Papers from the 2013 University of Tokyo - University of Hawai‘i
Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy
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Roger T. AMES
Masato ISHIDA
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Takahiro NAKJIMA

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About the Authors
The 2013 University of Hawai‘i-University of Tokyo
Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy

It was a great honor and pleasure for UTCP (University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy) to host for the 2013 Summer Institute in Comparative Philosophy. This was the second collaboration with the University of Hawai‘i Department of Philosophy. As the first Summer Institute was a great success, we could share a wonderful experience together with all participants in this 2013 Summer Institute.

The common theme of the 2013 Summer Institute was “Practicing Philosophy.” We organized a lecture series at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo, for two weeks from August 5th to 16th. Our colleagues Roger Ames, Ishida Masato, Kajitani Shinji, Kobayashi Yasuo, Takada Yasunari, and I gave intensive lectures to the participants. However, there was a significant difference from the 2012 Summer Institute. In order to realize “Practicing Philosophy,” we not only visited the D. T. Suzuki Museum in Kanazawa and Nishida Kitarō Museum of Philosophy in Kahoku, but also practiced “Zazen” at Eiheiji Temple in Fukui and at Tentokuji Temple in Tottori in the third week of the Institute, from August 17th to 23rd.

Ms. Iwamoto Akemi, chief researcher at the D. T. Suzuki Museum, and Mr. Ōkuma Gen, curator of the Nishida Kitarō Museum of Philosophy guided us with detailed explanations. At Eiheiji Temple, Master Saitō Godō, Master Kuroyanagi Hakujin, and Master Miyagawa Keishi supported us for a profound experience of “Zazen” and gave us a chance to ask questions concerning Dōgen over two days. At Tentokuji Temple, Master Miyagawa Keishi gave a really fascinating talk about the early thought of Dōgen. Master Chiyonishio Dōken, Master Wakuno Kenshō, and my old friend Hirose Reiko, professor of
Senshū University, the staff of Tentokuji Temple, and the members of “Zazen Kai” of Tentokuji Temple afforded us a chance to touch upon the rich spirituality of Tottori. We are deeply grateful for their support and kindness.

The great success of this Summer Institute owed very much to the generous support of the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education. Without this support, we couldn’t imagine being able to undertake such an international program of higher education. In addition, I would like to give my thanks to the Global Leadership Program which was designed for prominent undergraduate students in the University of Tokyo. Thanks to this program, we could invite one of undergraduate students to this Summer Institute. We shall share the experience of this Summer Institute to contribute to summer school activities which will be organized by Global Leadership Program.

Last but not least, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the immeasurable support of the staff of UTCP and the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia. Our Summer Institute is a realization of the camaraderie among so many friends.

Takahiro NAKAJIMA
I. Papers by Institute Faculty
Introduction

In August 2013 we convened the second iteration of the University of Tokyo-University of Hawai’i Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy (UTUH Institute) hosted in Japan. And the theme underlying the lectures and life of the Institute was “practice.” Our group consisted of some 30 graduate students from both institutions, together with several professors from American universities, as well as four instructional faculty. The first two weeks of the Institute consisted of formal lectures by Professors Nakajima Takahiro and Kajitani Shinji from UT and Ishida Masato and Roger T. Ames from UH. A rotating series of lectures on Chinese and Japanese philosophy were complemented by a close reading of relevant texts, setting a high standard for this intensive workshop. The lectures focused on the theme of “practice,” and after two weeks of intensive lectures and workshops at the University of Tokyo, the group traveled to Eiheiji and Tentokuji to experience zazen firsthand and to explore the inspired life of a Soto monk. We were introduced to the life of a Soto Zen monk in situ, and with close instruction by Miyagawa Keishi, we had the opportunity to make the intimate connection between philosophical ideas and living disciplinary practice.

During the Institute I offered four lectures on several different themes related to practice. Let me summarize these lectures here.
In the introduction of Chinese philosophy and culture into the Western academy, we have tended to theorize and conceptualize this antique tradition by appeal to familiar categories. Confucian role ethics is an attempt to articulate a *sui generis* moral philosophy that allows this tradition to have its own voice. This holistic philosophy is grounded in the primacy of relationality and life practice, and is a challenge to a foundational liberal individualism that has defined persons as discrete, autonomous, rational, free, and often self-interested agents. Confucian role ethics begins from a relationally constituted conception of person, takes family roles and relations as the entry point for developing moral competence, invokes moral imagination and the growth in relations that it can inspire as the substance of human morality, and entails a human-centered, a-theistic religiousness that stands in sharp contrast to the Abrahamic religions. Through the practice of assiduous personal cultivation, it is an effort to enchant the familiar, to make the ordinary extraordinary.

Confucian role ethics does not subscribe to the “Fallacy of Simple Location”—the assumption that we can know something by isolating it and taking it apart. Nor does it embrace the familiar instantiations of this fallacy in either abstract moral principles or in a foundational individualism. The classical Confucian texts give us a Chinese instance of the postulate of immediate empiricism in that they appeal to a relatively straightforward account of our actual life experiences as the ultimate source of our abstracted entities. For Confucianism, the primacy of relationality in experience means that its content is in fact eventful, organic, processual, and interdependent. Experience is holistic in the sense that there are no gaps or final boundaries; transitions and conjunctions are as real as anything else. In the growth of a friendship, the friendship itself is what is most concrete, and the individual friends are an abstraction from their friendship. The friends are best understood in their connectivity rather than in isolation, and they become distinctive as individuals because of the growth in this connectivity, not in spite of it. In this Confucian view, we are not individuals in the discrete sense of an Aristotelian *psyche*, but are rather
interrelated persons living a multiplicity of roles that constitute who we are, and that allow us to pursue a unique distinctiveness and virtuosity in our conduct. In other words, each of us is the sum of the roles we live in consonance with our fellows.

Viewed critically from a Confucian perspective, we are inclined to make a miscalculation in thinking of human nature retrospectively as the potential “being” of human “beings” rather than prospectively as the evolving product of “becoming” human. From the perspective of this relational human becoming, then, to assume we are human “beings” is to commit the philosophical fallacy by making the product of an ongoing process antecedent to it, and then ascribing to it a foundational and causal status.

In thinking of the nature of human “beings,” we are culturally disposed to default to a retrospective causal or a teleological explanation rather than to allow for a more holistic, prospective, contextual, and processive account of what it means to become human both individually and as a species. In so doing, we come to presuppose that human nature is either a given potential to be actualized or some pre-existing ideal to be attained. Some scholars believe that notions such as free agency and moral responsibility require us to isolate individuals from their relationships by positing a definition of what it is to be a human being. We would argue that the irony is that such scholars in thus insisting upon a definition of some ready-made human being or some guiding teleological hand not only diminish the possibilities of productive difference, but also, in asserting this kind of essential sameness among human beings, in fact truncate any robust existential notion of agency and responsibility.

Confucian role ethics is radical in resisting any separation between personal identity and world of experience. Role ethics goes beyond the penetration of “mind” and “language” into experience to locate the identity of persons within the actual content of experience as evolves through embodied propriety (ti 體) in their roles and relations (li 禮). It is because there is no severe distinction between the characteristic habits of transactional agents and their aggregating conduct that the term “consummate person/conduct (ren 仁)” denotes both persons and the conduct of such persons. It is for this reason
that *ren* requires a narrative rather than an analytic understanding of person, and as with its cognate *ren* 人, it is unclear whether the referent is singular or plural. Of course when *ren* is referred to in a more abstract sense, it is an open-ended generalization made off of particular historical accomplishments of consummate conduct rather than referencing some innate and essential element that is characteristic of all members of the set called human “beings.” And the assumption is that *ren* is to be cultivated by correlating one’s own conduct with those models close at hand rather than by acting in concert with some abstract moral principles. As gerundive persons—that is, as erstwhile verbal nouns—we are what we do, and whatever we do, we do together or not at all.

*Lectures Three and Four: “Traveling Together with gravitas: Confucianism as the Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Practice”*

We begin from the claim that the Confucian intergenerational transmission of culture is a practice captured in the term *dao* 道: “a forging of our way together in the world.” Within the interpretive framework of Confucian philosophy, associated, interpersonal living is taken to be an uncontested, empirical fact. Every person lives and every event takes place within a vital natural, social, and cultural context. Association being a fact, our different roles lived within family and society are nothing more than the stipulation of specific modes of associated living: mothers and grandsons, teachers and neighbors, lovers and shopkeepers. But while we must take associated living as a simple fact, the consummate conduct that comes to inspire and to produce virtuosity in these stipulated roles lived in family, community, and the cultural narrative broadly—that is, Confucian role ethics—is an achievement; it is what we are able with imagination to make of the fact of association.

Ralph Waldo Emerson appeals to a rather simple image of a carpenter hewing wood to make a rather profound statement about the march of continuing civilization and the morality that must
necessarily inform it. Emerson draws an intriguing contrast between the ineffectiveness of ‘going it alone’ in this world, and the indomitable felicity of squaring the practices of a mature civilization behind our shoulders and living lives that are propelled by the moral and cultural gravitas that such a shared purchase and momentum provides:

Civilization depends on morality. Everything good in man leans on what is higher. This rule holds in small as in great. Thus, all our strength and success in the work of our hands depend on our borrowing the aid of the elements. You have seen a carpenter on a ladder with a broad-axe chopping upward chips and slivers from a beam. How awkward! at what disadvantage he works! But see him on the ground, dressing his timber under him. Now, not his feeble muscles, but the force of gravity brings down the axe; that is to say, the planet itself splits his stick.

Emerson’s image of lives empowered by the weight of a common civilization recalls the key philosophical notion of “a forging of our way together in the world” (dao 道). How then are we to understand this important Confucian metaphor for the journey that we all join at birth in our families and communities?

Human beings are not only travelers; they must also be road builders because the continuing human culture—the human dao—is always provisional and ever under construction. Again, the primacy of vital relationality means that the locus of this personal cultivation lies embedded within those evolving roles and relationships that constitute each of us in the narratives of our lives. The particular and yet continuous and vital character of the human culture is captured in a passage in which the protégée of Confucius, Zigong, is questioned about Confucius’s academic lineage. Zigong replies:

The way (dao) of the early Zhou dynasty Kings Wen and Wu has not collapsed, but still lives on in the people. Since those of superior character realize the greater part of it, and those of lesser quality realize some of it, everyone has something of Wen and Wu’s way in them. Who then does the Master not learn from?
And again, how could there be a single constant teacher for him? 
(*Analects* 19.22)

Of immediate import in this passage is the choice of King Wen—literally, King “Culture”—as the source of Confucius’s education, and the claim that this living culture is embodied and realized in different degrees in the people themselves. The cultural narrative—the *dao*—unfolds in the ineluctable transmission of civilization in the broadest sense from one generation to the next.

Surveying and parsing the range of meaning invested in this polysemic term *dao*—“traveling through a shared physical, social, and cultural landscape”—we can identify at least three overlapping and mutually entailing semantic dimensions that have relevance to the image of traveling together with *gravitas*. First, there is the primary “momentum” sense of *dao* as an unfolding cultural disposition. There is a palpable glacial weight to *dao* as the continuing propensity of experience that provides us with identity and historical context as we inch ahead together. It is this sense of *dao* that justifies its familiar translation as “the Way.” If we look for approximations for *dao* in our own language, it can be understood as a generic idea such as “culture” or “civilization” or “life” that resists resolution into familiar, exclusive dualisms such as “subject/object,” “form/function,” “agency/action,” “fact/value,” and so on. *Dao* in this sense is the confluence of lived experience as our narratives converge into a shared cultural identity, with all of the cadence, continuities, transitions, and disjunctions that are characteristic of the stream of human experience.

Secondly, we must underscore the fact that *dao* is normative rather than simply descriptive because human beings have a proactive, creative role in making our way forward in the world. There is certainly an ineluctable force of circumstances at play in our lived experience that accounts for the persistence and regularity of our daily lives. But this unfolding process is underdetermined, allowing for our own unique and creative influence upon its course. Indeed, the indeterminate aspect that honeycombs what is determinate and intelligible in life provides a range of creative possibilities, and allows for the spontaneous emergence of novelty within each moment of experience. Making our way forward
Thinking through “Practice” in Classical Chinese Philosophy

is participatory, allowing for an educated responsiveness to the more fluid and indeterminate opportunities that this experience presents. And our capacity to respond to these novel opportunities in an optimal way is itself dependent upon the richness and depth of our own past experience. Indeed, it is the educated palate that can anticipate and most fully enjoy the new culinary experiences that become available to us.

Thirdly, the human being, far from being perceived as a minor player, has a major, even religious role as a cosmic collaborator. Personal cultivation is the ultimate source of meaning, and in this process, it is the achieved intensity and extensiveness of one’s roles and relations that determines the degree of one’s influence on the natural, social, and cultural world. The human being through a regimen of personal cultivation has both the opportunity and the responsibility to become co-creator with the heavens and the earth. It is in this sense that the sage (shengren 聖人) as the most accomplished among human beings is elevated to a truly cosmic plane that allows humanity to be properly described as “the bodyheartmind of the cosmos” (tiandi zhi xin 天地之心).

The most familiar yet derivative understanding of dao is a post hoc combination of these more primary meanings: the objectified use of dao that is expressed in the familiar demonstrative translation as “the Way.” To nominalize and thus overdetermine dao can betray its fluidity, reflexivity, and openness to the future, and when given priority, is often the first step to inadvertently overwriting a prospective, process sensibility with retrospective, substance assumptions. On the other hand, such a reading respects the aggregating weight of the tradition and the sacredness with which it becomes imbued. But even when we reflect on a temporally prior “way” that is invested with the weight and authority of the tradition—the way of Confucius, for example—we must allow that our own present vantage point involves us reflexively in our interpretation and reauthorization of it, making “Confucius” as a living tradition dynamic and corporate rather than simply referential and antiquarian.

We now turn from this perhaps overly abstract reflection on the more generic and cosmological sense of dao—“traveling through a shared
physical, social, and cultural landscape”—to a consideration of the more concrete xiaodao 孝道—that is, “the way of family reverence.” With xiaodao then, we encounter what is a literally a more familiar “way” of understanding this seminal idea, dao, in the sense that the words “familiar” and “family” share the same root.

The distinguished sociologist Fei Xiaotong draws a contrast between the nuclear “family” that for anthropologists takes its major significance from being the site of reproduction, and the dominant historical pattern of premodern Chinese families as lineages of persons with the same surname (shizu 氏族), and by extension, as clans (jiazu 家族) made up of several lineages who share the same surname. While these lineages certainly have the function of reproduction, Fei insists that within the Chinese experience they serve as a medium through which all activities are organized. That is, in addition to the perpetuation of the family, lineages have complex political, economic, and religious functions that are expressed along the vertical and hierarchical axes of the father-son and mother-daughter-in-law relationships. Lineage relations are again reinforced socially and religiously through the institutions of ancestor reverence, a continuing practice that archaeology tells us dates back at least to the Neolithic Age.

The contemporary anthropologist Yiqun Zhou marshals scholarly consensus behind her claim that premodern Chinese society was for several thousand years largely a polity organized by kinship principles. In weighing the extent to which social order was derived from and dependent upon family relations, Zhou cites the late Qing scholar Yan Fu who claims that imperial China from its beginnings was seventy percent a lineage organization and thirty percent an empire. It is this persistent family-based sociopolitical organization of Chinese society that has within this antique culture, late and soon, elevated the specific family values and obligations circumscribed by the term xiao to serve as the governing moral imperative.

Early in the tradition, the Analects is explicit in registering the foundational importance of family feeling as providing the entry point and the trajectory for the Confucian project of becoming consummate human beings through personal cultivation. Indeed, xiao is taken metaphorically as the ‘root’ from which dao as the vision of the moral life
draws its energy and takes its form:

Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having set, one’s vision of the moral life (dao 道) will emerge therefrom. As for family reverence (xiao 孝) and fraternal deference (ti 弟), these are, I suspect, the root of becoming consummate in one’s conduct (ren 仁). (Analects 1.2)

The profound influence of family on personal development begins from the utter dependency of the infant upon the family relations into which it is born. It is thus important to understand that an infant is not perceived as a discrete life form, but is rather inclusive of and constituted by these same family relations. And if infancy teaches us anything, and it teaches us much, its first lesson should be the inescapably interdependent nature of human beings for their very survival. The family is conceived as the center of all personal, social, political, and ultimately, cosmic order. All meaning ripples out in concentric circles that begin from a regimen of personal cultivation within the moral space of increasingly meaningful family roles and relations. These circles extend outward through community to the most distant ends of the cosmos, and then with value added return again to inform and nourish the family as its primary source.

In the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence, Confucius elevates this “way of family reverence” and declares it to be the very substance of morality and education: “It is family reverence (xiao) that is the root of moral virtuosity, and whence education (jiao) itself is born.” The opening chapter of the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence provides us with the familiar radial progression from a primary center that we saw above and find consistently in the Confucian literature, beginning from concern for one’s own physical person as what is closest at hand, extending to care for one’s family and kin, and then culminating in service to the ruler and to posterity. In this passage, King ‘Culture’ (wen) is once again singled out as the source from which the current generation draws its inspiration and to whom it makes return with the cultural dividends it has accrued.
Your physical person with its hair and skin are received from your parents. Vigilance in not allowing anything to do injury to your person is where family reverence begins; distinguishing yourself and walking the proper way (dao) in the world; raising your name high for posterity and thereby bringing esteem to your father and mother—it is in these things that family reverence finds its consummation. This family reverence then begins in service to your parents, continues in service to your lord, and culminates in distinguishing yourself in the world. In the “Greater Odes” section of the Book of Songs it says: “How can you not remember your ancestor, King Wen? You must cultivate yourself and extend his excellence.”

The charge in this passage to keep the body intact certainly refers to one’s own physicality, but it also lends itself to a broader reading: That is, each generation has the responsibility of keeping the corpus of culture that it comes to embody whole and alive. One way of understanding the dynamics of “family reverence” (xiao) as intergenerational transmission through this process of embodiment is to appeal to two cognate characters that are integral to the continuities of the family lineage: ti 體 (“body,” “embodying,” “forming and shaping”) and li 礼 (“achieving propriety in one’s roles and relations,” “ritual”). Without the formal dimension provided in human experience by embodied living and by the social grammar of meaningful roles and relations, there is a very real question as to whether the significant refinement achieved in and through our life forms would even be possible. As we have seen, “the lived body” through its “embodied living” is the site of growth in and a conveyance of the cultural corpus of knowledge—linguistic facility and proficiency, religious rituals and mythologies, the aesthetics of cooking, song, and dance, the modeling of mores and values, instruction and apprenticeship in cognitive technologies, and so on—as a continuing, intergenerational process through which a living civilization itself is perpetuated.

“Family reverence” (xiao) serves as the primary cultural imperative, and makes every life significant as a conduit of the living culture—the way of becoming human (rendao 人道). As we have
seen above, even “those of lesser quality realize some of it.” Still, the culmination of xiao lies with those who are able to raise their name high for posterity and in so doing bring esteem to their family lineage. It is these exemplars who in every age and who over the eons have enabled us to transcend our animality and intensify the human experience with the elegance and refinement of culture in its highest sense.

The 2012 UTUH Institute was an enormous success for everyone who participated. We are now looking forward to the summer of 2013 and the next step on this journey together. The third Institute is in the planning, and will be convened in August 2014 at the University of Hawai’i on the theme, “A Sense of Place.” In the shadow of Mauna Kea, we will explore issues in the areas of environmental philosophy, somaticity, and topos.
Nishida Kitarō’s ‘Temporal Plane’

Masato ISHIDA

1. Introduction

Theories of time vary on how it comes into being and how it flows. Like many other philosophers, Nishida Kitarō opines that the common image of time as linear succession of events is deceptively simple. Drawing on lectures from the summer institute, this paper offers a brief sketch of Nishida’s mature philosophy of time in which temporality is considered in multiple dimensions, a unique and intriguing view that Nishida developed over decades of intense reflection. Its intuition is that if time flows in a certain direction $t$, its cross-section—orthogonal to the flow—constitutes a temporal plane (jikanmen) that appears non-temporal from the perspective of $t$, though it may still be considered to affect events unfolding along $t$.

As a starting point, we may note that Nishida’s view of time heading in this direction was foreshadowed in his Inquiry into the Good (1911). In Part II, chapter 6 of this work, Nishida takes a broadly Kantian view of time by regarding it as form:

Because time is nothing more than a form that orders the content of our experience, the content of consciousness must first be able to be joined, be united, and become one in order for the idea of time to arise [to the experiencer]. Otherwise we would not be able to link things sequentially as before and after and thereby think in terms of time. The unifying activity of consciousness is not governed by time, but quite the contrary time establishes itself by this unifying activity.
In relation to his later work, what deserves notice is that the unifying activity does not occur in time. Nor is there any pre-established time frame for Nishida in which the unification takes place so as to order events in a sequence. Quite the contrary, the temporal frame itself depends on the unifying activity.

The position Nishida takes shows overlap with Bergson’s view: Time is established as indeterminacy is brought to determinacy in the field of experience, the direction of which serves as the basis for a temporal frame. This is why Nishida writes in From the Acting to the Seeing (1927): ‘We do not consider things to change in or in virtue of time, but we consider time in or in terms of that which changes.’ As one might anticipate, the field underlying change constitutes place (basho) when the latter is regarded as the locus of the temporalizing world from a logical point of view. In what follows, we shall familiarize ourselves with two diagrams Nishida used in his analysis of time. They appear in Collection of Philosophical Essays (Tetsugakuronbunshū) Series I and Series VII.


In Kyoto school philosophy, the relationship between time and eternity – i.e. as its cross-section – often receives articulation through the image of a circle without center (chūshin naki en). The concept is by no means straightforward, but it is central to Nishida’s thinking about time. In order to see what he understands by this concept, it is helpful to turn to a diagram Nishida drew in 1935. The figure below, found in the second essay of Collection of Philosophical Essays: Series I, introduces two temporal axes E and A, each expressing the orthogonal cross-section of the other temporal axis.
The vertical axis $E$ is intended as the primary temporal axis, $e_0$ marking the absolute present at the origin, and the negative sign ($-$) indicating the past. Along the $E$-axis, therefore, time flows from top toward the bottom. The sequence $-e_3, -e_2, -e_1$ belongs to the past, while the points $e_1, e_2, e_3$ belong to the future seen from $e_0$.

The next step of Nishida’s argument is that past and future must be linked together in a common structure. For if there were no structure that holds separate moments together, temporal points such as $-e_3, -e_2, -e_1$ would have to fall apart, since there would be no reason why they must be aligned on the same temporal axis $E$. At the same time, the past is gone, insofar as it is perceived as a temporal mode that is distinct from that of the present. Hence Nishida thinks that $-e_3, -e_2, -e_1$ must somehow be retained in the present at $e_0$. The same argument applies to the future. The moments $e_1, e_2, e_3$ must constitute a structured future along the $E$-axis rather than being random spatiotemporal points that belong to no system. The consideration leads to the view that both past and future must be mirrored into the present, such that $-e_3, -e_2, -e_1$ and $e_1, e_2, e_3$ along the $E$-axis are mapped onto the horizontal axis $A$, the mapping itself illustrated by the concentric circles in the diagram. For this reason, moments along the $E$-axis are rotated 90 degrees clockwise so that they are now contained in the cross-section $A$ at $e_0$. 
The mapping too, on the other hand, can be considered as part of the temporal structure. Hence a two dimensional temporal plane emerges in Nishida’s diagram above, although he does not make this point very explicit at this stage. There are of course numerous moments—or times—potentially connected to the present in Nishida’s view, which means that an indefinite number of temporal axes must eventually be taken into account. None of them would be privileged over another, nor would there be any particular center of the world around which a common temporal order is to be charted, which gives rise to the idea of a circle without center. Note that Nishida uses a dotted line when he draws the outermost circumference. It means that there is no definite edge or boundary to the temporalizing world.


The diagram above from 1935 also suggests that a change along the vertical axis E does not imply temporal change along the horizontal axis A, or vice versa. The idea can be generalized to more than two temporal dimensions that are mutually orthogonal. In an \( n \)-dimensional temporal space, time can be seen to flow with respect to one axis, while changes in directions that are orthogonal to this axis will appear ‘outside of time’ when seen from the perspective of the first axis— it is eternity revealed in the cross-section.

Bearing this in mind, we may observe another diagram that Nishida used in his 1943 essay ‘Life (Seimei),’ included in Collection of Philosophical Essays: Series VII, which was published posthumously in 1946. It is one of the most elaborate and interesting diagrams found in Nishida’s published works. In the figure below, the vertical axis \( t \) is the primary temporal axis again – time in the usual sense flows along \( t \) from top toward bottom.
But now the cross-section orthogonal to \( t \) is represented in two dimensions. It is as though our looking at the 1935 diagram from above in the previous section was part of a temporal flow that we were scarcely aware of. Hence the disk indicated by \( t' \) in this 1943 diagram is contained in an infinite two-dimensional temporal plane that is orthogonal to the primary temporal axis \( t \). This makes temporality active in three dimensions for Nishida with further generalizations to higher dimensions.

Nishida refers to the disk orthogonal to \( t \) above as the ‘temporal plane \( t' \) sustained by space (\( kukan-ni yotte urazukerareta jikanmen t' \)).’ It represents what he often discusses as circular time, a temporal space that lies orthogonal to the primary temporal axis \( t \) such that changes in \( t' \) does not imply change along \( t \). Vector \( F \), on the other hand, indicates a ‘life trajectory (\( seimeisen \))’, a particular course of life, which is regarded as a function not only of \( t \) but also of \( t' \). Nishida's view is that life cannot be adequately understood merely along \( t \), namely time in the ordinary linear sense, but requires determinations in circular time surrounding and sustaining \( t \) from the orthogonal directions. \( F \) itself runs in a slanting direction, not parallel to \( t \), because it is influenced by \( t' \). Life is thus an activity unfolding at the intersection of the lively felt temporal flow \( t \) and eternity of the cross-section \( t' \).

The structure of the present, therefore, contains much more than a thin point found on the abstract linear temporal axis \( t \). Every point of time is a moment enveloped within some higher-dimensional
temporal space $t'$ that lies orthogonal to the primary temporal axis $t$ in support of that point—it corresponds to place (basho) in Nishida's logic. When the present matures in this orthogonal space—which Nishida frequently refers to as 'eternity' or 'eternal now' since it appears non-temporal from the perspective of the primary axis—numerous moments burst forward as a creative diffusion of the present. It does not, however, change the fact that there is no privileged temporal axis for Nishida that can be taken as absolutely primary. Nor is time reversible when it is interpreted along a particular temporal axis, just as the life trajectory $F$ itself must be irreversible.

