces coercion. Homemaking raises the question: is there one who is responsible, or is the family responsible? As with families that feel at home, the line between a benefactor and a beneficiary is always a bit blurry-as any teacher, mentor or coach in an ostensibly superior position could attest. There is no point in describing who provides or receives a benefit, because edification is building a home. If something bad is produced, it is bad for all. If something good happens, it is good.

Many books on ‘vulnerability’ have been published in France in recent years.¹ This trend is at least partially influenced by American philosophy, especially by fields such as the ‘ethics of care’ and ‘queer studies,’ but today specialists with various backgrounds are dealing with this topic.

Bearing this in mind, in this paper, we will try to sketch an outline of a theory of vulnerability, or vulnerabilities, in a way that is different from the trend explained above. The reason why we take such an approach is because it seems that our key-concept ‘vulnerability’ is not one that has suddenly made an appearance out of nowhere, but one that had already been discussed in certain philosophical contexts created by several thinkers of the 20th century.

The thinkers – or writers – whom we will refer to in this paper are the following: Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Masao Yamaguchi and Kenzaburo Oe. What was the problem of vulnerability in the texts written by these French and Japanese thinkers? Or what would be a theory of vulnerabilities that we could sketch by examining these four thinkers?

To consider these questions, we will study the following three dimensions of vulnerability as clues for thinking: ‘existence,’ ‘society’ and ‘literature.’ Firstly, let us see the ‘existential vulnerability.’

Existence as the Vulnerable

To begin with, we can say that all human beings are fundamentally vulnerable existences. As far as ‘I’ have a body exposed to the outside world, and as far as ‘I’ am forced to have relationships with others, ‘I’ exist in the world with the possibility of being hurt. We may also want to recall that etymologically, the adjective ‘vulnerable’ derives from the Latin word ‘vulnerare,’ meaning ‘to wound, hurt.’

It was the phenomenologists who first paid attention to such an ‘existential vulnerability,’ one of which was Jean-Paul Sartre. In Being and Nothingness (1943), one of his main works, he uses the adjective ‘vulnerable’ when he analyses the function of the ‘look.’

The look which the eyes manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are, is a pure reference to myself. What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not there is someone there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I can not in any case escape from the space in which I am without defense – in short, that I am seen.²

It is important to note that when Sartre tries to form an original theory of the other by paying attention to ‘my’ shame in front of the other, the subject is regarded as fundamentally vulnerable. Judging from the sentence ‘I have a body which can be hurt,’ we can say that Sartre is questioning a corporeal vulnerability here. (When we read the sentence that follows, ‘I occupy a place,’ we understand that the question of (corporeal) vulnerability is intimately tied with the question of place, the main topic of this booklet.)

There is another important philosopher with regard to the existential dimension of vulnerability. That is Emmanuel Levinas, phenomenologist who is contemporary with Sartre and one of the most important Jewish moral philosophers of the 20th century in France. As is often mentioned, what he emphasizes in Totality and Infinity (1961)

is precisely the importance of otherness; in this work he questions the other by comparing it with the unique figure of the ‘face.’

Another important aspect examined in Levinas’s work is the question of vulnerability. Let us see the following citation dealing with the question of ‘love,’ for example.

Love aims at the Other; it aims at him/her in his/her frailty. Frailty does not here figure the inferior degree of any attribute, the relative deficiency of a determination common to me and the other. Prior to the manifestation of attributes, it qualifies alterity itself. To love is to fear for another, to come to the assistance of his/her frailty. In this frailty as in the dawn rises the Loved, who is the Loved Woman. An epiphany of the Loved, the feminine is not added to an object and to a Thou, antecedently given or encountered in the neuter, the sole gender the formal logic knows. The epiphany of the Loved Woman is but one with her regime of tenderness. The way of the tender consists in an extreme fragility, in a vulnerability.³

In this passage, Levinas points out the frailty, fragility and vulnerability of the Other. As is well known, in Levinas’s philosophy, the Other is described as an absolutely weak existence, which is sometimes even figured as ‘the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan.’⁴ A fundamental question in his ethics was how we can relate to such a vulnerable other.⁵

It is important to note that existential vulnerability in both Sartre and Levinas relates to the question of the other, but an important distinction, at least in these citations, is that the former emphasizes ‘my’ vulnerability of a subject, while the latter emphasizes that of the Other as represented in the figure of the Loved Woman. Perhaps it may be interpreted as a distinction between a philosopher of the subject and a

³. Levinas (1991, p. 256). The translation has been modified accordingly.
moralist.\(^6\)

At any rate, it seems that such an existential vulnerability concerning the ‘I’ and the Other is not negligible when thinking about the question of coexistence. ‘I,’ living with the Other who is vulnerable, am also a vulnerable existence.

**Social Vulnerability**

However, is it really sufficient to say that ‘I’ am vulnerable, or that the other is vulnerable? The question of vulnerability seems to be more complex.

For example, we can consider the question of ‘disability.’ In general, it is said that disabled people are more vulnerable than able-bodied people. They may face a fundamental weakness because of their disability in the first place, and furthermore, they may inevitably experience inconvenience in a society that is constructed mainly for the able-bodied. If you also consider the stigma the society puts on them – the word ‘stigma(ta)’ is also concerned with wounds, etymologically –, their vulnerabilities can be doubled or tripled.

It is not only disabled people but also other minorities who may experience such situations in their own ways. If we borrow a phrase from Judith Butler, one of the most important theorists writing on this topic, we could say ‘[t]here are ways of distributing vulnerability, differential forms of allocation that make some populations more subject to arbitrary violence than others.’\(^7\)

Here, we would like to mention the name of Masao Yamaguchi, a Japanese anthropologist, as an important thinker who has analysed such a ‘social vulnerability.’ We will examine a short essay entitled ‘On Vulnerability: “Ordinary Life” as a Potential Weapon’ (1980), in which Yamaguchi analyzes the film *Freaks* (1932) by Tod Browning. He writes:

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6. The two philosophers have already been compared from the viewpoint of vulnerability. Cf. Hanus (2006, p. 205).
For human beings who live their ordinary lives in the superficial sense of the word, identity is formed by constantly protecting themselves from being infected with what is seemingly unformed, uncanny and out of shape. The world of a ‘normal’ human being, a world that is cozy but lacking in resilience, is realized by keeping as far away from the sight of comfortable life as possible the Devil, the enemy, the politically weak, the rebel, the socially weak, the disabled, the deformed, the insane, the poor, the sick (especially those with contagious diseases), and other various metaphors of death, which are ultimately the completion of the entropy.8

In ordinary life, the normal maintains its identity by creating the abnormal.9 This insight in itself may not be anything new, as it has often been discussed in the structuralist context. However, what we would like to stress here is that Yamaguchi ties this problematic to the question of vulnerability. For example, when discussing A Bar of Shadow (1954) by Laurens van der Post in the same essay, he writes the following sentences.

Here, the cruelty of one that is unmarked towards one that is marked – of which the deformed body is an example – is rightly depicted. At the same time, this text captures quite accurately the state of vulnerability (攻撃誘発性), a state that does not fit well in the Japanese language. A corporeal characteristic beyond limits, merely because it does not fit in the order of the world, bears the nature of a ‘stigma’ as the potential target of aggressiveness.10

It is interesting to note that Yamaguchi chooses the expression 攻撃誘発性 for the translation of the term ‘vulnerability.’ We can re-translate this as ‘attack-inducing nature.’ Of course, this translation includes a certain interpretation of the word ‘vulnerability,’ but it would give us some hints when trying to understand this polyseme. As we saw above,

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9. The ordinary (life) is also one of the important topics considered by contemporary philosophers. Cf. Cavell (1994); Bégout (2010).
if the normal structurally requires the abnormal, the abnormal would continue to be attacked. This is the nature of vulnerability we inevitably find in the excluded.

The society is a place where vulnerable beings live together, and more and more vulnerable beings are produced. That is why we need welfare, support, ‘care,’ etc., as is claimed by writers such as Guillaume Le Blanc, a contemporary French philosopher. Le Blanc, in a book recently published in France, has tackled this problem of ‘social vulnerability’ by discussing issues on homeless people, illegal immigration, and exclusion in society.11

However, is the question of vulnerability always ethical? In other words, are we always ethical when faced with vulnerability? Should we not think about the relationship between vulnerability and evil, and not only about the relationship between vulnerability and goodness?

Vulnerability in Literature

We have discussed the problem of vulnerability on the existential level and on the social level. The final level of vulnerability is concerned with representation or a kind of immorality. For the moment, we will name it ‘literary vulnerability.’

As we have already seen through Yamaguchi’s text, vulnerability is one of the themes art and literature prefer to represent. In fact, it would be rather difficult to find a literary work which does not include any vulnerable characters (such as the disabled, the sick, the aged, etc.). In a sense, we may say that vulnerability is something that induces representation or narration of itself.

Let us consider this problem by referring to Kenzaburo Oe’s novel An Echo of Heaven (1989). In our understanding, one of the most important themes of this novel is ‘vulnerability.’ This work by Oe depicts the life of a middle-aged Japanese woman, Marie, who experiences many hardships: problems deriving from the disabilities of

her children, their suicides, sexual violence, etc. In one of the passages, when talking about his friend Marie, the narrator K – who closely resembles Oe himself – says:

‘I think the English word “vulnerability” – anthropologist Y defines it as an “attack-inducing nature” – applies to the state Marie’s in right now. Even if the original incident couldn’t have been foreseen, Marie’s been vulnerable ever since, the wound still raw and exposed. That’s how it seems to me, anyway.’

In this passage, the narrator describes her as vulnerable according to the theory of ‘anthropologist Y.’ If we recall that reality and imagination are often mixed in Oe’s work, it seems unquestionable that Y in this quotation is the initial of Masao Yamaguchi we saw earlier. (In fact, it is well known that Oe and Yamaguchi often refer to each other’s names and arguments in their own work.)

Thus, we can probably say that while Yamaguchi considers the problem of vulnerability in anthropology, Oe does so in literature. However, when we address this question in literature, the problem of the narrator, or the act of narration itself inevitably intervenes. In fact, Oe is writing not only about the vulnerable Marie but also about his double, i.e. the narrator writing her life. What is questioned here is not only the representation of a vulnerable woman, but also the act of representing it.

As we saw earlier, Yamaguchi focused on vulnerable existences produced in social structures. In our understanding, these existences are concerned with the social dimension of vulnerability, which can be tied to the ethical question of ‘care.’ Thus the question is, is it ethical for K – or Oe himself – to write about Marie? The answer would be, ‘Not necessarily.’ It is not in order to seek a way to care for her in an ethical or social manner that he writes her life. If we bear in mind that Marie’s sex

12. Oe (1996, p. 102). The translation has been modified accordingly.

appeal is emphasized throughout the work and that on one occasion she actually tries to seduce K, we could see even K’s (Oe’s) desire for Marie. At the end of the novel, Marie is violated by another man, but the narrator simply writes about her vulnerable life as a part of ‘his own story.’ Could we find here a kind of voyeuristic – even sadistic – nature in the writer himself?

Existentially, we are all vulnerable; socially, vulnerability is distributed in an unequal manner. In literature, we can say that this inequality of vulnerability is reinforced. Here, the ordinary idea of ‘the care for the vulnerable’ is out of the question. In describing Marie as vulnerable, the narrator writes about the life of a woman being hurt as well as about himself who writes it. K, wearing clothes, describes Marie being violated by another man. As has often been pointed out, the voyeuristic structure in which a man wearing clothes looks at a naked body is one of the most typical of sadico-masochistic relationships.14 Here, the look as language is thrown on Marie’s naked and vulnerable body.

The question of vulnerability cannot be irrelevant to issues of sexuality and gender. It was Sartre in Being and nothingness who compared the relationship between ‘I’ and the other to a sadico-masochistic relationship.15 As for Levinas, according to Butler, ‘it is possible, even easy, to read Levinas as an elevated masochist […].’16 Thus, vulnerability can be not only a part of the ethics of care, but also of the (vicious) circle of sadico-masochism with no exits. We may go so far as to say that there is a secret complicity between care and sadico-masochism. It would be possible that the look or language intended to care about a vulnerable other functions as a kind of violence that satisfies the desire of a sadist or of a masochist. At least we would need to remind ourselves that these problems are inevitable when drawing a theory about vulnerability.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to sketch a theory of vulnerabilities from the viewpoints of ‘existence,’ ‘society,’ and ‘literature.’ On an existential level, that is, from an ontological perspective, we could say we are all vulnerable. However, on the social level, our vulnerability is distributed in an unequal way and care is required. At the same time, the literary act of writing about a vulnerable being would require a consideration that is different from that of care. That is to say, the problem of ‘sadico-masochism’ intervenes here in a subtle manner.

In terms of social vulnerability, it would be necessary for us to deepen our knowledge about more particular cases such as those of the aged,\(^17\) the handicapped, or perhaps the *hikikomori* in the Japanese context.\(^18\) As for literary vulnerability, we will have to consider the relationship between language and vulnerability more generally.\(^19\)

At the same time, let us not forget that the question of vulnerability is also inevitable in order to understand our own existences as bodies that can be hurt; it is also a question that cannot be avoided when considering the relationship between the self and the other, or in other words, the question of co-existence.

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17. For example, Sartre’s lifelong partner Beauvoir tackles this question. Cf. Beauvoir (1970).


2011.


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Finding Xiang Yuan in Wuxingpian

Miles W. MARTIN IV

“The village worthy is the ruin of virtue.”¹ Such is the brief but disdainful opinion Confucius expresses of xiang yuan (鄉願), or the village worthy, in *The Analects*. This disdain of the village worthy is expanded upon by Mencius in another longer passage in which Mencius further elaborates on how Confucius feels about the village worthy. These are the only two passages where Confucius directly talks about the village worthy. Yet the passages do not provide much information about them, such as: who or what exactly is the village worthy, what in particular is wrong with them, and why does Confucius have such a low opinion of them. In exploring other Confucian texts can find passages that might make indirect reference to the village worthy to help better understand them. Particularly the Confucian text *Wuxingpian* (五行篇), or The Five Conducts, can help situate the village worthy into the framework of Confucian morality.

The closest thing to a clear description of the village worthy is provided by Mencius in book 7B passage number 37 in which a conversation with Wan Zhang is used to elaborate upon Confucius’ brief mention of the village worthy in chapter 17 passage 13 of *The Analects*. From this passage it can be gathered that the village worthy on the surface appears to be moral and irreproachable, thus the village worthy is adored and admired by the common people around them. But in reality their claims of moral excellence are made under false pretenses. They are merely someone who far too easily can be confused with a morally excellent person, just as weeds can often be easily confused for grain. There is also an indication of how the village worthy

achieves this appearance of morality. Because the village worthy is an expert on what is commonly and conventionally considered moral, they are always ‘chiming in with the practices of the day’ which allows them to ‘blend in with the common world.’ So to the common people the village worthy’s actions seem to all be moral. To these commoners the village worthy appears to be a moral exemplar, when in fact they are not. The explanation for why the village worthy lacks true moral excellence can be found in The Five Conducts.

In 1973 three tombs were unearthed near Changsha, China. This archaeological site, which could be dated back to the mid Second Century BCE, became known as Mawangdui (馬王堆), or King Ma’s Mound. Within the tombs were found numerous texts on philosophy, medicine, mathematics, military strategy, and many other topics all written on silk. One of these texts in particular was untitled but upon analysis it was theorized to be a long lost text. In 1993 another text was discovered in a different tomb, which could be dated back to the Fourth Century BCE, near the village of Guodian (郭店). While not completely identical it was clear that these two texts were different versions of the same text, only this Guodian text was written on bamboo slips and bore the title Wuxing (五行), or The Five Conducts. This confirmed the speculation over the identity of the text. The text was in fact The Five Conducts which has been attributed to Confucius’ grandson Zisi. The five conducts that give the text its name are: ren (仁) authoritative or consummate conduct/humaneness; yi (義) optimal appropriateness; li (禮) propriety in rituals, roles, and relations; zhi (智) wisdom; and sheng (聖) sagaciousness. The opening passage of The Five Conducts draws a distinction between those who are morally virtuous (德) and those that merely perform the actions that are conventionally attributed to moral virtuosity.

