Hegel on Fichte’s Conception of Practical Self-Consciousness
A Fundamental Criticism of the Sittenlehre in the Differenz-Schrift (1801)

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Abstract
Hegel’s criticism of Fichte in the DS announces the end of the unity of transcendental philosophy, though it does not cause this end. Despite of its crucial importance in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, the rational content of the Hegelian criticism remains unexplained. The present paper is only concerned with Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s Sittenlehre in the DS. In particular, we will argumentatively reconstruct Hegel’s rejection of Fichte’s model of causality with respect to the fundamental concept of self-consciousness. We will argue that both Fichte and Hegel approach the theme of non-objective and concrete self-consciousness in two different ways.

In the Differenz-Schrift (DS), Hegel criticizes almost all of Fichte’s major philosophical works published during his Jena period. However, his criticism is not entirely negative but rather double-sided: he admits the correctness of Fichte’s fundamental principle of philosophy, but objects to the specific form of his philosophical system. His central objection is that Fichte’s philosophical system fails to grasp its fundamental principle, which Hegel identifies as ‘intellectual intuition’, ‘pure thinking of its own self’, ‘pure self-consciousness (or I = I)’ or ‘I am’ (2: 52; 119). For Hegel, Fichte’s derivation of nature in the Sittenlehre (1798) (SE) is only a new form of one and the same

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Quotation will be followed by parenthesis in which volume number and pagination of German text will be given before semicolon and then English pagination after semicolon. Any modification of the translation will be acknowledged in the parenthesis.
systematic error. From this perspective, he objects that

The synthesis of nature and freedom provides now the following reconstruction of identity out of dichotomy into totality: I, as intelligence, as the undetermined—and I who am driven, I as nature, as the determined, shall become the same through the raising of impulse into consciousness. For then drive “comes within my control…” In the region of consciousness the drive does not act at all; I act or do not act according to it.”—That which reflects is higher than what is reflected: the drive of him who does the reflecting, that is, of the subject of consciousness, is called the higher drive. The lower drive, that is, nature, must be placed in subservience (Botmässigkeit) to the higher, that is, to reflection. This relation of subservience which one appearance of the I has to the other is to be the highest synthesis.

However, this latter identity and the identity of the transcendental viewpoint are totally opposed one to the other. Within the transcendental scope I = I, that is to say, the I is posited in a relation of substantiality or at the least in a relation of reciprocity. By contrast in [Fichte’s] reconstruction of identity one I dominates and the other is dominated; the subjective is not equal to the objective. They stand in a relation of causality instead; one of them goes into servitude, and the sphere of necessity is subordinated to that of freedom. Thus the end of the system is untrue to its beginning, the result is untrue to its principle. (Translation modified, 2: 74–5; 138)

Three points are involved in the Hegelian criticism. First, for Hegel the distortion of the transcendental viewpoint occurs in an incomplete synthesis of nature and freedom. In particular, the synthesis means to subordinate nature under freedom. Moreover, Hegel interprets the subordination as a causal relation. Secondly, it is remarkable that Hegel equates Fichte’s synthesis between freedom and nature with the synthesis between the intelligent ‘I’ and its natural drive. Whereas the intelligent ‘I’ is undetermined, its natural drive is determinate. The synthesis between the two kinds of ‘I’ then has something to do with a determination of the ‘I’. But this determination does not mean to objectify the ‘I’ as an external object. Rather it consists of self-reflection through which the ‘I’ becomes conscious of itself in and through the determination. As such, the incomplete synthesis of nature and freedom amounts to a defective form of determinate self-consciousness. Finally, Hegel attributes to Fichte an error in establishing an asymmetrical relation within self-consciousness. Due to this asymmetry, the independence of nature or the distinction of the reflected side is entirely canceled. Hegel’s own solution to the asymmetrical relation is to substitute the reciprocal and substantial relation for the causal one. In this way, it turns out that the Hegelian objection to Fichte’s special system is by nature grounded in a criticism of the theory of determinate self-consciousness or self-determination as developed in the SE.