4. Closing Remarks

Nishida's theory of time may sound highly speculative, but some of his insights reflect developments in modern science. For example, Nishida was aware of the significance of the imaginary coefficient $i = \sqrt{-1}$ appearing in quantum mechanics, from which it is conceivable that Nishida had in mind the Gaussian plane when he considered time in two dimensions. It is indeed quite common in quantum mechanics to represent time using the two temporal axes, the real and imaginary. In this connection it was a stimulating experience for our summer institute group to have the opportunity to take a look at Nishida's copy of Paul Dirac's *Quantum Mechanics* at Nishida Kitarō Museum of Philosophy in Ishikawa prefecture. It confirmed Nishida's exposure to the subject.

Paul Dirac is known for his introduction of many-time theory into quantum electrodynamics, which assigns different time variables to all particles in a given system. On this model there are numerous time frames in the world. Tomonaga Shin’ichirō, Japanese physicist and also a Nobel Prize winner, developed Dirac's theory into super-many-time theory in 1943. Nishida refers to these physicists in his writings. He also wrote in *Collection of Philosophical Essays: Series II* (1937): 'The viewpoint of quantum mechanics must be applied to every historical reality.' We may recall further that Nishida, after attending Albert Einstein’s lecture on relativity theory at Kyoto University in 1922,
wrote to Tanabe Hajime: “From here I think there would be a quick connection to philosophy.” Nishida’s thinking was never dissociated from contemporary science, a point worth mentioning since it is often overlooked by commentators.
“Practicing Philosophy” After the Disaster on March 11, 2011

Takahiro NAKAJIMA

How can we consider “Practicing Philosophy” after the disaster on March 11, 2011? We are obliged to rethink the idea of modern science from a philosophical point of view, and to change our social imaginary that has been mainly constituted by modern science. Towards this end, I shall try to consider science and technology from the perspective of East Asian philosophy.

First Lecture: “The Interdependence of Science and Religion in China”

To Chinese philosophers, the disaster caused by the First World War brought about skepticism, and then disenchantment with science. From 1919 to 1920, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) travelled in Europe that was devastated by the First World War. Later, he wrote in The Records of Travels in Europe (1920):

Now the achievement of science has been completed. In the past one hundred years, there has been more material progress in science than during the past three thousand years. However, instead of receiving happiness, it turned out that we human beings actually received many disasters. This disappointment is akin to that of a traveler who has lost his camel in the desert, and runs to catch up with a huge black shadow far away. Yet, the more he continues to run, the less visible the shadow becomes. What this shadow represents is the “mastery of science.” Although Western people dreamt that science would be versatile, now it is said to have completely failed. (Liang 1999, 2974)
Thus, the science which had been perceived as versatile turned out to bring disaster instead of happiness. Liang also stated that “the World War is a means of retribution.” (2973) How, then, could the failure of science be ameliorated? Liang suggested harmonizing the mind and object by introducing the values of Eastern civilization, in order to counteract those of Western civilization which are based on science. The concrete content of Eastern civilization to which he referred was Buddhism. In this manner, he attempted to mitigate the excesses of science with religion.

In contrast to Liang Qichao, Hu Shi (1891-1962) emphasized the importance of science regardless of the disaster of the First World War, because he felt that China had not yet reached the stage from which it could judge that science had collapsed.

We could say that with no hesitation. Today’s China is still in a mythical world, and the knowledge of science has no influence over the view of life held by the general population. [...] Our urgent need is to advocate the common knowledge of science, in order to make it a part of their view of life. (“Scientific View of Life” (1923), Hu 2003, vol.7, 48)

However, Hu did not affirm science so simply. The difficult task that faced him was to figure out how science could be introduced to China even after it had seemingly collapsed, as China did not understand the nature of science. At this paradoxical stage, he introduced a “new religion” by excluding the irrational elements of religion and simultaneously making it more social and moral.

To sum up, our future plan of action is to advocate our new religion and our new view of life. [...] 10. Based upon the knowledge of biology and sociology, we could let people know that the human being — or the “Great I” — is perpetual and immortal while the individual or “small I” goes to ruin. Moreover, we will let them know that the religion which makes it possible “to live eternally for everything” is a supreme religion and, on the other hand, the religion that preaches
“heaven” or a “pure land” for the individual is just a religion for personal gain. (Hu 2003, vol. 2, 212-213)

When Hu said that the “new religion” would be a “great provision,” he already understood that science did not stand on stable ground. However, he had to construct this on the far more fragile ground of Chinese society. To do so, a provision such as a “new religion” or morality was an absolute necessity.

On this point, Hu’s position was no different that that of Liang and other members of the Xuanxue School. The Chinese xuanxue (metaphysics/religion) was nothing more than a provision. When religion or morality as a substitute for religion accepted science and its bankruptcy, its provisionality was completely disclosed. For Hu, there could be no other way than to affirm the provisionality of modern religion and morality.

Second Lecture: “The Interdependence of Science and Religion in Japan”

Here, we might ask: what was the situation in Japan during the same period? Let us examine the thought of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945). In his later life, Nishida wrote the following in a letter to Mutai Risaku (1890-1874):\(^1\)

Through the mediation of my logic of place, my ultimate wish and goal is to associate Buddhist thought with the modern scientific mentality. However, I do not have enough energy to share for that. (July 27th, 1943, Nishida 2002-2009, vol. 23, 123)

If we take Nishida’s long-cherished ambition as it is, he attempted to connect science and religion using the “logic of place,” but this was not easily put into practice.

In his first book, *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911), Nishida

\(^1\) Professor Masato Ishida, Hawaii University, tells me the existence of this letter.
admitted that science not merely analyzes objective nature but also explains the subject (subjectivity) and that science, being the extreme opposite of philosophy, can give meaning to human life in a different manner than philosophy.

The above perspective coincides with that of scientists who believe that the mechanical movement of material bodies and the purposefulness of organisms share the same base as the will and that the activities of material bodies, organisms, and the will are identical. But what scientists regard as constituting the base of these activities is diametrically opposed to what I see: they regard material force as the base, whereas I focus on the will. (Nishida 1990, 94)

In An Inquiry into the Good Nishida did not go any further. He left it to explain later the occurrence of meaning in science and philosophy. Rather, he thought that it could only be explained by introducing the idea of “place,” “action-intuition” and “poiēsis.”

**Third Lecture: “De Anima in East Asia”**

Before Nishida, when Japanese intellectuals introduced “philosophy” to Japan, there was an impressive debate concerning the existence and significance of the soul.² It was not a simple philosophical debate, but was tightly connected to the political imagination of the modern Japanese nation.

Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901), who was one of the leaders of The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement in the Meiji period, argued in his later days that “I decidedly assert a simple theory of materialism based upon no Buddha, no God, nor soul.” (Nakae 1995, 115) Behind the theory of the immortality of the soul, he felt some sort of arrogance of anthropocentrism. His materialism aimed a radical

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² There were debates concerning the existence and significance of the soul between Buddhists and Confucians in the fifth and sixth Century, and also between Christian missionaries and Buddhists in the seventeenth Century in China. See Nakajima 2007.
equality not only among human beings, but also between human beings and animals. It was closely related to the French republicanism of the era. He viewed modern Japan through republicanism. That is why he strongly criticized the status quo of modern Japan, by saying that “I am so very unsatisfied in Meiji society.” (76)

The adversary of Nakae was Inoue Enryō (1858-1919), a founder of the Philosophy School (the present-day Toyo University). He asserted the immortality of the soul. In his “Immortality of Soul” (1899), Inoue said that the immortality of the soul is “a decisively important thing to affect the independence and decline of the state.” (Inoue 1987-2004, 312) He continued his theory as follows:

The theory of the immortality of the soul is the most effective one to give a person the resolve to die. Therefore, in military education there is nothing better than this theory to make the spirit of soldiers firm. [...] By investigating the reasons for the immortality of the soul and transmitting them to the Japanese nation, I hope to construct a spiritual citadel. (367-368)

Like Nakae, for Inoue as well, De Anima in modern Japan was a highly political and social matter.

Minakata Kumagusu (1867-1941) took an alternative approach to the appeal for the immortality of the soul, which criticized modernity itself. He was a naturalist, anthropologist, and biologist educated in the United States and Great Britain. However, he did not simply follow Western science uncritically. On the contrary, he continually questioned and criticized its paradigm. After returning to Japan in 1900, he retreated from the academic world and confined himself to the Nachi Mountains. There, he reformulated his attitude towards the world.

The soul about which we speak already involves its immortality in the setting of the theme. If one asks whether the essence which makes human beings what they are is mortal or immortal, I can reply that in contrast to animals it is immortal. (Minakata 1971, 315-316)
However, he did not try to recover Japanese animism or Japanese Buddhism in a simple way, but rather to open up a new type of mystic dimension, by inheriting Japanese “religious” traditions in a different manner.

In 1906, the Japanese government issued the shrine consolidation decree. The aim was to merge small shrines in each community into a large one in a village or town. Kumagusu declared himself against it as follows:

As is the case with the secret Shingon ritual, the mere existence of a shrine and a sacred forest, without any sermon or any lecture, without any theory or any experiment, gives a great deal of profit by illuminating the way in the world and the human mind. (Minakata 1971, 551)

Kumagusu did not regard the sermons and theories of Shintō as important, but he highly appreciated the “existence of a shrine and a sacred forest.” The former is easily absorbed into the nation state, especially when the shrine consolidation decree was imposed. However, the latter is prior to the modern religious setting of Shintō. It is a kind of social *topos* where people gathered, constructed a shrine, and maintained a forest, having common feelings toward the sacred. It is “religio” before religion.

**Fourth Lecture: “Buddhism and Technology: Reading of Dōgen”**

Let us return to pre-modern Japanese “religious” thinking. Dōgen took the strong position that meditation in Zazen is not a *means* to gain enlightenment but an actual *practice* of enlightenment. To consider this in a contemporary context, how might we consider radioactive contamination through his perspective? Dōgen said:

Since time immemorial foolish people have seen the consciousness of the divine as Buddha-nature, and as the original human state.
One could die laughing! To express Buddha-nature further... it is fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles. (*Busshō*, Dōgen 1996, 32)

According to him, we can find Buddha-nature even in “fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles.” If so, should we receive radioactive tiles and pebbles as Buddha-nature too? Referring to this citation, Graham Parkes has answered “no” to this question. He argued as follows:

He [Dōgen] would thus not be committed to celebrating the chemicals polluting a river (which render the resident fish more impermanent than they would otherwise be), or revering the radioactive waste stored all over the planet (which is capable of radicalizing the impermanence of all life to the point of total extinction), as venerable manifestations of Buddha-nature. (Parkes 2010, 144-145)

The “radioactive waste,” which severely damages the natural environment, does not belong to the “impermanence” of things. We don’t have to celebrate it as Buddha-nature. The Buddha-nature Dōgen supposes should be grasped in the co-existential relationship between human beings, but human beings hardly have a co-existential relationship with radioactive tiles and pebbles.

Miyagawa Keishi, Master of Sōtōshū, expressed a different interpretation of radioactive tiles and pebbles. He interpreted the passage mentioned above from *Shōbōgenzō* as follows:

We would say that fences and walls are the traces of a temple, so the practice starts from here. (Miyagawa 2012)

Miyagawa argued that the ruin of “fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles” as Buddha-nature or ancient Buddha mind is the moment for us to let Buddhist practice start. Therefore, even when we are confronted with radioactive tiles and pebbles, we should start practice immediately. The current possibility of Buddhism is to construct a temple using contaminated tiles and pebbles, and to then sit in this temple.

Parkes refuted the simple application of Buddha-nature to
radioactive tiles and pebbles, and he figures out the importance of a natural eco-system represented in impermanence, while Miyagawa, redefining the meaning of Buddha-nature as the moment to start practice, positively engaged with radioactive tiles and pebbles. From Parkes’ interpretation, we can find the starting point to criticize technology that causes severe damage to the condition of possibility of co-existence. From Miyagawa’s, we can find the starting point to radicalize Buddhism in practice.

Through these activities of “Practicing Philosophy” as described above, we are expected to change our perspective on the scientific world. There are many rooms for human “becomings” to contribute to the world differently.

References:


Naturalness and Normativity
Shinji KAJITANI

Introduction

What does it mean to be “natural”? – On one hand, this refers to “nature” as a realm of entities, especially the material world in contrast with the human domain. Expressions such as “the natural environment” and “natural science” are based on this meaning. But, on the other hand, the concept of “natural” indicates a certain mode of existence or appearance. It is mostly not nominalized as “nature”, but rather used in the form of an adjective like “a natural smile” or “the natural order of things”. These two aspects of “naturalness” partially overlap with each other, but belong to different dimensions.

Such an ambiguity can also be found in the Japanese (or Chinese) word 自然 (shizen / ziran). Originally, in the pre-modern age, 自然 was only used as an adjective or adverb which meant approximately “natural” or “naturally”. At the beginning of the Meiji period, the noun “nature” was translated into words like 天地 (tenchi: heaven and earth), 万物 (bambutsu: all things), etc. But these words gradually coalesced into a new noun: 自然.

It is remarkable that “natural” as a modal concept has a normative connotation: something natural is good or right. It suggests a positive value such as the good, right, beautiful, healthy, valid or fair. Therefore, “naturalness” sometimes works as an ethical principle. In this sense, naturalness has the double meaning of realm and mode, so what belongs to the natural world can also have a normative function. For example, natural death, birth, healing, etc. are thought to be good. In environmental ethics and bioethics, naturalness mostly suggests such a normative value. This seminar addressed the multiple meanings
of naturalness or nature in light of three topics: mother’s milk, death, and our attitudes toward nature.

*Is Mother’s Milk ‘Natural’?*

In bearing and rearing children, people often place great value on naturalness as opposed to artificial techniques such as C-section or the induction of labor. When they talk about mother’s milk (or breastfeeding), cloth diapers, and so on, they find these somehow “natural” in contrast with powdered milk and disposable diapers. What does “natural” mean here? What are its historical social conditions?

In order to clarify what it means to be “natural” in childbirth or rearing, we might first consider what “unnatural” means: intervention by modern European medicine (science, technology), the use of industrial products, something modern, and so on. So naturalness is associated with a less medical or technological intervention, the use of fewer artificial materials, something traditional, etc. So it can be asked whether traditional childrearing is more natural. In the first seminar, we dealt with this issue by reference to a book on childrearing in premodern Japan.

For example, the book of Katsuki Gyuzan (香月牛山) *Handbook on Necessary Advices for Child Rearing* (1703: 『小児必用養育草』) says: ‘Even in a noble and rich family, if the mother is not ill and has an adequate supply of milk, feeding with mother’s milk is the way to keep the natural order of heaven.’ – For understanding this text, we need to understand the social conditions during the Edo period. As it was a class society, childcare — including lactation — was regarded as physical labor. It was quite usual that mothers in wealthy families did not nurse by themselves. When a book on childrearing says that mothers should give their own milk, it does not criticize powdered milk as one might today, but rather the employ of a wet nurse. This advice does not aim at the loving maternal care for children. At that time, the distinction of social class was so fundamental that the two kinds of ‘blood’ of different classes must not be mixed. Moreover, because of the Asian idea of a continuity between body and mind, or
self and other, the mental and physical condition of the woman (either mother or wet nurse) were believed to affect the child directly though breastfeeding, and thus her character and temperament were thought to be transmitted to the child through her milk. Thus, in order to prevent such a harmful influence, the mother must breastfeed herself. In this context, “naturalness” means “not crossing the boundary between classes”. In the Edo period, class distinctions were seen as a part of the natural order which served as the basis for conveying a moral order in the world.

However, during the Meiji era, under the influence of European science and culture, the meaning of the naturalness of mother’s milk was radically changed. With the introduction of various kinds of substitute milk such as cow’s milk, condensed milk, and powdered milk, it was no longer the class distinction between mothers and wet nurses, but rather the distinction between human and animal that came to the fore. Here, naturalness means “preserving the difference between animal species”.

After World War II, in democratic society, books on childrearing have been published for mothers in all segments of society, and they no longer contain indications about wet nurses. In addition, as a result of the development of powdered milk, cow’s milk was no longer used as a substitute, such that we have the dichotomy of “natural” mother’s milk and “artificial” powdered milk, which concerns the opposition of the “human” versus the whole complex of science, technology, capitalism and so on. But today, it is quite contradictory and ironical that these values as well as “naturalness” of mother’s milk can be only proven using technology, which also improves the quality of artificial milk.

What is ‘Natural’ Death?

According to the OED, “natural” death is a “happening in the course of nature, as the result of age or disease, as opposed to one brought about by accident, violence, poison, etc.” Although disease is a natural phenomenon, it is often caused by human factors such as lifestyle, diet, social environment, population density, etc. Moreover, when
somebody dies young (it could happen at birth), even if it occurs by a natural process, we mostly feel it is unnatural. So there seems to be an assumption that following the natural course of things should result in a long healthy life, and death from old age. But this is a rather happy and rare case. In that sense, “natural death” is in itself a normative concept.

However long we may live, we mostly die from a specific disease. While any disease is a kind of natural process — be it infection by a virus or a malfunction of internal organs — it has historical and social dimensions related to lifestyle, diet, and social environment. The appearance of a contagious disease is based on the collective life of human beings, and the type of germ or virus that we find there depends on the social as well as the natural environment. But nowadays, after having overcome infectious diseases, we suffer more from chronic diseases or cancer which are rather individual. How long we can live depends on medical support, health insurance, a hygienic environment, the social order, a secure society, and also good luck. Thus, we cannot help asking: is the death after a long healthy life really “natural”, even if it requires so much artificial support and such a death is a rare case?

Behind this idea of the naturalness of death, there is a normative aspect: if a man were right and good, he could remain healthy and live a long life. Or, in the ideal case, would he never die? In fact, in European as well as in Asian culture, death is thought to be the result of human failure or punishment for human deed, as we find in the Book of Genesis and in the Japanese myth of Izanagi and Izanami. If humans had just obeyed God or followed natural providence, had committed no sins, would they not die and live forever?

Generally, people are not so religious, but they seem to believe in the natural order of things, and think that if we only do right or good things, our body will always function in the appropriate way and, even if death were a necessity for our lives which is programmed into our genes, our bodies should last without any disorder until the end. Yet, regardless of whether this assumption is valid or not, a long healthy life is only possible with many artificial factors such as medicine, social welfare, public hygiene, peace and so on, as we have already seen in the case of the naturalness of mother’s milk.

Besides, in this seminar we also discussed the natural feeling
Naturalness and Normativity

for the death of others, which we tend to think is sadness, but in fact, fear was a more natural response in pre-modern Japan, because of the notion of death as pollution. Sadness in mourning is rather an obligation for the living to console the dead and to protect the community against the grudge of the dead. In order to be sad for the dead in modern industrialized society, both the dead body and death itself had to be purified and neutralized.

Is a “Natural” Relationship with Nature Possible?

When we discuss the destruction or protection of the environment, it means the “natural” environment, and environmental ethics concerns the human attitude toward “nature”. This “nature” or “naturalness” is firstly a realm concept, but has a strong normativity as well: what belongs to the realm of nature is good and right, while any kind of human activity such as industry, capitalism, politics, customs, etc. is problematic and might be bad or wrong vis-à-vis nature. Here, the co-existence of humans and nature seems to be a contradiction.

But a closer consideration will clarify that this notion of nature as a realm is not self-evident at all. “Nature” in itself, supposedly independent of any human intervention, must be free from specific interests, meanings or values. It is an idea only established by the natural sciences as a quite specific and artificial attitude: quantification, mathematization and objectification. Based upon this science, technology treats nature as raw material or a tool for practical activities. So both kinds of nature are indeed human products, and it is difficult to distinguish something natural from something human.

Nevertheless in Europe, in order to protect this “purified” nature from human intervention, the attitude toward nature was criticized for its anthropocentrism, whose origin is ultimately ascribed to Christianity. For this reason, the non-European, especially Asian traditional cultures were seen as an alternative perspective, because they are thought to have a respectful, harmonious connection to nature. Such a relationship could be called more “natural”, though outside of Europe and in the pre-modern period, there are many examples of
severe environmental destruction which led society to total collapse, while European societies have repeatedly overcome such crises and catastrophes in their history.

In this way, anthropocentrism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for environmental destruction. So too animism — by which human beings do not believe themselves superior to nature, because they are only a part of the world full of spirit — cannot necessarily protect the environment. Whichever attitude we may have toward nature, it does not seem to be directly connected with the protection or with the destruction of nature. Even if nature is not merely material, but also spiritual and not essentially different from human beings, this doesn’t lead us to respect all of nature. For this purpose, the idea of equality among all lives is needed. But before that, all humans must be equally respected.

It might appear strange to discuss the relationship among humans for the protection of nature, but we know that most areas where the natural environment has been destroyed are those economically and politically vulnerable regions, such as in developing countries. This means, the human rights of the people who are living in such areas are not adequately preserved. In fact, we could say that environmental problems are problems of human rights, and in order to solve them, we must try to maintain a more “humane” attitude toward humans.
Ⅱ. Papers by Participants
Parallels between Zen Meditation and Psychology: The Positive Influence of Flow on Well-Being

Tomomi AMAKAWA

Meditation has widely received attention in the media due to its ability to provide physical and mental benefits to the human body. However, the seemingly ideal lives of Buddhist meditators seem to be out of reach from the common people. This paper discusses the intersection of the psychological phenomenon of flow contrasted with Dōgen’s practice of Zen meditation in order to extract the aspects of meditation that may be extended for use in a wider range of activities. Flow is contained in the subject area of positive psychology, which strives to increase the health of human beings by encouraging strengths, rather than healing illness. The aim is to illuminate specific aspects of this practice to contribute to the understanding of what constitutes a fulfilling life.

Positive psychology is a branch of psychology that focuses on building positive qualities of human beings, as opposed to the more widely recognized and popularized notion of ‘pathology, weakness, and damage’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000). As explained by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 5):

The field of positive psychology at the subject level is about valued subjective experiences: well-being, contentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and optimism (for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present). At the individual level, it is about positive individual traits: the capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal skill, aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, originality, future mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wisdom. At the group level, it is about the civic virtues and the institutions that move individuals toward
better citizenship: responsibility, nurturance, altruism, civility, moderation, tolerance, and work ethic.

A specific area of study in positive psychology concerns flow, briefly introduced above. Flow is a subjective experience, in which an individual is completely involved in the present. In Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002), the state of flow is ‘the subjective experience of engaging just-manageable challenges by tackling a series of goals, continuously processing feedback about progress, and adjusting action based on this feedback’ (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002, p. 90). Csikszentmihalyi has found that flow is a positive indicator of an individual’s level of happiness and life satisfaction. Goals of therapeutic applications of flow principles are ‘not to foster the state of flow directly but rather help individuals identify activities that they enjoy and learn how to invest their attention in these activities’ (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002, p. 100).

The benefits of flow have been tested through a tool, which Csikszentmihalyi and Larson describe, called the Experience Sample Method (ESM) (as cited in Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2002). The ESM was used to randomly sample the activities of participants during any time of day by signaling them with a beeper. When prompted, participants were required to record what they were doing, and what level of flow they were experiencing. These data were used to see how often and for what duration an individual was experiencing flow, and results showed that it ‘is expected to occur when individuals perceive greater opportunities for action than they encounter on average in their daily lives, and have skills adequate to engage them’ (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2002, p. 95).

One issue that must be noted is whether these benefits can be attained by anyone. In other words, are naturally motivated individuals naturally inclined to seek the state of flow, while other individuals are not? Previous studies found that persons with autotelic personalities are most prone to consciously seeking this state of flow. An autotelic personality is that of a ‘person who tends to enjoy life or “generally does things for their own sake, rather than in order to achieve some later external goal”’ (as cited in Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002, p.
93). Furthermore, research studies by Rathunde have shown that the ‘autotelic personality is most strongly fostered in a family environment referred to as “complex family,” where support and challenge are simultaneously provided’ (as cited in Asakawa 2001).

The autotelic personality is mostly studied as one that is already established, leaving out the possibility that it could be one that can be adopted later in life. As Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) indicate, ‘[the] flow state is intrinsically rewarding and leads the individual to seek to replicate flow experiences; this introduces a selective mechanism into psychological functioning that fosters growth’ (p. 92). As such, it is possible that if an individual engages in flow frequently enough, they can foster an autotelic personality in themselves. Future studies must incorporate this aspect to consider multiple factors of influence on a personality.

Researchers have studied flow occurring in a diverse range of activities. As cited in Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002):

> [Q]ualitative interviews have yielded domain specific descriptions of deep flow in diverse activities: elite and nonelite sport (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Kimiecik & Harris, 1996); literary writing (Perry, 1999) and artistic and scientific creativity more generally (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996); social activism (Colby & Damon, 1992); and aesthetic experience (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990).

One activity not listed above is that of Zen meditation, which ‘is performed by sitting cross-legged (in the ‘lotus’ or ‘half-lotus’ position) and trying to maintain throughout the session a straight posture, a normal breathing pattern, and a mental attitude of openness to one’s own mental processes while recognizing the occurrences of episodes of mind-wandering and distraction’ (Pagnoni & Cekic 2007). Practicing Zen meditation, as well as other types meditation, has been widely researched to bring about health benefits. However, requirements for meditation have been widely limited to the physical aspects and benefits, and have not discussed in detail the actual practice that is involved.
The writings of Zen master Dōgen are said to be among the highest literary achievements in history. Emphasized time and again in Dōgen’s writings is the importance of practice, not as a mean to an end, but as an end in itself. To Dōgen, there is no amount of effort that an individual can put into his work to become something that he is not. In a translation by Cook (1978), the essence of the practice of Zen is included in a short passage, telling the story about a dialogue between master Huai-jang and Ma-tsu:

Huai-jang found Ma-tsu doing zazen, and when asked why he was doing it, Ma-tsu replied, “To become a Buddha.” Thereupon, Huai-jang sat down and began to polish a piece of brick. “Why are you polishing that brick?” asked Ma-tsu. “I’m going to turn it into a mirror,” was the master’s answer. “But,” said Ma-tsu, “no amount of polishing will turn that brick into a mirror.” “That is true,” replied Huai-jang, “and no amount of zazen will turn you into a Buddha.”

From this excerpt, one can deduce an uncanny resemblance between Dōgen’s Zen meditation, and the psychological concept of flow, since individuals who are experiencing flow in an activity are also doing it for the experience itself, not as a means to an end. In fact, there are specific, prescriptive factors that one must fulfill in order to experience flow as described by Massimini and Carli, and Massimini et al.: ‘(1) perceived challenges posed by an activity must be in balance with perceived abilities or skills to tackle the challenges and (2) such perceived challenges and perceived abilities or skills must be relatively high’ (as cited in Asakawa 2001). For Zen meditation, understanding that the process is not a means to an end, but is an end in itself is a necessary component for successful practice. Furthermore, as Chiesa (2009) explains, ‘Zen meditation comprehends various types of practices whose difficulty levels usually grow with the meditator’s experience’ (Chiesa 2009, p. 585). Although it cannot be certain that Zen meditators experience flow while meditating, the rules that govern these concepts are very similar in nature, and indicate that Zen meditation is also a process that requires conquering challenges based
on the skill level of the individual who is practicing.