仁形於內謂之德之行; 不形於內謂之德之行。智形於內謂之德之行; 不形於內謂之行。義形於內謂之德之行; 不形於內

3. Aka possess the five virtuous conducts.
4. Aka only do what is merely perceived to be required by these virtuous conducts.
When *ren* takes shape within, it is called moral conduct (*de*); when it does not take shape within, it is called merely doing what is *ren*. When *zhi* takes shape within, it is called moral conduct; when it does not take shape within, it is called merely doing what is *zhi*. When *yi* takes shape within, it is called moral conduct; when it does not take shape within, it is called merely doing what is *yi*. When *li* takes shape within, it is called moral conduct; when it does not take shape within, it is called merely doing what is *li*. When *sheng* takes shape within, it is called moral conduct; when it does not take shape within, it is called merely doing what is *sheng*. When the five moral conducts achieve harmony (*he* 和) amongst each other, it is called moral excellence (*de*). Harmony among only the first four conducts is called efficacy (*shan* 善). Efficacy is *rendao* (人道 the Human Way). Moral excellence is *tiandao* (天道 the Way of Heaven).6

This passage draws numerous distinctions. It draws a distinction between conduct taking shape within as opposed to merely performing the actions of the conduct. This seems to be driving at a distinction between moral conduct and mere action. A mere action might be something that is conventionally and commonly linked with morality, but performance alone is not enough for actual moral conduct. Another distinction that is made is between efficacy and moral excellence. Moral excellence is something that sages possess, but at the same time requires efficacy. Efficacy alternatively is something everyone can strive for regardless of sagehood. This distinction is also

5. *Wuxingpian* 1

at the heart of rendao and tiandao. Humanity in general’s dao is to be efficient; whereas the sage moves past this dao, tapping into the dao of tian. At the complete opposite end of the spectrum the village worthy remains at the level of mere action. The conducts have not taken shape within for them. Their actions may appear on the surface to be moral or at least what is conventionally linked with morality and the five conducts, but these actions remain mere actions. The village worthy does not achieve true efficacy and remains out of touch with rendao, again because the conducts have not taken shape within for them.

But what exactly is meant by ‘take shape within?’ The concept of ‘taking shape within’ in the context of Confucian philosophy draws a different picture than what it might mean in a Western Aristotelian understanding involving a moral agent with internal motivations. In the Confucian context a moral agent and moral motivation are seen in a different light. In Chinese cosmology people are not considered independent individuals. Instead people are viewed as relational interdependent beings. A person is comprised of the relationships they have with other people, they would not exist independent of these relationships and it does not make sense to think of them independent of these relationships. It is through these relationships that each person occupies a role. Each role a person occupies may change over time, but they will always occupy some kind of role. The child eventually may become a parent; the student may eventually become a teacher; and so on. ‘To each role is attached a set of obligations, and to be in a role is to be under a set of obligations. Which obligations go with which role is determined by more or less explicit social expectations.’ Being a parent has certain obligations that a person is socially expected to meet. Likewise a child has a different set of obligations that are expected of them. Morality in this Confucian understanding occurs through finding out what one must do by considering yi, what is most appropriate for the circumstances, and li, what are the obligations attached to one’s roles in the society. The moral agent must determine what is expected of them and the most appropriate way to go about it. It is these role obligations that provide a moral motivation. ‘There is a close connection between

the Confucian agent’s believing that something is an obligation and feeling motivated to discharge it.” A parent should be motivated to do what a good parent does, in other words they should be motivated to meet the obligations of parenthood. A Confucian is motivated by society and themself to meet the obligations of the roles they occupy. It is in this way that they are moral agents.

What is crucial for the moral agent under this conception is that they correctly understand what roles they occupy in society and correctly understand what the obligations of those roles are. This is what it means to have the conducts ‘take shape within’. The conducts express themselves in different ways for each role in society. It is the moral agent’s obligation to understand how they are related to the conducts and how they should express them through the different roles they live in. The morally excellent agent strives for cheng (誠), sincerity/integrity/creativity. These morally excellent agents not only understand the position they occupy in society and how the conducts are related to this position, they also remain sincere in who they are in the society and manifest a creativity that allows them to remain true to themself no matter what circumstances they encounter. Part of this is being motivated by the obligations that are linked with the conducts. If they are a parent they not only understand what a wise parent must do, but they can also determine what is optimally wise given any particular situation. They are sincere to who they are, they maintain the moral integrity of the roles they fill in the society, and are able to be creative in adapting to any situation that might arise. Another way to understand cheng is that the morally excellent agent has a deep and intimate knowledge of who they are and how they are connected and related to everyone or everything around them. They know themself, so that they are able to do what is right no matter what circumstance they encounter. They express the moral conducts through who they are in society, fulfilling every obligation in the most beneficial (to both themself and society) way they can. It is this way that the conducts have ‘taken shape within’, becoming a central part in who they understand themself to be.

8. Ibid., p. 5.
There are at least two possible ways a person can fail to have the conducts ‘take shape inside.’ The agent can fail to understand their true position in society and the moral obligations that they are faced with. Or the agent can understand the roles they fill in society but fail to fulfill their obligations in an optimally appropriate way. In both cases the person could want to be moral, but they are not able to adapt with circumstances. They might know the right thing to do under certain circumstances, but anything new or novel will throw them for a loop. They might also be able to ape the right action, either by accident or in an attempt to cultivate an appearance of moral conduct. But these are mere actions not true moral conduct. Such a person might ‘always do what is right’ but for the wrong reason, such as because how others will think of them.

No matter the reason or way that they fail to have the conducts take shape inside, these are the kinds of people that Confucius and Mencius call the village worthy. Confucius describes them as “excellence (de 德) under false pretenses.” The village worthy appears to be moral, appears to be exemplifying the conducts, and appears to be someone praiseworthy and exemplary. But in reality they ape the moral conduct, merely doing what is perceived by others to be examples of the conduct. Yet at the heart of their actions, it is all just an act. The village worthy may appear to be wise and do things that are widely considered wise. But their actions are not really those of a person who wisdom has ‘taken shape inside of them.’ The village worthy are either performing these ‘wise’ actions not knowing their true position or role in society, thus not knowing what would truly be wise for them to do, or they know their position in society but are merely doing what is conventionally seen as wise, not able to replicate this wisdom into new or novel circumstances. A wise person would be able to apply their wisdom to any and all circumstances, whereas someone who is merely performing wise actions is only able to do certain things that appear wise under certain circumstances. This can be done both intentionally or it could be done unintentionally. If it is intentional, on the surface the village worthy might appear to be a fine upstanding morally virtuous person,

but behind closed doors the mask falls away. Regardless of it being intentional or not, the village worthy has failed to ‘shape the conducts inside.’ They either fail to understand their roles and obligations or they understand their roles and obligations but fail at being creative or sincere in fulfilling their obligations and living the role. In a way the village worthy are harmful to morality in general. Their existence belittles and marginalizes true moral virtue and conduct. They seem to receive all the benefits without all the hard work. Because the village worthy is able to have their cake and eat it to. If the village worthy can receive all the praise from their fellow villagers who are none the wiser, why should anyone bother to become truly moral? Why not become like the village worthy? This is exactly why Confucius had such a bad opinion of them and why any good Confucian should have a bad opinion of them. The village worthy exemplifies a path of appearance of moral excellence without it truly being present.
Ideal Presentations of the People (民) and Their Real Limitations:
Metaphysical Personhood in Ancient Philosophical and Religious Daoism

Sydney MORROW

This essay addresses the metaphysical, hierarchical construal of reality as it is experienced by the lesser actors in the hermeneutic world comprising and surrounding the Laozi. My aim is to show that not only are those to whom the work is addressed, namely those with a reasonable degree of sovereign or suzerainty power during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Eras (772-221 BC), existentially distinguishable from the ‘common folk’ (民) in terms of social and economic standing and the concomitant benefits of that lifestyle, such as literacy, but that the text indicates a different metaphysical status for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. I will show that the metaphysical difference is indicated by a different set of limitations imposed from without onto the common people that have no effect on those above, such as the rulers, sages, and hypothetical cases often indicated by the pronoun rén 人. I take this claim as the metaphorical expression of the physical construal of space, with those of relatively higher importance occupying a space above others, in a jiào (轿) or upper hall (上堂). The metaphysical perspective is never far from its analogical, physical counterpart, and so the proximity of those with power to the watchful and participatory powers above (tiān 天) is also implied. This connection is shown by the power of the ruler to upend a harmonious empire by engaging in nefarious activity, which can come in the form of civil unrest or, in extreme cases, massively destructive droughts and floods. Those who have the least control over their own circumstances are then affected by a reality not of their own making.
They lack context inasmuch as nothing in their lives seems peculiarly caused, but rather reality is all-causing and continuous process, and one impossible to predict. This paints a different picture than that which portrays all people as having similar faculties, imaginations, and capabilities. I argue that not only is it the case that not everyone can be a sage, but that most don’t meet the minimum threshold for being politically, and hence societally, relevant.

**Interpretive Context: Philosophical and Religious Daoism**

The use of simply the word ‘Daoism’ does not refer sufficiently to any one area, motif, or motive of living. I will employ the distinction between Philosophical Daoism and Religious Daoism to differentiate between quite different interpretations of the same material, the text that comprises what is now referred to as the *Daodejing*. I am motivated to do this because while the tradition referred to as ‘philosophical’ gives rise to many interpretations about the cosmological and metaphysical process of the world, the ‘religious’ perspective provides the bridge from the governing of the empire (天下) to the governing of one’s own person.¹ The religious view of the text, which provides a blueprint for self-improvement and realization, motivates a more inclusive relevant readership. Whereas the text read as a method of quasi-anarchical governance is only relevant to a select few, the text read as the mindful observance of one’s natural tendencies, connecting seamlessly with the endless processes creating and molding the cosmos, is potentially relevant to all. Yet, even with this inclusivity, equality among all individuals is neither stated nor implied in early Religious Daoism, for which I take the Xiang’er Commentary as a paradigmatic text. Often, the common folk are referred to as one body rather than an assemblage of individuals, which I take as an indication that there is still a metaphysical imposition put upon the common folk which is beyond their control. I take this as an indication that the common folk lack the freedom and agency necessary to play a formative part in the

¹. As all elements of life are vaguely politicized by this term, I refer to it as empire. It could also refer to ‘all things and processes’ as well as ‘existence’, most broadly.
creation of their circumstances.

The important terms which I’ve translated to suit my reading are dao (道), zìrán (自然), and wúwéi (無為). I take dao as the cosmological principle ordering the natural world and the way of human action prescribed by this order. I think that this definition includes the nuanced and lesser expressed meanings of dao such as ‘to rule’, ‘to talk’, and ‘to lead’, and though lengthy it captures the integral nature of human participation in the imaginative creation of reality. Correspondingly, zìrán is also co-defined as that which is and that which is experienced. I define it as a natural way of being, both in its manifestation(s) and change(s). This term may be employed to describe a single item, such as the germination of a single seed, or a complex of relationships like the bustling cycles of life and death in the heart of the rainforest. I will use the formulation ‘action without artifice’ such as is found in Steve Coutinho’s book titled An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies.2 This is primarily to dissuade a facile interpretation of wúwéi as ‘non-action’ through the Buddhist lens, as of sitting in meditation. Rather, wúwéi is an active engagement with the goings-on of things that is characterized by awareness in the present as well as of the past. For my purposes, these three terms provide the integrally connected framework for the metaphysical exposition of the place of the common folk in these ancient Chinese texts.

**The Laozi: Common Folk and the Properly Ordered Cosmos**

In this section, I will indicate the passages in the accepted text of the Laozi, whose authorship and origin remain veiled, as are the topics discussed therein, that I read as forwarding my claim that the common folk occupy a unique metaphysical space in the empire (天下). These passages indicate that the common folk self-order in a well-ordered state because of their natural ability to attune themselves with the prevailing state of things. Also proffered in these passages is

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the connection between the actions of the ruler and the circumstances of the common folk. If the empire is badly mismanaged, then the lives and moral conduct of the common folk will descend into chaos (luan 亂). From passage 57 of the *Laozi*: 故聖人云: 我無為, 而民自化;我好靜, 而民自正; 我無事, 而民自富; 我無欲, 而民自樸. "In the words of the sages: We do things without artifice, and the common folk naturally fulfill themselves. We value stillness of mind, and the common folk correct themselves. We do not implement strategy, and the common folk achieve their success. We do not desire any particular way, and the common folk simply are.’ It is apparent that direct and purposeful ruling are not held to be the desirous method for ruling. Rather, there is an indirect relationship to the goings on of the upper tier of society, the audience here being the sagacious ruler, and the common folk below. In a sense, they do not share the same world because the actions of the ruler shape the lives of the common folk not only in an ideological or exemplary way, but in a very real, though not evidently physical way as well.

The sagacious way of living has a broader cosmological context than the lives of the common folk. This is evident in passage 17 of the *Laozi*. After listing the best rulers, those who are known by the common folk only to exist and so have no expectations put upon them, and the less best whom they adore and despise, the final line reads 功成事遂, 百姓皆謂我自然. ‘When their work is finished the common folk all say “We are naturally like this.”’ It is apparent that the common folk do not do what they do because they were ordered to do so, but they are naturally inclined to do what is expected of them. Further, attempting to win their favor will distract them from their natural inclinations, and so will also be detrimental. This is the theme of passage 29, especially the lines 將欲取天下而為之, 吾見其不得已. 天下神器, 不可為也, 為者敗之, 執者失之. ‘If one would like to take the world as one’s empire, I feel that it is not something which can be held on to. The world is a sacred and complex vessel, and not something that can be artificially produced. If one’s intentions are to rule the world, then

3. 《正統道藏》本王弼註道德真經 Available from: http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing
4. ibid
failure is certain. Hold the world in the palm of your hand and you will lose it.’ An excellent ruler preserves the world instead of controlling it, and in so doing makes it possible for the common folk to carry on. The existence of the ruler is implied in the nature of metaphysical reality of the common folk, and what they can know, hope for, and experience is moderated by the ruler. The ruler in turn has the responsibility to the common folk to order the cosmos in alignment with the celestial and historical status quo.

The Xiang'er Commentary: Individual Expression of the Cosmos

The Xiang'er commentary to the Laozi (speculated origin 200 CE) interprets the text as a handbook for incorporating the principles of Daoism in the context of daily life for all individuals. The shift from its reading as a treatise on rulership, namely Wang Bi’s interpretation which implies a hierarchical view of human society, includes the common, non-elite populace in its scope. Whereas the common folk in the accepted text and commentary are taken as willfully ignorant and outside of the purview of the ruler’s immediate concerns, in this interpretation they may be privy to the machinations of the empire, but must be protected from evil, false, or perverted doctrines. This inclusivity allows for parity among the mass of common folk, and in effect grants them responsibility and freedom for their lives and actions. This theme is not immediately apparent in the accepted text, which does not indicate that they are capable of discerning right and wrong. Rather, they are subjected to the conditions and respond to them either naturally or unnaturally. In this way they may be considered as a mass, a singular body, which comprises a valuable though politically inert part of the social milieu.

The commentary does not advocate total equality. The sages on this interpretation remain much closer to the inner workings of the cosmos, while the common folk are unaware of the font of reality and the potential for the future. Having no epistemological ballast to stabilize and root them to the source of things, they must still depend on the sagacious rulers to model the cosmos in a way that suits their
natural proclivities. What they can do is resonate with the conditions more or less authentically, which creates, I argue, a new metaphysical mode of relating to the world. Whereas in the accepted text and commentary the common folk are presented as being completely dependent and passively affected by their circumstances, in the Xiang'er commentary they are also granted the moral efficacy to be exemplars for one another. Their natural way of being includes discrimination among possible modes of interpreting their surroundings. In other words, the proliferation of brigands and thieves does not necessarily indicate a failing on behalf of the ruler, but may simply be the a gang of commoners stubbornly or ignorantly refusing to source the prevailing circumstance for its inherent meaning. So although the text grants to the common folk an allotment of personal freedom, in the end there is an occlusion that bars the common folk from experiencing reality in its fullest manifestation. This, I argue is a metaphysical issue because the way that reality unfolds and shapes one’s life is different depending one’s orientation in the social hierarchy. The past and future have little formative effect on the common folk, as they are portrayed as doing their work and simply being so (ziran 自然). Reflecting on the turning over of change is not an essential part of their day to day lives, and so rarely enters the purview of their concern.