In the history of German idealism, Hegel’s criticism of Fichte in the DS is regarded as a public announcement of the end of the unity of transcendental philosophy although it does not itself
bring about this end.3 Hegel’s provocative criticism of Fichte used to be one of the most controversial issues in German idealism. Yet since the 1970s, Fichte’s later formulations of the *Wissenschaftslehre* have been regarded as resistant and even “immune” to Hegel’s criticisms.4 During this period, students of Fichte have become satisfied with his philosophical system. When Hegel’s criticism is dealt with, it is always considered in relation to the later Fichte. Early Fichte thus remains under the threat of Hegel’s criticism. Düsing, who is correct to point out Fichte’s development in the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*, seems to conflate this development in Jena with the later one in Berlin.5 To the best of my knowledge, we still lack an examination of Hegel’s overall criticism of Fichte during the Jena period, especially the later Jena period.6 In fact, Hegel’s criticism of Fichte during this entire span of time seems simply to be taken for granted.

The second phase of Fichte’s development in Jena begins after 1796 with his new presentation of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. It can be demonstrated that his *SE* belongs to the same phase of his thought. We will focus on the Hegelian criticism of the *SE* in this paper with the aim of bringing Fichte and Hegel into dialogue. With this in mind, what concerns us in this paper is not to justify their respective systems but to focus on a question common to both of them. We will show that the Hegel’s criticism of Fichte points toward a non-objective conception of self-consciousness. Although Fichte’s model of causality excludes objectification, Hegel contends that it also entirely destroys consciousness as such. At a minimum, consciousness must contain a formal distinction between the thinking and the thought, which is different from and independent of the thinking. Through his criticism of a causal relation, Hegel is concerned with the internal structure of non-objective self-consciousness. Fichte agrees with Hegel’s non-objective concept of self-consciousness. His possible rejoinder would be that Hegel misinterprets his notion of self-determination as a causal relation.

In the following, I will argumentatively reconstruct the Hegelian dialogue with Fichte in four steps. To begin with, we will explicate the Hegelian definition of the philosophical task. Then we will explicate the concept of non-objective self-consciousness through the Hegelian notion of the

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3 It is worthy of noting that Hegel has still not yet worked out his own philosophical system when he came to Jena at the beginning of 1801. His earliest sketch of his later system only emerged during the winter semester of the same year. Therefore, Hegel’s *DS* should not be regarded as the introduction to his own philosophical system. Insofar as a conception of philosophical system can be mentioned in the *DS*, it refers to Hegel’s reflection with Hölderlin and his friends circle during his Frankfurt period. For a survey of the development of Hegel’s system in his early Jena period, Cf. Rolf P. Horstmann’s “Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen”, in *Hegel*, Hrsg. v. Otto Pöggeler, (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1977), pp. 43–58, and Walter Jaeschke: *Hegel Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung*, Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2003.


Absolute. Third, we will show that Hegel’s criticism is based on his “logical” denial of the causal model with respect to the non-objective self-consciousness. Finally, we will focus on Fichte’s possible response in the SE to Hegel. In this way, we will argue that Fichte and Hegel approach the theme of non-objective and concrete self-consciousness in two different ways.

I

From the very outset, it is the Hegelian definition of THE philosophical task that orients his criticism of Fichte in the DS. For him, the philosophical task is to “construct the Absolute for consciousness” (2: 25; 94). It is trivial that our consciousness must be determinate insofar as it is what it is. The philosophical task primarily lies in making the Absolute determinate and thereby accessible to our consciousness.

Furthermore, at the beginning of his exposition of Fichte’s system, Hegel defines the Absolute as the synthetic structure of a single “subject-object” which contains both their identity and their difference. In addition, he equates his notion of the Absolute with Fichte’s “I = I” or self-consciousness in which I am conscious of my own self. Self-consciousness certainly contains the synthetic structure of subject-object because the thinking subject and the thought subject are both identical with and different from each other. Despite the superficiality of its structure, one should not think that through this formulation Hegel falls back on a fallacious model of reflection. Like Fichte, Hegel maintains that reason as the ultimate origin of our rational life is nothing but spontaneous activity. He also agrees with the Jena Fichte that the self-activity of reason is at the same time its pure self-exposition through which reason is consciousness of its own activity. The philosophical task then consists in becoming conscious of the non-reflective self-consciousness.

Like the Jena Fichte, Hegel introduces a substantial model of the Absolute to describe the character of self-consciousness as a philosophical object. This description is also characterized as a transcendental standpoint which requires the genesis of self-consciousness as its proof. In the discussion on the relation of philosophizing to philosophical system, Hegel maintains,

*In* this self-production [the self-activity as pure self-exposition] of reason the Absolute shapes itself into an objective totality, which is a whole in itself held fast and complete, having no ground outside itself, but founded by itself in its beginning, middle and end.