As discussed earlier, one type of personality that is most prone to seeking the state of flow is the autotelic personality. Dōgen does not discuss personality discrepancies for achieving potential, and instead believes that everyone is a Buddha in nature, but cannot realize it until he or she practices the talent. This undermines the concept of an autotelic personality, since if circumstances reveal the challenges that individuals must conquer according to appropriate skill level of the individual, e.g. a teacher gives prescribed steps for how to practice, the individual would have a greater possibility of pursuing and continuing her endeavors without needing to identify these aspects on her own. This could start a cycle in which the individual begins to seek flow, and thus can foster what is known as the autotelic personality. Dōgen’s writings speak with the attitude of a teacher, in that he is indirectly motivating the student to progress with the tasks at hand. In a sense, Dōgen is playing the role of teacher to help an individual to pursue his or her potential. From these perspectives, the practice of Zen meditation from Dōgen’s perspective is very social in nature, and indicates that the achievement of this practice can be not done alone. The presence and encouragement of a positive figure may be the first step required for anyone attempting to engage in this cycle. In an excerpt also taken from Cook’s translation (Cook 1978, p. 6):

It is somewhat like having talent for music. We may be told we have this talent, and the knowledge may be gratifying, but we are still unable, for instance, to play the piano. The potential is real, but remains unactivated and unrealized. If the individual begins to practice, the talent itself will become evident in the practice. The ability to play the piano is a latent talent now realized. But if a talented person does not begin to practice, he might as well not have the ability. Our Buddha nature is like this. Dōgen tells us, ‘To disport oneself freely in this [jijuyū] samādhi, the right entrance is proper sitting in zazen. This Dharma is amply present in every person, but unless one practices, it is not manifested, unless there is realization, it is not attained.’
The stance of positive psychology is understood as one researching and promoting positive aspects of life to encourage individuals to strengthen talents, rather than focusing on fixing shortcomings. Nevertheless, in the experience of flow that claims to be positively correlated with overall well-being, there is still an issue with that of possibility, deeming a person with a specific personality as having a higher chance of attaining this happiness. However, as was seen in Dōgen’s writings, a teacher was a crucial factor in leading someone to realize their potential, which insinuates that successful practice is not something that can be achieved alone. Perhaps a positive social presence may be all one needs in order to begin the positive cycle of flow, thereby providing a way for any individual to increase their fulfillment with life.

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Subjectivity in Zen Practice: Comparing Spinoza, Benjamin, and Dōgen

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0. Introduction: The reduction of the subject

The reduction of the self is one of the main ideas in Zen Buddhism. According to Miyagawa’s interpretation, for example, Dōgen thinks that when the self is diminished, the Buddha Law will flow into the space thus created between the self and the world. However, the reduction of the self does not only happen through Buddhist praxis. Drugs, alcohol, and dancing all night in a club can also reduce it. So the question arises, what is the difference?

In order to answer this question properly, we must analyze the concept of the self, and, as the meaning of a concept is determined by its relations to others, we should situate it in relation to a constellation of related concepts. In this paper, this will be done by comparing the relevant views of three thinkers, Spinoza, Benjamin, and Dōgen, and this will lead us toward a new model of subjectivity.

1. Spinoza: The necessity of the world

First, let us consider Spinoza’s view of the self. In his magnum opus ‘The Ethics,’ he writes as follows:

The mind has greater power over the emotions, and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary. (Spinoza, 1677. Prop. VI in Part V)
He held that emotion can be reduced by the mind inasmuch as it comes to understand that all actual things are necessary. In order to grasp this notion properly, we must consider his distinctive worldview. In the first part of ‘The Ethics,’ he defines a number of words such as ‘substance,’ ‘Nature,’ and ‘God’ which he then uses to build his metaphysical system. He argues that there is only one substance in the world, God, and that all of reality consists of this. From this monistic viewpoint, he argues that it logically follows that whatever happens, necessarily happens. (Spinoza, 1677. the Proof of Prop. XXXIII in Part I)

In thinking about the emotions in relation to the mind, Spinoza divided the mind’s workings into two types, active and passive. This distinction, however, does not depend on the will of the subject, but on whether or not the mind understands necessity. He replaced subjectivity with the following of necessity. The passive emotions arise from our sense of contingency. For example, what makes us feel sad when we lose a close friend is the notion that they could still be alive; the painful emotion that we feel when we are faced with a tragic event arises from the belief that it is possible that it might never have occurred. Spinoza holds that an understanding of the necessity of all things eliminates this feeling of contingency, and thus reduces the emotion. This leads him to the following strong claim:

It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain; therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure. (Spinoza, 1677. the Note of Prop. XVIII in Part V)

All things are necessarily connected to the first cause, God, and by tracing the chain of causes that connect us to God, he insisted, we can change pain to pleasure.

But how can we discern what is a necessary connection between cause and effect? Out of all the multiplicity of events that we experience, which are causally and necessarily connected to which? In
primitive times, for example, a sacrifice and rain were often thought to be causally linked. Also, in our modern daily life we often mistakenly induce causal connections that are not there. For Spinoza, however, there is no need for a criterion of necessary connection: because there is ultimately only one substance, it follows that necessity rules all things.

Spinoza’s firm insistence that there is only one substance means that the problem of differentiating between necessary and contingent connections does not arise for him. However, it has been a key concern for many other modern philosophers. Whereas, for Hume, there is no necessary connection between cause and effect, Kant searched for a criterion of necessity in the mechanism of the self’s knowledge. Since knowledge is a relation between the self and the world, Kant’s worldview is dualistic.

2. Benjamin: The blindness of the subject

In his younger days, Walter Benjamin engaged in the study of Kant. In his fragment ‘On Perception,’ he pointed out that there is a sharp divide between Kant and all pre-Kantian philosophers. As Benjamin saw it, the fundamental concern of the latter—he cites Spinoza as the very epitome of them—is ‘the deductibility of this world.’ By contrast, Kant is concerned with the justification of knowledge and therefore cannot rely on such metaphysical ground. (Benjamin, 1996a, p.95)

After abandoning his study of Kant, Benjamin established his own distinctive style, mixing concepts and ideas from different sources, philosophical, literary, political, and religious, and so developing an approach different from both the pre-Kantian philosophers and Kant. In focusing on the transcendent, he replaced the necessity and the deductibility of the world with ‘fate’ and emphasized the blindness of the individual to this fate. This contrasts starkly with the Enlightenment view, as represented by Kant.

In ‘Critique of Violence,’ for example, Benjamin criticizes the connection between the law and violence in the light of his concept of fate. As he explains it, the basic relationship within any legal system is
that of ends to means, and in order to fulfill its ends, a legal system uses violence as means. How it exercises violence is rooted in the order of fate.

... the law, of course, takes under the protection of its power, which resides in the fact that there is only one fate and that what exists, and in particular what threatens, belongs inviolably to its order. For law-preserving violence is a threatening violence. (Benjamin, 1996b. p.242)

A point to bear in mind is that the concept of fate is closely bound up with that of the blindness of the individual. As ungraspable and ambiguous causality, fate threatens the subject who is blind to it, and brings them to guilt and retribution. It is within this order that a legal system has its power and works for its own self-preservation. Benjamin describes the system of violence inherent in the law and fate as ‘mythic violence,’ and describes human existence as being trapped within it. The individual is subject to a connection between ends and means that exists out of its purview and beyond its interests. For a possibility of release from this situation, Benjamin looked toward the transcendent, to God.

Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying. (Benjamin, 1996b. p.249)

It is transcendent violence that overcomes mythic violence. But divine violence is characterized in a purely negative way, merely as opposed to the mythic, and, in fact, it is almost impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. In his argument, there is a general problem about the transcendent. It cannot be perceived by the subject and this very ineffability comprises its essence.

In ‘Fate and Character,’ Benjamin defines happiness in a way that starkly contrasts with Spinoza’s view that it comes from following the causality given by God:
Happiness is, rather, what releases the fortunate man from the embroilment of the Fates and from the net of his own fate. (Benjamin, 1996c. p.203)

This definition of happiness parallels the way in which he characterizes divine violence. For Benjamin, philosophy is an incessant and almost hopeless effort of training people to open up their blind eyes.

3. Dōgen: Practice and believing

We have surveyed the concept of the self in its relations to other concepts such as the world, necessity, fate, violence and the transcendent, and have roughly described a map that has two poles, represented by Spinoza and Benjamin. Now we shall discuss Dōgen. How can we place him within this framework and how does his thought transform it?

Behind Zen practice, there is a view about the self and the world, which is deeply at odds with the sort of reduction of the self that can be brought about by drugs or alcohol. Dōgen thinks about the self in its relation to the Buddha Law. If the self is reduced, then the Buddha Law flows into the space made by this. A question naturally arises, however: what is the Buddha Law? It cannot be anything like Spinoza’s conception of necessity, because that follows, in his view, from the fact that everything is composed of a single substance. In Dōgen’s thought, there is no substance and there is nothing in the world that determines the Buddha Law. As he explains it, the Buddha Law is omnipresent and imperceptible, that is, it is transcendent. Furthermore, between Dōgen and Benjamin there is an acute difference, since it is practice which Benjamin’s thought about violence lacks and Dōgen possesses.

According to Benjamin’s theory about mythic and divine violence, a person cannot distinguish one from the other, and therefore there is a danger that, by hoping and waiting for divine violence, he can open himself to the worst effects of mythic violence. Much the same applies to Dōgen, also, because there is no guarantee that what flows into the space made by reducing the self will be the Buddha Law
rather than the worst sort of violence.

In Zen practice, people are trained to not think about anything, and this provides a powerful way of dealing with past violence. Normally, the self is compelled to remember the violence that it has suffered, and thus to suffer again, but through Zen practice this memory can be shut out. However, this can make the self blind to, and thus at the mercy of, present or future violence that may be imposed on it from outside. Thus, in Zen practice we need to find a way to resist this danger. It should be sought, I think, in the realm of believing.

What status does believing have in Dōgen’s theory about修証一如 (shushō-ichinyo), the theory that ends (i.e. Enlightenment) and means (i.e. practice) are one and the same in Zen practice, and denies thoughts toward ends? Generally speaking, believing is concerned with ends, because it is an attitude toward something which has not yet come and a belief that it is coming. Therefore, I think, the belief that the Buddha Law is coming, and will flow into the space opened up by Zen practice, resides in outside of his theory about修証一如. I shall call this ambiguous form of believing, which is concerned with the unperceivable and undetermined and cut off from the theory of practice, ‘ambiguous believing.’ I do not intend this expression to have any negative connotations, however. Rather, I think that this ‘ambiguous believing’ should be valued positively, as a rest of subjectivity in Zen practice.

4. Conclusion: Subjectivity in Zen practice

On the one hand in Zen practice, the self can be reduced by the attempt to clear all thoughts out of the head. On the other hand, perception toward the unperceivable law is keenly sharpened and subjectivity rests as ‘ambiguous believing.’ From this minimal form of subjectivity, where relations and connections around the self are shut out, things start to be reconnected differently from now in every moment, without regard to distinctions of active or passive, and regardless of what the Buddha Law may be. In this, we may find the possibility of resisting violence.
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In his lecture on metaphilosophy, Kobayashi (2010, p. 144) argues that Buddhism can elucidate that teleology is a hidden assumption within Western philosophy. In this essay, I will draw out the significance of this claim by extending the discussion to the notion of future, for teleology assigns a telos (end/goal/purpose) to the future, creating a temporal gap between actuality and potentiality. Insofar as teleology is established upon a linear conception of time, I argue that the deconstruction of philosophy is possible if this conception is disputed. The philosophy of here and now discussed extensively in the summer institute challenges such conception of time, emphasizing instead the inseparability of being and time. Understood thusly, the future is not ahead of the present, but it is incorporated in the present as the depth of being from which creativity emerges. I will attempt to show this point through Dōgen’s notion of time-being (uji) and extend it to Ames and Hall’s discussion of the Zhongyong to illustrate that these distinct theories are event ontology without a linear conception of time.

According to Kobayashi (2010, p. 144), teleology still provides the conceptual framework for Western philosophy. This teleological structure is most evident in the philosophy of history, many discourses of which are dialectical in nature—a comprehensive teleological worldview that considers history as a progress toward an ultimate end. Focusing on the extent to which teleology demarcates Western philosophy, Kobayashi (2010, p.145) asserts that existentialism also assumes the structure of teleology despite the loss of an ultimate end that religion used to provide.

Buddhism is effective in drawing out the limitation of teleology, for it demonstrates that teleology is built upon a linear
conception of time. When Kobayashi (2010, p.144) mentions the importance of ‘a vertical escape from eschatology (終末論からの垂直的な脱出),’ he envisions history as a horizontal line that supports such conception of time. Although Kobayashi does not focus on the notion of time in his discussion, I argue that Dōgen’s ontology of time-being (うじ) is effective in challenging this hidden framework within Western philosophy.

Teleology is evident even within non-Western culture, for it is a useful conceptual device that can label and organize being according to a specific purpose, allowing us to comprehend its development in an orderly way. Even within Buddhism, teleology is pervasive when it comes to the notion of Buddha-nature, inasmuch as many Buddhist texts refer to it as the seed for Buddhahood. Although many construe that Buddha-nature is a potentiality for enlightenment, Dōgen (2002, p.64) vehemently criticizes such teleological conception:

There is a certain group that thinks the Buddha-nature is like a seed from a grass or a plant. When this seed receives the nourishment of Dharma rain, it begins to sprout; branches and leaves, flowers and fruit, appear, and the fruit contain seeds within them. This supposition is bred from illusion in the unenlightened mind.

In order to eliminate this problem, Dōgen attempts to establish a proper view of time that exposes the mistake of a teleological conception of the Buddha-nature with the notion of time-being (うじ) in the Shōbōgenzō.

Through the notion of time-being, Dōgen aims to show that being is not separate from time. A horizontal view of time assumes that we are placed in a temporal passage, and time flows independently of our existence, rendering it impossible for us to go against the direction of the temporal passage. Thus, at the onset of our lives, death is an inevitable consequence, as we are equally headed toward this end. Dōgen wants to show that such view is mistaken by arguing that being and time are one. In ‘The Time-Being,’ Dōgen (1985, p.76) writes:

“For the time being” here means time itself is being, and all being is time. A golden sixteen-foot body is time; because it is time, there
is the radiant illumination of time. Study it as the twelve hours of the present. “Three heads and eight arms” is time; because it is time, it is not separate from the twelve hours of the present.

In teleology, a temporal gap is supposed between actuality and potentiality. On the other hand, when time is not separate from being, it is impossible for being to move anywhere on a temporal axis, eliminating the gap between time and being as well as the gap between being and its telos. In short, teleology simply dissolves in Dōgen’s ontology.

According to Ishida (2013, p.1), Dōgen’s view of being and time can be characterized as event ontology, for ‘everything that exists is an event.’ Insofar as the notion of event emphasizes a temporal dimension of being, the unity of being and time characterizes event ontology. Hence, time is incorporated therein as the depth of being that encompasses all within what is here and now. This depth enables the dynamic working of the world, as all beings bounce up and down, uniquely transforming themselves with their flexibility.

The philosophy of here and now advocates this inseparability of being and time entailed in event ontology. Qualitatively speaking, the philosophy of here and now differs from the philosophy of the present: the former suggests the unity of being and time, whereas the latter, in signifying a temporal point between what is gone and what is yet to come, separates time from being. Thus, the philosophy of here and now captures the heart of Chinese and Japanese ontology that emphasizes the fact that being is an event. When Ames compares the Greek substance ontology of being with the Chinese event ontology of becoming, this inseparability of being and time is insinuated. In this worldview, being is not placed in a temporal flow, but being is that which flows.

Inasmuch as the Chinese ontology of becoming corroborates the inseparability of time and being, a focus-field model that Ames and Hall employ in their analysis of the Zhongyong is effective in understanding Dōgen’s event ontology. In illustrating the shortcoming of a part-whole model of ontology, Ames and Hall (2001, p.11) explain that a focus-field is more suited to depict Chinese ontology:
The language of focus and field expresses a world always in a state of flux, a world in which items cannot be fixed as finally this or that, but must be seen as always transitory states passing into other, correlative states. There is no final whole we call “Cosmos” or “World.”

This paradigm shift from a part-whole model to a focus-field model of ontology is necessary to grasp Dōgen’s view of time. If we understand that each moment is simply a part of the entire history, it is difficult to see that each moment is a full manifestation of the Buddha-nature. However, a focus-field model enables us to see that one moment is not a part of the whole history, but rather a focus point from which everything emerges. As previously mentioned, this view is connected to the elimination of teleology, for the transformation of being is not directed toward a certain end: this process itself is what it aims. Ames and Hall explain (2001, p.11):

The world is a field of many things, and the ‘things’ are not discrete objects but are themselves states of becoming; they are happenings. Thus the locution, ‘the ten thousand things,’ must be glossed as ‘the ten thousand processes or events.’ Processes are continuous happenings; events are happenings that have achieved some (always transitory) culmination.

Similarly in Dōgen’s ontology, the Buddha-nature is not a potentiality that will be actualized through practice, but it is ever present in each moment. In other words, the end is always in the present, and each moment is an event of its own that repels being a passing point toward a certain goal. What emerges from such ontology, therefore, is the appreciation of each moment as the end of its own. When each moment contains everything, just as in Dōgen’s view, what is here and now is endowed with intrinsic value that resists any comparison.

Based on this intrinsic value of what is here and now entailed in Dōgen’s event ontology, I believe that even radioactive debris, as long as it is here, is a manifestation of the Buddha-nature. If all being
The Future is Not Ahead

is the Buddha-nature, as Dōgen explicitly states so in the *Shōbōgenzō*, radioactive debris cannot be an exception to this claim. When Dōgen discusses the Buddha-nature, he includes not only humans and animals, but also mountains and rivers, stones and trees, and all kinds of beings that exist in this world. If we dismiss radioactive debris as something harmful, it ultimately supports a type of consequentialism that disregards the intrinsic value of what is here and now. Dōgen’s event ontology assigns intrinsic value to all there is equally: with the attitude of nondiscrimination, we ought to accept it for what it is.

The philosophy of here and now in the summer institute of 2013 helped me realize that a linear conception of time not only marks the shortcoming of Western philosophy but also creates an obstacle in understanding Chinese and Japanese philosophy. Within the three weeks of lectures, this paradigm shift was explained with different voices from various angles. To me, this summer institute was a focal point from which abundant possibilities emerged. I was truly fortunate to be part of this summer institute, and I hope this essay serves as one of many answers that I will develop based upon and in response to the defining experience that this institute has afforded me.

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Introduction

In order to realize efficient education, active involvement of students seems to be indispensable. Reasons for it can be easily listed. First, because students’ motivation is the starting point of learning, learning does not begin if students are passive. People say that you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink it, in other words, students who do not thirst for knowledge do not learn anything even if teachers give them opportunities to learn. Teachers might be able to train students and make them to learn, but such education based on power does not tend to go smoothly. Also, even if teachers succeed in making passive students learn, these students will not continue to learn after the teachers leave. They may forget everything they learned, get lost, and would have no idea what to do. Although one of the goals of education is the independence of students from teachers, passive students fail to achieve this goal. Furthermore, if students are passive, they believe what teachers told them are true without their own examination of judgments. Such students are vulnerable and tend to be deceived by others. Without their own invested effort, this risk cannot be avoided. For these reasons, active involvement of students seems to be essential for efficient education.

However, Dogen, who was mainly discussed in the UH-UT Summer Institute 2013, proposes opposite idea of desirable education. According to Dogen, people need to reduce ego [goga wo hanareru 我を離れる] in order to reach to the enlightenment; he emphasizes the necessity of passivity in Buddhistic education. His idea of education
which demands passivity of students should be different from the problematic education which lacks students’ active involvement that I mentioned above.

This paper aims to examine how passivity contributes to education in Dogen’s thought, and to find the new possibility of passivity not only in the Buddhism but education in general.

1. To Live Buddha Dharma

Although Dogen emphasizes the importance of passivity, he does not deny the will to start Buddhist practice as the first point. He calls this will or motive as hotsu bodai-shin [発菩提心]. As monks in Eiheiji emphasized the importance of first-mind [shoshin 初心] in the summer institute, Dogen does not make little of the will students have at the very beginning of their practice.

However, once people enter into the practice of Buddha and start learning the teaching of Buddha, they need to reduce their own ego in the religious sense. Dogen does not deny the fact that they have an ego at the first point, but tell them not to extend but to shrink the ego.

Once students have the first-mind, they start practice in Zen temples [zenrin 禪林]. People regard Sitting [zazen 座禅] as the most famous practice of Zen Buddhism, but there are many other practices in Zen. In fact, the whole life as zen monks, cooking, eating, cleaning, and sleeping, for example, are all practices of Zen.

There are two characteristics in this practice. One is monks practice Zen in community life. The practice is basically carried out cooperatively. It is true that Zen practice demands solitude in a sense that monks need to examine and reflect on themselves. However, it does not mean that the monks are lonely. Monks need to stay in solitude in community. They seldom speak to each other and practice by themselves, but community life is necessary condition of Zen practice.

Another characteristic is that monks need to follow the way of practice which is prescribed in detail. For example, the order of
practices, the angle of posture, and speed of movement are determined. Because the whole life of monks is the practice of Zen, their way of living are strictly regulated.

The root of these characteristics is one, that is, monks need to live Buddha’s life and embody Buddha Dharma. Buddha Dharma is the truth of the world, but it is not the truth which people become to possess as knowledge. People need to have Buddha mind, live Buddha’s life, and then, they can reach to Buddha Dharma. Because of this view, education of Zen demands monks as students to shrink their own ego and unite with Buddha’s way of living. Once they forget their ego and become absorbed in Buddha Dharma, then they can reach to the enlightenment, which is the goal of Zen practice.

Dogen’s view of education suggests the existence of truth which cannot be possessed as knowledge but can be found in practice. This idea or Buddhist truth seems to be similar to the idea of virtue in Western philosophy, which is not knowledge but manifest in activity. Buddha Dharma and the idea of virtue have a common point that learners of them need to reform themselves. In this kind of learning, passive attitude of students is indispensable.

2. To Discover Buddha Dharma

In order to understand Dogen’s idea of education more deeply, it is worth examining the argument of Jikigejoto [直下承当] and Sanshi-monpou [参師聞法], that the Rev. Keishi Miyagawa introduced in the summer institute.

The structure of Jikigejoto is the following. For Dogen, the truth of the world is beyond our sensibility: we cannot access the truth by our five senses. When people seek for the truth, they tend to extend their arms and try to touch it, but it is not effective. In order to touch the truth, people must go the opposite way: shrink themselves and make a room between the world and them. Then the truth fall into the room and people can receive the truth.

According to the Rev. Miyagawa, there are two methods of reducing ego for early Dogen. One is Sitting [zazen 座禅], which
is examined in the first chapter, and the other is visiting teacher and 
listening Buddha Dharma [sanshi-monpou 参師聞法], which this 
chapter focuses on. In Sanshi-monpou, a student visits a teacher and 
asks him about Buddha Dharma. The teacher, who is transmitted 
Buddha Dharma, gives an answer to the student. Shosan[小参], which 
was performed in Tentokuji in the summer institute, is the style of 
Sanshi-monpou.

The insistence of Dogen that the truth is beyond our sensibility 
can be understood as that it is impossible for us to reach to the truth. 
However, when the process of Jikigejoto is strictly considered, this 
interpretation is not valid because Dogen tells how people receive 
the truth. Receiving the truth must be somehow possible; otherwise, 
the existence of enlightenment and the teaching of Buddha cannot be 
justified. Another possible interpretation of this phrase is that the truth 
is not available for us. What Dogen tries to say is that the truth is usually 
not available. but despite this fact, receiving truth is still possible.

From this view, Sanshi-monpou is not the process that a 
teacher gives his knowledge to students. Even for teachers, the truth is 
usually not available. We should regard this process as a collaboration 
of a teacher and a student to make the truth appear. A junior act as a 
student and ask a question not for himself but for the appearance of 
Buddha Dharma. A senior, who once experienced the truth, act as a 
teacher and sincerely answer to the question. in this earnest trial, the 
truth may appear.

This collaborative trial is not direct approach to the truth. 
Even the existence of the truth is uncertain because this truth is not 
available either for a student or for a teacher. Therefore, this trial is 
based on the belief for the existence beyond our availability. Because 
of this belief, Sanshi-monpou is a method of reducing ego. In this trial, 
people think of something beyond their availability, then their ego 
become relatively smaller than the world. The more they imagine the 
importance of something unavailable for them, the smaller their ego 
becomes. In the education by Sanshi-monpou, teachers and students 
do not try to be passive by their own effort. Through imagining the 
existence beyond them, ego automatically shrinks.

Dogen’s view suggests the significance of collaborative inquiry
of teachers and students. The practice that teachers tell what they know to students is only a part of whole education. Because teachers’ knowledge and abilities are limited, they still keep learning and seeking for the truth beyond them. Although students are immature than teachers, they can give teachers chances to learn by questioning. Through the process of questioning and answering, both teachers and students gain the opportunity to glimpse the truth. Passive attitudes of teachers with the respect for students and imagination of the truth beyond them seems to be necessary for the desirable education.

**Conclusion**

This paper investigated Dogen’s pedagogy and clarified how a passive attitude of students and teachers contribute to education. Although active involvement of students seems to be necessary for successful education, Dogen emphasizes the importance of passive attitude. This paper pointed out two possible reasons for it.

First, Buddha Dharma or Buddhist truth cannot be possessed in the form of knowledge. It can be acquired only when people live Buddha’s life. In order to reach to this state, monks need to follow the strictly prescribed way of living in Zen temples and shrink their ego. In this process to the Buddhist truth, passive attitude is necessary.

Secondly, the argument of Jikigejoto shows that Buddha Dharma is usually not available for any monk. This truth can be momentary available through the process of Sanshi-monpou, that is, the questioning by students and answering by teachers. In order to acquire the truth beyond them, people need to believe the existence of the truth and sincerely seek for it by cooperative inquiry.

Some people may think that Dogen’s religious view of education have nothing to do with non-Buddhist education. However, I think that secular people can also learn from Dogen’s view. The arguments and ideas of Dogen’s education which I mentioned in this paper seem to indicate the limitation of secular view of education. From Dogen’s point of view, transmission of knowledge which is already available for teachers to students is not the only purpose of education.
Secular theory of education can become deeper when it is compared with religious pedagogy. This paper is a first step of this comparative philosophy of education.

References:


Emptiness and Phenomenological Ambiguity

Ben HOFFMAN

When we see things and hear things with our whole body and mind, our understanding is not like a mirror with reflections, nor like water under the moon. If we understand one side, the other side is dark.
(Dōgen 2013, p. 105)

In this paper, I sketch a type of ambiguous phenomenological structure. Such a structure contains two or more terms that stand in a reversible core-horizon relationship: one term serves as a limit that defines the space in which the other term appears, and this relationship may be reversed. I present two examples in the works of Kyoto School philosophers Nishitani Keiji, and Watsuji Tetsurō. In each case, a ‘dialectic’ of emptiness is definitive. Emptiness is presented as a self-negating ‘standpoint,’ and phenomena approached from the standpoint of emptiness stand in self-negating relationships of interdependence. I suggest that Watsuji and Nishitani present emptiness phenomenologically, as indicating a specific kind of interdependence: i.e., core-horizon reversibility.