Conclusion

In this short essay, I hope to have shown that the hierarchical social strata implied by the mentions of the common folk in the Laozi and its commentaries in its philosophical and religious interpretations indicates a metaphysically unique construal of reality. The perspective of the common folk is limited to the manifest set of circumstances, which is immediately ordered by the ruler who is ideally sagacious and responsible with the power. Otherwise, the common folk will be unwittingly subjected to abject conditions. Though on this view they have little control over their immediate environment, they are gifted with the ability to naturally accord with things. If the conditions are auspicious, then their lives will be well-preserved. If not, then they will
suffer a deluge of misfortune with no recourse to rectification. Thus the metaphysics of their reality are socially construed. Whether or not they are capable of a deeper, nuanced knowledge of reality is not addressed in the accepted text of the *Laozi*, but is subtly indicated in the *Xiang’er* commentary. On this view, the common folk are capable of spiritual knowledge but are easily fooled. This indicates that although they may be granted a limited knowledge of reality that allows them to discern right from wrong, they are dependent on the actions of the ruler. Thus, they are not able to be creative agents in their lives, although their natural way of being aligns perfectly and symmetrically with the prevailing state of things.
Notes on Place:
Ars contextualis and the Intersection of Fin-de-siècle Psychology, Philosophy and Art

Kyle PETERS

In the 2014 University of Tokyo-University of Hawai‘i Institute in Comparative Philosophy, Kajitani Shinji stressed the social and historical nature of feelings, thoughts, and action, and stressed their interconnection with both basho (place) and fūdo (climate), the respective topics of lectures by Nakajima Takahiro and Ishida Masato. Likewise, Roger Ames stressed *ars contextualis* as an interpretive methodology, applying the vocabulary of classical American philosophers like William James to early Confucian philosophy in order to express productive correlations and novel significance. Inspired by these presentations, this paper also uses James to re-articulate established horizons, but does so keeping him within his own intellectual climate/place. Bringing James to bear on my own research, which functions at the intersection of fin-de-siècle psychology, philosophy, and art, it works to articulate a productive re-reading and re-imagining of an important moment in early cinematic theory.

In particular, this paper uses James to clarify and develop the film theory of his colleague Hugo Münsterberg, who published *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study* in 1916. In the first section of the book, “The Psychology of the Photoplay,” Münsterberg claims that film is the objectification of our psychological processes, predicing his argument upon the cinematic parallels with perception and attention, which he claims function at the base of experience. While he makes productive parallels, this paper argues that his account of attention and perception is overly spatialized and rigid, and therefore his analogy is unable to account for the temporal richness of the cinematic structure. But rather
than idiosyncratically criticizing Münsterberg from the perspective of contemporary filmic and psychological theory, it employs the art of *ars contextualis*, using James in order to articulate the temporal dimensions structuring this framework. In doing so, it works to provide a navigable reinterpretation of Münsterberg’s writings on the correspondence between film and attention, and thus of an important moment in the early history of film theory.

**The Active Attention**

Like William James, Münsterberg develops his understanding of perception against the traditional empiricist account, which argues that we perceive bare sense impressions and subsequently interpret this data according to the activities of the imagination. As a Neo-Kantian of the Baden (Southwest) school, Münsterberg argues that the imagination does not search for the principle of dead sensuous data, but that our perceptions are fundamentally structured by determining [bestimmend] judgments. In determining judgments, our imagination filters the objects of presentation through the understanding thereby structuring each individual presentation according to a particular concept. We never perceive bare sense data because perception is conceptually organized from the outset.

Radicalizing this Kantian presupposition, he further parts from the empiricist account by claiming that our perception is inextricably structured by attention. Münsterberg (2002, p.79):

> If we hear Chinese, we perceive the sounds, but there is no inner response to the words; they are meaningless and dead for us; we have no interest in them. If we hear the same thoughts expressed in our mother tongue, every syllable carries its meaning and message...(this significance) is something which comes to us in the perception itself as if the meaning too were passing through the channels of our ears.

1. While Neo-Kantians differ from Kant, and from each other, in a variety of manners, this is the basic principle that is shared between them.
While we can parcel out individuated phonemes through reflection, such elements are patent abstractions which do not express lived perception as it is enveloped in meaning. For Münsterberg, perception is not a passive recording of bare sense impression but rather an active process by which we attend to certain dimensions in our perceptual field. Through intentional acts of selective attention, a meaningful horizon is formed out of a larger continuum of experiential possibility. This network determines the realm of perceptual, conceptual, and practical affordances thereby structuring the way that we attend to objects. Thus Münsterberg (2002, p.80): “Of all internal functions which create the meaning of the world around us, the most central is the attention. The chaos of the surrounding impressions is organized into a real cosmos of experience by our selection of that which is significant and of consequence.” And James (1905, p.402): “My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind — without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos.” Within this delimited experiential horizon certain objects further arrest our attention, becoming “more vivid” based on our interests, aims, and goals. As these objects capture our attention, other objects “fade” such that they “have no hold on our mind, they disappear” (2002, pp.79-80).

Attention and the Close-Up

Münsterberg objectifies this conception of attention in the close-up. While he does not offer many concrete examples, we can elucidate this in relation to one of the iconic moments of film in that period, the shot of the wrench in D.W. Griffith's Lonedale Operator. Before the close-up of the wrench, the audience is presented with a medium shot of the train conductors and the tramps aligned in half-circle. The left conductor brings the female clerk towards the camera,

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2. Münsterberg notes that this can be either voluntary or involuntary.
3. Because it is one of the few close-ups of the time.
with her motion attracting the spectator’s attention. The audience’s attention is further focused on the female character because of the relatively fixed status of the surrounding party. As she pulls the wrench out and moves it towards the center of the frame, the surrounding characters lean in to get a better view. Objectifying the mental desires of the spectator, the film cuts into a close-up of the wrench as if the audience is guiding the cut. Likening this act of attention to the close-up, Münsterberg (2002, p. 87) claims that the wrench “suddenly become[s] the whole content of the performance, and everything which our mind wants to disregard has suddenly banished from our sight and has disappeared.”

While the object does indeed become more vivid, this analysis of the close-up, like the theory of attention which it is based upon, is excessively exclusionary. When we attend to an object, the surrounding perceptions do not “disappear” but rather they continue to structure the foreground of our attention. The radical empiricism articulated by James, the colleague mentioned above, is much more attentive to this foreground-background structure of experience. James argued that perception is constituted by a focus-fringe structure in which the focal region of clear and determinate elements is surrounded by a vague, emotionally tinged field of indeterminate elements. James (2008: 117): “[m]y present field of consciousness is a center surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a subconscious more.” These background relations structure the foreground of our attention such that we relate to focal objects in a radically different manner depending on the field they are situated within. It follows that the dimly illuminated fringe is more intimately connected with the focus of attention than Münsterberg allows, and thus certain commentator’s comparisons to Gestalt psychology are quite problematic (Dudley, 1996, p. 16).

It is this focus-fringe pattern of attention that is objectified in the close-up. On the level of the frame, the wrench reflects the foreground-background structure spatially. The director, like the mind, spatially organizes the elements of a frame in order to direct our attention to certain elements. But we do not merely see the wrench, rather we also notice the way in which the wrench is positioned halfway between the woman and the conductor, with its chrome color
acting as an intermediary between her white clothes and his dark clothes. We also attend to the way in which the wrench is held in the woman’s hands, as if being offered to the conductor. Despite the fact that the wrench is in the focus of our attention, the other elements – the conductor, the woman, and her hands – do not merely “disappear” from our consciousness. Rather, we see the wrench as it is on display for the characters in the film. Like attention, the close-up is framed so that the wrench is intimately structured by these fringe elements.

This shot also stands in a focus-fringe relation to a more distant, weakly felt spatial axis that surrounds the framed background. That is, film implies at least two background layers, those elements which impinge on the foreground from within the frame and a more distant spatial orientation. In Noël Burch’s *Theory of Film Practice* (1973, p.17), he speaks of six spatial axes: above or below the frame, right or left of the frame, and depth away from or depth toward the camera. Our perception of the framed foreground and background is always oriented within space. This spatial axis has a mental corollary, being the cinematic objectification of the Kantian intuition of space. The presupposed content inhabiting these spatial axes, moreover, influences our experience of the wrench. In addition to the wrench in the foreground and the torsos in the background, we also implicitly recognize the heads of the torsos peering down upon the wrench. Despite not being presented within the frame, this more remote background is also objectified in the focus-fringe structure of cinema.

*Attention and the Shot*

But while this close-up accurately clarifies the foreground-background spatial structure of the frame, this analysis proves inadequate for a number of reasons. Like the empiricist notion of bare sense data, the frame does not express the richness of the cinematic structure. This is most evident in the shared presupposition of a “knife-edge” instant (James 1905, p.609). For James, experience is not instantaneous but rather is a temporally thick “duration” which retains past experience and anticipates future experience (James *ibid.*). Our attention is a
diachronic, dynamic process which constantly brings elements into the foreground of attention and retires elements into the dark background based on our experiences, interests, and goals. Attention is a continuous movement from fringe to focus, a dynamic determination of objects from the indeterminate penumbra of consciousness.

Insofar as this frame does not express the richness of the cinematic structure, it is no surprise that the foreground-background structure of the frame does not objectify attention. In film, the frame is always situated in either a single shot or a series. Whether it is a shot from a fixed angle, a single tracking shot, or several shots cut together, the temporal process of shooting affects the foreground-background spatial structure of the frame. As Felicity Colman (2011, p.48) demonstrates, frame and shot stand in a dynamic relationship in which “attention to the framing of the image, and the dis/continuity of parts within a shot work to construct different screen arrangements.” Based on the establishing shot, we see the wrench not only as it is situated between the two torsos (and their heads in the more remote background), but also as it inhabits the gaze of the five people. We see the wrench as an object of interest for the three characters which are not presented within the frame but were given in the preceding shot. This is because, like attention, the close-up retains the previous shot (in which the three characters on the right side lean in). Moreover, the close-up also anticipates forthcoming shots such that we simultaneously recognize that the tramps will be shocked or angry at seeing the wrench.4 Like attention, the dynamic interplay between frame and shot is a diachronic, dynamic process.

Attention and the Filmic Whole

But the close-up is not merely situated within the series of shots in the clerks room, it is also situated in the background filmic whole. Appropriating Aristotelian categories, we can say that the close-up of the wrench produces a catharsis of anxiety in the spectator. In

4. Protention is less determinate than retention, and we are always open to the possibility of mistake.
the shots preceding this scene, Griffith uses parallel editing to connect the female clerk in peril and the conductors racing to the rescue. The two story lines are edited together in a parallel montage so that each story line heightens the tension and drama of the other story. As the conductors race to the station, Griffith quickens the tempo of the editing and the action within the shot, thereby building a feeling of suspense in the audience. The danger is deconstructed with the arrival of the conductor, and the end of suspense is marked by the close-up of the wrench. The wrench allows for spectatorial catharsis through its location in the larger film. Thus, like the dynamic focus-fringe structure of attention, the foreground of the wrench is intimately structured by its relation to the surrounding shots and the larger cinematic whole.

**Conclusion**

Applying the art of *ars contextualis*, this paper has used James’s philosophy to reformulate Münsterberg’s spatial articulation of the correspondences between attention and film within a temporal framework. In our revised reading of Münsterberg, attention is objectified in the cinematic technique of the close-up insofar as it stands in a dynamic, spatio-temporal focus-fringe relation to the framed elements, the surrounding shots, and the larger filmic whole.

**References:**


Swimming with the turtles: 
Co-existence, Co-being, Convivial, Co-thrive, Co-dependent, or Inter-being?

Maki SATO

Introduction

During the 2014 summer institute, I had a lovely chance swimming with the turtles at Waikoloa beach in Big Island, Hawai‘i. Under the bright sun and clear water, turtles were busily eating algae on a craggy rock while I was floating in the seawater like a big shadow over them, watching them closely nearby in a reachable distance. The turtles with their big bulging eyes were obviously acknowledging my existence. They were not startled but alerted, not completely ignoring but were just simply acknowledging my existence there. This particular experiment led me to think on the existence of A and B sharing a particular dynamism of spatial and chronicle, acknowledging yet without interfering into each other’s business.

We also went to a hiking together with Sam Ohu Gon III, where he pointed out the difference of the endemic and indigenous plants and animals on the islands of Hawai‘i. What is the meaning of differentiating the endemic and indigenous species when they are both seemingly thriving in a harmonious way? If there is an invisible hand of what we call ‘nature’ leading to the optimization of population of species in balance with the surrounding environment, isn’t it a ‘natural’ phenomena for the weak species to die out and strong species to thrive without human intervention, regardless to endemic and indigenous? In this globalized world with increasing amounts of traded goods, why

1. Sam ‘Ohu Gon,III was honoured in 2014 with the designation of Living Treasure of Hawai‘i.
are people concerned with non-native species but not with imported vegetables and grains? Furthermore, nowadays, we also have a variety of choices from ‘man’-made genetically modified crops to ‘nature’-made crops. What is the meaning in differentiating ‘nature’-made endemic and indigenous when we already have ‘man’-made crops?

In this short essay, by raising various questions deriving from the relationship between ‘nature’ and ‘humans’, I would like to argue on the notion of ‘harmonious’ by touching upon the Chinese 天人合一 (tian ren he yi, unification of heaven (nature/moral) and human) which originates in Daoism suggesting an ideal reciprocal relationship or co-existence of humans and nature.

1. 天人合一; a harmonization of nature (heaven) and humans

道教 (Daoism) notion defines 自然 (zi ran, nature) as something self-going, self-so-going, creation ‘in situ’, something that evolves by itself, or as the manifestation of the change itself etc. When it comes to the notion of 天人合一 which was the important notion for Daoists from the ancient Chinese culture, it was 朱熹 (Zhu Xi) who systemized the idea of 理気説 (Li and Qi operate together in mutual dependence) and defined 理 as a principle that unifies heaven and humans. In 儒教 (Confucian), 理 is understood as a principle of articulation of the world. In regard to this 理 a set of questions arise: does 天人合一 paradoxically connotes that 天 and 人 can never be 合一 (unified), that there is no such harmonious motive nor notion between nature and humans? With the notion of 理 or only by understanding 理, we could acquire the harmonious stage of 天人合一. Does this indicate that with the absence of 理, we will be situated in the chaotic situation of 天人離多 (separated into several parts)? Then what is 理 in a sense of harmonizing bond between nature and humans? In our modern secular society, can we say that 理 is substituted for science, to better understand 天理?

2. According to Mori Mikisaburo (森三樹三郎), 朱熹 utilizes the idea of 天理 articulated by 程明道. 程明道 comes up with the idea of 天理 from ‘天地之大德謂生’ in易經繁辞伝下一. Mori Mikisaburo, 1978. Chugoku shisou shi (中国思想史), Daisanbunmeisha, p.337
When we turn our eyes to Kant’s view on nature, nature is based on harmonious notion as can be seen in the following: ‘The guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less than that great artist, nature (\textit{natura daedala rerum})’.\(^3\) This indicates that the teleology of nature leads the environment (or eco-system) autonomously to the ‘optimum’ state which can be interpreted as the realization of ‘harmony’ for all entities. When we experimentally apply 朱熹’s 理 to Kant’s view on nature, 理 in nature seems to be indicating \textit{theology} or \textit{subject} that leads to ‘optimality’ of entities, whereas in Chinese philosophy 理 is indicating the \textit{Law of nature} itself or the piercing mechanism that enables the work of ‘\textit{natura naturan}’\(^4\).

2. Reciprocal or mutual relationship in space and time

What could be the reciprocal relationship between humans and nature? In Hawaiian context reciprocity is closely related to responsibility in taking care of each other; ‘aina’ as land, taking care of humans by producing food; while humans as servant, taking care of the chief, ‘aina’. If reciprocity is accompanied with responsibility, what is the responsibility of nature, the nature’s responsibility which it owes to humans? In Judea-Christianism ‘stewardship’ is the important notion for humans in relation to nature, which suggests of utilitarian notion of well management of nature for the sake of human use. Whilst in Japan, according to Tadahiko Higuchi,\(^5\) ‘sympathizing with nature’ is the important notion for humans in relation to nature. In both cases the ‘responsibility of nature’ does not appear instead the implication of ‘human action towards nature’ rises.

\(^3\) Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual Peace, First supplement of the guarantee for perpetual peace. 1795.

\(^4\) Kant quotes from Lucretius ‘\textit{Natura daedala rerum} (Nature, the inventor of all things)’. Spinoza in his \textit{Ethics} has differentiated ‘\textit{Natura naturata} (natured nature)’ and ‘\textit{Natura naturan} (naturing nature)’. By differentiating the work of nature, he came up with his conclusion of ‘\textit{Deus, sive Natura} (God, or Nature)’ which was criticized as an atheistic view.