(emphasis added, 2: 46; 113)

As such, philosophy does not mean to describe self-consciousness as an independent object but rather to realize its self-construction. The self-construction means that self-consciousness brings forth a ground within itself, from which it can be developed. The philosophical task then consists in realizing the genesis of self-consciousness. At the end of the genesis, the transcendental structure of the self-consciousness should have been proved. It thus turns out that the Hegelian definition of philosophical task is the same or nearly the same as what Fichte assumes in the SE.7

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7 For Fichte’s distinction between the ‘I’ as object and the ‘I’ in general in relation to his argumentative program in the *Sittenlehre*, Cf. Jürgen Stolzenberg’s “Das Selbstbewusstsein einer reinen praktischen Vernunft”,...
II

In the SE, Fichte only introduces a substantial model to describe the internal structure of self-consciousness. On the contrary, the Hegelian notion of the Absolute also has something to do with the objective totality. As we have seen above, the Absolute as self-consciousness constructs itself in the form of an objective totality. Hegel’s account of the self-construction of self-consciousness then sounds as if it were intended to divinize human reason. In the philosophical tradition, it is only divine thinking that constructs the whole world in its self-consciousness. In the preface to the DS, Hegel regards Fichte’s fundamental principle of self-consciousness as an extraction of the spirit of Kantian philosophy “in a purer and stricter form”. Moreover, he identifies his notion of the Absolute with the Kantian ‘I think’ and Fichte’s fundamental self-consciousness. In the Kantian tradition, it is difficult to regard human reason as divine thinking. It is thus necessary to explicate the Hegelian notion of the Absolute, so that Hegel’s genetic program can be better understood.

In the post-Kantian context, the relation of objective consciousness to self-consciousness becomes a basic and uncontroversial idea. In this section, we will show that the Hegelian connection of the Absolute with the self-consciousness of reason is based on a Kantian insight. It turns out that Hegel’s identification of the Kantian and Fichtean ‘I’ with the Absolute is based on the crucial epistemological significance which Kant attributes to the rational subject. In §16 of B deduction of the first Critique, Kant argues that ‘I think’ is “the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy” (CPH: B134). In view of the systematic place of the subject in Kant, Hegel seems justified in identifying the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of the fundamental ‘I’ as the Absolute.

Furthermore, the Hegelian concept of the Absolute not only refers to the systematic status but also concerns the way in which reason is conscious of itself. Due to his identification of the fundamental ‘I’ with the Absolute, it seems as if the concept of self meant the special substance of the soul in rational psychology which constitutes a component of metaphysica specialis in the pre-Kantian tradition. But this scholastic notion of the self cannot be applied to the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of the ‘I’ at all. I believe that Kant retains the notion of the “carrier” of representations while rejecting the ontological characterization of such a carrier in traditional psychologia rationalis. As such, the self in question only means the subject of thinking which “we” are.

Consequently, Hegel’s characterization of the Absolute as objective totality cannot rely on any form of pre-Kantian scholasticism. In fact, its function can be discovered in the epistemological significance which Kant attributes to ‘I think’. In §16 of the B deduction of the first Critique, he argues that “otherwise [that is, without the accompaniment of the I think] the representation would...
either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me” (CpR: B132). For Kant, ‘I think’ demarcates the horizon of our knowledge of the world. Put another way, the world to which we have access must be that in which we can become conscious of our own selves as subjects. For Kant, empirical knowledge of world or again the empirical world is characteristic of objective validity. Hegel, who differs from Kant on this crucial point, characterizes the same empirical world through a kind of holism. For him, the Absolute as objective totality is an organic whole which finds itself in each of constituents. In the DS, he does not further explain the organic relation of parts to whole. Yet it seems self-evident that the existence of constituents must be grounded in an organic whole. In this way, Hegel substitutes his own nascent epistemological holism for Kant’s notion of objective validity and regards it as the condition of our empirical world. He is thus justified articulating fundamental self-consciousness in terms of the Absolute.

In the Aristotelian tradition, the substantial term of the Absolute has two negative characteristics. On the one hand, it cannot be included in or placed next to another. In other words, substance must be a whole, which so to speak does not have an “outside”. On the other hand, because of its holist nature, substance cannot be determined through another concept. For a minimal condition of determination is the distinction of one thing from its opposite. The indeterminacy of the Absolute is primarily based on its holist nature as objective totality. We have shown that the philosophical task of constructing the Absolute for consciousness amounts to the genesis of self-consciousness. However, the indeterminate nature of the Absolute as objectivity totality rejects a possible objectification in self-constructive self-consciousness because any objectification assumes determinacy of our consciousness. At this point, one may conclude that the fundamental self-consciousness to which the Absolute refers is by nature non-objective.