Horizons and Intentionality

Husserl’s phenomenology presents the relation between the core and the horizon of the perceptual field as a defining feature of experience (1982). The horizon is the limit that defines a field in which a core (or a focus) appears as the object of attention. The project of describing horizon phenomena—content at the limits of perception—became a particular concern in his later works. Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) furthers this project of describing horizon phenomena: world circumscribes the horizon of the space in which entities appear.
Beyond all disclosure is the limit of *nothing*. The temporal horizon of human beings is defined in terms of *thrownness* and *projection*, encountered in *being-towards-death*.

In *The Bodymind in Japanese Buddhism*, David Edward Shaner (1985) employs the phenomenological concepts of core and horizon to develop an account of Dōgen’s Zen practice. He aims to provide phenomenological language for ecstasy that discloses a primordial ground of all experience. To this end, Shaner identifies what he defines as a *second phenomenological reduction*. The first, presented by Husserl (1982), involves a ‘bracketing’ of ordinary assumptions that supports the direct description of phenomena. The second reduction is what Shaner identifies as *bodymind* awareness, which he describes as disclosure of the ‘*horizon in toto*’—the horizon of all phenomena.¹ Shaner argues that the second reduction brackets even the structure of intentionality (the *noema-noesis* correlation of acts and objects of consciousness), such that it finds a horizon beyond intentionality.

I suggest two possible challenges to this approach: One, an argument from traditional (Husserlian) phenomenology: in describing bodymind, Shaner orients it as the *noetic* pole of an intentional structure. A reduction is necessarily a *noematic* act (as an *orientation of consciousness* that discloses the world in a particular way). Two, the appearance of bodymind, through a second reduction, would place it at the core (or focus) of a phenomenological structure for which *something else* would then provide a horizon. The absolute horizon as such cannot appear. Both challenges indicate the difficulty of presenting a *horizon in toto*, or a ‘primordially given non-privileged horizon’ that transcends intentionality. (Shaner 1985)

I present Shaner’s account to indicate the difficulty of describing a primordial horizon of all phenomena. Following a discussion of ambiguous phenomenological structures in Watsuji and Nishitani, I

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¹. ‘This even more radically reflexive reduction serves to neutralize all thetic posittings and leads us from a description of the noetic and noematic aspects of experience to the primordially given non-privileged horizon. Husserl only hints at such a maneuver in his *Ideas I*. I would like to underscore the importance of a second reduction in order to move beyond even the noetic/noematic distinction.’ (Shaner 1985, p. 50)
will suggest that *emptiness* serves as an unstable (*dynamic*) primordial horizon, which—for Nishitani and Watsuji—is ‘self-emptying.’ The ‘realization’ of emptiness (i.e., its shift to a *core* phenomenon) is the disclosure of the *suchness* of phenomena. As core, emptiness reveals the primordial horizon as the finite limits of particular things.

**Revolving Reciprocity**

In ‘Emptiness and Sameness’ (*Kū to Soku*) Nishitani writes:

[W]e could say, the world ‘worlds.’ If we say that the world worlds, the ‘thing’ of the world becomes the most simple and straightforwardly peculiar phenomenon. But at the same time this ‘thing’ is the dynamism of the limitless and complex body of linkages, the appearance of life. (1999, p. 198)

The *world* as the horizon in which all things are disclosed is ‘the most simply and straightforwardly peculiar phenomenon.’ However, this ‘thing’ can be fully described only in relation to that for which it serves as a horizon: a ‘limitless and complex body of linkages’—the interrelated phenomena of the world. ‘World’ is both a horizon, or—to use Heidegger’s term, a *clearing*—and the particular content that it bounds.

Nishitani describes first the relationship between art and religion and then ‘the basic form of the linkages of the ‘world’ seen as a limitless and complex whole’ (p. 198) as ‘*revolvingly reciprocal*’ (*egoteki*).² Religion and art share a boundary such that each defines

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² ‘The most important thing for a revolvingly reciprocal relationship is, first of all, the fact that, when something belonging essentially to *A* is a phenomenon reflecting itself (moving toward) or projecting itself onto *B*, it does not phenomenologize itself as *A* in *B* but, rather, appears as part of *B*. Said differently: When body *A* transmits itself as body *B*, it does not transfer itself in the “form” of *A* but in the “form” of *B*. Body *A* communicates (*mitteilen*) itself to *B* in the form of *B*, while *B* also partakes (*teilhaben*) in the form of *B* what it has received from *A*. This is the “function” of *A* known as self-transmission to *B*. The same thing happens when the transmission occurs from *B* to *A*.‘(Nishitani 1999, p. 197)
the limit of the other: each serves as a possible standpoint from which the other can be realized. ‘In theory, and as a rule, the ground known as the “arts” is faced with the limits of its possibilities . . . When the limits of “art” appear in such a way, the opening far in the distance of such limits is, to say it simply, the horizon of “religion.”‘ (pp. 196-197) The relationship is revolvably reciprocal because it is not static: art and religion shift dynamically toward each other.

For Nishitani, as for Nishida in his essay ‘An Explanation of Beauty’ (‘Bi no setsumei’), (1983) art and religion are both ecstatic: aesthetic experience and religious experience both involve an opening possible only through the transformation of the one who experiences. Where religion appears as the limit of the opening that is art, I suggest that from the identification of a revolvably reciprocal relationship between art and religion, it follows that art appears at the limits of the opening of religious ecstasy, as the aesthetic transfiguration of the phenomena of the world. This is the appearance of suchness, which I will discuss below. Nishitani writes: ‘Although it is an opening of revolving reciprocity, the opening known as the world is nothing but the original opening where all openings as “relationships” come into being.’ (p. 201) Nishitani’s definition of ‘openings’ as relationships suggests that that in such a relationship, one thing can serve as the horizon of the other. Where one thing is taken as a standpoint, another appears as a horizon.

**Sociality and Dual Negation**

In *Ethics in Japan* (*Rinrigaku*), Watsuji (1996) presents a relationship between individuality and community that can be described as revolvably reciprocal, and which exemplifies the kind of ambiguous structure that I discuss here. Watsuji’s notion of sociality describes a dynamic relationship of two terms—individuality and community—such that each can be the boundary of the other, and each discloses the other in its own self-negation. Sociality describes the process of the continual self-negating transformation of each term into the other.
Now, that *ningen’s sonzai* [the human way of being] is, fundamentally speaking, a movement of negation makes it clear that the basis of *ningen’s sonzai* is negation as such, that is, absolute negation. The true reality of an individual, as well as of totality, is ‘emptiness,’ and this emptiness is the absolute totality. Out of this ground, from the fact that this emptiness is emptied, emerges *ningen’s sonzai* as a movement of negation. The negation of negation is the self-returning and self-realizing movement of the absolute totality that is precisely social ethics. Therefore, the basic principle of social ethics is the realization of totality (as the negation of negation) through the individual (that is, the negation of totality). (p. 23)

According to Watsuji, the (relative) totality is ‘realized’ in its negation—the particular, or the assertion of the individual; as the individual, in turn, is realized in its own negation—the totality, or the affirmation of community. The horizon of the individual is the limit of community, and the horizon of community is the limit of individuality. The two terms are not only interdependent, but exist as moments in a process (the *absolute* totality) by which each realizes itself in its disclosure of the other.

**The Dialectic of Emptiness as Dynamic Core-Horizon Reversibility**

The notion of revolving reciprocity presented by Nishitani, and the social dialectic presented by Watsuji both follow a dialectic of emptiness. In both cases, the terms of the relationship are mutually interdependent in such a way that either can serve as a clearing in which the other is disclosed. Moreover, each term is realized in its self-negation, by which it serves as an opening for the other.

In *Religion and Nothingness*, Nishitani (1983) offers a distinction between *relative* and *absolute* nothingness. The former is the reification of emptiness as a static absence; the latter—absolute nothingness—is the liquidation of nothingness that discloses the presence of things. This shift, I suggest, describes a *core-horizon reversal*
of emptiness. Relative nothingness is a static horizon that looms over all phenomena, as their absence; absolute nothingness—the self-emptying of emptiness—discloses finite phenomena in their suchness. Nishitani describes this as follows:

All attachment is negated: both the subject and the way in which ‘things’ appear as objects of attachment are emptied. Everything is now truly empty, and this means that all things make themselves present here and now, just as they are, in their original reality. They present themselves in their suchness, their tathata. This is non-attachment. (p. 34)

Everything ‘becomes truly empty’ in the dialectic self-emptying movement of emptiness, in which it shifts from horizon (as beyond all things) to core (as the heart of all things). This shift is defined by the confrontation with nihility that Nishitani identifies as the Great Doubt.

Structures described in terms of emptiness—as a dialectically unstable standpoint—are marked by ambiguity. To return to Dōgen, as cited at the head of this paper: Zen awareness is not a ‘mirroring’ of the world that beholds the totality of phenomena. ‘When we understand one side, the other side is dark.’ This awareness discloses phenomena and their ambiguity: the dependence of appearance on something that remains concealed. All appearance takes place within a horizon that conceals what is beyond the field, and there is no standpoint from which the set of possible core and horizons relations can be disclosed simultaneously.

Emptiness can be presented as an absolute horizon because it is dialectically unstable. As relative nothingness it is the horizon of all phenomena; as absolute nothingness it is the core of all phenomena: this is the disclosure of suchness. Suchness, the appearance of a phenomenon in its ‘original reality,’ is a revelation of the phenomenon as an expression of the unfolding of the world. In suchness, the finite limits definitive of the particular phenomenon appear as the horizon of all phenomena: The limits of the particular thing—its point of contact with all other things—appear as the limits of the world.
References:


Uselessness [無用] is an important concern of the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi through myths and arguments, stories and analogies tries to make clear the usefulness of the useless. As the book says at the conclusion of chapter four, ‘The Human World’:

The mountain tree brings down itself; the torch consumes itself. The cinnamon tree can be eaten, and therefore is chopped down; the lacquer tree can be used, and therefore is cut apart. Everyone knows the usefulness of the useful, but no one knows the usefulness of the useless.

山木自寇也，膏火自煎也。桂可食，故伐之；漆可用，故割之。人皆知有用之用，而莫知無用之用也。¹

It seems paradoxical to put a passage stressing the importance of being useless in a chapter called ‘The Human World.’ After all, we are dependent on one another, and it is because of this mutual dependence that we must live with, help, and, in short, be useful to one another. And it is even more paradoxical once one realizes that the Zhuangzi’s praise of uselessness has led interpreters to claim that ‘an underlying theme of spiritual transformation is at the heart of the text’² and that for Zhuangzi ‘eremitism, properly understood, was the highest ideal to which a man can aspire.’³ In other words that the Zhuangzi advocates for a retreat from the human, or at least the political, world. I will not


argue that spiritual transformation or eremitism are not important themes in the *Zhuangzi*. However, in a text as rich as the *Zhuangzi*, written by as many authors as recent scholarship has stressed, asserting anything is the heart of the text or its highest ideal is problematic. And in this case, doing so has obscured that the *Zhuangzi* is very much concerned with politics. I will argue that the Zhuangzian theme of useless is intimately connected to politics and living in the human world.

The first two stories about Huizi and Zhuangzi concern Huizi discussing something he thinks is useless, and Zhuangzi showing how in fact it is not. The first story concerns the seeds for an enormous gourd the king of Wei has given Huizi, a gourd so large he is unsure what to do with it. The second tells of an enormous tree Huizi is unable to use. In each story, the subtext is that either Zhuangzi’s words or Zhuangzi himself is similarly big and useless. And Zhuangzi’s seeming uselessness is inseparable from the fact that, unlike Huizi, Zhuangzi does not hold office. But in each case Zhuangzi responds by showing how what Huizi considers useless can in fact be used, namely as aids in wandering. The gourds can be used to float down rivers, while the tree can be planted in the Field of Broad Nothing to rest under after wandering.

Clearly, these uses are meant, in part, as jests, yet these jests serve an important purpose. They are to show Huizi the importance of wandering and being able to view matters from a different perspective. And those points, we shall see, are crucial to the usefulness of the useless. But before we do so, let us look more closely at a story that attempts to show the usefulness of the useless. It is the story of Carpenter Shi and the useless tree.

Carpenter Shi was going to Qi, when he arrived in Crooked-shafts and saw an oak-tree used as an altar for the god of the land. Its size was such it could give shade to thousands of cattle, and it was several spans round. Its height was like a hill’s, eighty feet of trunk before the lowest branches, and more than ten branches that could be made into boats. With so many sight-seers, it was


5. Both stories are found at the end chapter one of the *Zhuangzi*. 
like a market, but the carpenter gave it no heed and kept on walking. His apprentice stared at it, then ran up to Carpenter Shi, saying, 'From the time I took up an axe to follow you, I've never seen lumber this beautiful. Why didn't you look at it but kept on walking instead?' Shi replied, 'Stop! Don't speak any further. This is a good-for-nothing tree! Make it into a boat, it will sink; make it into a coffin, it will rot; make it into utensils, they will break; make it into doors, they would ooze sap; make it into pillars, they would be eaten through by bugs. That is not a tree for lumber, it is useless and that is why it can become so old.'

Carpenter Shi returned home and the sacred tree appeared to him in a dream, saying, 'What are you comparing me to? Are you comparing me to a workable tree? The hawthorn, the pear, the orange, the pomelo, and all the trees with fruits, as soon as they are ripe, they are picked clean, and once picked clean, thrown aside, their big branches broken, their little branches snapped. It is because of their ability that their life is bitter, unable to live out their lives and while on the Way die prematurely. They brought upon themselves the hitting and tearing of the world. All things are like this. And I spent a long time seeking how to be useless, and nearly died, before now obtaining it. For me, it is of great use. If I were useful, would I have become so large? Moreover, both you and I are things. Why? Because we are things to one another. How does this good-for-nothing person who is close to death know about this good-for-nothing tree?' Shi awoke and thought upon his dream. His apprentice said, 'Isn't it interesting that by becoming useless, he became an earth god?' Shi replied, 'Quiet! Don’t speak! This is a truly strange thing and only those who don’t know it criticize it for those that aren’t altars are soon cut! Furthermore, what protects it and the masses are different, so if concerning its appearance we speak of it, then aren’t we far off?'
Here, uselessness is praised. It is the tree’s uselessness that preserves its life and made it serve as a local shrine. The most obvious part is that by being useless, one will preserve one’s life, not an easy task during the Warring States Period. But what does it mean to be useless? Many would interpret this to mean not to be involving in governing, to be of no use and no interest to those in power. Aat Vervoorn writes that the Zhuangzi argues that one should ‘stay out of sight and out of trouble; keep away from politics and state affairs until such times as you have achieved sagehood.’ This is arguably done through ‘making oneself invisible by doing away with any outstanding characteristics or abilities.’ One is consequently spared from harm, while those who can be used are treated as straw dogs before being set aside once they are no longer deemed useful.

It is easy to see the appeal of such an interpretation. It is nevertheless wrong. Just as wuwei (無為) does not mean one does nothing (不為)—but instead something closer to acting naturally, not

forcing things—, so too does being useless [無用] not mean one has no use [不用]. For there is an obvious, brutal objection to not having a use: that which has no use will often be destroyed just as Huizi destroyed his useless gourds. This is an objection that is acknowledged in a later story. For there is a second useless tree story, one that is normally thought of as offering a counterpoint to the original tale. It reads:

Zhuangzi was walking on a mountain and saw a big tree; its branches and leaves were luxuriant. A woodcutter had stopped by the tree and was not interested in it. Zhuangzi asked why, the man replied, ‘It’s without anything that can be used.’ Zhuang said, ‘This tree, by not being fit for lumber, is able to live out its natural span.’ So he left the mountain and came to a friend’s house. The friend was glad to see him and ordered a young servant to kill a goose and cook it. The servant asked, ‘One of them can cry out, the other cannot, which one should I kill?’ The friend said, ‘Kill the one that can’t.’

Challenged by a disciple, Zhuangzi does not make what one might consider the obvious retort: insofar as the goose could be eaten, it was still useful. If he had said that, there would be no tension between the story of the useless tree and the story of the useless goose for then it was only insofar as it was useful, that the goose was killed. But that is not what Zhuangzi argues. Instead, he says he would rather ‘reside in the space between being lumber and not being lumber.’ [周將處乎材與不材之間。]

In other words, be neither useless nor useful but something in between. This would seem to contradict, or at least greatly complicate, the original story of the useless tree. It does not, though it does contradict a more naïve reading of the first story.

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For the uselessness of the tree is only part of the original story. There is a second point made by the story: the tree draws people towards it. It has, in short, virtue [德]. And it is on account of this virtue that it is made into an altar of the earth. Like the Pole Star, it remains in its place and everyone pays it tribute. So while other passages may support a reading of the *Zhuangzi* that supports eremiticism and spiritual transformation, the story of the useless tree does not. Instead, it places the useless, of which the *Zhuangzi* is one example, at the center of Chinese political-religious life.

So clearly uselessness is not simply a self-preservation strategy. It attracts others to you. But how? A passage from the 'Miscellaneous Chapters' explains further:

Huizi said to Zhuangzi, ‘Your words are useless.’ Zhuangzi replied, ‘One must know what is useless and then begin to be able to speak of use. The earth is certainly broad and large, but what people used is just where they put their feet. If around his feet one dug to the Yellow Springs, would people still find them useful?’ Huizi said, ‘Useless.’ Zhuangzi said, ‘That being so, the use of the useless is clear.’

惠子謂莊子曰：「子言無用。」莊子曰：「知無用而始可與言用矣。夫地非不廣且大也，人之所用容足耳。然則廁足而墊之致黃泉，人尚有用乎？」惠子曰：「無用。」莊子曰：「然則無用之為用也亦明矣。」

Depending on where one takes one stand determines which bits of earth you use. But it is the useless bits that allow for movement. And this can be extending more generally. It useless not because it has no use, but because it is broad and large, inexhaustible, without any single, fixed use. People like Huizi—those who are unable to roam, change, or see things from another perspective—are useful instruments. But when the times change, they become of no use. But someone useless, like Zhuangzi, is paradoxically always useful, able to adapt to the times, having room for growth and wandering. Equally important, by being

able to change her perspective, she can find out how to use others, just as Zhuangzi is able to show to Huizi the use of what he considers useless. Thus no one is in danger of being discarded by a Zhuangzian ruler, and consequently all are attracted to her. Therefore, uselessness is not just useful to yourself, but to others as well.

If Confucius is the timely sage, perhaps Zhuangzi is the useless sage. And since both stress the importance of adapting to the times and not being a fixed instrument as well as the powerful, attractive force of virtue, the difference between the two might be much slighter than is generally believed. But suggestive comparisons aside, what should be clear is this: there are considerable perks in being a useless tree.
How One Becomes What One Is:  
*Mediation of Sein and Werden in Watsuji Tetsurō’s ‘Memorandum’*

Yu INUTSUKA

Wie man wird, was man ist.  
*Nietzsche, Ecce Homo*

**Introduction**

Looking at the significances and motivations in comparative philosophy, we can find a general tendency: the criticism of ‘Western’ thought by ‘non-Western’ thought, especially the ‘modern Western’ dualism of subject and object. Destruction of natural and cultural environment is one of the reasons to rethink the expansion of modern western society with the model of free individual human existence. Consequently, the thought of non-western regions, especially East Asian ways of relational thinking has been useful. I myself am one of researchers who search for a new framework of human-environmental relationship and look for the possibility in Japanese philosophy.

There are problems, however, in dealing with Japanese philosophies in Japan today. The greatest negative legacy is WWII, when the relational aspect of modern Japanese philosophy was put into the services of holism or *kokka*. The taboo on them has relatively faded compared to the immediately after the war, but still stands, together with the rise of other discourses like multi-ethnicity. In the collaborative seminar between the University of Hawai‘i and the University of Tokyo, such disaffections with holistic views were also found, especially among Japanese participants.

Environmental ethics, too, has a past of relational thinking resulting in a deadlock. The ecological point of view has expanded to
the so called ‘eco-fascism,’ go so far as denying human existence\(^1\).

It is clear that we are not an independent existence from nature and society as shown by ecology, psychology, anthropology, sociology and other knowledges developed in the 20\(^{th}\) century. However, we have the certainty of ‘I’ with the distinct free consciousness. In order to deal with such controversy, I would like to introduce a phrase, treasured by one Japanese philosopher, Watsuji Tetsurō in his youth.

**Determinism and Indeterminism, Philosophy of Werden and Philosophy of Sein**

Many philosophers and scholars keep notebooks of new knowledge acquired every day. Although today they may take form on the cloud based applications, they are precious intellectual resources.

In 1913, about 100 years ago, Watsuji of the age 24 also had such a notebook. He has published his first work *Nietzsche Kenkyu* (*Nietzschean Studies*) in October 1\(^{st}\) of the same year. As it is dated ‘1913, X-,’ Watsuji supposedly started the notebook coinciding with the publication. On the cover of notebook, beside the date and title ‘MEMORANDUM,’ there is one phrase: ‘Wie man wird, was man ist.–Nietzsche,’ meaning ‘How one becomes what one is,’ the well-known subtitle of Nietzsche’s autobiography, *Ecce Homo*. Watsuji has explained the reason of his choice in his memos themselves.

First, he questions the problem of flux and stasis.

‘Flux and Stasis’

All is flux: that is ‘unchangeable’ truth. –But isn’t this ‘unchangeability’

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1. Specifically, not all relational thinking results in this deadlock. In environmental philosophy, there are rich and indispensable studies of relational thinking for reconsidering the problems of environmental issues today (for example, Callicott & Ames (1989)). The problem is the relational thinking connected to determinism or holism with no subject of moral action. To know more of this issue, see Berque (1996).

2. There exists another way of translation for ‘man,’ such as ‘you’ instead of ‘one’ as the recent English translation of *Ecce Homo* by Duncan Large in 2009. Here I translate it into ‘one’ to follow Watsuji’s translation as ‘人’ (1914, p.587).
already static? Absolute stasis and absolute flux, neither is true (1992, p.21).³

At the days, in addition to Nietzsche, Watsuji was reading Bergson and pragmatism philosophies which also influenced the Japanese philosophers of his time, who posed the problem of flux and stasis.

‘Ecce Homo’ wie mans wird, was man ist. This is a meaningful phrase. Here exists the unity of Werden and Sein. Here also exists the unity of determinism and indeterminism (1992, p.21).⁴

Absolute stasis and absolute flux, neither is true. The quote from Nietzsche was to support this⁵. Here, importantly, Watsuji saw the ‘unity of determinism and indeterminism.’

The destiny is determined but it does not come from the outside. It is inside. The present self (that is Sein) is the destiny. The particular self cannot be the other sorts of particularity. From this point, it is more determined.
But this determination is not as a conscious fact. Everything is free in the true life. It is a free creation. It never happens that the future program is determined.
If the transformation is absolute, it could be said such that the life felt by intuition in this moment must be another life in the next moment. Therefore, as the critique of pragmatism, it can be said

³. [流動と静止と] 凡てはfluxであると〔の〕語は、「動かすべきからざる」真理である。――然しこの「動かすべきからざる」といふことは既に静止ではないか。絶対の制止も絶対の流動も共に真実でない。
⁴. Underline by Watsuji. ［エケ、ホモ］wie mans wird, was man ist.は深い語である。ここにWerdenとSeinの融合がある。ここにもまた、決定論と自由論との融合がある。
⁵. In November 1913, Yoshishige Abe published the first translation of Ecce Homo in Japanese. In this book Abe separated the phrase ‘wie man wird, was man ist,’ which appears in the section 9 of Chapter 2, into two questions ‘how one becomes, what one is’ (人は如何になる、人は何であるか) (1913, p.101). This separation was strongly criticized as a ‘fatal mistranslation (致命的誤譯)’ by Watsuji (1914, p.587).
that the truth, all is flux, could be not untruth in the next moment (1992, p.21).⁶

One cannot be somebody else but only him/her existing there and then. From this view point, the one is determined to be him/herself. But, the fact one will never be ‘something else,’ on reverse, can be the proof that its existence is secured. One’s future will never be anybody’s but definitely his/hers. This allows one be a ‘ruler’ of his/her own life (Watsuji 1914, p.588).

Nevertheless, this moment is eternal in the true life. The life in this moment is the life itself. Even Bergson must accept this. Here exists the color of Sein. All philosophies of Sein are indispensable because of this point. Nevertheless, flux is the noumenon of this eternal life. It is the true figure. Nothing is unchangeable other than the schema inside consciousness. Because of this point, all philosophies of Werden are indispensable (1992, pp.21-22).⁷

One is non-exchangeable one. There is the preciousness and

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6. Underline by Watsuji. 運命は定まつてゐるが、それは外から来るのではな
い、内にある。現在の自己（即ち Sein）が即ち運命である。この特殊な
る自己は他の種類の特殊となることは出来ない。この点より見ればもつ
と決定している。
ただしこの決定は意識的の事実としてではない。真実の生命に於ては凡
て自由である。自由の創造である。未来のプログラムが定まつてゐると
いふことは絶対にない。
もし転化が絶対であるならば、この瞬間に直観せられた生命は次の瞬間
に他の生命とならなければならない、といふ様なことも云へる。従つてプ
ラグマチズムに対する反撃のやうに、凡ては flux であるといふ真理そのも
のが次の瞬間にう真理でないといふことも云へる。

7. 然るに真の生命に於てはこの瞬間が永久である。この瞬間の生命が生命
その者である。ベルクソンと雖これは許さなければならないだろう。
ここに Sein の色彩がある。凡ての Sein の哲学はこの点に於て捨てる事が
出来ぬ。
然るに flux はこの永久の生命の本体である。真のすがたである。意識内の
図式の他に不変わるものはない。この点に於て凡ての Werden の哲学は捨
てること〔ママ〕が出来ぬ。
brightness of the particular being. Philosophies of Sein (being) are to make this brightness more concrete. On the other hand, one is not in complete solitude. It is in the universe of life with the consciousness with the past, present, and future. Philosophies of Werden (becoming) makes this truth clearer. Watsuji ends this series of reflections with the following words.

All cores of the great philosophies reach the true life from either point. Only an ordinary man makes the both philosophies in fallacy when he brings them back the truth to the world of common sense. This ordinary man exists everywhere, even inside a great philosopher (1992, p.22).  

It would have been the caution to himself. Not to lose either of the philosophy of Sein and philosophy of Werden, Watsuji has written down this phrase on the cover of his notebook.

The opposition of determinism and indeterminism is the problem raised by the models. In reality, they are unified. In Asian traditions, determinism was strong. One’s life was the matter beyond his/her will or responsibility. This deterministic way of seeing is actually shared in the societies of 21st century, along growing ecology, psychology, and other knowledge of revealing the influence one’s background on its life. Even if one commits a crime, the society could admit the responsibility belongs to his/her family reasons. It saves one from over-responsibility, but sees human being as if subject without free will. On the contrary, when people see the world through the glasses of indeterminism, it could forsake the people in harsh situations, as if the responsibility of being homeless is solely on them, because they did not do their best.