If we understand reciprocal as a simple continuity of positive reaction to positive action (humans take care of land and land answers back with fruits and vegetables etc.), in a certain supposed closed situation reciprocity may work. However, as the debate between Rousseau and Voltaire after the 1755 Lisbon earthquake suggests, if we stand on the mutual understandings of reciprocity, how should humans react to the natural disaster? In our secular society, can we still regard natural disaster as a causal relation to human activities? If reciprocity does not imply the ‘responsibility’ from both entities, how could we describe the reciprocal relationship between humans and nature, and what could be the concrete example for an ideal reciprocal relationship? I can also raise my question this way: Are we playing an infinite ‘Game’ based on ‘Tit-for-tat’ theory in Prisoner’s dilemma with nature? Is there a room in realizing ‘Folk’s theorem’ between humans and nature?

Regarding the relationship with time and space, biologist Imanishi Kinji defined all the living things as the existence as in the very crossing point of spatial and chronicle. Yi-Fu Tuan considers both ‘space’ and ‘place’ is linked strongly with ‘experiences’ experienced by the subject who classifies and puts into order or values the difference between ‘space’ and ‘place’. Tuan’s mention on experience suggests somewhat of an amount of time being spent in a particular ‘space’. However, Tuan leaves ‘time’ issue and goes on to differentiate ‘space’ from ‘place’: That ‘space’ is where human (animal) recognizes by moving their body, whilst ‘place’ is recognized instinctively as where they can

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7. ‘Tit-for-tat’ theory is the strategic theory posed by Robert Axelrod in playing Prisoner’s Dilemma in Game theory.
‘live’. A ‘space’ can only be recognized as a ‘place’ when the subject sees a certain space with subjectivity, such as feeling a favourable atmosphere or having an attached, affectionate feeling toward that certain space. From his argument derives my question, can human only be conscious with particular ‘place’ environment when it comes to environmental protection, that people tend to neglect the pollution or destruction of ‘space’ even though the spatial distance of ‘place’ and ‘space’ is just within a stone’s throw? If this accumulated perception of ‘place’ leads to a strong movement to protect (natural) environment, why cannot ‘space’ gain such a subjective attention and how can ‘space’ be changed into ‘place’ in people’s perception in general?\textsuperscript{11}

Civil engineer Tadahiko Higuchi, in his book on Japanese landscape thinks that when looking into details of landscape where Japanese have built their ancient cities and villages, the landscape patterns can be categorized as in 盆地 (basin), 谷 (valley), ひの辺 (side of a mountain) and 平地 (plains).\textsuperscript{12} Higuchi argues that though Japanese are self-evaluating themselves as ‘nature-loving nation’, the reality is they faced serious environmental pollution problems during its rapid economic growth from the late 1960s to 70s. He thinks that the Japanese attitude of ‘sympathizing with nature’ is the key in understanding the Japanese attitude toward nature which is profound in the landscapes that Japanese have chosen to ‘live’. By surveying such landscape, Higuchi found that Japanese have carefully chosen ‘liveable’ space with clean flowing water for fishing and cultivating rice fields, forest for gathering and hunting, and surrounding mountains to protect themselves from enemies and severe climate.\textsuperscript{13}

It seems there is a tendency that it is in ‘landscape’ where Japanese people imagine their 心象風景 (landscape in mind) or 故郷 (homeland): It seems for Japanese it is not a particular ‘space’ or ‘place’,

\textsuperscript{11} In trying to answer the question regarding ‘place’ and ‘time’ and its relation to ‘protection’, I have presented a paper titled ‘Affection to a certain place: An Introduction to ‘Histo-topo-philia” during 2015 Uehiro Graduate Philosophy Conference (http://uehiro2015.blogspot.jp/).


\textsuperscript{13} 風水(feng-shui) stands on ideology of 防風蔵水 (protect from wind and gather water), which is a similar ideology to how Japanese chose a ‘place’ to live.
but more of a ‘landscape’ of Satoyama when they think nostalgically about their ‘hometown’. ‘Place’, such as cities and towns, is where you live and belong temporary, while ‘landscape’ is where you really belong to, where your soul flies back after your death (among old Japanese people in rural areas, it is still believed that mountain is a ‘place’ where our ancestors live after their death). Based on Higuchi’s argument, I wonder whether it was this overemphasised notion on ‘landscape’ which let Japanese people feel free to pollute industrial areas and cities. Does this imply that Japanese have a tendency to pollute ‘place’ where he/she doesn’t feel they belong to, whereas once they feel they belong to that ‘place’ will start protecting and conserving (natural) environment, as we currently see in the Satoyama initiative movements? Or is it the Japanese perception of nature that leads to protection of ‘landscape’ in set with human activities which is slightly different from protection of ‘place’ that excludes humans as we often see in Western style of natural environment protection and conservation?

3. Li and the magic number 3+1

On further arguing the reciprocal relationship of humans and nature, I would like to bring up some of the examples that might indicate the reciprocity between the two entities. Usually, Biota is divided into Flora and Fauna. In articulating the reciprocity of human and nature, I would like to first focus on flora, especially on ‘bonsai’. Bonsai itself could be understood as a well-balanced representation of human effort (or intervention), tree itself, and environment: other elements that help the tree grow such as sunshine, soil nutrition (N, P, K balance), water conditions etc. This co-work of the three major elements (human, tree and environment) represents of an aesthetic change of nature, the very articulation or icon of 自然 (nature) itself. For the case of fauna, ‘sheepdogs’ might well represent the co-work of human, nature (dog and sheep) and the surrounding environment. The dog in nature chases moving object and the sheep in nature herd. Humans make efforts in well training the dog for sheep herding by giving commands. Sheepdog in this sense is not the serving animal
Swimming with the turtles which leads to anthropocentric idea, but has its own object-oriented motivation or will to work actively taking initiative of its own. This co-work of dog and human leads to protecting flocks of sheep from wolves in the plain or mountainous environment. These two examples might indicate the neat balance between humans and elements from nature.

From the olden days humans have obsession to the number ‘three’: we live in the world of three dimensions, the three primary colors of light (magenta, cyan and yellow), and trichromatic principle in printing (red, blue and green). We also invented the famous syllogism (三段論法) in logics from ancient Greek time. However when articulating the nature, humans have been using the number ‘four’, as we can see in arche rhizomata by Empedocles pointing out that fire, water, soil and air as the essential constitutes of this world, that philia (love) and neikos (hate) as forces that account for the motion in the universe. We can never ignore the Aristotle’s four elements of quality that is dry, wet, warm and cold in relation to Empedocles’ finding. Going back to what I’ve raised in Section 1, when we look at the example of reciprocal relationship of humans and nature, where does it fits in? as a principle that unifies metaphysics and physics is something which can never be seen since it is the binding law behind the nature and human relationship that enables such relationship to work. If we follow this logic, the examples of reciprocity which I gave as examples seemingly indicate the Chinese ideology of 天人合一 with the notion of 理 behind.

14. Interestingly, 老子 (Lao-tzu) in 老子道德經 (Laozi Tao Te Ching) Chapter 42 mentions: 道生一、一生二、二生三、三生萬物。萬物負陰而抱陽，沖氣以和。 This indicates that three produces everything. There are several ways of reading this passage. However the importance in harmonization is in the third element, which neutralize the ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ (沖氣以和).

15. In Buddhism, the world based on 一切法 is consisted of 三科 (sanka), which is namely 五蘊 (pañca-skandha), 十二處 (āyatana), and十八界 (六根, 六境, 六識).
Conclusion:
How should we define the notion of ‘harmonization’ in our secular society?

I would like to come back to the argument on ‘harmony’ and ‘harmonization’ in regard to the relationship of humans and nature. Generally we have a tendency to imagine a ‘harmonized’ relationship of humans and nature when we think about an ideal situation of sustainable society. However as I have argued in Section 2, if there is no responsibility given to nature, can the harmonization based on mutuality be possible? The notion of ‘harmony’ itself already includes and implies of the anthropocentric idea, that in order to have ‘harmonized’ relationship, humans need to manage and control nature in a way that serves humans (a utilitarian way of thinking!).

If we are to define ‘harmony’ as a notion of taking mutual responsibility towards each other, could ‘harmonious’ be really possible between humans and nature? Isn’t it more like searching where the balancing point is to settle in the optimized state, which looks like ‘harmony’ in representation? We see a debate after the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake that it is the humans who were irresponsible to build a town where was indicated of the tsunami affect by their ancestors back in the Edo period. We also see the similar argument done in the late eighteenth century by Voltaire and Rousseau after the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, as Rousseau pointed out, it is the way humans constructed their town to be blamed (not God).

Going back to the original question: When we cannot expect ‘responsible’ conduct from nature, what could be the ‘harmonistic’ state between humans and nature? I think the key for the answer might be hidden in the notion of in combining the two entities, with long term perspective. In our current secular society, as mentioned in Section 1, there is an obvious trend we see that it is only the science that makes this harmonization possible. By better understanding the tendency of nature through science, including the deeper understandings of historical data and the relating prediction

of future using computer modelling, there is a strong belief that the scientific understanding of nature will lead to a solution for building rational harmonic state between humans and nature. However when we are facing cul-de-sac of science, maybe the time has come for us to get over with our science fetishism. And the hope is that the alternative solution to science fetishism may rise from philosophy with perpetual questioning method in countering what we are facing. 17

References:


17. In the first chapter of Capital:Critique of Political Economy, 1867, Marx is known to have pointed out ‘commodity fetishism’.
0. **How can one explain East-Asian beauty?**

What do you feel when you look at the white jar in this picture? Some people may find nothing special in this image of a plain piece of furniture. However, some other may well be impressed by the outstanding beauty of this Korean handicraft. If so, why would they find it beautiful? How could one explain its beauty? As is widely known, beauty has always been associated with metaphysics in Western history. Simply put, it has been regarded as a token of the existence of a super-human god. One can use this interpretation of beauty in this case. There may be some sort of profound and sublime beauty unique to East-Asia hidden in this somehow oriental vase. However, modern Japanese intellectuals attempted to understand East-Asian beauty in their own, somewhat different way. In this thesis, such an attempt will be explored by examining writings by Muneyoshi YANAGI (1889-1961), a modern Japanese aesthetcian. To support this discussion, the author will compare Yanagi with Tetsurō WATSUJI (1889-1960), a Japanese philosopher who lived in an age almost exactly the same as Yanagi.

1. **Yanagi’s aesthetics and metaphysics: instinct (‘chokkan’)**

Yanagi’s aesthetics is seemingly close to the metaphysical understanding of beauty. Amongst Japanese, he is thought to have
discovered the previously unknown beauty of East-Asian handicrafts, especially those of Korea and Japan. In explaining the beauty of East-Asian handicrafts, he underlined the importance of ‘instinct’ (‘chokkan’). His notions, while seemingly criticizing metaphysical understandings of beauty, actually mystify East-Asian beauty;

One can say that instinct (chokkan) pre-exists concept. Thus, it is completely irrelevant to any dogma. It means to look at an object directly. It does not mean to look at an object with pre-conceived concepts or prejudices. If you look at something incorrectly, it is because your instincts are not working well enough. There is no telling beauty without looking at it first. To put it the other way around, to try to know beauty first never yields any look. It is exactly the same as the fact that one cannot regain a living tree from its cut pieces even though one can cut a living tree into pieces. Only instinct provides a basis for the understanding of beauty. (Yanagi 1937, translated by Shiroma*)

Although Yanagi claims that ‘instinct pre-exists concept,’ the ‘instinct’ of which he speaks is highly conceptualized. In other words, here, ‘to look at an object directly’ indicates some mystical act behind which lies the unknown power of a look. ‘Instinct’ (‘chokkan’) is also a key concept in the philosophy of Kitaro NISHIDA (1870-1945), a well-known modern Japanese philosopher with whom Yanagi was acquainted. From this, one fairly concludes that Yanagi’s understanding of beauty is trapped in the very metaphysics he claims contrary to his theory.

However, his understanding of beauty is not that simple. In an essay he wrote later, he stated as follows;

When one critiques an object without looking at it or without being able to look at it, it does not sound convincing. You should keep in mind two important points when you critique an object; firstly, the extreme importance of directly touching (fureru) an ‘object’ (‘mono’) rather than discussing a ‘thing’ (‘koto’). Secondly,

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* All the quotations are translated by Shiroma.
the fact that ‘the power of look’ is greater than the ‘power of knowledge’ in determining what is beautiful. Beauty should always be discussed in accordance with what is beautiful. One should ‘look at beauty’ before ‘trying to know beauty.’ (Yanagi 1941, underlined by Shiroma*)

In this quotation, what is noteworthy is the passage ‘the extreme importance of directly touching an “object”’. In this passage, is Yanagi simply articulating the importance of holding or rubbing a handicraft? He is not. To understand why, you need to understand what is meant by the word ‘touch’. Its original Japanese word ‘fur eru’ has a meaning slightly different from an English word ‘touch’ in this context. Here, it connotes ‘to percept.’ Therefore, ‘directly touching an “object”’ connotes to directly percept ‘object.’ In other words, Yanagi is again emphasizes the importance of looking at an object without ‘pre-conceived concepts or prejudices’ (Yanagi 1937). Therefore, as you can tell, what ‘fur eru’

* All the underlines are made by Shiroma.
means is conceptually the same as the instinct he uses in this context. However, ‘fureru’ is not totally a metaphysical concept.

2. Yanagi’s aesthetics and sensation: ‘fureru’

Needless to say, the word fureru (to touch) originally means an act of literally touching something. When you remember this fact, you can Yanagi’s aesthetics can be understood in a manner not metaphysical. Actually, it is not going too far to say that Yanagi’s aesthetics had its origin in physical sensation and emotion. Writings on Korean handicrafts from his youth testify such aesthetics;

To convey a fragile and pitiful mind, that tearful line should be the most suitable. The line is the source of inexhaustible imagination for Koreans. The Korean people have beautified all the things by these lines.

The line is emotional, isn’t it? (…) Its beautiful posture is as if saying ‘Approach me and give me a kiss,’ isn’t it? Once you approach her, you will never be able to leave her. One cannot help touching her. In sorrow, one’s mind and another’s can come together. (Yanagi 1922)

The significance of sensation is represented in this literary quotation. He is not simply depicting how one looks at an object. It is depicting how one literally touches and feels an object. On the contrary, art-historian Alois Riegl (1858-1905) put it, western modernity can be defined as an orientation toward three-dimensional visual art (Riegle 1985). Riegle considered sensation or ‘Haptic’ to be more primitive than visual, but Yanagi did not.