III

How could non-objective self-consciousness be possible? For this question, one should turn to Fichte’s derivation of nature in the SE which the Hegelian criticism concerns in the DS. We will save an analysis of Fichte’s derivation of nature for the next section. In this section, we will concentrate on the fundamental ground of Hegel’s criticism of this derivation.

As we have seen at the beginning, Hegel is correct to point out that this derivation by nature consists of determinate self-consciousness or self-determination. According to Hegel, Fichte’s notion of self-determination is dependent on a causal relation, which characterizes the internal structure of self-consciousness. One may wonder what the concept of causality means here. Again what defect does the model of causality have in relation to the non-objective self-consciousness? It is a commonplace to believe that the causal relation consists in the productive relation of cause and effect. Whereas a cause is the condition of an effect, an effect is the consequence which a cause may bring forth. On the basis of any form of spatio-temporal scheme, the causal relation involves a succession from causes to effects in which a cause is antecedent to its effect. Due to the successive order, causality consists of an asymmetrical relation, in which the cause must be unconditioned and hence determinant. It is the unconditioned cause that determines the character of its effect and hence produces the latter.
Nevertheless, the Hegelian criticism of Fichte assumes that causality cannot preserve the difference between cause and effect. To clarify this supposition, we must examine his contrast between reciprocity and causality. According to Hegel, reciprocity means that two things which are related to each other can be both cause and effect \textit{at the same time}. It is apparent that reciprocity destroys the asymmetrical relation inherent in the ordinary concept of causality. Such asymmetry is based on the spatio-temporal condition which is presupposed in the concept of causality. Insofar as the asymmetry is destroyed, it is necessary to cancel the spatio-temporal presupposition as such. Otherwise, the successive order would make it impossible for one thing to be both conditioning and conditioned at the same time. The concept of reciprocity must be considered from a purely \textit{logical} perspective as deprived of spatio-temporal condition. Because of the symmetry which reciprocity requires, it is impossible for one term to determine the other. In this way, it is only the logical distinction between the two related terms that can be assumed. Since he opposes reciprocity to causality, it follows that for Hegel the distinction of causality consists in a loss of the logical distinction between cause and effect. Without any doubt, the Hegelian criticism of causality is not based on commonsense. Only from the purely logical perceptive can he contend that causality \textit{cannot} retain the distinction between cause and effect. The logical perspective overcomes any spatio-temporal distinction between them, which is however the presupposed condition of their commonsense distinction.

But why does the loss of any logical distinction between cause and effect count as a defect? It is worth emphasizing that Hegel criticizes the model of causality in relation to the notion of non-objective self-consciousness. Because self-consciousness is non-objective, it cannot contain the same distinction between subject and object as holds for objective knowledge. Rather in the case of non-objective self-consciousness it is the same ‘I’ that is both subject and object. Nevertheless, consciousness must by any means be defined through the \textit{formal} distinction between subject and object in order to be what it is at all. Since the model of causality excludes the logical distinction between its two related terms, it entirely destroys the existence of consciousness and hence self-consciousness.

At this point, one may well respond that the commonsense notion of causality can preserve the distinction between cause and effect on the basis of a spatio-temporal order. However, self-consciousness, which concerns us here, is fundamental because it constitutes the ultimate ground of the empirical world. Due to the systematic status, it is simply impossible to preserve the indispensable distinction in an empirical way.

Because of the limited space available here, the Hegelian solution to the issue of non-objective self-consciousness has to be saved for another occasion. Yet it has already become clear that the Hegelian criticism of causality is based on the indispensable nature of self-consciousness as consciousness.

IV

At the beginning, we have seen that for Hegel Fichte’s non-objective concept of self-consciousness consists of the subservience (\textit{Botmässigkeit}) of the reflected to the reflecting. Hegel interprets this
supposed subservience in terms of a causal relation. Fichte could then reply that Hegel misinterprets his notion of *Botmässigkeit* and hence self-consciousness. In this section, we will take a closer look at Fichte’s notion of *Botmässigkeit* so that his self-consciousness may be better understood. We will show that Fichte’s notion of *Botmässigkeit* concerns a practical notion of self-consciousness rather than what Hegel thinks of as a causal relation.