The philosophy of the 20th century has experienced a great shift in its way of questioning from epistemology to ontology: the

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8. 凡て偉大な哲学の核心は、真の生命にいずれかの方向から触れてゐるのである。唯俗人がこの真理を常識の世界に引き却すに当つていずれの哲学も常に迷蒙に化して了ふ。偉大な哲学者の内にさへもこの俗人が住んである。
shift from how to acquire the knowledge of the world to what our existence is. Now we need to proceed to how to live as a particular human existence in this real world, the question of practice. The work of comparative philosophy will be not only looking at frameworks or models of viewing the world but also enriching the phase of practice in actual life. We should not forget that this is a hard task, even for a great philosopher.

**Practice in the Real World**

The following strange formula is also in the memorandums of Watsuji, which is the result of ‘dissection of himself’ (1992, p.7),

\[
T_t. = (T_t. + T_r.) + A + \ldots + \text{Nietzsche} + \text{Bergson} + \text{Shaw} + \text{Tolstoi} + \text{Maeterlinck} + \text{Families} + \text{X.X.X.} \ldots \text{Erlebniss (Zwanzigjähriges)} \ldots (1992, \text{p.7})
\]

At this time, he was interested in the problem of ‘personality.’ It is a very naïve and personal note but it somehow appeals to us directly (according to the editors, Tt. means Watsuji ‘Tetsurō’ and Tr. means ‘Teruko,’ his wife (1992, p.7)\(^9\)). We can see him regarding himself in the relationship, which in turn figure his responsibility for people and things around him as part of his own existential problem.

The reality is neither solely determinate nor solely indeterminate. When we consider the practice in the real world, we need to go beyond the models. In Watsuji’s notebook, we can learn his resolution to do so\(^{10}\).

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\(^9\) In this paper, I mainly focused on Watsuji’s attitude toward philosophy. For the significance of Nietzschean studies in his philosophical development, further investigation must be done.

\(^{10}\) The cover page of Watsuji’s ‘Memorandum’ is from Watsuji (1992, p.1).
Works cited


Why Bother With This Debate?

Following the recent Bill Nye / Ken Ham debate in the U.S. in early 2014, I feel that a connected topic from the 2013 UTUH Summer Institute in Comparative Philosophy was important to address for this publication. That debate was between scientific and creationist accounts of the origins of the universe and the supposed battle between empirical studies and the Bible. In the most recent Summer Institute, a much more profitable discussion ensued regarding philosophy’s characterization of both science and religion. I feel that the question of this supposed divide between science and religion should be brought into focus in a different light. For what are we to make of the old argument phrased as science vs. religion? Is this distinction even beneficial for us anymore? What about this debate between science and creationism? Is this any more than a distraction from more meaningful issues?

I will argue in this work that the supposed opposition of religion and science is not helpful in any general sense. I will argue that an over-generalized and uncritical assessment of the components of this opposition creates nothing but distractions and does not provide any avenues for the reconciliation of these modalities, and furthermore confuses what reconciliation might look like. Reconciliation will require innovative thinking about how to abandon the terms of this debate without effacing the role these modalities have in our history and everyday life. I will argue that reimagining this as representing a
distinction in the modalities of our experience of the world will provide a view that by no means suggests there should be a strict opposition. Instead, I will suggest that life is where these modalities of experience, that of subjectivity and objectivity, of third-person and first-person, combine. I will suggest that a more fruitful discussion should be about the relationship between recognizable aspects of these modalities that do not bear the burden of unnecessary opposition: measurement and expression. In other words, I want to make this a discussion about the relationship between science and poetry.

*Mistaken Identities*

Let’s begin with what this debate really was: a debate between creationists and big bang theorists. The supposed opposition of creationists and big-bang theorists is actually an opposition between theism and atheism, faith and the secular, and is certainly nothing new. This debate has nothing to offer serious thinkers. The Nye/Ham broadcast was a publicity stunt on the part of the creationists to add credit to their position. Yet, we stand to learn nothing from such an engagement except that science and the Bible are not equal sources of information regarding observable phenomenon and debates involving both sway no one.

In the creationist/big bang theorist debate, theism and atheism are disguised as views of an externally ordered world and one of a world composed of complete random accident. This is perhaps the most charitable and discussion-generating characterization of this debate, making it a question of the origins of values. The world created by God is a world with meaning, the later is not. Now, these characterizations do indeed seem to be contradictory. Following the law of the excluded middle, either the world is composed of meaning or it is not. Indeed, were these to be proper distinctions then we would certainly have a serious opposition on our hands. This is hardly to be the case. A world without external meaning, such as a world that does not proceed toward an ultimate goal or is not due to an external creative agent, does not exclude a world full of internal meaning, which
would likely be fragmented, pocketed and place-based meaning, in other words, contextual meaning. This is perhaps the best that such a characterization of the opposition at hand can offer, that between external and internal meaning. However, the creationist account is far from arguing this nuanced position and instead wish to

*The Case for Science as Measurement*

The physical sciences developed as a way to rid prejudice from explanations of phenomenon, and the best way to do that was to implement a system of external review and verification through repeated experimentation. This was then the implementation of measurement as a source of knowledge of the world. It is about the observer, taking notes and generating data, leaving the emotions and wishes of the practitioner behind. Of course, this is a very general sense of what science is. However, perhaps there is an image perception issue with science. Perhaps science is best characterized not by the hosts of scientific television shows, not by the popular writer, nor by the technological output of companies or militaries, but by the scientific ‘grunt,’ the fieldworker, the research assistant and the lab tech, endlessly observing phenomenon and recording measurable data. This image makes science out more like the methodology rather than the caricature of a spokesperson for scientism that the creationist proponents think they are debating.

Following this shift to measurement, characterizing this debate in terms of technology and morality can provide the parameters for a productive discussion, perhaps that between unemotionally-restrained advance and restraint based on a principle of the value of a world we might be altering. Here, religion refers to something like a mitigating force for the excesses of materialist regimes. If technological advances allow us to produce even more massively destructive weapons, for example, why should we keep going in that direction?

I do not think that the science reduces to unfettered technological advance, in either chemicals, drugs, weapons, etc. because the science that we discussed above is one of a method for investigating
phenomenon that attempts to reduce the influence of prejudice in results. The method, that which brings us closest to a sense of the scientific that can provide a useful dimension to our investigation, can be complimented by a set of principles that involve the thoughtful and full consideration of moral imperatives for action or restraint. Indeed, the impacts of our endeavors should always be continually reconsidered.

For an opposition that can support fruitful discourse, it is extremely important that we recognize certain possible limitations of this methodology in virtue of its general strengths. Its ability to treat and trade in collectable measurements resulting in confirmed predictions is why it should be trusted. Yet, is measurement the only way of learning about the world? While it might be one of the most trusted methods yet developed, is it all that we have? Is everything measureable? What does it take for something to be measureable? Measurement requires a standard unit. Such application of externally provided units of measurement restrict the creation of entirely arbitrary data used to back up explanations which do not correspond to aspects of the world but rather support the motives are select groups. This aspect of measurement corresponds to a third-person stance on the world, a stance that values the objective, in the least, and restricted to the objective, in the extreme. What provides an opposition to this objectivity in approaching the world? One such possibility is subjectivity.

What I want to suggest now is a way in which to uphold one of our best tools for engaging the world, the scientific methodology, and yet to respect with real ontological status of something from the other side that can provide a fruitful opposition through which new avenues of investigation can ease old tensions. This new opposition is between measurement and expression, between that which we can know about the world through third-person verifiable measurements and that which we can know about the world through the uniqueness of lived experience.
The Case for Religiosity as Expression

We considered the religion side of our overly simple initial opposition as being the argument from theism, from external order and meaning, and the view of creationists, particularly young-earth creationists. Clearly, this is a side of the debate restricted to American-based Christians. What we need is to imagine a sense of the religious aspect of human life that is not reducible to creed or locality. Perhaps again we suffer from an image problem when we think of religion, or what it is that religion refers to, in terms of the debate at hand. I would suggest we move away from conceiving of religion in terms of the fanatic, the televangelist, or the dogmatist, in similar fashion that science was reimagined above. For the battle between fanatics and dogmatists will get us nowhere. Religiosity is perhaps bettered characterized as an expression of our sense of belonging in the world.

What do I mean by expression and how does it fit into the opposition with measurement? I mean by expression a few ideas. One idea I intend is that of the world known from our first-person experience, as immediate felt experience. This is a view that suggests that the interior lives of individual subjects have ontological status that we should engage empirically. This does not suggest that every person's account of religious-like experience has merit for explaining the observable phenomenon of the world. We have seen that explanations of observable and measureable phenomenon are the realm of scientific methodology. Yet, the emotional contents of our experiences as we live them are not quite of the same realm as that which is measureable and confirmable in third-person sorts of ways, but is undeniably a key component to our lives.

I also intend this pole of expression to be taken also in its more immediately literal sense of something being expressed, spoken, displayed, enacted, revealed, something conveyed even if not communicated. In opposition to measurement, or that which can be confirmed in a third-party sort of way, that which is expressed in this sense is that which the individual brings to the present situation from the utterly unique historical path of experience. Every individual living person has seen a succession of events that is utterly unique
in sequence, emotional content, time and space. To respect this uniqueness is to respect that which we can only know from a person through their expression. In this sense I intend expression to be more than communication, but even the habits, mannerisms, and preferences of a person as all of these make bare the marks of a history, whether of nature or of nurture. I see all of this as poetry because it is all an act of poiesis, an act of creation in the present world that the accumulation of the past offers through our living expression.

This view of our opposition, now between measurement and expression, provides us with a new sense of the original debate. Rather than being one between science and religion, since we have seen the complication with those terms, this is now an opposition between science and poetry. It is now an opposition between that which we know through measurement and that which we know through our life as lived by us. This does not mean that everyone has the ability to proclaim equally valid explanations for observed phenomenon, but that ever person has access to a portion of the history of life that others only have access to if the expression of the individual is taken seriously and respected for its ontological depth.

This is an opposition that takes us past the old battle between science and traditional religion and frees both sides of this debate from faulty over-generalizations while still providing a conceptual opposition that has contemporary research potentials and an ethical appreciation of life and the place of living experience in the world.

Why Bother Now?

So why bother with this new debate now? First of all, any possibility of a reconciliation for two of the most significant modes of thought in human history would need a reframing of the question and the positions such that we are not simply rehashing old family feuds between the proponents of each. Discussions between dogmatists and fanatics get us nowhere. Second, we need to have discussions about ourselves in the world that respects both the scientific endeavor and the living, immaterial experience that characterizes our conscious,
emotional lives. This is how reconciliation happens. Not by declaring a winner in a debate, but rather by shifting the debate to one about how to best understand why these two modalities have this strange colocation in our lives.

Finally, you might ask if there is an ethics to this ontological view. The ethical comportment that this view suggests is one in which we refrain from considering merely the measurable aspects of individuals and thereby do not reduce anyone to their physicality. Instead, in order to respect that which we cannot have access to, we must provide the space for that sort of access to be granted us by the individual being comfortable, capable and empowered to express him or herself. To do this we must also open ourselves, we must become vulnerable and let the poetry of the other flow out. Doing so would not take any individual’s life and experience for granted. I believe that this is the way forward from a debate that loosely resembles the one we began with, because it is that misconceived debate that is leading us astray.
Introduction

It is widely argued that the concept of “society” emerged in modern period, and this concept has been utilized for the purpose of government. According Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault also argues that society was invented to reinforce the governmentality of the modern nation-state. According to Foucault, before the invention of society, the concept of “population” was invented to point to the mass of people inhabiting in a particular region, and “the true object of the police becomes, at the end of the eighteenth century, the population” (Foucault 2002). The state comes to posit the population as the object of its policing, and, at the same time, intervene in each individual life to improve the life of the population. Then, the population was thought to constitute a natural and rational system “specific to relations between men, to what happens spontaneously when they cohabit, come together, exchange, work, and produce” (Foucault 2007). This natural and rational system was society. After the find of society, the policing of the population by the state could be pursued in more rational ways, and thereby the governmentality of the state was reinforced and legitimated in more effective ways.

From this angle, the emergence of the concept of society in modern Japan would be understood as the process to establish the governmentality of Japanese nation-state. The concept of society was initially discussed in the debate between theorists of “Emperor as national organ” (tennō kikansetsu) and of “Emperor as the sovereign” (tennō shukensetsu). Generally speaking, this debate is interpreted according to the schema of the opposition between the pro-democratic
camp and the imperial absolutist camp. Therefore, the organ theorists are regarded as the proponents of democracy, and in this sense they are assumed as the critics of the governmental power exercised by the state. However, interestingly, the concept of society was suggested by the organ theorists, and even became the major principle that underpinned the thought of Minpon-shugi (people oriented politics) and the movement of Taisho democracy. This paradox would be understood as follows: whereas the organ theorists or pro-democratic camp opposed the type of exercise of power supported by the sovereign theorists, they supported a different type of exercise of power.

In this essay, I shall roughly examine the problem of society mentioned above by looking at Minobe Tatsukichi’s discussion, and thereby contextualize Nishida Kitarō’s discussion of society in An Inquiry into Good (Zen no kenkyū). The book A Study of Good was published in 1911, and this means that this book was written precisely in the Taisho democratic atmosphere. In other words, the fact that this book discussed society showed the influence of the trend at that time upon Nishida, and in this sense the book would also contributed to the reinforcement of the Taisho democratic governmentality.

**Society, Organ Theory, and Taisho Democracy**

Minobe Tatsukichi was well-known as the major protagonist of the Theory of Emperor as National Organ (Tennō kikan-setsu), and this Organ Theory endorsed the trend of Taishō Democracy in terms of constitutional law. The primary concern of Minobe’s Organ Theory was how to interpret Article One of the Meiji Constitution, which defined the Emperor as the subject of government (tochi no shutai). Because of Article One, the sovereign theorists like Hozumi Yatsuka and Ueshugi Shinkichi argued that the Emperor had the prerogative to exercise his absolute power willingly. Minobe opposed to the interpretation by sovereign theorists, and tried to make the logic to limit the exercise of power by the Emperor.

In order to achieve this goal, Minobe argued that the most crucial question about the Emperor’s prerogative was to consider why
the Emperor’s power was exercised. To this question, Minobe answered that the power was exercised for the state; the state as the association of people. The state was the association of people who shared the same interest or purpose, and that the government of the state had to aim at enhancing such a collective purpose or interest.

What was the implication of this idea for Article One? According to Minobe, insofar as the state is the main actor in the exercise of governmental power, Article One does not define the absoluteness of the Emperor’s power; what Article One defines is that the Emperor is the “national organ” with exclusive entitlement (kengen) to exercise power in the name of the state. This means that although the Emperor is entitled to exercise power, he cannot exercise it for pursuing his private interests or purpose, but only for the collective interests or purpose of the state. Minobe stated:

However, the governmental power...should not be for the private profits of the Emperor, but for the [collective] purpose of all of the state. The operation of government should never be decided according to the Emperor’s personal will, but according to the state’s will. Thus, it is inappropriate to state that the governmental power resides with the Emperor. The governmental power resides with the state as the association which will exist eternally: the Emperor represents all of the state, and takes control of the governmental power, which resides with the state, according to the articles of the Constitution.

(Minobe 1913)

In other words, Minobe argued that the Constitution should be understood as the means to limit or regulate the power exercised by the Emperor.

Insofar as the Emperor has to exercise governmental power for pursuing the collective purpose or interests of the state as an association of the people, he needs to understand what it is. Here, Minobe paid attention to “society.” Minobe argues that whereas people seem to pursue their own interests in society, there should be a social interest which can subsume each individual interest, and this social interest
should be clarified through the mutual communication between individuals. He stated that:

In this sense, society can be defined as the [collective] life to pursue a particular collective interest, [which is formed] through the communication between many people: law should be based on society in this sense and rule the people in society. (Minobe 1948)

Minobe argued that legal rules, that is, the exercise of power according to the Constitution, should be grounded in society, which was envisaged vis-à-vis the state as the people’s association.

Despite his discussion seeming to endorse a democratic interpretation of the Constitution by limiting the Emperor’s prerogative, Minobe’s attention to society should be problematised. This is because, as Arendt and Foucault argue, society is utilized in order to rationalize the exercise of power. Hence, whereas Minobe would succeed to limit the absolutised power of the Emperor, he also found the ground of the exercise of governmental power. From the angle of Foucauldian governmentality, thus, Minobe’s Organ Theory should be understood as a theory, not to limit power per se, but to suggest another rational way to exercise power.

**Nishida Kitarō and Society**

Nishida also published his earliest major book, *An Inquiry into Good* (*Zen no kenkyū*), in the Taishō era. In this book, Nishida discussed the relationship between individual and society. He was also concerned with how the individual could be involved with society. He wrote:

As said earlier, true individuality is never reproachable nor does it necessarily conflict with society. But are people’s individualities independent, unrelated realities? Or are individuals all expression of a social self that functions at our base? ... I think that Aristotle
gets at an indisputable truth when he states at the beginning of his study of politics that people are social animals... When humans live in a community, a social consciousness necessarily functions to unify the consciousness of the members. Language, manners, customs, social system, laws, religion, and literature are all phenomena of this social consciousness. Our individual consciousnesses emerge from and are nurtured by it, and they are single cells that constitute this great consciousness. Knowledge, morality, and aesthetic taste all have social significance, and even the most universal human learning does not escape social convention.

(Nishida 1990)

For Nishida, the individual is fundamentally social, and even the “distinctive characteristics of an individual are simply variations that derive from the social consciousness at their base” (Nishida 1990). Therefore, the purpose of the nation-state should be understood as the completion of the individual self or personality: the individual self can achieve his/her true self only as a social self. Nishida argued that:

We individuals are entities that have developed as cells of one society. The essence of the nation is the expression of the communal consciousness that constitutes the foundation of our minds. In the context of the nation, we can accomplish a great development of personality; the nation is a unified personality, and the system and laws of the nation are the expression of the will of this communal consciousness. (This theory was set forth in antiquity by Plato and Aristotle and in modern times by Hegel.) To exert ourselves for the sake of a nation is to exert ourselves for the sake of the development and perfection of a great personality. (Nishida 1990)

Thus, Nishida emphasised the unity between individual and society or nation-state. In the context of the Oragn theory, this emphasis was thought to be comparable to Minobe’s discussions, because Nishida also argued that the nation-state existed not for the
absolutised sovereign, such as the Emperor, but for society, as the mass or unification of the people. However, whereas Nishida problematised the relationship between individual and society, curiously, he did not pay attention to the relationship between a self and “others”, who also constitute society altogether. That is, for Nishida, the unity between “social consciousness” as “a perfection of great personality” and an individual personality is thought to be experienced in the individual consciousness. This is because, in *A Study of Good*, Nishida argued that the unity can be experienced through “pure-experience” (*junsui-keiken*). Pure-experience is “identical with direct experience” (Nishida 1990), and “[w]hen one directly experiences one’s own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object are completely unified” (Nishida 1990). In other words, since the distinction between subject and object, or self and other, is initially nullified in “pure-experience”, there the existence of the other does not have to be taken into consideration. Therefore, Nishida could advocate the unity between society and the individual, but could not problematise the relationship between self and other. This means that he could neither grasp nor even problematise the differences and interplay between individual and individual.

**Conclusion**

Nishida’s discussion on society argued how society could be formed as a harmonious and homogeneous entity that perfectly subsumed and integrated individuals. As *An Inquiry into Good* was published in 1911, Nishida’s focus on society itself can be understood as under the influence of the Organ Theory and Taisho Democracy. Therefore, Nishida seemed to finally arrive at the same problematique of governmentality which had emerged in Minobe and Yoshino’s logic. Like Minobe and Yoshino, whose logic promoted a rational way to exercise power while dissenting from the absolutised Imperial sovereign power, Nishida’s logic seems to have made it possible to justify the exercise of power by focusing the immanent principle of society: that is the power of governmentality
References:


Producing the Genius in Japan: 
A New Perspective on Nishida’s Middle-Period Aesthetics

Kyle PETERS

The dominant approach to the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō often understands his work according to the comparative framework, where he is situated as a philosopher of the East-Asian tradition who appropriates concepts from his Zen Buddhist practice to dismantle misguided dualistic presuppositions in Western thought. While there are a number of virtues to understanding Nishida in this light, for example overcoming various Eurocentric tendencies and legitimating Japanese thought, there are also a number of problems. One of the most pernicious is the inevitable constraint of the discourse brought about through the reification of purported rigid boundaries between East and West. This East-West constraint regulates the way that we approach the work of Nishida thereby stultifying the horizon of our ideas and thus the construction of new discourses surrounding his groundbreaking work.

Such a constraint is concretized in the discourse surrounding Nishida’s aesthetics, where his conception of artistic performativity is often understood as the spontaneous expression \([hyōgen 表現]\) of the nothingness \([mu 無]\) embodied in the Zen spirit. While space constraints prevent in-depth analysis of those endemic and introduced artistic trends structuring Nishida’s account of aesthetics, this paper aims to balance the Buddhist-centricity of the secondary discourse by elucidating the Western references structuring Nishida’s conception of art. In doing so, it focuses on the theory of artistic performativity put forth in his middle period essay “Expressive Activity” \([Hyōgen sayō 表現の活動]\).

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Situating artistic production as a subset of expressive activity, this essay claims that the work of art is constituted by three elements: the expressed content, the expressive activity, and the expression itself, which respectively correspond to: the work of art’s reference, the function by which the work of art is linked to its reference, and the particular arrangement of the work of art in its own medium. The essay asks how meaning can be transmitted when the three constituent elements appear to be vastly independent.

Nishida begins by focusing on the production of meaning, stressing that artistic creation is not a subjective function by which ideas, emotions, and sentiments are manifested from the standpoint of the conscious self [ishiki jiko (意識自己)]. Nishida challenges the everyday assumption that there exists a causal relation between the intention of the artist, the meaning of the work of art, and the emotion that it incites in the spectator. In doing so, he explicitly draws upon Western figures like Konrad Adolph Fiedler. Fiedler claimed that artistic production takes part in a cognitive state which necessarily transcends conceptual understanding. Fiedler’s aesthetic cognition was a popular, psychologically grounded articulation of a much broader Kantian discourse. Since the time of Immanuel Kant, the conception of the artistic “genius” [genie], wholly unaware of the way in which they create art and the effect it will have on the spectator, has been circulating. This notion follows from the fact that no determinate rule can be provided for the work of art. In the Critique


3. It should be noted, however, that much of the argument rides on a distinction between art and language. Artistic expressive activity is proved to be possible if language is possible. This is because, unlike language, art is a relatively direct form of expressive activity in which the content expressed (the work of art’s reference) and the expression itself (the particular arrangement of the work of art) are tightly connected. Insofar as there is a greater distance between the meaning and the expression, language is a less direct and therefore more impressive form of expressive activity.


of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft] Kant distinguishes aesthetic judgments of taste from determining [bestimmend] judgments, the subject of the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft]. In determining judgments, the imagination filters the objects of representation through the understanding thereby applying concepts to each individual representation. But judgments of taste are reflective [reflektierend], and as such there is a suspension of the dominance of understanding over sensibility. Reflective judgments disrupt the power of the understanding to conceptually subsume the particular sensible presentation. Here, the faculties go into free play and the imagination searches for the principle of the sensuous in experience. The aesthetic experience constitutes an open space in which the sensible presentation is heterogeneous to conceptual allotments. Rather than creating from discursive concepts, the genius is a channel by which nature, a force outside of the realm of phenomena, presents itself.

But while Nishida develops a position influenced by the Kantian notion of the genius, he simultaneously rejects the notion that artistic production is an objective function by which one operates from the standpoint of the unchanging objective mind [kyakukanteki seishin (客観的精神)], an idea that he associates with certain German idealist thinkers. For Nishida, both the standpoints of the conscious self and the objective mind are born out of a more primordial act which stands as the one true reality. Like the Kantian genius, the artist transcends both the subjective position of our conscious self and the objective position of the objective mind thereby operating from the more primordial standpoint of the supraconscious self [chōishikitekijiko (超意識的自己)]. Using this more fundamental standpoint, Nishida claims that subjectivity is submerged into objectivity in artistic production. This is not an endorsement of the objective mind discussed above, but rather it is the recognition that when subjectivity is born, the objective is objectified as objective for that subjectivity. Nishida often refers to objectification qua subjectification [kyakkan soku shukan (客観即主)]


and subjectification qua objectification \([shukan soku kyakkan (主観即客観)\)], arguing that without the subjective there is no objective. His point is that when one submerges the subjective self into the objective, both subjectivity and objectivity drop and they operate from the supraconscious self, the one true reality as action. At this more primordial standpoint, subject and object are unified and there is just the act, which is the basis for artistic production.

Because Nishida articulates this more primordial standpoint according to an act ontology, many commentators note affinities with Eastern, primarily Buddhist, philosophy. They strengthen these connections through an appeal to the lexicon fleshed out in the immensely popular essay \(Basho [Place (場所)]\), written a year later. The terminology used in this later essay, describing the act as constituting the most fundamental \(basho\) of true nothing \([shin no mu no basho (真の無の場所)]\), lends itself particularly well to comparisons with Japanese Zen Buddhism, Chinese Daoism, and Indian Madhyamaka philosophy. Nishida no doubt understood the Eastern associations attached to this vocabulary, and such comparisons appropriately highlight the non-dualistic, non-intentional, unified dimensions that Nishida shares with “traditional” Eastern accounts of reality and art. But it is important to recognize that these do not fully account for the influences structuring Nishida’s thought. The notions of both expressive activity and \(basho\) were both influenced by Western thinkers like Plato and Plotinus. \(Basho\), for example, partially developed out of the conception of \(chōra\) put forth in Plato’s \(Timaeus\). Moreover, the undifferentiated notion of pure experience \([junsui keiken (純粋経験)]\), of which \(basho\) and expressive activity are said to be less psychological formulations, has roots in Schopenhauer’s notion of the will, as a

letter from 1902 demonstrates.\(^{13}\)

The influence of Western references is also seen in the account of artistic spectatorship advanced in “Expressive Activity.” Insofar as this essay is primarily about the production of meaning Nishida only briefly deals with this point, claiming that we see art because we see from this primordial standpoint.\(^{14}\) We can, however, reconstruct Nishida’s ideas using his first book, *An Inquiry into the Good* [*zen no kenkyū* (善の研究)]. Nishida:

> In direct experience, there is only one independent, self-sufficient fact; if there is not a subject that sees then there is not an object that is seen. Just like when our minds are caught by exquisite music, we forget our nature and physical things, and we experience the universe as one resounding sound, this moment – what is called pure reality – presents itself.\(^{15}\)

To couch this in Nishida’s middle period lexicon, when one listens to music, reads a book, or in general looks at art, their attention is drawn out from its abstractedly felt location in the subjective perceiving “I,” the conscious self, into the object itself. Here, we transcend the intellectual dominance of ordinary experience as in the free play outlined by Kant. For Nishida, when we look at art, consciousness transitions to the supraconscious self. From the standpoint of the supraconscious self, where one transcends their subjective position against the music as an object thereby overcoming the intellectual, subject-object opposition, experience becomes one melodious sound. Here, consciousness is in the song itself, and our subjective, intentionally directed attention drops away. In such a transition to the supraconscious self, the materiality of

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the music dissipates and, rather than attending to the physical sound waves, meaning is carried by the song itself.\textsuperscript{16} The movement away from the abstracted, subjectively conscious self which is intentionally directed to the object accompanies such a departure from the sheer physicality of the sound wave to the supraconscious realm of activity.