According to comparative Japanese culture researcher O-YOUNG Lee (1934), the sensation of touching nature or other humans occupies a large role in Japanese culture. Lee claims that Bonsai, an archetypal genre of Japanese art which involves making miniature trees, was created to allow people to feel our surrounding nature by touching it with our skin. It is the same in the case of Japanese
tea houses. Japanese tea houses are built on a small scale so that people come close to each other and feel each other with their skin. Lee says that such a culture of sensation is greatly unique to Japan. As mentioned earlier, the English word ‘touch’ does not precisely correspond with the Japanese word ‘fur eru.’ Both of them basically mean the same thing, but only the latter can mean close relationships with each other like in the case of the word ‘fure-a u’ (‘to touch each other’). As you know, when one says ‘touching each other’ in English, it does not mean anything but two people literally touching one another. It is the same in the case of the French word ‘toucher.’ Lee says that even Korean is different from Japanese on this point. A Korean word ‘geondeuryo’ basically means ‘to touch,’ and according to its context it can mean to stimulate a person. However, it does not express close relationships like ‘fur eru.’ According to Lee, 18th century Japanese philosopher Norinaga MOTOORI (1730-1801) mentioned the importance of sensation in Japanese culture; he defined it as the concrete feeling of touching each other with our skin, not the brain or heart, which links one person and some other person together. The sensation characterized by the Japanese word fur eru forms the foundation of Yanagi’s aesthetics. In other words, his aesthetics requires that a person and an object get close to one another;

I believe that there is nothing more artistic and nothing which so greatly anticipates the arrival of love than Korean art. It is the art of a heart longing for human feeling and for living in love. The long and terribly pitiful history of Korea has given its art unknown loneliness and sadness. (...) Where could you find such pitiful beauty other than Korea? It is inviting people to come closer. It is yearning for a warm heart. (Yanagi, 1922)

3. Comparing Yanagi with Watsuji

In contrast, how did modern Japanese philosopher Tetsuro WATSUJI (1889-1960) understand beauty? Seemingly, their understandings of beauty are completely opposite. While Watsuji
Shotaro SHIROMA

favored sophisticated and aristocratic Japanese art like beautifully arranged Japanese gardens, Yanagi favored handicrafts which can fulfill the needs of our everyday life. However, in defining Asian art as the art of irregularity or randomness, Watsuji said as follows:

Japanese have a worldwide reputation for being an artistic people. They are truly talented in expressing what is inside in an instinctive (chokkan-teki na) manner. However, one should never fail to see this difference between Greeks and Japanese; whereas the Greeks feel an object by looking at it, the Japanese look at an object by feeling it. (Watsuji 1935)

The similarity between Watsuji and Yanagi is obvious. They both emphasize the significance of instinct (chokkan) and of ‘feeling’ or sensation. Interestingly, what is meant by Watsuji’s words ‘look at an object by feeling it’ is almost identical with Yanagi’s aesthetics. However, can one say that Watsuji’s aesthetics is essentially the same as Yanagi’s? What did Watsuji say when he critiqued Japanese handicrafts? Let us consider this by examining the following passage:

While western plates or coffee cups have those plain regular patterns, Japanese plates or tea cups have patterns which never cease to attract people; although their patterns are seemingly irregular, Japanese handicrafts have some profound beauty not found in Western ones. These unique patterns are unconsciously considered to be the archetype of Japanese design. (…) These unique handicrafts are obviously the opposite of Western ink-pots or pen-trays which give us nothing other than inorganic impressions no matter how expensive they are. Even though these Japanese handicrafts are extremely irregular, they have nuances of brilliant unity. (Watsuji 1935)

What Watsuji says here by putting emphasis on ‘irregularity’ corresponds with what Yanagi says about instinct. The beauty of irregularity is something we feel through ‘nuances’, not something grasped by reason. However, contrary to Yanagi’s critique of handicrafts, Watsuji’s
understanding of them is in the realm of metaphysics. In other words, unlike Yanagi, physical sensation did not matter for Watsuji’s aesthetics which are based on ‘irregularism.’ Regardless of Watsuji’s attempt to distinguish Asian (Chinese, Indian and Japanese) art from European art, Watsuji’s aesthetics is essentially the same as traditional Western aesthetics in mystifying beauty.

4. Conclusion: Yanagi’s aesthetics and ‘relationality’

In Chinese philosophy, ‘relationality’ is a key concept. Whereas traditional Western philosophy can be characterized by solipsism or individualism, Chinese philosophy can be characterized by its orientation toward putting a high value on relationships between people or between nature and humans. The same thing can be said of Yanagi’s unique aesthetics. Although it does not ideologically aim to create relationships as does Chinese philosophy, it all the same creates one between people and objects. This is another difference between his aesthetics and Watsuji’s.

Furthermore, it is not an exaggeration to say that Yanagi’s apparently ideological conduct was indeed a product of his sensibility. In the 1920s, Yanagi opposed the imperial Japan’s governance of Korea in an attempt to protect its art and people. This is widely thought to be due to his radical political beliefs. This in turn leads to controversies over his dogmatic ideology in regarding Korea as ‘pitiful’. However, it is impossible to understand him without considering his characteristic aesthetics. According to his own sensibility, Yanagi attempted to establish a ‘close relationship’ between Korea and Japan. Even today, he tells us what beauty can do to change a difficult reality.

References:


Locating a Place for Environmental Ethics:
Local Answers to a Global Problem or Global Solutions to a Local Problem

Andrew K. L. SOH

Environmental Crisis – a Global Yet Local Problem

The environmental crisis is a global problem, one that transcends borders—whether they be political, geographic, cultural, or economic. Our experience of environmental disasters attests to this assertion, for example, the contamination from the damaged nuclear reactors in Fukushima, the downstream effect of the Chernobyl and Bhopal disasters, the melting of the polar ice caps and its effect on the sea level rise that endangers Kiribati, and the health problems that Indonesia’s neighbors suffer as a result of the forest and peat fires in Sumatra. Nevertheless, despite the global reach of environmental problems, we cannot deny also the very real local-ness of such problems. Local communities are coming together to create awareness and to respond to the environmental ills that plague the places where they live. But can we apply one strategy that works in a small community in Kaua‘i to a small town in Indonesia? This highlights an undeniable tension in the attempt to respond to a global environmental crisis, namely, the tension between the global and the local. This study aims to address this tension by asking the questions: How do we bridge the gap between the global and the local in our response to the environmental crisis? I search for an answer through a reflection on Daoist philosophy, while drawing from Hawaiian traditional ecological wisdom as well as insights from Tetsuro Watsuiji and Martin Heidegger.
Source of the Environmental Crisis?

Let us begin our reflections by asking the question of the source of our current environmental crisis. No doubt some will point to pollution of waterways caused by industrial waste, or to indiscriminate use of fossil fuels that continue to pollute the air, or even to the irresponsible use of nuclear technology. These are causes of environmental ills, for sure. But I believe our investigation calls for us to look deeper for the source of the crisis. Bruce V. Foltz (1993) draws on Martin Heidegger’s reflections on nature and concludes that the current environmental crisis can be traced to the technological view of nature. This view of nature is the limiting worldview (the enframing of metaphysics) that sees nature as a collection of objective things, and as a standing resource that can be tapped for human purposes and benefit. It is drawn from a view of nature as ‘Vorhandenheit’ (‘presence-at-hand’) — that nature is a collection of things, things that are just there, there as objects to be studied, manipulated and extracted for human uses. Vorhandenheit presents nature as objects separated from us, as something that we have a detached dealing with. Heidegger offers a vivid example of this in the manner that a hydroelectric plant transforms a river into a standing reserve. If we think about it, the river is no longer a river where we fish, along the banks of which we have our picnics. Rather, it is now no more than a power bank, a resource placed at our disposal to be tapped for electric power. Heidegger criticizes this view of nature because it runs counter to the manner in which we experience nature as world. He uses the example of a farmer who experiences the south wind as a sign of rain, rain that will fall onto the land and be for him a source of water for his planting and growing on the soil that supports and gives life, and to which his work is directed. This experience of the world that runs counter to that of Vorhandenheit, Heidegger calls Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand) through which we experience things as presenting themselves to us based on a fundamental relation to us and our concerns (as the farmer experiences the south wind). Things are not ‘indifferently there.’ Foltz (1993) writes:
Before nature can become the object of a disinterested gaze, it must first be disclosed by means of our concerned involvement and interaction with it; that is, our primary access to the world is not through theoretical inspection but through the circumspection of praxis. Before entities can become mere objects, they must first be disclosed as ‘pragmata—that is to say, that which one has to do with in one’s concernful dealings (praxis).

Reflecting on the environmental crisis in this light, what begins to emerge as an answer to the problem is the necessity for a realignment of our view of nature, and of the land (land here taken in its broad sense of encompassing the various elements that go into making up the natural environment—what the Hawaiians call ‘aina). We also need an environmental ethic that will enable us to harmonize the global and the local—allowing us to see the big picture without losing sight of the particular details and realities of a place and people. One place that we can look in our search for a viable global-local environmental ethic is Daoist philosophy, particularly grounded on the relation of dao (道) and de (德) as field and focus.

**Dao (道)**

In Daoist thinking, dao (道) implies a process, an ongoing efficacious functioning; it is the potentiality and possibility within each thing and each situation. It is also that which moves, the ‘energy of transformation’ in the natural world that is behind the processes of nature (Ames and Hall, p. 21). Dao, therefore, is not ‘way’ but, as Roger Ames and David Hall (2003, pp. 57-59) put it, ‘way-making.’ We may gain a better appreciation of its verbal and active nature by examining the Chinese character dao. Etymologically, the character dao (道) is a compound character made up of two separate characters.

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1. Aldo Leopold, in ‘The Land Ethic,’ takes lands to mean more than just the soil and includes ‘soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land,’ which he also calls the ‘biotic community.’ Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1970), 239, 241.
The first character, *zhou* (辵), means to go. It is made up of the ancient character that also means foot, thus the connotation ‘to go.’ The other character is *shou* (首), a primitive character that means head. These root characters contribute to the meaning of *dao* as ‘to lead’ or ‘to go ahead’ since *dao* (道) is to go (*zhou* 辵) at the head (*shou* 首) (Watts 1979, Ames and Hall, 2003). 2 *Dao*, then, as way-making refers both to the way the natural world is constantly in flux and process and to the agency of the human person making her way in the world such that *dao* is never fixed; it cannot be captured in concept or entity. The opening lines of the *Daodejing* express this meaning very well: Way-making (*dao* 道) that can be put into words is not really way-making, And naming (*ming* 名) that can assign fixed reference to things is not really naming. The nameless (*wuming* 無 名) is the fetal beginnings of everything that is happening (*wanwu* 萬 物) While that which is named is their mother.3

There are several implications of this. The first is that *dao* as way-making is a ‘presencing,’4 which allows us to experience and be aware of the constantly happening processes of life at a basic, existential level. On this level, *dao* cannot be named, it cannot be put into words because to name is to assign a fixed reference to something. Thus, *dao* is not anything, it is ‘no-thing’ precisely because it is the possibility of everything; it is the dynamic process in everything.

Second, *dao* as way-making allows us to be aware of and

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2. Alan Watts notes that the character, *zhou* (辵) connotes “moving step by step,’ a ‘going and pausing’ that exhibits a ‘rhythmic movement,’ where going is *yang* and pausing is *yin*, demonstrating the equilibrium of *dao* (Watts, pp. 39-40).

3. *Daodejing* 1. Unless otherwise stated, all citations from the *Daodejing* are taken from the translation of Ames and Hall. Subsequent citations will carry the abbreviation *DDJ* followed by the chapter number, for example, *DDJ* 1.

4. A note about the use of the term ‘presencing.’ The term is often associated with the thought of Martin Heidegger. In our discussion, we do not use the word in the Heideggerian sense. Rather, we borrow the term to help us express the dynamic nature of *dao*. Here, it refers to the dynamic manner in which *dao* is constantly manifested in the processes of the natural world, in all that is happening (*wanwu* 萬 物).
participate in life without our reducing it to our subjective view or conceptual framework of what life is, or what it is for. In other words, \textit{dao} as way-making is ‘presencing’ and not ‘representing,’ the latter being the tendency we have of controlling via concepts—a ‘grasping knowing.’ One fundamental means with which we try to grasp the world is through the use of language, in giving names to things. In the classical Chinese worldview, to give a name to something signifies one’s control over it. Ames and Hall (2003, p. 134-135) note: ‘to name (\textit{ming 名})’ is ‘to command (\textit{ming 命}).’ If you have the name of something, you not only know it, but can contain it and hold it subject to your will. To invoke a name brings power and mastery with it.’ The anthropocentric view is precisely such a grasping knowing—we try to fit the natural world into our conceptual frameworks by privileging our rationality, while viewing the natural world as a sort of mechanism that can be manipulated to satisfy our purposes. Thus, the unnamable \textit{dao} challenges us to become aware of this limiting character of language, and through that the lens with which we view the natural world and subsequently the way we treat it.

The nature of \textit{dao} is further elucidated in the \textit{Daodejing} with the use of metaphors such as water (\textit{shui 水}), the nameless scrap of unworked wood (\textit{pu 樸}), the female (\textit{ci 雌}), the infant (\textit{er 兒}), and the valley (\textit{gu 谷}). These metaphors allude to \textit{dao} as fluid way-making that is: life-giving and efficacious, noncoercive and transformative, and all-pervading (water); potent and inexhaustible possibility, or potentiality (unworked wood); receptive, fecund and nurturing (female); boundless potency (infant); and bottomless fecundity and potentiality (valley). They also help bring to light the mutual entailment of opposites of \textit{dao} in that it is characterized as soft and yet strong, simple and yet potent, useless and yet full of potentiality, passive and yet brings things about, empty and yet fecund. \textit{Dao} is everywhere and in all things, it is always transforming and full of possibility because \textit{dao} as way-making is always in process, acting, and presencing. However, as we shall soon see, it is not through \textit{dao} alone that the presencing of the natural world occurs. It is brought about by the mutual working of \textit{dao} and \textit{de}.

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5. See the following chapters of the \textit{Daodejing}: water (\textit{DDJ 8, 35, 43}), unworked wood (\textit{DDJ 19, 28, 32, 37}), female (\textit{DDJ 6, 28}), infant (\textit{DDJ 28, 55}), and valley (\textit{DDJ 6, 4, 11}).
De (徳)

De is usually translated as ‘virtue’ or ‘power.’ But, a more appropriate translation of de is virtuosity, which expresses the active efficaciousness of de. Let us refer to chapter 51 of the Daodejing to draw out this richer meaning of de:
Way-making (dao 道) gives things their life,
And their particular efficacy (de 徳) is what nurtures them.
Events shape them,
And having a function consummates them.
It is for this reason that all things (wanwu 萬物) honor way-making
And esteem efficacy.
As for the honor directed at way-making
And the esteem directed at efficacy,
It is really something that just happens spontaneously (ziran 自然)
Without anyone having ennobled them.

In this chapter, we see that dao gives rise to things while de nurtures them. What does it mean to say that de nurtures? Roger Ames, in his analysis of the etymology of the character, de, sheds some light on its meaning:

The character, de (德) is comprised of three elements: chi (彳) ‘to move ahead’; [zhi (直)] which most etymologists take as a representation of the human eye; and xin (心), the ‘heart-and-mind.’ The eye and heart-and-mind elements suggest that the unfolding process of de is disposed in a particular direction. De then is the transforming content and disposition of an existent: an autogenerative, self-construed ‘arising’...
[Thus,] de . . . denotes the arising of the particular in a process vision of existence (Callicott 1989, p. 125).

De is, thus, an ‘arising,’ or ‘presencing’ (sheng 升) (Callicott 1989, p. 124). De, as ‘arising,’ is the realization of dao in the particular as its particular efficacy. De is the particular consummation of dao, the manifestation of ‘nameless,’ ‘elusive,’ ‘inaudible,’ and ‘intangible’ dao (DDJ 1, 14) in actual, concrete instances of nameable, observable,
audible, tangible experiences. De nurtures all that arises through dao in the ordinary events of the natural world—the falling rain, the quiet sprouting of a seedling, the gentle breeze, and the unnoticed wilting of a flower. We who are wont to look for the spectacular and unusual, often overlook this presencing of de by reason of its ordinariness (Watts 1979, p. 108). Much like the nameless scrap of unworked wood (pu 樸) that is unattractive, de as presencing of dao often goes unappreciated. Recognition of this can have important implications upon our view of the natural environment and of the value of the seemingly ordinary and the useless.

The second meaning of de is that of ‘power.’ In our common understanding, to have power is to be able to influence another person, to manipulate events in order to attain a desired outcome, or to be able to exert force upon a subordinate physical world. In the Daodejing, the notion of power is not that of force or control, or domination. Rather, its power is ‘power exercised without the use of force and without undue interference with the order of surrounding circumstances’ which is best described as ‘creativity’—the ability to bring forth something noncoercively (Watts 1979, p. 121, Ames and Hall 2003, p. 17).

Thus, de as arising, as virtuosity, and as power can be said to be the realization, the expression or the manifestation of dao in the way that it nurtures the possibility by non-interference and by noncoercive action, and, in so doing, brings about the presencing of all things in the natural world.

Dao-de (道德)

In this presencing, dao and de are related in a mutually entailing and mutually benefitting relationship. In this dialectical relationship, ‘[t]he world emerges as a collaboration between foci and their fields, between particular events and their contexts, between one’s effective character and one’s way in the world, between de and dao’ (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 157). This relation of dao-de, then, as field-focus plays itself out as a unity and continuity by way of the whole and the particulars. The whole (dao) is the continuity, that is, the underlying
context that ‘holds together’ the particulars (de). On the other hand, each particular element (de), each presencing of de taken in context of the whole is weaved together through this continuity (dao) into a dynamic unity, which is expressive of the ongoing processes of the natural world. The forty-second chapter of the Daodejing speaks of this:

Way-making (dao 道) gives rise to continuity,  
Continuity gives rise to difference,  
Difference gives rise to plurality,  
And plurality gives rise to the manifold of everything that is happening (wanwu 萬 物).  
Everything carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms  
And blends these vital energies (qi 氣) together to make them harmonious (he 和).