Apparently, the Hegelian criticism is concerned with what he describes as “raising impulse into consciousness”. The central core of this criticism is mainly based on Fichte’s argument in §9 of the *SE*. In the previous section, Fichte works out the notion of the so-called natural drive as limited by something given from without so that a practical self-consciousness of the natural drive can finally be established. He then attempts to prove in §9 how a natural drive can be attributed to me as mine. It is the self-ascription of natural drive that constitutes his concept of non-objective self-consciousness as self-determination.

Here we do not pretend to provide a detailed commentary on §9. For present purposes, it will be sufficient to explain Fichte’s crucial concept of longing (*Sehnen*), which constitutes his solution to the issue of non-objective self-consciousness. For Fichte, the concept of longing functions as the means to become conscious of the natural drive which is given to me. However, this consciousness is not an objectification of the drive but rather an immediate relation to it which Fichte articulates as feeling. On the basis of the immediate relation, the feeling subject is in the state of need which the natural drive causes.

According to Fichte, longing is still an indeterminate feeling of need. Yet he argues that a kind of self-consciousness may have already been involved in immediate feeling. To make sense of the notion of longing, one must show what kind of consciousness is at stake. On the one hand, like animals, we cannot control our natural drive which is immediately given to us. On the other hand, human longing does not have the same relation to the natural drive as is the case for animals. For Fichte, it is the state of longing that distinguishes us from animals that always immediately react to the natural drive. This distinction points to an internal difference between longing subject and natural drive. In particular, it is incumbent on us to confirm a natural drive or sensation.

In addition, it is worth acknowledging that Fichte’s notion of longing is only concerned with an indeterminate form of consciousness. Through the reference to indeterminacy, Fichte emphasizes that particular contents of longing have not yet been considered at this phase of primordial confirmation. What remains to be confirmed is then either a decision or resolution to be an agent that can have and then satisfy different kinds of needs. The decision or resolution constitutes the indispensable moment of consciousness in question through which I can attribute the capacity of endless pursuit to myself as mine. It is above all in this primordial sense of agency that Fichtearticulates his view of practical self-consciousness as self-determination.

Nevertheless, our full fledged form of practical self-consciousness cannot but be determinate. Insofar as a need can be felt and brought into consciousness, it must be determinate and hence distinguished from other possibilities. Fichte names determinate longing desire. Because of the possibility of determination of longing, one is free to choose among and to satisfy felt needs. For Fichte, the subject can only have causality with respect to natural drives insofar as it can neglect some of them. The notion of causality then only has a negative sense in that it keeps the identity of subject from deconstruction. But it does not show how the subject can come into being at all.
Both the practical sense of self-determination and the mere negative sense of causality may be regarded as Fichte’s indirect response to the Hegelian criticism in the DS. Hegel’s criticism rests on a misinterpretation. The Hegelian misinterpretation is by nature concerned with the epistemological role which non-objective self-consciousness may play in our rational life. The central core of the argument is dependent on Fichte’s seemingly confusing term of Botmässigkeit which might well connote an asymmetrical relation between the reflecting and the reflected in its literal sense. The possible confusion directs us back to the basic insight in Fichte’s genetic program which proves to concern Hegel as well. Due to the limited space available here, we will not be able to deal with this difficulty.

Admittedly, for Fichte non-objective self-consciousness as self-determination primarily means to be a longing or more precisely a desiring agent. Like Hegel, Fichte is equally concerned with a practical way of concretizing the non-objective form of self-consciousness. It turns out that the Hegelian criticism of causality misunderstands Fichte’s view in the SE. However, it may be suspected that Fichte could explain a determination of longing which his notion of self-determination cannot but involve. In any case, Fichte does not halt his reflection and self-criticism in the second phase of his Jena period. For Hegel, the Differenz-Schrift is only the very beginning of his philosophical career. His answer to the issue of concrete self-consciousness still needs to be worked out. In addition, his criticism of Fichte continues throughout his career. I can only conclude here that the theme of the concretization of non-objective self-consciousness developed here does not exhaust but rather only points to an aspect of their very fruitful dialogue.

For a criticism of Fichte’s fundamental concept of intentionality, Cf. Violetta Waibel’s “The One Drive and the Two Modes of Acting—Cognition and Volition”, in Philosophy Today (52) 2008.

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