My point is not that Japanese Zen Buddhism had absolutely no influence on the work of Nishida. Rather, my point is that Nishida’s philosophy is not reducible to the Buddhist, Japanese, nor Zen frameworks. And further, that when these act as procedures governing our inquiry, we exclude important dimensions of his philosophy. In this paper I have highlighted the western dimensions structuring Nishida’s account of art, thereby taking \textit{one of the initial steps} that is necessary to properly situate his aesthetic theory in both endemic and introduced aesthetic trends.

Practice of Buddhism:
Zazen or a Compassionate Heart

Xue RUI

All sorts of Buddhist practice are in the pursuit of Buddha nature or enlightenment. The question is how.

As Professor Ishida interprets Dōgen’s favourite note— ‘A flower’s blooming is the entire world’s coming into being’— Buddha nature is not contained in certain bodies, but things ARE Buddha nature. Buddha nature is not something outside but inside. The idea shares the consensus with another basic notion of Buddhism that everyone can become a Buddha. Now that everyone is to some extent an inherent Buddha, the critical problem is that how people discover such heritage inside themselves and wake up the covered nature. Then here comes the necessity of practicing Buddhism.

Meditation is now a prevalent practice, among which Zazen (Zen Meditation) is a way to pursue enlightenment in Zen Buddhism.

Zen Buddhism practiced in the way of sitting meditation emphasizes a unity compounded by nature and individual. While doing Zazen, one sits and absorbs himself into the surroundings, focusing on his breath. Enlightenment will come. Enlightenment in Zen Buddhism is not something transcendent but wandering around. It is there, above one’s head in the air. Whereas, instead of thinking about when one can be enlightened, one should find it more essential to concentrate on the very present moment. As Dōgen remarks that time is origination, every moment is absolute, irreplaceable and eternal. Professor Ishida further points out that self, world, Buddha-nature, being and time are inseparable. In short, it can be concluded as the key perspective of Dōgen, here and now. Zazen, intensively carried out and supported by Dōgen materialized the pivotal belief, and Zazen itself is a sort of enlightenment.

Meditation brings people fantastic experience, including inner
peace and extraordinary interaction between oneself and the outside world, but sometimes it is a very isolated conduct as well. One does not need to communicate with others nor expose himself to society. However, considering Zen Buddhism is regarded as Mahayana, one would possibly wonder how the world view of Zen Buddhism supports its meditation.

As commonly presumed, Mahayana takes saving all suffering living beings in the world as its ultimate goal. Taking this aspect into account, Zazen remains weak as a practice of Mahayana Buddhism. When asked, Monk Miyagawa from Tentokuji Temple clarified that, because Zen or Zazen can be generally recommended to the public, it extends itself to society. To make it clearer, he added, Zazen as a movement going backward to one’s own heart does not require particular efforts. Everyone can sit down, adjust his or her breath and do meditation. It is this very accessibility that makes Zen Buddhism Mahayana. Although it is not clearly stated in Dōgen’s works, saving others through Zen Buddhism is still contained in the practice. Unlike Tibetan Buddhism, saving all suffering creatures in Zen Buddhism is implemented through an indirect approach, according to Monk Miyagawa. Taking donating food to the poor as an example, it resembles giving a man fish, while suggesting doing Zazen to perceive peace is teaching a man how to fish. Monk Miyagawa so referred to the old saying, ‘Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day, but teach a man how to fish and he will be fed for a lifetime.’

Apart from Zazen, there is one more frequently mentioned Buddhist practice that is less solo and can definitely form connections among people. Having a compassionate heart, to be specific, doing good deeds and helping others, is the alternative. Its theoretical root lies in another fundamental notion of Buddhism, that is, karma.

*Karma and the Great Compassion*

Karma, particularly in Tibetan Buddhism, is a law of all sorts of mutual causation of actions and explains every cause and effect. Karma is a circulation of human actions, thoughts and words. As long as one
has consciousness then karma is with him/her. One dies with Karma, experiences the cycling of rebirth while his/her karma improves or worsens. It is a record of one’s existence.

When we examine how karma works, the similarity between this basic Buddhism notion and the idea 因果同時 (simultaneity of cause and result) in Sōtō Zen comes to be manifest. Karma is simultaneously cause and result, for different deeds. For instance, what one is going through at the moment is the result of what he/she has done before and the cause of what one is going to experience later on. Nevertheless, the ‘before’ and ‘later’ used here are not simply referring to early years in one’s childhood and later years at one’s deathbed. To broaden the time span, one’s reward can be paid in the next life while present suffering can be punishment for misbehaviours in the past life.

Quite obviously, karma is a reflection on people’s daily deeds. Since no one can ever undo what he or she has done before, karma has a rather enduring impact on human beings. However, karma does not encourage or forbid people to do anything. Phelps (2004, p.103) argues karma simply describes the natural process of cause and consequences. Despite the neutrality, the premise of the law of Karma does suggest that the universe is not merely physical, but also moral (Phelps 2004). But how does karma motivate people to practice Buddhism and in what way people practice?

An old Chinese proverb helps to reveal the correlation. The one 行善积德, literally meaning conduct kind deeds, accumulate virtues, illustrates the most raw idea that Chinese link committing good deeds with developing oneself. It is the same idea as ‘one good turn deserves another.’ When one is helping others, he/she obtains good virtues or positive karma. Therefore, karma gets people to see a motivation to take responsibility for their own deeds and associate with their own benefits in relation to themselves and others. Now that helping others is helping oneself, people are given more incentives to behave kindly in their social life.

In addition, conducting good deeds, a reflection of a compassionate heart leads people to Buddha nature.

Another saying in Chinese gives a clue. People who help others profoundly, in ancient China, nowadays also, are called 活菩
萨/活佛 (living Bodhisattva/Buddha) which means by helping others, one is practicing Buddhism. Since Buddha is known for his Great Compassion, following Buddha’s teachings, being compassionate, one is Buddha himself. It goes along with the every-man-can-be-a-Buddha belief exactly. As this example shows, to attain great wisdom and learn to be Buddha, one should first try to have a compassionate heart. A compassionate heart can also be viewed as one’s attitude towards the relationship between one and the world. Exposing oneself to the outside is likely to be dangerous. As one devotes himself to interactions between human beings, he inevitably poses himself to be vulnerable. However, without this sort of vulnerability, one cannot truly connect others, not to mention offering others assistance. There is no one who gets hurt not caring about others, vice versa. Vulnerability is anything but a weakness. It comes with the compassionate heart and is a strength for exposing oneself to the outside requires tremendous courage.

Naturally, we see the role that relationality plays in this context. People who practice Buddhism are seeking the meaning of their lives in the interaction with others.

Maintaining a compassionate heart and doing good deeds can also be the answer to a famous philosophical question: is Buddha dead?

In order to examine the connection, we may first look at Zhuangzhou’s reaction to his wife’s death. As we know, Zhuangzhou’s singing for the death of his wife is taking death as part of nature. Professor Ames commented ‘to die and not to perish (not be forgotten) is to be long lived’ on Zhuangzhou’s unusual attitude towards death. So long as remembered, people who have passed away are still alive. People who are alive extend the life of the dead in their own being. Therefore, death as a transformation is not only in the sense concerning diverse forms of existence but transformation of the bodies of existence. Applying this to the death of the Buddha, as long as there are people in the current world still following Buddha’s principles, spreading Buddha’s teachings, behaving themselves with great compassion, Buddha is not dead. His teachings are passed on. He lives inside and among us.

To sum up, in order to practice Buddhism, one cannot cut oneself from people around. The only way to acquire good karma and commit Buddha deeds is to reach oneself out to the outside world,
which makes this practice more valuable in a social context. Keeping a compassionate heart just as the Buddha did is a natural practice based on the understanding of karma. Unlike indicated in Zen Buddhism, conducting good deeds holds a closer connection with people around and shows more apparent characteristics according to which can categorize Tibetan Buddhism into Mahayana.

**Conclusion**

Walpola Rahula (1978, p.46) notes that, ‘according to Buddhism, for a man to be perfect, there are two qualities that he should develop equally: compassion on the one side and wisdom on the other.’ The Buddha himself is the embodiment of both Great Compassion and Great wisdom. When the Buddha and Buddhist masters look at other living beings, the great wisdom enables them to see through delusions and misconceptions. Holding great compassion, the Buddha and masters devote themselves to teaching us to have the same compassionate attitudes. It requires not only sympathy but wisdom to have a compassionate heart.

Differing in the aspects of approaching Buddha nature and enlightenment, practice of Zen Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism consist of two crucial perspectives of Buddhist practice. People achieve wisdom by practising spiritual disciplines, such as meditation and chanting (Phelps 2004). And to develop compassion for all living beings and to work for their good, happiness and peace is another purpose of life of Buddhists (Rahula, 1974).

More importantly, both Zen meditation and having a compassionate heart are so accessible that everyone can fully take the Buddhist practice as an inseparable part of his/her daily life. This remarks the incredibility of the practice of Buddhism most.

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Nishida Kitarō and Ifa Fuyū: Respective Ideas of 'The Empire of Japan'

Sana SAKIHAMA

Introduction

When we consider the relationship between the one and the many, we can refer to the rich discussion in Japanese philosophy. Needless to say, Nishida Kitarō is one of the most famous philosophers who struggled with this problem. He finally resolved this difficult question by inventing his original idea: 'absolute contradictory self-identity.' This idea enabled him to describe the world in a new way. According to Nishida, the world is harmonious though it is filled with contradictions. It is important that Nishida did not try to eliminate the contradictions. It can be said that it was his original insight that one could let the contradictions remain. For this reason, there was a great possibility to describe a world which is filled with multiplicity. But at the same time, his philosophy was dangerous because it was easily able to support the logic of 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.' For this reason, we may say that Nishida's philosophy is ambivalent. He never gave up to remain multiplicity, but for this reason, he ironically provided legitimacy for imperialism.

In 1911, when Nishida published his masterpiece An Inquiry into the Good (Zen no Kenkyū), the book named Ancient Ryūkyū (Ko-Ryūkyū) which announced to the world the birth of Okinawan Studies was written by Ifa Fuyū. He is called 'the father of Okinawan Studies' because he is the first person who studied Okinawan history, linguistic, and folklore integrally. He is also known as a theorist who advocated 'NichiRyū Dōso-ron (日琉同祖論),' which is the theory upholding that the Okinawan people and the Japanese people have the same
ancestor. The evaluation of his theory splits into two main arguments. People who uphold Ifa (Oguma 1998, Ōshiro 1976, Ōta 1976, Hiyane 1981) insist that he tried to maintain the uniqueness of Okinawa by his theory. According to these opinions, Ifa tried to keep Okinawa's culture as one piece of the Empire regarding the 'Empire of Japan' as an ideal state. On the contrary, there are arguments (Arakawa 1971, 1973) that insist that Ifa promoted the assimilation of Okinawa into Japan. We can also see the ambivalence in Ifa as in Nishida.

By the way, it is interesting that both of them refer to a book named *The World and the Individual* written by an American philosopher Josiah Royce when they discuss the problem of the one and the many (Nishida 2003a, Ifa 1974). I am not going to analyze in detail the relationship between Nishida and Royce or Ifa and Royce, but this fact is quite suggestive when we examine how Nishida and Ifa considered 'Empire of Japan.' In this essay, I would like to ask a question as follows: why did their philosophy result in the support of 'Empire of Japan' at the last moment? Here I would like to emphasize that we cannot easily criticize them from a one-sided view. But at the same time we should not pass over the question mentioned above because of their ambivalence. I hope that I can search for a clue to overcome the problem of Nishida and Ifa through this essay.

*'The Empire of Japan' for Nishida Kitarō*

In this section, I would like to examine the relationship between Nishida's viewpoint of 'The Empire of Japan' and the concept of 'absolute contradictory self-identity.' First, let me see the citation from Nishida on imperialism.

Today, the world has become one world. The rise of mechanical industry which comes from the development of science and capitalism realized this situation. Becoming one world means the negation of the subject. Therefore, when the world becomes one by extinguishing absolute contradictory self-identity, one subject represents the world. This means that one nation governs
the world. Imperialism comes from such a situation. In this case, the temporary peace will be maintained when the one nation has strong power. Such a situation is realized by making slaves of other nations. This is the corruption of human-beings. And it will be impossible to maintain such a power forever. When many nations rise, war must break out, which will bring the destruction of the culture of human-being. (Nishida 2004, pp. 76-7.)

From this citation, we find that Nishida looked at imperialism with critical eyes. Nishida elucidates the mechanism of the sham oneness produced by imperialism. He points out that the peace realized by imperialism is no more than temporary, and this temporary peace must cause the break out of war some day.

When we consider the realization of the true oneness, there seems to be two choices. The one is that we search for another way to realize the true oneness rather than imperialism. And the other is that we give up pursuing such unity. The former attitude evaluates the unity as an ultimate value, but the latter attitude does not. Nishida’s attitude was the former one. He never gave up pursuing the realization of the true oneness. We may understand that he invented the concept of 'absolute contradictory self-identity' to reconcile the world it was with the world that should have been.

The real world must be the world in which things interact. The real figure is supposed to appear from the interrelationship

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1. My translation.
between things. But the fact that something acts must mean that something negates itself. The fact that things interact and construct one world must mean that a thing is a part of one world. [...] The real world must be one of many. The real world must be a world of inter-limitation between a thing and another. Therefore, I say that the real world is an absolute contradictory self-identity. (Nishida 2003b, p. 367.)²

But his philosophical invention ended up providing legitimacy to 'the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.' He received the request from the government and wrote an essay titled Principle of the World New Order (Sekai shinchitsujo no genri). In this short essay, Nishida tried to differentiate 'the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' from western imperialism. According to him (Nishida 2005), western imperialism is based on the self-centered nationalism. This kind of imperialism ends up in the invasion of other nations. The true unity must contain individuals in it. To realize such unity, we must consist 'a universal universe;' he considered that 'Co-prosperity Sphere' is a mediator of the one and the many.

‘The Empire of Japan’ for Ifa Fuyū

When we think about Nishida’s problem, it might be useful to refer to another thinker of the same age. Ifa Fuyū, who was a pioneer of Okinawan Studies, also had the same attitude as Nishida. Ifa tried to regard 'the Empire of Japan' as an ideal state which could realize the true oneness. He developed the very same theory as Nishida. It might

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2. My translation. 現実の世界とは物と物との相働く世界でなければならな

い。現実の形は物と物との相互関係と考へられる、相働くことによって

出来た結果と考へられる。併し物が働くと雲ふことは、物が自已自身を

否定することでなければならない、物といふものがなくって行くこと

でなければならない。物と物と相働くことによって一つの世界を形成

すると雲ふことは、逆に物が一つの世界の部分と考へられることでなけ

ればならない。[...] 現実の世界は何処までも多の一でなければならない、

個物と個物との相互限定の世界でなければならない。故に私は現実の

世界は絶対矛盾的自已同一といふのである。
be because Ifa, like Nishida, was also strongly influenced by Royce. But we have to pay attention to the difference between Nishida and Ifa. It is ironic that Ifa tried to regard 'the Empire of Japan' as an ideal state because he actually recognized the violence of assimilative policy of the Empire. In the essay titled The *Trend of the History of Ryūkyū (Ryūkyūshi no sūsei)*, he tried to resist the assimilative power.

I think that the Okinawan people can become a main part of the Empire of Japan by showing the common nature [with the Japanese people]. If there is a person who tries to destroy the original things of Ryukyu, it means that he destroys the spiritual chain which connects Ryukyu and Japan. It can be said that he ignores the history. Though it is necessary that the Okinawan people show the common nature [with the Japanese people], but it is also important to show the uncommon nature. (Ifa 1975, p. 10.)

This logic usually called as 'NichiRyū Dōso-ron (日琉同祖論).’ Referring to Royce, Ifa (1975, p. 10) insists that the Okinawan people have to maintain their uniqueness. Ifa (1975, p. 11) thought that the assimilation of Okinawa into Japan is neither more nor less than a mental suicide.

Since Ifa did not simply emphasized the common points of Okinawa and Japan, 'NichiRyū Dōso-ron (日琉同祖論)' have been considered as his strategy to maintain the uniqueness of Okinawa (Oguma 1998, Ōshiro 1976, Ōta 1976, Hiyane 1981). But we cannot overlook the negative dimension of his theory. Arakawa (1971, 1973) indicated that Ifa’s theory had led the Okinawan people to become the subjects of the Emperor of Japan. According to Arakawa, however

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3. *My translation.* 私は沖縄人がこの一致してゐる所を大に発揮させるといふことは即沖縄人をして有力なる日本帝国の一成分たらしむる所以のものであろうと存じます。もしもこれまでの精力で琉球固有の者をかたつばからぶちこはさうとする人があつたら、これとりあわず両民族の間に於ける精神的連鎖を断切るのであります。歴史を無視するのであります。只今申上げた通り一致してゐる点を発揮させることはもとより必要なことで御座いますが、一致してゐない点を発揮させることも亦必要かも知れません。
hard the Okinawan people try to maintain their uniqueness, to ask for the equal rights to the Japanese people, is nothing but an attitude to make themselves subjects which brings a result that Okinawan people sacrifice themselves.

Conclusion

What can we learn from Nishida and Ifa? It is quite important that two of them had never denied the value of the individuals. This fact is a complication for us to try to overcome their problem. If their philosophy suppressed the individuals, the situation would be a little easier. Nishida (2005) strongly emphasized that 'the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' did not kill the individuals but gave vigorous lives to them. As Kawamura (2013) indicated, it is troublesome that Nishida's universalism strangely supported the Japanese imperial nationalism. Here we may say that Nishida could keep the universal attitude because he did not face actualities. His ultimate goal was to realize the true unity by the concept of 'absolute contradictory self-identity.' But we have to say that it was the world that should have been, it was never the world it was. The world it was was filled with the battles, and there were people who sacrifice others and people who were sacrificed by others. Nishida had already noticed this fact, but he did not seriously consider this problem. Ifa experienced the feeling of being oppressed directly, but he never openly criticized the Empire.

We can say that the common point of Nishida and Ifa is that the two of them describe the ideal world instead of describing the real world. I do not would like to say that it is not good to imagine an ideal world. I rather consider that the imagination is the most important when we try to change the world better. But at the same time, we do not have to forget to look at what is going on in our real world. It might be needed to visualize the contradictions before we try to realize the true unity.
References:


Introduction

When one is strolling on the quiet beach of a little island in Indonesia in the early morning, one would recognize not only a relaxing sound of waves quietly washing the beach but also a rhythmical sound of a palm-leave-broom sweeping the trash and debris left overnight. The once good tradition of local people’s habit in cleaning the beach is somehow turning into a nightmare in maintaining the clean beach. Why? Isn’t it good to sweep and clean the beach on daily bases? The key is how the local residents are treating the debris and trash after the sweeping. Traditionally it was the Mother Nature who took care of all the debris and trash with its slow decomposing process, thus human had to only dig a little hole on the beach and bury the collected trash for the nature to take care of them. However in this era of new human-made materials such as plastic bags and non-compostable substances, debris and trash have turned into something that Nature cannot take care of any more.

It seems that our innocent trust in nature that she will take care of our doings is ironically leading to environmental pollution. And there seems to be no cultural difference in such simple trusting attitude and dependence on nature, as we see in the situation of international river Elbe in Europe in 1980s (Netzband, 2002) or in the Mediterranean (Haas, 1989) or the much recent PM2.5 air pollutants (Zheng, 2005) affecting other East Asian countries (Batjargal, 2006) that Environment Ministers of Korea, China and Japan has recently started discussion regarding trans-boundary air pollutants (TEMM).
In this short essay, I would like to argue about the human and nature relationship in regard to the complexity of ‘Amae’ and ‘Enryo’ (Doi, 1971).

**Environmental ethics as Western studies?**

When we look at the textbooks on environmental ethics (Pojman, 2012) (Kato, 2005) and read the history of the development of its study field, one would always tend to have an impression that the idea of preservation or conservation of natural environment developed only after the industrial revolution and it evolved mainly in the U.S. and in the U.K. with its earlier movement be traced back in the late 1800s. One will also be surprised that the Western environmental ethics has developed well enough as to give “rights” to nature as we see in Stone’s argument (Stone, 1972). The reason to this West-centric development of environmental ethics might derive from the early development and taking off of the economy and industry in the Western society. However it is only in the 1960s that the environmental ethics drew academic interests stimulated with Rachel Carlson’s book (Carlson, 1962) on anthropogenic environmental pollution driven by chemicals such as DDT, which drew huge social concern. Till then, environmental ethics were more for the selected people, well-educated as to discuss the conservation of the wilderness (Thoreau, 1848). These facts draws an understanding that for the environmental ethics to be counted as an academic research, people first had to face the severe deterioration of natural environment which was severe enough to become as a social problem, leading the majority of people to realize the importance of natural environment and the underlying ethics that shows the alternative way of thinking in the usage and exploitation of the natural resources.

In Japanese society on the other hand, also has its scholars writing precisely about the importance of conservation of natural environment, such as Minakata Kumagusu (1867-1941) who is known as biologist as well as an activist to protect Japanese forests from shrine consolidation regulations (1906). When we look into Japanese
history, during Edo period, Japan somewhat managed in stabilizing the population and found a sustainable farming, forest management and recycling technique (Brown, 2013). However the carefully weaved balance between human and nature was deteriorated gradually in accordance with the Japanese modernization. Though Japan enjoys its notion as ‘nature loving’ nation, it faced a severe environmental pollution from industries which led to pollution disease during the 1960s and 70s (Higuchi, 1981). What is interesting is that the scholars at that time paid not much attention on ethical aspect but focused more on technological and scientific research that actually deals directly with environmental problem. There are scholars such as philosopher Watsuji Tetsurou (Watsuji, 1935), scientist Imanishi Kinji (Imanishi, 1972) and anthropologist Umesao Tadao (Umesao, 1974) who took nature as an important issue for human to reconsider culture. However we have to wait for Umehara Takeshi (Umehara, 1995) for the ethical aspect to be pointed out in relation to religion. This is a queer phenomenon we see, that scholars in Japan compared to the Western scholars took much practical action rather than jumping into environment ethics when facing one of the negative aspect of our modern society, environmental pollution. Why didn’t environment ethics emerge in Japan till recently?

Are West and East divide important?

My major research topic on the relationship of human and nature easily leads to and make believe the scholars that the cultural difference or the religion as underlying ethics is the key to the perceptual difference of nature between East and West (Callicott, 1994). My first understanding was as such too, that the Christianity together with the idea of “stewardship” easily leads to the over exploitation of nature with the notion of human as a steward of nature, therefore it is the given right for human to practically and efficiently use the natural resources for the human benefit and welfare. On the other hand, Buddhism or Daoism has a more holistic view towards human surroundings that there lies a harmonious notion between human
and nature, and based on ancient animism like religion, ecologically egalitarian view has been developed way before the Western catch-up as we saw in giving “rights” to nature (Stone, 1972).

However, when we turn our back to “academic” debate on variation of environmental view based on cultural difference and jump back to the current actual on-going debate in the international society on global environmental issues, we realize that there lies quite different axe that is dividing the world into two, which is the divide between developing and developed countries, North and South. Surely in the 1970s and 80s when the global environmental issue arose, it was “natural” to divide the world into East and West, taking the West-centric idealism and industrial revolution combined as one successful development path that all other developing nations will follow (this worldview can be seen in Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory developed in the 1970s. After the development of global history studies, the worldview has changed to core-periphery theory, which does not stress the superiority of the Western culture as to the Eastern culture). In regard to the environmental international agreements, which most of them were under negotiation in the late 1980s till 90s are differentiating the necessary action taken by developed and developing countries; North and South. However this divide has already been outdated in early 2000s, as we see in the rapid economic growth and its related growing environmental concerns and impact in the emerging countries (the global warming gas emission trends shows that China exceeded U.S. and became the largest global warming gas emitting country from 2008). Though we are facing a rapid change in our global environment, it seems there still remains a twisted worldview of East and West, North and South divide, a mythical legend from human history.

Fernand Braudel in his view on history leveled the concept of ‘time’ in three layers; the first level as geographical time (la longue durée) which is that of environment, nature and structure, such as climate (Braudel, 1949). The second level as rapid change compared to the climate change but long-term social, economic and cultural history such as empires and civilization. The third level of layer is the most rapid change which focuses on individual, events and politics (histoire
événementielle, courte durée). When we apply Braudel’s concept on the human attitude toward nature, I think the attitude based on cultural difference might be the third layer, whilst the second layer is on milieux, difference based on climate, as Watsuji and succeeding Augustin Berque is arguing. The first level is on something more universal, which is more a habitual human response toward nature that is not affected by culture neither climate.

**Amae and Enryo as the habitual concept for human toward nature**

When we focus on the first level of the human attitude toward nature, we see not much importance in differentiating East and West, North and South, but the essential human attitude toward nature appears. Based on this assumption, what could be the underlying implication that could be drawn from such perspective? If we look the human tendency toward nature based on a universal view, instead of further looking into culture based environment ethical view and discuss on its difference and variance, we may be able to create a totally different standpoint of the human view on nature, which might lead to a new perspective in understanding the human and nature relationship. By making this argument, I would also like to look into the possibility of Philosophy responding further to resolve the global environmental problem.

In the ‘Anatomy of Amae’ theory, Doi defined Amae (dependence) mentality as the attempt to deny the fact of separation from mother which is an inseparable part of human existence, and yet to obliterate the pain of separation. Enryo (reserved, modest) as an inverted form of Amae, used as negative yardstick in measuring the intimacy of human relationships, works as gauge for distinguishing between inner (relatives, miuchi) and outer (stranger, tanin). The absence of Enryo is due to Amae, that Enryo and Amae relationship can be diagrammed in a concentric circle. When the relationship is close to inner world, there appears Amae. However more remote the relationship gets, the more Enryo appears and Amae fades away. In applying this concept to relationship between human and nature, Amae would be interpreted
as exploitation, dependence or the use of nature, whereas *Enryo* would be interpreted as controlled reaction toward nature, most of the time associated with awe, wonder and respect.