This relationship of dao-de is characterized by a mutual deference (Ames and Hall 2003, 38), in which each allows the other to operate with greatest efficacy, according to the ongoing presencing of the event—a blending of yin and yang, and of ‘vital energies’ that results in the ‘harmonious’ presencing of dao-de. This mutually entailing, benefiting and deferential relationship in and through which the natural world occurs is expressed in the Daodejing as ziran (自 然), often translated as spontaneous, but more appropriately as self-so-ing. In our relation with the world, we become more aware of one or the other (of field or focus) depending on what we direct our attention upon but, in each case, we never lose the other, for the two are inseparable for they are mutually entailing. Our response to the mutual entailing of field and focus, according to the Daodejing, is through living as wuwei (無為), that is, living non-coercively with the world (Callicott 1989, p. 129).

Hawaii: Land and Identity

We find an illustration of this non-coercive living in traditional Hawaiian land use practice. Being an island culture with limited land
has forced the ancient Hawaiians to develop an effective and self-sustaining land-use method and way of life that is closely tied to their habitat. It is good to note that the first settlers of the islands did not develop the land-use system that came to be known as the *ahupua‘a* land use system. Rather, the early settlers practiced slash and burn agriculture, but as the population grew to several hundred thousand between 1100-1600, they began to develop ‘large irritation works, dryland field cultivation, and aquaculture’ (Andrade). In this period, called the ‘Expansion Period,’ the Hawaiians developed the *ahupua‘a* system of land management—a carefully devised system that helped them to live sustainably on a limited amount of land. *Ahupua‘a* residents had ‘free access to all the resources in their *ahupua‘a*, from *mauka* [mountain] to *makai* [sea]’ (Andrade).

Carlos Andrade, an Associate Professor at Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Studies who teaches courses about Hawaiian perspectives in astronomy, geography and resource management, describes the *ahupua‘a* as a ‘single system’ which comprised a close relation between the people and the land, and which was centered on a clearly organized hierarchical social system. The social hierarchy consisted of, from top to bottom: ‘the mo‘i (king) at the top, layers of ali‘i (chiefs) below him, the *konobiki* (managers) in charge of the *ahupua‘a* below them, and at the bottom the *maka‘ainana* (common people).’ Citing the work done by fellow professor at the University of Hawaii Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Studies, Lilikala Kame‘eihwa, Andrade writes: ‘The traditional Hawaiian perspective saw the *‘aina* [land, earth] and the ali‘i ʻinui (high chiefs) as elder siblings (brother or sister), with the *maka‘ainana* as the younger sibling—all three having descended from the mating of earth and sky. It was the duty of the *maka‘ainana* to *malama‘aina* (care for the land), while it was the duty of the *‘aina* and the ali‘i ʻinui to *hoʻomalu* (protect) the *maka‘ainana*’ (Andrade). Grounded on a social check and balance of prohibitions (*kapu*) that ‘controlled when and how resources were used,’ the native Hawaiians made use of their resources guided by values of *‘aloha* (respect), *laulima* (cooperation), and *malama* (stewardship) which resulted in a desirable *pono* (balance)’ (Andrade). Andrade points this out as ‘sound resource management where the interconnectedness
of the clouds, the forests, the streams, the fishponds, the sea and the people is clearly recognized.’

From the above, we learn that the native Hawaiian principle and practice of land use was one grounded on the close ties among members of the community as well as between the people and the natural environment (‘āina). Sam Ohu Gon III, senior scientist and cultural advisor at the Nature Conservancy of Hawaii, sums up this spirit by noting that, ‘Hawaiian culture and ecology are inseparable. You cannot talk about protection of Hawaiian ecological systems without knowing what the consequences are for Hawaiian culture. The main idea, the driving thing for me, is that protecting these species and ecosystems is protecting Hawaiian culture’ (Sodetani). Speaking at a lecture on the ‘Hawaiian Sense of Place’ in August, Gon (2014) emphasized this inseparability thus: ‘Who we are is where we are. A person is expected to be one’s place.’ He pointed out that the traditional Hawaiian reason for caring for the environment is that a person is identified with his or her land, but emphasized that the person is not master of the land, but rather that the person is ‘servant of the land’ (Gon 2014). Andrade (2008, p. 25) makes the same point in his book, Haena: Through the Eyes of the Ancestors, by pointing to the origin story of the Hawaiian people:

The familial relationships established by the Papa and Wākea story place human beings as the younger siblings of the kalo (taro plant) and the ʻāina (islands) in the family of life. These relationships carry with them responsibilities and examples of proper behavior. The ʻāina is the eldest sibling, and therefore responsible for protecting and feeding the younger ones. As younger siblings, Hawaiian people inherit a kuleana (responsibility) to mālama (keep, obey, pay heed to, care for) ʻāina and kalo.

Gon also adds that here is a sense of one’s deep connection with the land that involves incessant learning. The wise persons in the Hawaiian tradition are known as ‘ʻimi loa,’ translated to mean: ‘to seek far, explore; distant traveler, explorer. Fig., one with great knowledge or avaricious for knowledge’ (Pukui/Elbert). Gon (2014) notes that the wise persons in the Hawaiian tradition are wise because they are ‘ever-constant thinkers.’ But their thinking is not merely theoretical. Rather,
their knowledge and wisdom is closely connected to understanding how the land and all creatures in the surrounding environment work. This carries with it an important sense of always being able to adapt one’s understanding to the transformations in one’s surroundings. Thus, the deep connection between people and land is reinforced.

Taking this deep connection to the land and extending it to a broader scale, we might be able to make that connection between the local and the global. The ahupua ‘ā system, with its carefully devised methodology to harness the symbiotic relationships between people and land (taken in its broad sense), can be extended beyond individual ahupua ‘ā in an ever-expanding concentric circle to become a district (moku), island (mokupuni), and beyond. Sam Gon (2014) speaks of this extending outwards from one’s self to one’s community, ahupua ‘ā and beyond as an essential part of the Hawaiian experience and conception of their relation to ‘āina. For the native Hawaiians, the ‘boundaries of land had no significance because the person is seen as intrisically related to bonua (land, earth, world).’ Taking this traditional wisdom and connecting it to a more contemporary investigation might help us in our search for the bridge between the local and global, as well as the ancient and the contemporary.

**Locating a Place for an Environmental Ethic**

Our reflections have led us to an awareness of the intrinsic relations of field and focus, and how that field and focus is extended in the traditional Hawaiian worldview and living sustainably through the ahupua ‘ā system, which can be extended outwards towards a regional, and perhaps global, scale. Our search for an answer to the local-global problem is still open, but I believe that we have begun on the path to a worldview and vision of the intrinsic relatedness of persons and land, and vice-versa. This relation can be further supported by Tetsuro Watsuji’s (1961, p. 11) reflections on the inter-relatedness of the human person with one’s ‘climate.’ Watsuji writes in *A Climate: A Philosophical Study* that ‘the human body is not mere matter.’ He points out that the ‘self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the spatial and
temporal structure of human life existence; a self-active body cannot
remain in isolation. Its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation and
isolated isolating within union.’ By reflecting on our experience of
weather, he points out that when we experience the cold, for example,
that experience is inextricably bound up with a social relation and one’s
surrounding. Watsuji (1961, p. 5) writes:

[W]eather...is not experienced in isolation. It is experienced only in
relation to the soil, the topographic and scenic features and so on of
a given land. A cold wind may be experienced as a mountain blast or
the cold, dry wind that sweeps through Tokyo at the end of the winter.
The spring breeze may be one which blows off cherry blossoms or
which caresses the waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be of the
kind to wither rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in the
sea. As we find our gladdened or pained selves in a wind that scatters
the cherry blossoms, so do we apprehend our wilting selves in the very
heat of summer that scorches down on plants and trees in a spell of dry
weather. In other words, we find ourselves—ourselves as an element
in the ‘mutual relationship’—in ‘climate’. In sum, we find ourselves
disclosed in ‘climate’ as the relational in-between-ness itself.’

This relational in-betweenness of human persons with one
another and with our climate, or land, or ʻaina can be understood as
the ground for an environmental ethic. Our experience of living on the
earth is one of dwelling. Heidegger’s reflections on nature also help us
understand our dwelling as a form of tarrying, of being-in and being-
with ‘nature as homeland’ with which we are inextricably involved. The
world is our dwelling place. He proposes a manner of living that mirrors
the self-revealing of nature—dwelling that is poetic, that respects the
intensified self-emergence of nature. As Foltz (1993) states so elegantly,
‘A genuine environmental ethic cannot be self-contained. Rather, it
must emerge into an ‘ecology’ that corresponds to the full dimensions
of human inhabitation, into a dwelling that gathers together (logos) the
house (oikos) of the world’

This leads Heidegger to point out that our response is to dwell
upon the earth, and to dwell poetically upon with earth—conserving
it, saving it. For him, dwelling ‘constitutes the primordial character of
ethics’ (Foltz 1993). In this manner, we are able to make the connection
from Heidegger’s view of nature to an environmental ethic. To live ethically with the environment, one is called to dwell. But Heidegger also points out that we ought to dwell in a specific manner—to dwell poetically as a renewed comportment toward things. Dwelling poetically, the human being lets nature be as it is, as it self-reveals (and self-conceals), and gives voice to what he/she discovers of the world. To save the world also is to save the world by allowing the world to be world, as in Heidegger’s example of building a bridge over the Rhine that allows the river to be a river. It does not mean that we are not to use the resources of the earth, but it challenges us to recover the relation to the earth as more than a standing reserve.

I believe that the way forward towards locating a place for a viable environmental ethic, one that can bridge the global and local needs to take into consideration the fact that our reality is one of having to address global environmental problems one locale at a time. Learning from the Hawaiian ahupua ‘a system, perhaps the way forward is to take a step back to adapt a traditional sustainable method to our contemporary needs. At the heart of any effort for sustainable development must be a realization that our existence, our being human is one of inter-relatedness. Our approach to living ought to be one that respects the mutual deference that our being as foci (de) with our surroundings as field (dao) calls us to live, and further, that living ought to be one of poetic dwelling that allows the world to be world. Our dwelling ought to be guided by deferential relating to our world, a relating that nurtures and lets the world be as world. But, as we have learned from our reflections above, the world is world that is inextricably linked to us and we to the world. As Sam Gon (2014) affirms: ‘Who we are is where we are.’ And I suppose the reserve makes sense as well, that, ‘where we are is who we are.’ Perhaps the way forward to living harmoniously with the world is by taking a step back to recover our roots, grounding ourselves in our intrinsic relation to the world that we are part of so that we can move forward as one-with-the-world, feet firmly on the ground that we tread (locally) and linking up our localities in a concentric circle of relations to affect the planet that we inhabit (globally).
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Some insights to understand marine conservation activities in Japan

Izumi TSURITA

Introduction

Philosophy and ethics provide valuable insights to comprehend in depth and to think beyond the present about various issues including my own study interest, marine conservation. University of Tokyo University of Hawaii Summer Institute (UTUHSI) was a perfect place to gain such insights through learning how the philosophy and ethics are generated, developed, understood, shared and studied in different places. Three objectives were set before attending the UTUHSI which are 1) to learn how the philosophical and ethical view would influence marine conservation activities, 2) to understand how the philosophy and ethics are created, studied, and compared in different places, and 3) to think in depth about the challenges and way forward for the future research on marine conservation.

Background

The background of above three objectives goes back to 2010, the Aichi Target, which was agreed in the 10th Conference of Parties of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD/COP10). An ambition to conserve 10% of the ocean by 2020 was indicated in Target 11 of the Aichi Target. At present, international communities share the ideas not only to fulfil its quantitative target but also to achieve qualitative outcomes by 2020. In order to evaluate the quality of results, clarifying integrated goals and reviewing the activity
based on such goals are known to be critical in the environmental management field (Slocombe 1998). However, understanding the quality or effectiveness of the conservation activities conducted in different places is somewhat problematic because of their diverse goals and outcomes.

Two concepts on marine conservation activities

As an example to facilitate shared marine conservation activities, two international concepts were highlighted during the CBD/COP10, namely, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Satoumi (里海). Both concepts have different historical backgrounds but contain somewhat overlapping ideas on conservation.

Various definitions exist for the MPAs and thus, there is no internationally agreed definition. However, numerous international reports refer to the definition of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) which is ‘a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values (Dudley 2008, p.8).’ One of the reasons of not having a single definition is because the concepts of the MPAs have been shifting among the history, location, and actors. In the early period, before the 21st century, the image of MPAs had close linkages with a no-take zone or a marine reserve (no-entry zone). Under such image, main objectives to set MPAs were to protect and maintain marine ecosystems based on its scenic beauty for the scientific advancement. Therefore, protection methods were basically to isolate specific marine area from human activities. However, as time goes by, dynamics of marine ecosystem and complexity of human interaction became obvious. Since marine creatures and substances move in three dimensions, marine ecosystem cannot always be protected even if a certain area is untouched. Also, many of the coastal zones are inhabited with the people who receive direct and indirect benefits from the surrounding marine ecosystems. When prohibiting human activities, disputes arose among different beneficiaries such as fishermen, tourists,
NGOs, scientific communities, and government agencies. Taking account of the interfaces among and between human and marine ecosystems, now, multiple-use zoning system that combines various conservation methods including resource management area and no-take area is being recognised as an effective tool than a single marine reserve (Tsurita 2015).

The concept of 里海 is proposed by Yanagi in late 90s. Yanagi (2006) defines 里海 as a ‘coastal sea with high biodiversity and productivity under the human interaction.’ In Japanese, sato (里) means home land or arable land and umi (海) means the sea. The concept of 里海 is derived from Satoyama (里山). In Japanese, yama (山) means mountain. 里山 usually refers to the ‘landscapes that comprise a mosaic of different ecosystem types including secondary forests, agricultural lands, irrigation ponds, and grasslands, along with human settlements (Duraiappah and Nakamura 2012, p.3).’ In spite of its vague concept, the term 里山 has been used in Japan for more than a century. The idea boosted during and after the high-growth period of the Japanese economy during the 50s to 70s (Knight 2010). The concept of 里海 spread after the term 里山 became as a household word. In general, both 里海 and 里山 stands for a sustainable community based (coastal or agricultural) resource management area that is known to create an effective environment to live in harmony with nature.

When reviewing the concepts of both MPAs and 里海, some essences of comparative philosophy emerge. 里海 can be compared with the Western conservation approaches that exclude people from nature under the regulations such as no-take zone or no-entry zone. The idea of 里海 can also be compared with the Western culture as a culture with a root to conquer and control natural environment, whereas Asian culture as a culture that include the existence of natural environment into its own sentiments and practices. The population density, history, and lifestyle in Asia can be emphasized as well when comparing with the West. On the other hand, now that the concept of MPA includes multiple-use zoning system, it gives an overlapping impression with the idea of 里海, the idea of human interaction. Therefore, these two concepts raise some important questions. What would be the distinctions between the two concepts? Is there any
meaning to separate two concepts? How can we evaluate these concepts through the activities on ground?

Marine conservation in practice

Considering above questions in mind, field research in Hinase, Bizen city, Okayama prefecture in Japan was conducted during 2011 to 2015 to further seek about the reality of marine conservation activities. Hinase is a fishing village facing towards the Seto Inland Sea consisting 13 islands with approximately 8,000 inhabitants. The sea of Hinase is a part of Seto Inland Sea National Park (which can be said as a MPA from the government’s decision) and is known to be one of the successful sites of 里海 (UNU 2011).

In the 80s, restoration of the eelgrass (*Zostera japonica*) was initiated by a group of *Tsuboami* (つぼ網), a small scale set-net fishermen. The activity originated in the 70s when a staff at the Hinase Fisheries Cooperative Association realized that the seafloor of Hinase no longer comprises the eelgrass which used to cover the majority of the shallow water. This finding was taken seriously by the group of *Tsuboami* since they catch fish along the edge of the eelgrass. They concluded that the decline of fish catch is somehow related to the loss of eelgrass bed. Since then, *Tsuboami* fishermen started to restore the eelgrass, the nursery ground of fish, with the hope to recover their fish catch. The restoration process was not easy. Trial and errors continued for more than two decades. Step by step, with the support from the city, prefectural, and national governments, as well as researchers, NGOs, and local communities, finally the regrowth of eelgrass became obvious after 2007 (Tsurita 2015).

Even with this success story, during the in depth interviews, it became clear that different stakeholders share different ideas on eelgrass restoration activity. For example, though fishermen acknowledge the regrowth of eelgrass, their fish catch is still unfulfilled. Fishermen are willing to continue the activity with a hope to achieve sustainable fishery practice but no one knows how they can achieve their final goal. While government agencies emphasise the activity as a successful
practice of 里海 by focusing the bottom up approach conducted for more than 30 years, some experts take cautious observations by pointing out the multiple reasons of eelgrass regrowth such as improvement of water quality due to the improved wastewater treatment system and limitation of dredging, artificial change of the seafloor height, construction of floating sea wall, and shift of the seasonal current. Also, overwhelming growth of eelgrass is starting to be a concern since some people from the local community raise issues about the smell of drifted eelgrass and the increasing occurrences of motor tangling. Apart from different stakeholders’ idea, there are also some issues on shift of fishing practice from hard and low income small scale set-net fishing methods to stable oyster aquaculture due to aging (average age above 60) and consumers’ expectation (stable supply on particular species), which could hinder the future conservation activity.

Above findings provide some answers to the question on ‘what would be the distinctions between the two concepts (MPAs and 里海)?’ and ‘is there any meaning to separate two concepts?’ Those answers, for example, can be found from the setting of Hinase. Hinase not only has the characteristics of 里海 but also MPAs by being a part of Seto Inland Sea National Park. Therefore, 里海 can be regarded as a part of the MPA, which implies that there is no clear need to separate the meaning. For the last question on how can we evaluate these activities on ground?, the answer is still hidden. Nevertheless, the UTUHSI delivered some clues to step forward.

**Learnings from the UTUHSI**

The final question highlighted above is related to three objectives listed in the beginning (to learn how the philosophical and ethical view would influence marine conservation activities; to understand how the philosophy and ethics are created, studied, and compared in different places and; to think in depth about the challenges and way forward for the future research on marine conservation). On that note, following points or clues came out during the UTUHSI.

Firstly, there are pros and cons to apply philosophy and ethics
to marine conservation. Philosophy and ethics provide deep insights to seek intentions and goals of conservation and to think beyond the present situation. The discussions on *earthy men* by Professor Nakajima and *to think beyond* by Dr. Miyagawa quoting Dogen are closely linked with these findings. However, if the philosophy or ethics is grasped arbitrary to justify the current status, it contains risk. This argument were raised during the discussion of風土 or climaticity (Watsuji 2000).

Rationalisation of 里海 from the cultural perspective explained that disproportionate idea could hinder the important aspects happening in the real world. MPAs and 里海 could contain some good practices for explaining conservation activities but contain risks when simply justifying the situation as it may give misimpression as a promise for the future through generalized yet ambiguous concepts.

Secondly, it is important to understand the ideas from the past, consider about the new ideas and social situations in present, and analyse the linkages or changes between the past and present. This means the importance to take account of the modern philosophers’ concern on science and technology, globalization, consumerism that are currently prevailing in both western and eastern countries. Such considerations were frequently raised by the lecturers and participants and were especially highlighted in the classes of Professor Aims, Professor Nakajima, and Dr. Sam Gon III. These discussions were even exchanged during the break and excursion which made me realize the importance to link the knowledge of the past and present. In terms of marine conservation, MPAs were thought differently in the past and present but now, accepting the broader concept, 里海 also belongs to MPAs. Still, considering the present situation, ignoring the social issues such as aging society without people to take over the activity could be problematic when presenting the concepts as a success story. The reality is ongoing and so as the effort to overcome the objectives of each stakeholders.

Finally, on ground activity is dynamic and thus, there is a need of careful consideration when dealing with the characteristics of each location’s history and spatial environment, as well as people’s own way of thinking. When observing and evaluating particular activity on ground, it is critical to understand their climaticity (including
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historicity and spatiality). This is because the process of on ground activity is vigorous and the intention behind could be both objective and subjective which are affected by personal emotion and value judgment. The idea on climaticity was shared by Professor Ishida and emotion and value judgement was pointed out by Professor Kajitani. Each actor has different perceptions towards the conservation activities (MPAs and 里海). People may offer different ideas depending on the situation and those ideas could vary time to time through the change of their own historicity and spatiality. Hence, processes to set a goal, to plan and to manage the activity, and to evaluate the activity could differ among the stakeholders’ own experiences.

Conclusion

The actions and intentions behind the conservation activities contain complex dynamism of ethical and psychological beliefs and values. The discussions and examples provided during the UTUHSI were somewhat new and exciting which made me appreciate the importance to understand philosophers’ ideas and arguments from various positions at a distance. It was a great opportunity for me to go through such exercise and now, this experience is encouraging me to step forward to deal with the complicated perspectives of marine conservation activities in Japan.

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Read Dōgen’s poetry, Shöbōgenzö, Eihei Koroku, or other writings and you will see that nature imagery, the language of nature, runs through them all. Dogen’s writings are part of a long tradition in East Asia of using nature imagery to express a religio-aesthetic awareness. That is one reason that Dōgen uses such language—an other one is the soteriological importance for Buddhism of leaving the home and the ‘marketplace.’ However, in thinking about the theme of place explored during the 2014 UTUH Summer Institute in Comparative Philosophy, I cannot help but wonder about the ‘philosophical’ why of the language of nature (place) that Dōgen uses. Are there reasons for Dōgen’s using the language of nature to express the Dharma that go beyond the contingencies of Buddhist and East Asian tradition? To be clear, I am not inquiring about the explicit, conscious reasons Dōgen wrote what he wrote. What I want to investigate is: Are there substantive philosophical reasons for preferring or needing the language of nature to express the Dharma? The purpose of this essay is to look briefly at possible reasons for and against an affirmative answer in order to demonstrate some of the complexities involved.

In asking about the language of nature, one might wonder what the contrast class is. That is, what is not the language of nature? Is it the language of the artificial? Language of the human-made? Language of the city? Saying what exactly it is that marks something as nature or natural is difficult. While the details of those difficulties warrant attention, for the sake of this essay, I want simply to take ‘nature’ to refer to those things that, in themselves, would generally be agreed to be nature. Again, Dōgen’s writings are filled with examples: mountains, valleys, mist, rivers, oceans, trees, grasses, flowers, the moon, the sky,
vines, ox, dragons, foxes, etc. These stand in contrast with what I take to be clear cases of things that do not belong to nature: houses, streets, lamps, doors, carts, pots, books, etc. I will call the latter *contrived objects, things, or contexts.* It is true that given these two lists we might wonder how to classify a house cat, modern corn, fire in a fireplace, or smoke from a chimney. However, such complicating examples aside, I take that what I mean by ‘nature,’ and what is not nature, is sufficiently clear and philosophically useful.

To return to our main question, consider the following poem by Dōgen:

Kusa no ha ni  Like a blade of grass,
Kadodeseru mi no  My frail body
Kinobe yama  Treading the path to Kyoto
Kumo ni oka aru  Seeming to wander
Kokochi koso sure.  Amid the cloudy mist on Kinobe Pass.
(Heine 2005, 35)

Heine’s analysis of this poem makes clear the importance of the imagery:

*Kusa no ha* (a blade of grass) is a multidimensional image. First, it connotes travel (*tabi*), a theme used generally in Court poetry to suggest someone’s feeling of either dismay or relief in leaving Kyoto, but here it ironically expresses uneasiness about an imminent return. On a symbolic level, the image indicates the fragility and vulnerability that pervades yet undercuts the existence of each and every being. It also recalls several passages in the *Shōbōgenzō* in which Dōgen equates “the radiance of a hundred blades of grass” with the true nature of reality or maintains that “a single blade of grass and a single tree are both the body-mind of all Buddhas.” *Kusa no ha* therefore expresses a convergence of departure and return, feeling and detachment,

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1. ‘Contrived’ can have the negative connotation of being artificial or for ulterior purposes, but here I simply use it to indicate something’s *being created for a purpose* as opposed to *naturally occurring.*
Why Not ‘City Sounds, Urban Colors’?

and particularity and frailty with the universal non-substantiality of phenomena. (2005, p. 35)

*Kusa no ha* (a blade of grass)’s being a multidimensional image is dependent upon how Dōgen uses it but also on the Buddhist and literary tradition of which he is a part. But, again, is there more than tradition involved here? Asking the readers forgiveness, consider the following reworked version of Heine’s English translation next to the original:

Like a blade of grass, Like a rusted can  
My frail body My frail body  
Treading the path to Kyoto Treading pavement to Kyoto  
Seeming to wander Seeming to wander  
Amid the cloudy mist on Kinobe Amid the cloudy fumes on Hokuriku  
Pass. Expressway.

We must, of course, be very cautious in comparing an English translation of Dōgen’s poem with my version. Let us begin by noting that the content of my modified poem is clearly altered and that part of this difference comes from the change of imagery. A *blade of grass* is quite different from a *rusted can*. One difference is that ‘blade of grass’ is used, for example, in Case 4 of the *Blue Cliff Record*: ‘Sometimes use a blade of grass as a sixteen-foot golden body. Sometimes use as sixteen-foot golden body as a blade of grass’ (cited in Dōgen 1995, p. 263). ‘A rusted can’ is not so used. But is it simply that it would be an anachronism to find it in the *Blue Cliff Record* or a similar text? Or is there something in its being a contrived object that robs it of the possibility of it entering into an authentic expression of the Dharma? What about ‘the cloudy mist on Kinobe Pass’ in comparison to ‘the cloudy fumes on Kokuriku Expressway’? Is it possible for a line like the latter to embody *yūgen* in the way that the original line can be seen to?

The last question brings us to aesthetic considerations. A *rusted can* lying about and *cloudy fumes of exhaust* both have negative connotations that might rob them of positive aesthetic attributes. However, this is not true of all contrived objects. What kind of
general conclusions are warranted regarding the differences between the aesthetics of the natural versus the contrived? Are the items of nature intrinsically more beautiful, at least on average, than contrived items? While I would say, ‘Yes!’ such aesthetic judgments are highly problematic. To sidestep those issues, we might turn to the ever-increasing empirical research being done on the effects of nature on physical and mental health.² This would not come as a surprise for those familiar with the Japanese practice of Shinrin-yoku (森林浴), or ‘forest bathing.’ Nevertheless, one issue with such findings or even such practices as Shinrin-yoku, given our topic, is whether the different effects of health are a cultural or biological product. That is, is it somehow a part of human nature to feel and be healthier in more natural environments or is it a kind of placebo effect that is the product of enculturation? Either way, given the connection between Buddhist practice and peace of mind, etc., and given the similar positive health effects of natural objects and settings, might such a reason, despite its dependence on biology, be developed into a substantive one for preferring an expression of the Dharma using the language of nature?

That natural settings are ‘naturally’ healthier than urban ones, together with Dōgen’s emersion in an extremely rich religio-aesthetic tradition that focuses on nature, might help explain why ‘...for Dōgen there is a sense of being unable to resist the aesthetic feelings generated by natural forms, from which one ‘cannot help’ but be drawn into an emotional response’ (Heine 2005, p. 28). One such emotional response that is central according to Heine is a response to transiency. Commenting on Dōgen’s ‘Genjōkōan’ lines, ‘Flowers falling even as we turn our admiring gaze, / While weeds keep springing up despite our chagrin,’ (2005, p. 38) Heine writes:

A religio-aesthetic interpretation argues that the “Genjōkōan” sentence demonstrates a transcendental view at once encompassing and sublating the human emotions of sorrow and grief over the transiency of nature. Genuine spiritual realization must be found by embracing—rather than by eliminating—one’s emotional

². See, for example, Lee, J., et al., 2009. Here is a good list of references for other research on the issue of nature and health: http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/90720.html
response to variability and inevitable loss. (2005, p. 38)

In an email correspondence (21 May 2015), Heine confirmed that ‘nature’ in ‘the transiency of nature’ refers to nature in opposition to the contrived and not nature as in reality. However, it is not clear why it would be nature in opposition to the contrived, except for the influence of the religio-aesthetic tradition, since it is not merely nature that is transitory. Nevertheless, we might still wonder whether the transience of nature is somehow more poignant than the transiency of the contrived, and, therefore, whether the language of nature is more apt for engaging and expressing that transience. And here, again, it is difficult to know what kind of general conclusions are warranted. Nature has its seasons, but one might well argue that nothing says poignant transience like a run down, deserted town. But perhaps we might note that the transience of the town is a byproduct of those seasons, the alternating effects of heat, cold, rain, wind, etc. The manifestation of transience in contrived objects only occurs as a response to the natural elements. And there is something right about that; look at attempts to preserve things, whether mummification or maintaining a 500 year old work of art, and one of the main things you need to do is, in a sense, keep nature out. Still, it is unclear to me, whether this, by itself, amounts to a substantive philosophical reason in favor of the language of nature for expressing the Dharma.

Let us take a different tack. Consider the following passage from Genjōkōan: ‘While one does not fully put the Dharma into practice in one’s body-mind, one thinks that the Dharma is already enough. When the Dharma gets full in one’s body-mind, one wonders if something is lacking’ (Ishida 2010, 12-p. 13). This wondering if something is lacking might be fruitfully viewed as an attunement to the depths of reality in all its emptiness. Dōgen continues:

For example, when one boards a boat, sailing in the wide open sea, and looks around, one sees the ocean only as round. One does not see any other aspect of it. However, this great ocean is neither round nor square. Its [sic] qualities of the ocean cannot be exhausted. It is like a palace. It is like a bead ornament. Only to
one’s eyes, one sees it as round for the time being. Likewise, it is true with myriad things.

... In order to comprehend the way myriad things are, one must know that besides the fact that one sees the ocean as round or square other qualities of the ocean and mountain cannot be exhausted, and that there are worlds in the four directions. (Ishida 2010, 12-p. 13)

I want to suggest that the realization that the ‘qualities of the ocean cannot be exhausted’ is a perception of something approximating the Japanese aesthetic quality of yūgen. There is no one-to-one translation that we can give for yūgen—its meanings are layered, complex, and change over time—but we can say that it is an aesthetic property concerning the suggestion of a profound depth or mystery. The nature of what exists, whether water or Buddha Nature, is such that its qualities cannot be exhausted. That is, there is a profound depth and limitlessness to them.

I want to suggest now that a possible key difference between the language of nature and the language of the contrived is that nature is more ‘naturally’ the object and symbol of the profound depth to reality that is akin to yūgen. Thus, the language of nature is better suited to the soteriological ends of enlightenment. While all of reality—natural or contrived—may be through and through Buddha Nature, through and through exhibiting profound depth, language employing the imagery of contrived objects implies a limit not implied by the imagery of nature. And this limit contradicts the openness and profound depths of that quality of reality which we are saying is akin to yūgen. What kind of limit? Consider the following point made by Dewey about language. He writes that contrived objects are, ‘a mode of language. For [they say] something...about operations of use and their consequences. ... ...these [contrived] objects are so intimately bound up with interests, occupations and purposes that they have an eloquent voice’ (Dewey 1998, 30). However eloquent their voices may be, in their speaking of purposes and interests, contrived objects also reify self and other. That is, their embeddedness in teleological contexts reifies all that is involved: the contrivance, the maker, and the one who
uses it. The language of contrived objects is teleological in a way that the language of nature is not. While our nature concepts are in some sense determined by our purposes as human beings, e.g., the purposes of taxonomy, the mountain does not speak the teleology that the house speaks. And this language of purposes implies limits that are counter to Zen’s soteriology. Thus, when it comes to expressing the Dharma in words, the language of nature implies a freedom from teleology that the language of the contrived does not. And this freedom from teleology is what enables the language of nature to express, to the extent that it is able, that quality of reality that is akin to yūgen.

However, against this conclusion, do the ‘teleological limitations’ of contrived things really limit the range of expression of the language of contrived objects. After all, one of the things Dōgen is known for is his felicity with language and his ability to express the inexpressible through language. On this issue, Kim writes:

Language and symbols circumscribe reality; but, as living forces, they are dynamic enough to open up, constantly re-expressing, renewing, and casting off, so as to unfold new horizons of their own life. In this way language and symbols know no limits with respect to how far they can penetrate both conceptually and symbolically. (Kim 1985, p. 60)

Kim does not here distinguish between the language of nature and that of contrived objects, but perhaps that is because the above applies equally well to both. Alas. There is not space here to further address this issue. Where does this leave us then? Aside from the inertia of the religio-aesthetic tradition of which he was a part, we have failed to find solid philosophical reasons for preferring the language of nature for expressing the Dharma. Nevertheless, while we have not shown what might count as necessary reasons for using the language of nature, we have seen that there a variety of factors that might be thought to recommend it.³

³. I want to thank Steven Heine for his willingness to discuss some of the issues of this paper by email. His feedback, as always, was very helpful.
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Cosmetic Surgery and Confucianism:  
*Reread “body” and “filial piety”*  
Yao CHENYU

**Introduction**

Cosmetic surgery is of great popularity in China now. Incisive cosmetic surgery changes body in a fierce and painful way and this seems to violate the old Confucian adage that “the body, hair and skin, all have been received from the parents, and so one doesn’t dare damage them—that is the beginning of filial piety” (Xiaojing, The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise). However, as Dr. Roger Ames (2011) says in his work *Confucian Role Ethics*, Confucianism never stops changing and evolving through history with successful adaptation to two remarkable waves of impact from Buddhism and western theoretic framework, how has the Confucian understanding of “body” and “filial piety” been changing is very relevant to the perception of cosmetic surgery today.