The relationship of human nature is an inverted model (Fig.1) from Doi’s original model, that the closer and tense the relationship with nature becomes, there appears the “sense of awe” in human. As we see in every culture, in East and West, in North and South, there seems to be the ancient animism type relationship with nature (e.g. Yaorozu no Kami in Japan, Roman and Greek Gods and Goddess in the West). Because of this “sense of awe” toward nature, there is a tacit understanding (or unspoken agreement) not to over-exploit the mother-nature but utilize them in the ecologically fit, sustainable way (1), which is an *Enryo* attitude toward nature. However when the nature is thought as being “under-control”, when the density of nature becomes sparse enough as to let the human sense it as “controllable”, suddenly human starts over-exploiting them (2). As we can see in the modern world, this over-exploitation leads to unsustainable way that does not let the nature take care of itself: where ecological reproduction or ecological purification of the contamination cannot take place any more, as we are witnessing in our current society. At this point we suddenly start *Amae* to the environment forgetting the reproductive or re-purification rate embedded in the nature itself. The irony is that this stage let the modernization happen.
Once we over-exploited all the surrounding natural resources that we acquired at relatively low cost, we start feeling the sense of remoteness toward the once abundant but now scarce nature. Paradoxically this environmental change turns the notion toward nature to *Enryo* again, leading to the want and the necessity of preservation and conservation of the nature (3). By utilizing this diagram we can get to assume the reason why modern Western environment ethics developed earlier compared to that of Japan, as I have argued in upper section. Western society as a society may have perceived that they have already over-exploited their nature that they needed a radical shift from *Amae* (2) to *Enryo* (3), whilst Japan took another few decades as to realize the necessity of the shift, thus latent of the elaboration in environment ethics. It could be assumed that it is not the outcome of a deep Western philosophical mind but the surrounding condition of nature and a docile human response to nature’s condition making the environment ethics deepen its study field.

**Conclusion**

This short essay is a mere attempt to critically analyze the current style of environment ethics considering the importance of diverse view on nature based on culture and climate. By utilizing Braudel’s three layer of time concept in history and Doi’s psychological analysis on *Amae* and *Enryo*, my argument is rather an attempt in finding the universal human tendency or habitual response toward nature. I think without such consideration, under the globalization and the emerging global environment issue, it would be difficult for human to reconsider on righteous relationship with nature for our sustainable future.

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Cultivating Shades of Emptiness:  
Experiencing the Aesthetic Locality of a Decentered Japan

Ryan SHRIVER

Preliminary Remarks

The intent of what follows is to weave together themes from the sessions of the 2013 UTUH Institute for Comparative Philosophy with the travels and experiences of the participants that summer. The aim is to create a sense or a texture that translates what we learned through what we did and to gather some ideas and patterns of thinking with observations that arose from our day to day interactions and discussions. The desired outcome is to harmonize the personal with the group, the particular with the general. In any work there is always a tinge of the subjective, a degree of the personal. This does not in turn deteriorate into the ultimate privacy of experience and prevent generalizations into the sphere of others. We are not closed off. There is the possibility of weaving the personal and the public, the focus and the field and thus to generate an atmosphere of knowing and meaning that can be at once mine and ours. It is this atmosphere that this essay seeks to generate.

This project is not towards comparative philosophy. It is not setting up some defined quintessence of Japan to be compared with ‘the West.’ It is simply meant to be a piece of philosophy bringing out some depth of experience. The major themes that extend throughout the work are ‘decenteredness’ and ‘locality.’ It is these two threads which will serve to characterize the evident patterns of orientation for negotiating Japan. In the first part of the essay Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎), one of the prominent philosophers discussed in the Institute, and his notion of the ‘continuity of discontinuities’ (非連続の連続)
finds concrete exemplifications in the local aesthetics of maps, stations, and the districts of Tōkyō.

The medieval Buddhist philosopher Dōgen (道元) also played a major role in the dynamics of the Institute. In the second part of this essay his philosophy of ‘uji’ or being-time (有時) i.e, the inseparability of being and time and the fullness of the moment in the immediate presencing of things, finds particular content and articulation in the restless, anticipatory musings from within the temple of Dōgen’s founding and final resting place. While not engaging in detailed analysis of the theories and technicalities of Nishida and Dōgen, the hope for the work at hand is to show how some aspects of their thought shone through our experience and thereby to exemplify how these philosophies are seen and become evident in some actual lived, concrete experiences of the land from which they sprouted.

Tōkyō as Decentered Localization

A remarkable thing about travelling around the various districts of Tōkyō is the inevitable encounter with street maps. They are outside of train stations, on street corners, dotted throughout historical districts and around various points of interest. In such encounters there is an exceptional example of a decentered localized logic. No map is alike, not in its orientation, scale or general aesthetic. In new maps and old, each map approached is a fresh and localized experience that requires particular orientation specific to that map encountered. The logic, or way of interpreting one map by no means carries over to the next. Rather than the unified universal grid centered by the cardinal directions with a consistency of aesthetic character, key of symbols and scale between maps and thereby centering the negotiation of the cityscape around one logic or pattern that reigns over all localities such that deciphering the logic of one map is to decipher them all, the proper orientation for each map arises out of what is relevant in that particular district. Thus the characterization of decentered refers to the lack of universal grid or logic. The term localized is meant to characterize from whence the orientation arises in that absence. Between maps there are
various orientations regarding the cardinal directions. For one, north will be on the right side and with another it will be at the bottom. The compass rose is spun each time a new map is approached if it is there at all. There is no uniform scale from map to map, so while an inch may be one mile on a map in the antique book district of Jinbōchō, in the shopping district of Harajuku an inch may only be 100 meters. Each place has its own localized system of orientation that grows out of the particularity of the place itself. North, South, East and West are not as helpful as that particular billboard or the color of the side of that building. Its logic and use are locally enclosed. The approach is specific to that experience, in that place. This phenomenon exemplifies a decentered, localized approach to orientation and its aesthetic embodiment in the map's resultant aesthetic.

Considering the phenomenon of 'levels' in the Tōkyō cityscape one comes upon a lack of 'ground' i.e. the fundamental level by which other levels are determined. This becomes clear when negotiating rail stations, malls and temples. Within the crowded station of Tōkyō central or the shopping mecca of Sun City in Ikebukuro, one may ask a local or visitor alike at any given point whether one is above or below ground and the answer is usually the two-fold reply that one cannot be sure and that this fact is irrelevant. At times the ground is at once above and below you, as if one could pass through an exit after going either up or down one story and end up at ground level, outside. No level is primary; the ground is not the ground, or rather there are several grounds, depending on where you are and what you are doing. Between places, localities and logics become plural, partial and fragmented.

One may witness this in the individuality and particularity of the general aesthetic atmospheres found in each of the districts that make up Tōkyō. The skyscrapers and neon in the bustle of Shinjuku do not blend into the peaceful lake, park and nostalgic thoroughfares of Kichijōji. The madness and glitter of Shibuya contrast to the peaceful commonality of Ōchanomizu and a day spent in the maze of shopping malls in Ikebukuro is quite unlike one spent among the flashy streets of electronica found in Akihabara. This phenomenon of aesthetic difference displays the decentered and localized pattern of orientation at the heart of Tōkyō's on-going creative becoming.
Thus far I have only highlighted phenomenal aspects showing discontinuities, i.e. displaying a centerless plurality whose orientation grows out of an experience of locality, rather than from a universal system that would be repeatable anywhere and essentially negate the localness of locality, subsuming it under unity and homogeneity. There is another aspect to consider, that of continuity. Each of these particular districts finds its own center within itself through its train station (eki, 駅). The doings and happenings of each district unfold and radiate outward from the eki as the meeting point of arrival and departure. And it is the trains, seen as a pulsing system of veins bringing novelty and nourishment to its various nodes, that serve the movement of the people as communication among the various eki and their surrounding districts. With communication comes continuity. With the trains there is consistency and order. There is an evident pattern. Particular behavior can be expected and this brings a sense of uniformity and communion.

There are certain ubiquitous bits of culture, but they are often the most mundane or trivial. One can travel nary a step without coming upon a poster for the pop group AKB48 or chancing upon some vending machine offering a practically inumerable possibility of items. Taking the train, buying a coffee from a machine and passing by an advertisement all happen without notice. They preserve the continuity of experience. They smooth out the texture between the punctuating events of note. While at the same time, being immersed in the experience of orienting oneself in the uniqueness of the aesthetic atmosphere found in each district brings out the discontinuous. It is thus that a focus on locality leads to a decentered, discontinuous plurality of orientations for experience, with continuous processes of communication, development and life for the pulsing cityscape of Tōkyō.

**Being-Time and Shades of Emptiness**

Arriving at the gates of Eiheiji (永平寺), Dōgen's temple of lasting peace, where as a group we suffered towards satori (悟り),
walking through the ancient moss covered cedars, seeing sculptures of an age of such duration as to blend seemlessly into the rock which surrounds them as having been created by the earth itself, the temporal thickness of the place made its first impression. Filtered through administration in the lobby packed with visitors and things to buy, in the ancient corridors shuffling bare-footed among practitioners, the past speaks through the present. Traditional bathing and ceremonious eating is punctuated on both ends by the locally ever-present, simple yet demanding practice of zazen (座禅).

With many of us there is the feeling of a deep authenticity, though perhaps with an edge. There is a layer that may not match up, the modern gleen. The temple is clean, new and modern, and at the same time, it is as if it has been there forever. With its security systems and scrolls, amenities and asceticism, relics and cell phones, it is a place of compacted temporal density. Before sleep, following and anticipating zazen, laying in the atmosphere that only a tatami room brings with it, among the breath, life and half-consciousness of companions in the darkness, acutely the feeling of the weight and condensation of time into the density of the present was available. Half-looking through the thick shadowy air and the sacredness around us, towards the rich grain of the timber over head, the edge of the authenticity lurked at my periphery in the form of a bright green rectangular light indicating an emergency exit. It shone its artificial glory of convenience over and through all the darks hollows of mystery in that seeming sacred space. Perhaps there may be an inclination to consider the light out of place and that it is items and systems and amenities like the light, scattered throughout the temple which generate the edge to authenticity in Eiheiji.

But there is no edge, or rather the edge is the temple’s authenticity. By not fleeing from its own becoming it maintains its integrity with what it is. This is a place where Dōgen’s asserted inseparability of being and time (uji) is encountered. In Dōgen’s house the green light is not some blemish on a supposed original purity. Our past, which irrevocably drives into the future, is here and now, is shown in the active becoming of the moment. The objects of the past and present highlight and co-define one another. There is an assertive
co-presencing. There is a density and compactness of the ancient past and modern present (no less in Tōkyō with its temples nestled between shopping centers, and shrines among sky rises).

But this phenomenon is not just temples and neon juxtagposed, but objects themselves. Spacality is time, being is time. The green light and the state of the art fire alarm system in Eiheiji, the authentic Edo period photo in a tenth story back room of some flash arcade in Akihabara, an old clock in a Shibuya hip-hop club or the new innovative library in the basement of Tentokuji in Tottori all show how past is smeared into the present and future, and how the present becomes (genjō, 現成) by smearing itself into the past in its creation of a future. This is not to point out simply that there are old objects in the present, but that those objects are a sense of time themselves simply by the way that the are and render temporality along with us.

This temporal being of objects constitutes a thickness and density of the present, all of which is not readily available to explicit attention. Between things is emptiness, potentially slipping away as we become more immersed in the demands of those things. There are layers of invisibility, connections between discreteness, demands from within, demands to attention lest it all slip away. The creative and sacred are nestled and enfolded in the mundane. Tradition(past), practice (present) and possibility (future) are entwined as immediately co-presencing. In the invisible, in what is not, is the possibility for a better present, a better here and now. It opens up what we can make, based on what we have achieved and what may come. This is cultivating the ‘shades of emptiness’ (kokūshiki, 虚空色). It is in this density of compacted timing as decentered space that the beckoning invisibles lay nestled, enfolded into our lives quietly demanding maintenance and patience and work. It is here, nested into our temporal, visible, tactile, decentered lives, that invisible satori is calling silently to attention.
Relational Persons, Relational Ethics: Existential Trust and Its Significance for Contemporary Ethical Discourse

Ian M. SULLIVAN

At the 2013 Summer Institute, Roger Ames gave a series of lectures on the distinctiveness of Confucian role ethics with regard to contemporary Western ethical theory. In place of an Enlightenment emphasis on discrete individualism and epistemic certainty, Confucian role ethics emphasizes the relational constitution of persons and their pragmatic efficacy in meeting the ethical demands of everyday life. The aim of this paper is to build from these lectures and rearticulate the challenge Confucian role ethics represents to contemporary ethical theories in terms of existential trust. I will begin with a description of the relationally constituted person before developing the notion of existential trust.

With regard to constitutive relations, Confucian role ethics takes familial relations to be paradigmatic, and the importance of the family is found throughout the classical Confucian texts. For example, Analects 1.2 reads:

Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having taken hold, the way (dao 道) will grow therefrom. As for filial and fraternal responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root of consummate conduct (ren 仁).

A related passage from Zhongyong 20 states:

Consummate conduct (ren 仁) means conducting oneself like a human being (ren 人), wherein devotion to one’s kin is most important.
The first thing to note with these two passages is the conceptual relation of conduct to personhood, of *ren* 仁 to *ren* 人. While the relation is explicit in *Zhongyong* 20, *Analects* 1.2 further reinforces this point. The original Chinese for the line, ‘the root of consummate conduct (*ren* 仁),’ is ‘其為人之本與,’ but as Ames and Rosemont (1998 p. 230n4) note in their commentary on this passage, ‘其為仁之本與’ is a traditionally accepted variant. The terms *ren* 仁 and *ren* 人 are regularly interchanged in early Confucian texts, and this underscores the direct correlation between one’s conduct and one’s personhood in the Confucian worldview.

Second, these two passages highlight the primacy of family relations; consummate moral conduct is rooted in the responsibility one has to one’s parents and siblings. It is in the family that one is first exposed to the values central to one’s community and culture and that one develops the skills necessary to relate to others efficaciously. The family also serves as a governing metaphor for nearly all social relations, as *Mencius* 3A.4 illustrates with its enumeration of the five Confucian relations—father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, senior and junior, and friend-to-friend. Given that the ruler-minister relation is analogous to the father-son relation, and the elder-younger relation is often conceived of in terms of sibling or intergenerational familial relations, four of the five central relations of classical Confucianism are either literally or metaphorically familial.1 The fifth relation, friendship, serves as the primary relational means with which one can expand one’s intimate circle. In short, from a Confucian perspective one’s personhood is closely tied up with one’s conduct and one’s conduct arises from the family nexus, which itself serves as a guide for virtually all social relations.

Elsewhere in the *Mencius*, one finds a development of the notion of human becoming (*renxing* 人性) in terms of the four sprouts (*siduan* 四端). Following the famous story about a child about to fall into a well, Mencius claims that there are four heartminds (*xin* 心), those of empathy, shame, deference, and a sense of right and wrong, which all people are born with. These heartminds can be either

1. A post-patriarchal enumeration of these relations is necessary for future work, but that project is beyond the scope of the present paper.
cultivated or neglected. Their cultivation yields the moral qualities of consummate conduct (ren 仁), situational appropriateness (yi 義), ritual propriety (li 禮), and wisdom (zhi 智), respectively; denial of these heartminds ‘cripples’ a person to the point of being unable to serve her parents. A failure to meet one’s moral responsibilities to one’s parents is a failure of moral development, but given the coincidence of moral conduct and personhood, this failure of moral development is a diminishment of one’s personhood. Significantly, this point is made while portraying personhood as an ongoing process. A human is a perpetual becoming, an unfolding process of growth, and thus from the Confucian perspective personhood is best understood narratively.

These four heartminds that constitute the parameters of one’s narrative identity are also interfaces for a variety of relationships. That is to say, these heartminds are fundamentally relational. I am not empathic without another for whom to feel empathy, just as I am not right or wrong, shameful (or shameless!), or deferential without a social context with particular others. Given that these four sprouts are constitutive of one’s narrative personhood (xing 性), and given that they are first developed within the family environment, one can say that these sorts of particular and ongoing relations are constitutive of one’s identity. This gives considerable substance to the family metaphor, in that the family now serves as a thick, existential situation extending temporally into both past and future and serving as the relational substrate from which our selves arise and through which we craft our selves.

It is in this picture of the relationally constituted person that one finds a sense of existential trust. The analysis thus far has demonstrated that personhood is coterminous with moral conduct, that moral conduct and thus personhood is rooted in family relations, that personhood is best understood narratively, and that this narrative personhood arises out of ongoing intimate relations with others. Now, if it makes sense to say that Jack’s narrative person arises, at least partially, out of his intimate relation with his mother, Helen, it also makes sense to say that her narrative is partially constituted by her relationship to Jack. As such, Helen’s conduct will directly affect Jack’s development as a person, and so too will his conduct affect her development. In this
way the continuation of the close relation between mother and son is one in which both Helen and Jack entrust their persons in an existential sense to each other. Not only is Jack capable of doing physical and psychological harm to Helen, and vice versa, but Jack’s development as a person and the projects, values, activities, and so on that he takes on bear directly on the environment in which Helen herself is growing or diminishing as a person. Thus the continuation of such an intimate relationship is an entrusting of the other with one’s self. If it is the case that one can find this relational trust at an existential level in the Confucian worldview, then one would expect to find the value of trust displayed prominently in Confucian role ethics, and I believe one does.

The famous single thread stringing Confucius’s teachings together in Analects 4.15 is the combination of doing one’s utmost (zhong 忠) and putting oneself in the place of the other (shu 恕), and while doing one’s utmost is mentioned thirteen times in the Analects, it is paired with putting oneself in the place of the other only once. The majority of the time, it is paired or listed along with making good on one’s word (xin 信). For example, Analects 1.8 (which is repeated almost verbatim in 9.25) reads:

Take doing your utmost and making good on your word as your mainstay. Do not have as a friend anyone who is not as good as you are. And where you have erred, do not hesitate to mend your ways.

Making good on one’s word is foregrounded as an admirable quality, and the final injunction to mend one’s ways where one has erred follows naturally from an ethic built on trust. Being trustworthy is not solely about knowing how to handle future situations that may arise, but it is also about knowing how to repair the relationship when one fails to handle situations well. Also worth noting regarding this passage is the injunction to build and maintain friendships with those who are at least as good as oneself. This is not an elitist injunction, but rather a logical consequence of taking existential trust and the relational constitution of the person seriously. If my friend’s behavior not only reflects upon me but influences my growth as a person, I would hope that this friend
is influencing my growth for the better.

The importance of trust to the Confucian vision of the moral life is further emphasized with the notion of cheng 誠, which preoccupies roughly half of the passages from the Zhongyong and is alternatively translated as sincerity, integrity, and creativity.\(^2\) Zhongyong 22 reads:

Only those of utmost integrity (cheng 誠) in the world are able to make the most of their natural tendencies (xing 性). Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own natural tendencies is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others; only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of processes and events.

One’s growth as a person is a matter of having integrity, proving oneself reliable in one’s relations with others, which involves being sincere in one’s intentions and with what one says but also being creative in how one meets the challenges to maintaining the relationship and caring for what one has been entrusted with, in this case the growth and well-being of others. Thus here too one finds an ideal of moral development that involves producing, strengthening, and extending trusting relationships.

Returning to the family metaphor discussed earlier, existential trust poses a serious challenge to many theoretical positions in contemporary ethics. Perhaps most significantly, selfhood is seen to diffuse radially through intimate, constitutive relationships with particular others. Who I am and who I am becoming is very much a matter of my relationships with my wife, my parents, my siblings, and my friends among others. Our interdependence as persons is met with our cooperative cultivation of existential trust. And while attention to rules, consequences, and persistent character traits are helpful in working on our relationships and our selves, this deep level

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\(^2\) I would interpret ‘integrity’ here along the lines of Margaret Urban Walker’s notion of ‘integrity as reliability,’ rather than the Greek-influenced notion of integrity as completeness or wholeness.
of trust cannot be secured with them alone. Our intimate, constitutive relations with particular, concrete others are complex and dynamic, requiring creativity in our responses to each other. At times rules will help and consequences will need to be taken into consideration. My vices and the other’s virtues will influence how particular situations are navigated. But ethics does not reduce to any of these perspectives; theory only takes us so far. If Confucian role ethics provides one challenge to contemporary ethical theory, it is the return of ethical discourse to everyday practice, to the persons and relationships that gave rise to ethical reflection in the first place.

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Acting Well in the Present Moment: 
Considerations from Nishida Kitarō’s Concept of Kōiteki Chokkan and Dōgen’s Sansuikyō

Laura Specker SULLIVAN

A core question of philosophy is how to act well in the present moment. This is not just the question of how *do* we act, but how *should* we act. For many, these questions have no clear connection; descriptions of who we are now will not help in resolving the ethical issues that we face. The answer to how to act well in the present moment can be resolved by referring to a normative or prescriptive theory that we apply in order to reveal the most appropriate action.

For others, normative and prescriptive moral theories are not independent of who we are and the world in which we live. Considering the question of how to act well in the present moment is not just a rational question but also an emotional one. The answer comes from the interaction of a complex web of social behavior that includes the development of social emotions within an individual through interactions with the sociocultural environment as well as reflection on past experience and analysis of general concepts and theoretical ideas (Damasio 2007).

However, reason and emotions may not contribute equally to moral judgment. Jonathan Haidt has suggested that the process of moral judgment is best captured by a social intuitionist model in which socially developed and supported intuitions and emotions form the basis for our decisions of what to do and how to act (Haidt 2001, Greene and Haidt 2002). According to this model, answering the question of how to live well in the present moment is accomplished by a process more like perception than reason. We have a sense of what we should do, and it based on this sense that we make a moral judgment. While we may reflect on our judgments and their many components post-hoc, at the moment they are made we are more likely to rely on
intuition than reason. This does not mean that we cannot improve our moral reasoning. Haidt argues that creating a fair and just environment for exchanging views (such as a well-structured summer seminar) couples implicit learning with explicit discussion such that intuitions can be gradually ‘tuned up’ to allow for multiple perspectives (Haidt 2001).

The suggestion that this type of judgment – the judgment of how we should act – is grounded in emotions and intuitions bears striking similarities to Nishida Kitārō’s idea of kōiteki chokkan, or active intuition. Nishida himself seems to have thought about ethics on an empiricist or experiential model. As he writes in a 1902 letter to D.T. Suzuki,

‘It seems to me that ‘ethics’ in the West is purely an intellectual pursuit. Its arguments are cogent, but no one pays attention to the ‘soul experience’ – experience deep in the human heart. People forget the grounds on which they stand. There are those who analyze and explain the constituents of bread and water, but none considers the actual taste of either. The result is an artificial construct, which has no impact on the human heart. I wish contemporary scholars of ethics would leave their scholarly research and, instead, explain the spiritual experience of great figures of the past. That should be the factual basis for the study of ethics.’ (Nishida cited Yusa 2002, p. 74)

In this paper I will explain what bearing the concept of active intuition has on the question of how to live well, using an approximate translation of the opening of Nishida’s 1937 essay, kōiteki chokkan (active intuition). I will also connect the concept of active intuition to Dōgen’s sansuikyō fascicle in order to account for the ethical dimension of active intuition.

Nishida writes, ‘Speaking of intuition, people readily think of something passive, or even the state of being in a trance. This is thought to be the polar opposite of action (kōi).’ However, for him the standpoint of active intuition is that of ‘extremely practical knowledge’ that ‘forms the base of all experiential knowledge.’ This standpoint is
the opposite of previous theories of intuition such as those of Henri Bergson and Plotinus, which take intuition to be unlimited activity (Nishida 1937, p. 541). While for Nishida intuition is active and action is intuitive, the standpoint of active intuition is necessarily limited by the historical world.

Nishida writes that, ‘people think that we intuit by action (kōi) and say that action does not come out of intuition. However, this is because such thinking does not think that our action is in any case historical, that we as individuals (ko) in the historical world are active. Thinking of the self abstractly is the result. Even our action must be something that came to develop historically from instinctual behavior (dōsa). Instinctual behavior is one type of formative activity (keisei sayō). However, life is not simply one type of formative activity. That is, the subject limits the environment and the environment limits the subject, and subject and environment must be in dialectical self-identity’ (Nishida 1937, p. 542-543).

He continues, “Life is considered to be the self-limitation of the world of the dialectical universal. Thus, there is the formation of the absolute contradiction of self-identity, creation, and what is called ‘from the made to the making’ (Nishida 1937, p. 543). What this means is that creation, or creative action, does not begin in a vacuum. Rather, human life and human action arise from the already-made historical world in which we are embedded and with which we have a dialectical relationship.

Accordingly, ‘to make must be to see. Action arises due to our being in a world of [already made] things. In the arising of action, there must be things. Things are not thought, but are seen, and must appear as that which has been historically formed’ (Nishida 1937, p. 543). In other words, the arising of action entails seeing the world as made. When that action occurs we are ‘making’ our own present. Nishida writes that, “furthermore, this [process] takes place in the dialectical relationship with the self. While the world is thoroughly determined as the historical present, the self contains the negation of the self within itself, and in the overcoming of the self and the movement from the present moment to the present moment, there is the establishment of action. Therefore this is why action is practice and production (Nishida
In short, to act is to create the self in the present moment based on seeing the self as it has already been determined as part of the present world. To practice the self based on this seeing is to produce the self anew in the present moment, but it is also to produce the world. This is because the self is dialectically related to the world as the singular is related to the universal. While I do not have the space to fully explain this idea here, suffice to say that for Nishida, self-production is also world-production.

Nishida’s theory of active intuition has interesting similarities with the social intuitionism proposed by Haidt. In Nishida’s theory, our present action is determined by our past experience to the extent that this experience shapes who we are now. However, our action is undetermined in that present action does not flow linearly from the recognition of our current self but occurs by negating this already determined self in order to create the self anew. Action is intuitive in that it is based in this seeing of the self, but it is active in that it produces the self, as opposed to mere reproduction.

The dialectical structure of active intuition indicates that intuition as so described is not just perception, conventionally understood as seeing the surface of things as they exist in space. Rather, ‘perception must also be active intuition’ (Nishida 1937, p. 553). Whereas many contemporary theories of moral intuitionism propose that to know what is moral is to perceive self-evident and objective moral truths, for both Haidt and Nishida morality is intuitive in that it is necessarily based on one’s past experiences, one’s already ‘made’ self. In other words, ‘intuition’ refers to the process by which one acts in the present moment. In addition, as Damasio, Haidt, and Nishida all stress, acting intuitively does not entail predetermination since one’s intuition can be shaped by how one sees the self; to see the self in a different way is to act differently.

In order to clarify the ethical dimension of active intuition it is helpful to refer to the thoughts of the Japanese Buddhist priest and philosopher Dōgen. As explained by Masato Ishida, Dōgen’s use of the phrase *kekaisekaiki* means that ‘a flower’s blooming is the entire world coming into being,’ or in other words, ‘the working of the cosmos is
focused in a single flower’s blossoming.’ As mentioned above, for Nishida as well intuitive action is not just the production of the self but also the production of the world. The world of the dialectical universal is the entire world, and an individual’s production of his or her self is the blossoming of a single flower. This blossoming of a single flower is not separate from the world of the dialectical universal but is part of its working.