**“Body”: meaning and relationship with mind**

Cosmetic surgery takers tend to belittle physical body and regard cosmetic surgery as a means to bring other’s attention to their inner personalities. In their own words, “good appearance provides me with an opportunity to display my deeper and inner personality”. One protruding feature of Chinese cosmetic surgery takers is that they emphasize less on the significance of physical appearance but attaches great importance to the consistence of themselves before and after cosmetic surgery. It happens on a considerable amount of cosmetic surgery takers from other countries that they begin to deny
their image before cosmetic surgery and feel distant and unfamiliar with their “before self” after recovering from the cosmetic surgery. But this doesn’t happen commonly to Chinese cosmetic surgery takers. Actually, most of them try to address that something fundamental and essential of them are consistent and shall not be changed by cosmetic surgery.

As a physical or biological conception, body is often regarded as a comparative concept against mind. The body-mind relationship is a classical, fundamental, and perplexing theme in Confucianism. Body and mind are so closely correlative and interactive with each other that they are rarely separated from each other. The study of mind and the study of body are two sides of the same sword. The assumption that there’s no body without mind and no mind without body is the basis in body-mind relationship. (Yang, 1996) Body plays a grander and more serious role in Confucian thoughts where it is believed to display the universe and links to the truth of the cosmos. Body is the intermediary that communicates between truth and human beings. The five internal organs are believed to be the dwelling places for the spirit beings and the five facial organs apertures opened by spirit beings on human beings. (Chen, 2008)

However, the physical meaning of body has been weakened and diluted through the history and body becomes an abstract and metaphysical concept that is similar to “self”. The idea of Self-cultivation (Xiushen, 修身), which refers to the cultivation of one’s moral character, literally means “body decoration” or “body processing”. In the Analects of Confucius, the saying that endures long popularity “I reflect on myself in three approaches everyday” (吾日三省吾身) literally means “I reexamine my body in three approaches everyday”. Body was understood far beyond the framework of functional physical being, but in the relationships with mind, truth, dignity, propriety, and so on. If body is regarded as physical existence or place that displays one’s identity and social-cultural elements in western context, then body contains more spiritual and relational meanings with truth and propriety in Chinese culture. In other words, body should not be taken biologically or sociologically but spiritually and relationally.

Though it should be noted that body and mind are believed to
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intertwine and interact with each other and one part cannot be what it is in lack of the other, the de-physicalization of body is so strong that the body parts controlled intentionally by mind is sometimes regarded to be shallow and impeding human beings from touching the truth. Internal organs like heart, stomach, and liver that function without the control of mind are the core of body and they are said to be the place where heaven-ness dwells (Chen, 2008).

So the depreciation of physical body also plays a significant role in understanding how body is perceived, particularly represented by neo-Confucianism that thrived in Song and Ming dynasties. The major argument is that body is subject to mind and mind is the ruler of the mind. Zhuxi, one of the most eminent epitome of Confucian thoughts in Song dynasty emphasized on the dominating role of the mind by saying “Heart(mind), is the name of governance and domination” (心,主宰之谓也) and “Heart(mind), is the ruler of body” (心者, 一身之主宰) (Analects of Zhuai, Vol. 5). And he explains the reason by saying that “The reason that heart(mind) can rule the body is because mind is consistent and doesn’t spilt, because it is the subject instead of the object, because it shall control objects while shall not be controlled by them” (心者, 人之所以主乎身者也, 一而不二者也, 为主而不为客者也, 命物而不命于物者也) (Analects of Zhuai, Vol. 44). Even tracing back to Five Elements (45-46), it is explicitly argued that:

Six parts, which are ears, eyes, nose, mouth, hands, and feet, comply with the heart. When the hearts says ‘respond’, the body doesn’t dare not to respond. When the hearts says ‘agree’, the body doesn’t dare not to agree. When the heart says ‘go forward’, the body doesn’t dare not to go forward. When the heart says ‘retreat’, the body doesn’t dare not to retreat.

耳目鼻口手足六者, 心之役也。心曰唯, 莫敢不唯; 心曰诺, 莫敢不诺; 进, 莫敢不进; 后, 莫敢不后; 深, 莫敢不深; 浅, 莫敢不浅。

These records lead to the idea that body is manipulated and determined by mind and listens to what mind demands. In this framework of body-mind relationship, it should be noted that body is
considered to be inferior and subject to mind in general notwithstanding the significance of body and the inseparability between body and mind are emphasized as well. Body is more of a reflection or operating system of mind. The shape, composition, and status of body associate with, or even are determined by the mind.

**Filial Piety: rich contents of Xiao**

Body also links with filial piety. “The body, hair and skin, all have been received from the parents, and so one doesn’t dare damage them—that is the beginning of filial piety.” (Xiaojing, The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise) It seems that cosmetic surgery violates this principle, used by many people as a reason to oppose cosmetic surgery. Moreover, it’s harder for older generation to accept cosmetic surgery and family conflicts related with cosmetic surgery widely exist. As shown in the survey, though cosmetic surgery is considered to be a matter of personal choice, it seems necessary and common for people to get approval or admission from their parents before undergoing cosmetic surgery. It is common and natural that juveniles who want to take cosmetic surgery must get approval and financial assistance from their parents, but even those who earn fair salary tend to consult with their parents even under the circumstances where they consider their parents to be “stubborn and hard to accept new things”. They want to “seek for parents’ acknowledge and support and change their old-fashioned ideas” though the decisions are theirs own to made at the end of the day.

Filial piety (孝, Xiao) has very rich contents ranging from “obeying what parents say” (无违, Wuwei), “support parents’ life with propriety when they are alive, bury and offer sacrifice to parents with propriety after their death” (生, 事之以礼; 死, 葬之以礼, 祭之以礼), to “the body, hair and skin, all have been received from the parents, and so one doesn’t dare damage them—that is the beginning of filial piety” (身体发肤, 受之父母, 不敢毁伤, 孝之始也). Though filial piety has very rich contents, the core of it is “the heart or mindset of filial piety” (孝心, Xiaoxin) instead of “behaviors of filial piety” (孝行, }
Xiaoxing). And as recorded in *Book of Rites*, “there are three types of filial piety: the most important one is to make your parents respected, followed by not making them insulted or blamed. The least important one is to support their life” (孝有三: 大孝尊亲, 其次弗辱, 其下能养). To make parents respected means not just children’s respecting their parents, but making their parents respected by all as well, which requests higher morality in parents. And it has been mentioned by Confucian classics that to “remonstrate” (劝谏, Quanjian) parents is a very high level of filial piety. To correct the inappropriate ideas and behaviors of parents is actually a higher level of filial piety. To maintain the family harmony and effective communication is also a higher level of filial piety. Compared with these, to be obedient seems to be not enough in terms of filial piety.

Moreover, one-directional filial piety cannot complete family ethics, kindness and care from parents (慈, Ci) to children are also addressed in traditional culture. “Father is kind and son is filial” (父慈子孝, Fuxizixiao) is the ideal picture of family relationship. To understand, love, and cultivate children is requested of parents and only when performed, filial piety from children could be completed and reinforced. The roles in family are relational and interactive and propriety is relational and mutual-directional as well. Efforts from both sides complete the family ethics and maintain the harmony of a family. Thus, to consult with parents about cosmetic surgery shows respect to them. To persuade them shows the will to make parents change old-fashioned ideas and become respectable. To seek for support shows the pursuit of harmony in the family. And to insist on their own opinion shows their request for “kindness from parents”.

**Conclusion**

We can still find the vestige of Confucianism in people’s understanding of cosmetic surgery and attitude towards it today. The emphasis on “consistence” accords with the important role that “mind” plays in traditional Confucianism, and body as a means manifests the tendency of de-physicalization of body. To consult with parents before
making decisions shows respect to parents, and to persuade parents into the ideas people believe in to maintain family harmony shows the higher level of filial piety. However, something is changing for sure. It is clearly observed that the spiritual and heavenly meaning of body has been alleviated but the physical and material meaning of body is increasingly active.

The abundant connotation of “body” and “filial piety” in Confucianism enriches the understanding of general attitude towards cosmetic surgery today in China. But the understanding of “body” and “filial piety” also keeps changing and evolving, backgrounded by the fast and dramatic transformation of Chinese society. The focus of importance changes from heart to body, from virtue to beauty, from family role to individual role, but Confucianism with rich contents has the power to digest the changes and becomes more colorful.

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“Whether what we call “the west” has always been incorrigibly tilted towards a prioritizing of the individual and a neglect of what Watsuji called “betweenness”(aidagara)is, I think, an important question ..... During the recent centuries of their intellectual and social life, Europe and America have placed a stress on the individual to such an extent that intellectuals in certain Asian contexts have come to view that emphasis as an imbalance needing to be challenged. Watsuji was arguably the best read and the most sharply articulate among the Asian thinkers who addressed this problem. And the Ethics is where he best demonstrated that point of view and the challenge to thought implicit within it.” (William R. LaFleur “Foreword” in Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan)

As the passage suggests, Watsuji Tetsuro is one of few Japanese philosophers in the history of philosophy, for his astonishing works in the field of ethics. 3 weeks of lectures on east philosophy at University of Hawaii with UTCP has provided me with the great interests particularly on Japanese philosopher. Watsuji Tetsuro, one of the representative philosophers of Japanese Kyoto School was significant in putting an emphasis on human relationship in the study of ethics. His most famous work, “Ethics”, argues how the study of ethics can be defined, from the point of in-between-ness of person.

Watsuji’s philosophy can be summed up as the objection to individualistic ethics. This individual ethics is what characterized almost all western philosophers in the field of ethics. (Although individualism is a concept rather prevalent in all fields of western culture) For example,
Thomas Hobbes imagined a state of nature in which we are radically discrete individuals, at a time before significant social interconnections have been established. We are individuals inescapably immersed in the space/time world, together with others. For Watsuji Tetsuro, it is almost impossible to grasp the essence of human beings in isolation from their various social contexts and communities. He counters that we are inevitably born into social relationships, beginning with one’s mother, and one’s caregivers. Our very beginnings are etched by the relational interconnections, which keep us alive, educate us, and initiate us into the proper ways of social interaction.

At the center of Watsuji’s study of Japanese ethics is his analysis of the Japanese word for human person, 人間 (ningen). In his “Ethics”, (“Rinrigaku”), he affirms that ethics is the study of human persons. Offering an etymological analysis, as he does so often, he points out the important complexity in the meaning of ningen. Ningen is composed of two characters, nin, meaning ‘person’ or ‘human being,’ and gen, meaning ‘space’ or ‘between.’ He cautions that it is imperative to recognize that a human being is not just an individual, but is also a member of many social groupings. We are individuals, and yet we are not just individuals, for we are also social beings; and we are social beings, but we are not just social beings, for we are also individuals. Many who interpret Watsuji forget the importance which he gave to this balanced and dual-nature of a human being. They read the words, but then go on to argue that he really gives priority to the collectivistic or social aspect of what it means to be a human being. Yet it does not fit Watsuji’s theoretical position, which is that we are, at one and the same time, both individual and social.

In Japan, nothing is more important than relationships. One needs to understand this when dealing with Japanese people. The practice of gift giving, while often little more than a reflex, is meant to reinforce the ongoing importance of relationships. For example, a student’s gratefulness for a teacher’s instruction often continues to the end of the teacher’s life. It is one’s responsibility to show gratefulness through periodic gift giving long after one has completed one’s schooling. To do less is to be less than human. Perhaps the Japanese perspective can be better understood if we attend to the concept and
Significance of Watsuji Tetsuro’s Ethics in nowadays

meaning of Ningen borrowed from Soseki Natsume, and it is brilliantly amplified by Watsuji. So, to be human is to be in a rather wide array of relationships, and ethics is concerned with those problems that arise between persons. Rinri refers to a system of relations guiding human association, including some sense of the appropriate attitudes to embody in one’s dealing with others. These rules and principles are required for people to live in community in a friendly and nourishing manner. Given this heavy emphasis on relationships, it is little wonder that Confucianism is the starting point for ethics in Japan. Watsuji himself refers to Confucianism when describing the principles of human relationships. The precise ordering of relationships between “parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and wife, young and old, friend and friend, and so forth.” For the most part, these are the ordering principles which give sense to social relations, and on which Watsuji base his description of an ethical Japanese person.

Watsuji gives an example of ancient Confucian patterns of human interaction as between parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and wife, young and old, and friend and friend. Presumably, one also acquires a sense of the appropriate and ethical judgment ability in all other relationships as one grows in society. One can think of the betweenness as a *basho*, an empty space, in which we can either reach out to the other in order to create a relationship of positive value, or to shrink back, or to lash out, making a bad situation worse. The space is pure potential, and what we do with it depends on the degree to which we can encounter the other in a fruitful and appropriate manner in that between-ness. Ethics “consists of the laws of social existence” Watsuji’s analysis of *gen* is of equal interest. He makes much of the notion of ‘betweenness,’ or ‘relatedness.’ He traces *gen* (*ken*) back to its earlier form, *aida* or *aidagara*, which refers to the space or place in which people are located, and in which the various crossroads of relational interconnection are established.

Watsuji Tetsuro’s contribution to defining the study of ethics as something being involved with in-betweenness of person was something significant. Considering human relationship as the essential factor in thinking about what should be done in ethical problems was something neglected and underestimated in the context of western philosophy.
There have been a number of theories of ethics from Aristotle’s ethics of purpose and happiness to Kant’s imperative principles of ethics, but none of them talked about how instinct bondings between community can be decisive in ethical decision-making. Common mistakes or inclination of western philosophy was to try to find out absolute laws or principles in ethics. In that sense, Watsuji Tetsuro was successful in grasping the essence of human being, different from western paradigm, or culture.

However, that doesn’t mean that there is no room for criticisms on his thoughts of ethics. One of the facts he couldn’t foresee was that ethics is nowadays not only defined to the realm of human beings. Today, ethics is expanding its fields as to environmental ethics, animal ethics, bioethics, business ethics, and so on. His argument has sense in that all of these new kinds of ethics have to do with relationship between objects. However, it is hard to accept that these relationships are defined to human beings only. The typical example would be animal ethics. The representative scholar in this field is Peter singer, who is a moral philosopher with his works of “Animal Liberation (1975)”. His argument of taking animal’s right and ability to feel pain and pleasure into account was sensational and influential. His thoughts of applied ethics is greatly influenced from thoughts of utilitarianism, which states that the sum of pleasure and pain should be the basis of ethical judgment and the amount of the pleasure and pain are something measurable. If pleasure is Good and pain is Bad, there was no reason, according to Singer, that animal’s ability to feel pain and pleasure cannot be considered as moral objects as far it is evident that they feel much of a same pleasure and pain like human being does. Thus the implication of Singer’s philosophy is that he overcame the limited range of traditional studies of ethics, to the extent of living things capable of feeling pleasure and pain from the range of human beings. According to him, Watsuji Tetsuro’s ethics of dependency on human relationships and in-betwenness of people is too much restricted way of view. We, living in 21st century, are challenged everyday with problems of what’s right and wrong and we are required to make a decision how one should behave under complicated contexts and knowledge. Fields of study has broadened, and as technology has developed, it is getting complicated
and harder to decide what the essence of human is and what differs human from animals, artificial intelligence, robots, vegetable man, disabled man, and so on. Watsuji Tetsuro’s ethics is not enough to provide us with the answers to those questions, because limiting the range of ethics only to the human being is not enough for solving ethical questions we are having nowadays society. Ethics has to think about many kinds of relationships other than the one about between humans, as global ethics, cyber ethics, environmental ethics and so forth. Human's relationship with these new mediums is unprecedented, and the knowledge and principles of human in betweenness is barely helpful. However, it is believed that Watsuji Tetsuro’s idea of grasping the ethics as the revealing the principles of 'relationship' is prevalent regardless of how the range of ethics change with the society and time era.

References:


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