For both Dōgen and Nishida, active intuition becomes something like a moral imperative, although the imperative is more readily apparent in Dōgen. Dōgen writes,

‘You should clearly examine the green mountains’ walking and your own walking. You should also examine walking backward and backward walking and investigate the fact that walking forward and backward has never stopped since the very moment before form arose...If walking stops, buddha ancestors do not appear. If walking ends, the buddha-dharma cannot reach the present...These activities are a mountain’s practice. Keeping its own form, without changing body and mind, a mountain always practices in every place.’ (Dōgen p. 98).

While it is true that we are included in the working of the world, and that for Dōgen we are all already expressing buddha-nature, we can do harm if we fail to recognize this. If we do not recognize our selves and our dialectical relationship with the world, we cannot act from this understanding, and we may ‘drown in small views and narrow understanding’ (Dōgen 99). This may not actually hinder others, as ‘walking forward does not obstruct walking backward’ (Dōgen 98) and ‘things do not hinder each other, just as moments do not hinder each other’ (Dōgen 77), but it means we are not creatively producing ourselves in full understanding. The moral imperative, then, is to understand ourselves completely with the goal of ‘emancipation-realization.’ This imperative could just as easily apply to Nishida’s active intuition.

Taking Nishida and Dōgen together, I suggest that the question of how to act well in the present moment is best answered not
by reference to an abstract ethical theory, but by seeking to know oneself fully. Nishida’s concern with the spiritual experience of past thinkers reveals his belief that others’ deepest experience of themselves and their world can be a guide for his own attempts at self-understanding and thus moral action. In order to act well in the present moment, we would do well to seek understanding of ourselves as we have come to be determined in the historical world.

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The word “compare” originally comes from the Latin compar, com meaning “with” and par meaning “equal.” In some sense, it suggests an act of equaling something. How can we compare Dōgen (1200–1253) with Maurice Blanchot (1907–2003) when there are such significant temporal and other kinds of distances between them? If one finds similarity in their respective treatments of the question of time, how would one proceed? This small study is aimed at the reconsideration of the possibility of comparative study between Dōgen and Blanchot and their stances toward the question of the ancients.

Dōgen, a monk known as the founder of the thirteenth-century Soto Zen sect, developed a multilayered and complex system of thought in his lifetime. We can access his thought through the text entitled Shōbōgenzō, which includes philosophical discussions on many topics. For example, in the chapter on time-being, “Uji,” we find the interesting theory that explains the inseparableness of time and being (Dōgen 1985).1 According to Dōgen, ‘time itself is being, and all being is time (Dōgen 1985: 76).’ ‘As time is not marked by coming and going, the moment you climbed the mountains is the time-being right now. This is the meaning of time being [...] In essence, all things in the entire world are linked with one another as moments. Because

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1. The original words for Uji consist of two Chinese characters, 有時. Dan Welch and Kazuaki Tanahashi translated it as time-being and I presently use their translation, referring also to Dōgen (1970-72), Nihon Shiso Taikei vol. 12-13, ed. Toru Terada and Yaoko Mizuno, Tokyo: Iwanami.
all moments are the time-being, they are your time-being (Dōgen 1985: 78).’ In the “Mountains and Waters” sūtra, Dōgen writes that ‘Mountains and waters right now are the actualization of the ancient Buddha (Dōgen 1985: 97).’ He writes that ‘mountains’ walking is just like human walking [...] Green mountains are neither sentient nor insentient (Dōgen 1985: 97-98).’ It seems, then, that the problem is not the distinction between human and non-human nor the denying of either; rather, Dōgen proposes a totally different world view wherein every being is the world and every being is in absolute time. This powerful idea evokes those of other modern philosophers and even suggests the possibility of considering them together.

At the same time, we cannot miss the fact that the time-being chapter starts with a quotation from “An ancient Buddha.”2 In fact, it is easily seen that the expression “ancient Buddha” frequently appears in the text. A chapter entitled “Kofutsu shin” also seems to indicate that Dōgen was thinking about ancient conceptions of time. One cannot help wondering about the relation between time-being, the ancient conception of time, and the constitution of the texts of Shōbōgenzō, for example. A study of whether the notion of time in Dōgen really corresponds with that in the Shōbōgenzō, or with ancient concepts of time, would be controversial.3 A consideration of Dōgen and his work, however, would open the sphere of time theory. On the other hand, it is necessary to pursue original meaning in Dōgen: is it in some sense a mixture of Chinese and Japanese ideas, or did he create a new way of writing?4 The more we learn about Dōgen, the more profound his ideas seem, and the more difficult it is to comprehend the entirety of his thought in his various extant texts.

2. The phrase “An ancient buddha said” appears in Chinese poems and seems to explain time-being. Ibid. 76. How to translate 古仏, especially the word 古, has some possibilities: ancient, old, eternal, etc.

3. If we open a dictionary, we can easily find a lot of meanings for this character (時), for example, “time flow,” “chance,” “certain period,” “coming over,” and “here.”

4. What the UH-UT Summer seminar held in 2014 told us was that the complexity of Dōgen’s thought calls for a plural approach, especially with regard to examining aspects of practice in Dōgen, or rather by taking into account the risk involved in dividing theory and practice without hesitation.
What to do, then, with similarities discovered between Blanchot and Dōgen? Since the similarities are many, the challenge is to pursue them by digging and drilling down even if they appear to be illogical. Why does it seem imminently necessary to discuss Dōgen and Blanchot here and now? One possible answer is that it may enable us to discover a way to break through a kind of aporia. In short, the case of Blanchot and Dōgen may provide a chance to reconsider a totally different notion of time and the transformation of it by the imagination, perhaps revealing something unexpected in their seemingly individual research.

The question of time in Blanchot occupies a unique position in his thought about literature. A typical expression of his notion of time is the explanation of the transformation from the real to the imaginary in the récit. In *The Book to Come* (1959), he proposed a concept of time that is totally different from the experience of daily life and includes rather impersonal characteristics—that other time, implicating and succeeding the eternal return of Nietzsche (Blanchot 2003: 9). I suggest that this is the practice and theory of Dōgen as well, and that Blanchot explored not only the critic but also the writing of the récit. In Blanchot’s récits too, as in the ancients, we find an exploration of the question of time, the eternal return, repetition, and the moment (Blanchot 1985). The recurrence of this theme across such a wide space of time argues for not limiting our research if understanding is to be reached. As Roger Laporte (1987) has emphasized, it is true that Blanchot was also thinking about the “ancient,” the terribly ancient. In this, he is similar to Dōgen and both propose a totally different concept of time and of the ancients. Of course, there are many differences between their ideas: for example, Blanchot’s time is impersonal and contrasts with the lack of difference between sentient and insentient beings, or the inseparableness of time and being in Dōgen. Needless to

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5. Actually, there have already been some attempts to compare Dōgen with French philosophy/philosophers. Dōgen and Derrida—including a little bit Blanchot—, Deleuze, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty...etc. Morimoto (1989) has already pointed out these similarities, referring to Blanchot and even Laporte in this work, although the analysis is brief. There is also a study of the concept of time in Deleuze and Dōgen. For example, see Motoyuki Uchida (2003).
say, this is a historical and social difference. However, there is a strange coexistence of that time and the ancient. Exploring this would be a way to pursue the installation of the origin without origin.

Of course, the way terms related to time are translated is essential to the ongoing philosophical discussion. The French translation of Dōgen’s time-being chapter reveals the complexity of this issue. In 1987, although he had not translated the time-being chapter, Bernard Faure proposed that Uji be translated as ‘Être-Temps (Dōgen 1987: 177).’ Uji as translated and published in 1997 has been interpreted in two ways: one is the original and usual meaning of Uji as sometime, and the other is as time-being, être-temps (Dōgen 1997: 40-41). Both interpretations are reflected in translation. In 2004, Orimo Yoko proposed ‘Le temps qui est là’ in order to express the paradoxical meaning of time (ji, temps) as être (u, là) (Maître Dōgen 2004: 61). In 2007, however, Orimo proposed a subtly different translation of Uji as ‘Le temps qu’il y-à (Maître Dōgen 2007: 177-178).’ What she tries to do is to avoid the reduction to occidental ontology, a critical aspect of the translation of Uji as “being.” Such an attitude has some proximity with Derrida, for example. The translation of ‘le temps qu’il y’ evokes that of Emanuel Levinas, who pursued the “autrement qu’être.”

It is necessary to not just be content with finding similarities between several ideas, but rather to try to answer the fundamental questions posed by each of them, and to be open to unexpected conclusions. Such an attitude needs to take into account not only the problems of translation but also of background and context. Now facing the problem of the imagination to the terribly futural and unborn times in actual situation. Reconsidering the time of one life or one generation again and again. A comparative study of Dōgen and Blanchot shows that their questioning of the ancients led each of them to formulate a totally different notion of time, one that is still prevalent today.

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6 As we have seen above, at the same time, it seems that using 時 as temps is not very skeptical.
References:


Lu Xun and Hu Shi: 
A Comparative Approach to Their Early Lives and Their Reception of the Theory of Evolution

Tomoko TOYA

Lu Xun (魯迅, 1881-1936) and Hu Shi (胡適, 1891-1962) are representative thinkers in modern Chinese history who still influence Chinese intellectuals today. In Mainland China, Lu Xun has long been highly appreciated, and “Lu Xun Study” is a popular field of research, while Hu Shi, who used to keep a close relationship with the ROC and died in Taiwan, was a target of criticism. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, however, Hu Shi’s contribution to the modern Chinese cultural movement began to be reevaluated, and “Hu Shi Study” also became popular. Since both Lu Xun and Hu Shi were known as the leading figures of the New Culture Movement, they were often compared, in many cases, in the framework of “Lu Xun, or Hu Shi”. Recently, this framework has become less common, and “the combination of Lu Xun study and Hu Shi study is expected for the creation of new culture in China” (Zhang 2007, 71).

This paper briefly overviews the early lives of Lu Xun and Hu Shi, an important element of their philosophical backgrounds, and examines how they received and developed their thoughts on the theory of evolution, one of the most popular “scientific” concepts for the intellectuals in East Asia in the beginning of the 20th century.

1. The Early Lives of Lu Xun and Hu Shi

Lu Xun was born into a family of intellectuals in 1881, and received traditional education based on Confucianism in order to take the civil service examination. When he was thirteen years old, his grandfather was apprehended in a corruption case and his family
lost their property. Lu Xun felt a drastic change in people’s attitudes towards his family, as he later wrote that “when one’s family is down and out, can one understand what human nature is” (Lu 2005 437). At the age of eighteen, he moved to Nanjing to study natural science and technology.

In 1902, he went to Japan as a scholarship student. While studying in Japan, he gave up his idea of becoming a doctor and decided to cure the spirit of Chinese people through literary works instead of medicine. As a result, he left medical school in Sendai and moved to Tokyo, where he learned German and came into contact with Western literature, art and science.

In 1909, Lu Xun went back to China, worked as a biology teacher in his hometown before becoming an official in the Ministry of Education of the newly established Republic of China. As a government official, Lu Xun tried to initiate several cultural projects, but he soon found it difficult to carry them out in the increasingly confusing political situation into which he was thrown. He began to hide himself from the world, visiting antique shops and becoming deeply absorbed in the world of classic books and rubbed copies of tombstones.

In 1918, encouraged by some fellow associates, he began to write short stories and essays to be published in the magazine *New Youth* and gradually became involved in the New Culture Movement.

Hu Shi was born in Shanghai in 1891, ten years later than Lu Xun. Hu Shi’s father, a local government official, died when Hu Shi was five years old. His mother followed her husband’s directions and sent him to a private school in order to become a government officer and a decent man of letters. When he was fourteen, he went to Shanghai and received both traditional Confucius-based education and Western-style education at four different schools.

In 1910, at the age of twenty, Hu Shi went to the United States on a scholarship to study agriculture at Cornell University. In 1912, he changed his major to philosophy and literature. After receiving his undergraduate degree, he went to Colombia University and finished his PhD thesis, “A Study of the Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China”, under the guidance of John Dewey, a prominent
Lu Xun and Hu Shi

pragmatism scholar. He returned to China in 1917, and became a professor at Beijing University.

Both Lu Xun and Hu Shi were born to intellectual families, and received traditional childhood education based on Confucianism with the goal of becoming civil officers. However, the differences in their ages, their experiences through adolescence and the environments in which they studied abroad must have had different influences on their processes of thought formation.

2. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics and Yan Fu’s Tianyan lun

The theory of evolution had a great impact on East Asian nations in the modern period. The theory was introduced in Japan in the 1870s and in China in the 1890s. In China, Tianyan lun (天演論), written by Yan Fu (嚴復 1854-1921), was widely known as the first introductory book on the theory. This book was based on T.H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. Yan Fu translated the script, adding some explanation and his own opinion on evolution. In Evolution and Ethics, Huxley admits that men in society are undoubtedly subject to the cosmic process which can be characterized by such words as “struggle for existence” and “survival of the fittest”. However, Huxley points out, that “the influence of the cosmic process on the evolution of society is the greater the more rudimentary its civilization”, and he claims that “social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process” (Huxley 1901 81).

Yan Fu translated the phrase “cosmic process” to “天演” or “天行”, and “ethical process” to “人治”. Masako Kitaoka who carried out text analysis of the both books, points out that “using the words with 天 implies that human are under control of the will of Heaven, which strongly reflects the traditional Chinese idea of 天人相応” (Kitaoka 2006 188). For Yan Fu, the important issue was how to let China regain its power and save the nation, which was on the verge of crisis. Thus, in Tianyan lun, he regarded the critical situation as a phenomenon of “天演” and claimed to overcome the situation by
3. Lu Xun’s reception of the theory of evolution

Lu Xun encountered the theory of evolution through *Tianyan lun* while studying in Nanjing. As Yan Fu expected, *Tianyan lun* led Lu Xun to have the idea that those who try to fight against 天 should be called 人 in modern context, and through this idea he developed his concept of 立人. However, as his brother Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967) mentioned, Lu Xun did not quite understand the theory of evolution until he went to Tokyo, where he learned Japanese and read *Lecture on the Theory of Evolution* (進化論講話) written by Asajiro Oka (1868-1944). The book was first published in 1904, aiming to popularize the theory of evolution. According to Zhou Zuoren, Lu Xun finally became clear what the theory was all about after having read the book (Zhou 2000 185). Lu Xun also read other Japanese books on the theory of evolution, including Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* translated by Oka.

Thus, Lu Xun received the basics of the theory of evolution while he was in Japan, and he was much influenced by the theory of evolution in biology. In his essay, “What is Required of Us as Fathers Today” which was published in the magazine *New Youth* in 1919, Lu Xun wrote,

“Why must life be propagated? So that it can develop and evolve. Each individual is mortal, and no bounds at all are set to evolution; therefore life must continue, advancing along the path of evolution. For this, a certain inner urge is needed, like the urge of a unicellular creature which in time enables it to multiply, or the urge of invertebrate animals which in time enables the vertebrae to appear. This is why the later forms of life are always more significant and complete, hence more worthwhile and precious; and the earlier forms of life should be sacrificed to the later” (Lu 1956 56-57).

Based on his belief in the biological theory of evolution, he felt that the younger generation would be able to create a better society and that the older generation should be responsible for protecting the
younger generation. This may have something to do with his academic backgrounds as well as his other interests: he had studied science and technology in Nanjing and was interested in biology, although he gave up the study of medicine to become an author.

4. **Hu Shi’s reception of the Evolution Theory**

Hu Shi, like Lu Xun and many other Chinese intellectuals, had his first contact with the theory of evolution through *Tianyan lun*. He read the book in 1904, by which time *Tianyan lun* was already quite popular. It was even adopted as a reading material for junior high school students, and Hu Shi was among them. He remembered that he was excited to read the book, but “Yan Fu’s literary style was too antique and elegant” (Hu 1998 414) for young boys to read. He also wrote,

“Those who read this book could hardly understand Huxley’s contributions to the history of science and thought. They could merely understand the meaning of survival of the fittest formula in international politics” (Hu 1998 413)

Hu Shi himself later went to the U.S. and was able to deepen his understanding of the theory of evolution through original textbooks, including Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species*.

He was much influenced by Huxley, not because of his book *Evolution and Ethics*, but because “Huxley taught me how to doubt: he taught me not to believe anything that has not sufficient proofs”. Together with Dewey, Hu Shi recalled, Huxley “helped me clearly understand the characteristics and effects of scientific approach” (Hu 1998 164).

Given the age at which Hu Shi encountered the *Tianyan lun*, it makes sense that he did not feel much empathy with Yan Fu. He learned the theory of evolution as a model of the scientific approach in an academic field.
5. Concluding remarks

In this paper, I approached the philosophical backgrounds of Lu Xun and Hu Shi by looking at their early lives, and examining how they received the theory of evolution. I mainly discussed the differences between them, but it is important that they both had deep understandings of Confucianism and the theory of evolution, although they developed their thoughts in different ways. Zhang Mengyang, a distinguished scholar known for his research on Lu Xun, claims that China now needs both “Luxun Study” and “Hu Shi Study”, studies of two exemplars who proposed “scientific rules to an opponent in argument” (Zhang 2007 82), which I found interesting and instructive.

My personal academic interest is the modern history of art and society in China and Japan, and my research has been involved with “Lu Xun Studies”. In the world of art history, he is known as a father of the modern Chinese woodcut movement. Through the UT-UH Summer Institute in 2013, I had the chance to learn about Hu Shi, another important figure in the New Culture Movement. Comparing Luxun and Hushi gave me a new perspective on Luxun, which is quite meaningful for my further research. I thank the Institute for providing me with such a valuable experience.

References:


Riddles with and without Answers:  
Expressing the Inexpressible

Saeko YAMAGUCHI

During the 2013 UT-UH Summer Institute, one of the main topics that we discussed was Dôgen’s philosophy. Prof. Ishida Masato of the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa delivered lectures on Dôgen’s views on time and being, suggesting the possibility of considering Dôgen’s worldview as a valuable philosophy, independent of his Buddhism. During our seminar trip to two temples (Eihei-ji in Fukui Prefecture and Tentoku-ji in Tottori Prefecture), we had unique opportunities to practice Sôtô school of Zen meditation, which is founded by Dôgen. Reverend Miyagawa Keishi, who generously hosted us at his Tentoku-ji, also gave us a lecture about his latest findings on his chronological research of Dôgen’s texts. He emphasized the importance of reading Dôgen’s main work, Shôbôgenzô, along with his other texts and without framing his thoughts incorrectly into all-too-common theoretical constructs, which predetermine and limit our reading. These experiences allowed us to deepen our understanding of Dôgen, whose thoughts offer an innovative alternative to our modern, West-oriented perspective on life.

1. Why is it — or does it only seem to be — so hard to understand Dôgen?

When we try to look at Dôgen’s thoughts as serious philosophy, the first problem we encounter is difficulty in understanding the riddle-like language of Shôbôgenzô, especially in the texts written in the period of his hardships, as he faced pressures from the other schools of Buddhism and had to leave Kyôto. As Yorizumi (2005, 21) has noted, the reason for this difficulty does not entirely lie in the Buddhist words
and sayings that are unfamiliar to us. Then why is it so difficult to understand him? Is his confusing, abstruse language, which seems to defy our discursive understanding through clear concepts, and which is a usual target of criticism in Western philosophy, one expression of mystical nonsense and thus an example of Obscurantism? Why did he have to write in such a way that challenges the readers, at least the yet to be enlightened ones, into incomprehension? Did he just intentionally choose to do so for an educational purpose, in order to make the disciples ponder upon his words and foster their thinking outside of the box, or was he compelled to do so?

As Rev. Miyagawa pointed out, part of this difficulty occurs certainly due to the lack of chronologically conscious reading of the diverse texts in Shōbōgenzō, which are not arranged in the correct order of their establishment. However, at the issue here is also the general problem of Buddhism: the relationship between enlightenment (Satori) and language, that is, how it can be expressed in words (see Yorizumi 2005). In his lecture, Rev. Miyagawa noted that this was a persistent issue for Dōgen throughout the period of his visit to China. The necessity and impossibility of putting Satori into words is mentioned both in a text that Dōgen’s early master Myōzen wrote to him before he left Japan and in another text that Dōgen wrote to one of his first disciples right after he returned to Japan (see Miyagawa 2013a, 65-66).

2. Letting go of the self and transcending the words

Rev. Miyagawa bases his analysis on Dōgen’s view that words (説/教) are coequal with enlightenment (宗/証) and practice (行/修) and he argues that, as is in the case of enlightenment and practice, you also need to let go of your ego (自我/吾我) through the way you deal with words (see Miyagawa 2013b, 38). This notion of equality between words, enlightenment and practice in the writing of Dōgen was, along with the demonstration of the Sôtô custom of conducting a uniquely styled question-and-answer session by Rev. Miyagawa, an eye-opening realization for me. I had misunderstood that in Sôtô practice today,
they use Kôans far less than compared to the Rinzai sect, and thus Dôgen regarded the verbal dialog between the master and the disciple as somewhat less important. Far from being unimportant, according to Rev. Miyagawa (verbal lecture, 23 Aug 2013), poem-making was an important way for the disciples to prove themselves to be the master’s successor according to Buddhist custom at the time; the master gave his poem to the disciples, who would thus respond to it by creating their own poems, by which they are evaluated and the successor would be chosen. The emphasis on verbal communication in words led me to find his difficult writings more accessible than before, as it was part of his constant endeavor to express the imperceptible Satori.

But how is the ‘letting go of the self,’ which is an essential element for enlightenment (宗/証) and practice (行/修), possible in the case of words (説/教), where the presence of the self as the uttering agent seems absolutely necessary? Rev. Miyagawa answered this question by pointing to the keyword ‘konjin (渾身),’ which makes it possible to express words while also ‘reducing the self (自我を縮小する)’ (see Miyagawa 2013c, 60). This word ‘konjin’ appears in the opening sentence of the second volume of Shôbôgenzô (摩訶般若派羅蜜):

観自在菩薩の行深般若派羅密多時は、渾身の照見五蘊皆空なり。

This is a very difficult sentence to translate, but Rev. Miyagawa interprets it as Guanyin (観自在菩薩) practicing the ‘reduction’ of the self through sitting meditation and thus attaining the state of ‘konjin.’ Here, enlightenment flows into her through the ‘gap’ between the world and the ego, and at the same time lets her utter the word of Satori (enlightenment): goun-kaikû (五蘊皆空). In Reverend Miyagawa’s interpretation (see Miyagawa 2013c), ‘konjin,’ which Mizuno (Dôgen 1990, 62 [footnote 3]) explains as ‘the whole of the living body,’ indicates not merely the whole body of the practitioner, but rather the state of being that makes it possible for us to open our eyes to the ever existing Satori around us, which goes otherwise unnoticed by
our usual ego-centered perception. In this state of ‘konjin,’ the words of Satori are not uttered by the ego but rather, so to speak, are uttered by the Satori itself through the ‘reduced’ ego.

3. Inexpressible Satori expressing itself

This structure is not very difficult to picture, but it might be hard to understand. It is interesting to note that this view resembles, despite all the contextual and cultural differences, the postmodern view of language in 20th century Western philosophy, where the necessary connection between the uttering subject and the utterance is called into question. In both cases, the subject becomes a mere transmitter of a self-referencing and self-determining language, i.e. the language of Satori in the case of Dōgen.

But there remain two problems. First, what Rev. Miyagawa meant by the word ‘utter’ (語る) was not so clear to me. To guess from his articles, it means roughly that wisdom (般若) appears to us in a concrete, audible form. For example, in the above cited text, the words ‘goun-kaikû’ are ‘uttered’ by Guanyin while she is practicing. However, these words are not a repetition of what she learned from someone else, nor a logical deduction based on what she knew. But they appear, according to Rev. Miyagawa, out of Satori itself, which ‘flows into’ her (Miyagawa 2013c, 60). This process of utterance seems reminiscent of spiritual or demonic possession in the sense that the words are expressed outside of one’s ego to me, however misleading it might be. But when I allow myself to use this word [possession], it is still not clear how we are supposed to know if the ‘true’ Satori possessed us or a ‘false’ one did.

Second, when one put this view of self-determining language of Satori together with the idea that Satori cannot be conveyed through texts and words but directly transmitted from the master’s heart to the disciple’s heart, which is expressed in words such as ‘direct communication from mind to mind’ (Ishin-denshin: 以心伝心) and ‘non-dependence on writings’ (Furyû-monji: 不立文字), another question arises: How do the words uttered through the ‘reduced self’ function in the master-disciple relationship? In a dictionary devoted to
terms in Dōgen’s work (*Dōgen Jiten* 1977, 196) ‘non-dependence on writings’ is explained by way of an analogy between texts and a finger pointing to the moon, which appears in the Nyuryōgakyo sutra. Like children looking at the pointing finger itself while not being able to see the moon being pointed at, an unenlightened person gets captured by words and texts and does not see the world of Satori those words allude to. The words are important only as markers pointing to the true teachings and should be let go when the recognition of the moon or Satori is achieved.

However, when there are a lot of fingers claiming to be pointing at the moon, how should we know which fingers are the correct markers? Are all the fingers actually pointing to Satori, only with varying degrees of effectiveness? Moreover, while the analogy between the finger and uttered words is somewhat intuitive, there is a difference between the two. In the case of the finger pointing at the moon, both the one pointing and the thing that is pointed at are visible. But in the case of words pointing at Satori, the two seem worlds apart. Then, in the latter case, how can we recognize the invisible moon, i.e. transcendent Satori, guided by the mere finger(s), i.e. by the concrete words that allude to Satori?

4. **Riddles answered by more riddles, many answers or no answer?**

These two problems and the following questions occur in part due to my distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Satori, which is probably wrong in itself, in the sense that it substantiates Satori or presupposes the existence of something like ‘true’ Satori. A pointing finger by the master, i.e. his riddle-like words that allude to satori, may only be responded by another pointing finger by the disciple, i.e. other words that allude to Satori in another way. Riddles posed by self-referencing Satori may only be answered through another riddle. Since this answer, which must be ‘uttered’ by the same self-expressing Satori, is a riddle in itself, it requires in turn another answer. There are, then, infinitely many answers to infinitely many riddles, which constitute a boundless chain and endless cycle of riddles. But does this not undermine the
possibility of finding any answer for ourselves, i.e. the possibility of basing the practice on a firm ground, or let alone interpreting Dôgen’s thought as a ‘philosophy’?

These doubts are difficult to shake off. However, while an attempt to definitively articulate what Dôgen ‘really meant’ might contradict his understanding of language, it does not necessarily mean that we need to give up our research on his worldview. It certainly cannot be denied that his unique language conveys strong messages to us. What we need is a historically responsible, chronological reading of Dôgen which enables us to trace the development of his thoughts, as Rev. Miyagawa has shown us. And on a more fundamental level, reconsideration of what qualifies as ‘philosophy,’ and what such an endless chain of riddles might mean for us.

References:


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