

Tokyo Workshop on Social and Collective Self-Conscious Emotions

- July 1 & 2, 2017
- University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus, Bldg.18, 4F, Collaboration Room 1

Program

July 1:

- (1) 9:30 - 10:45** Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) & Alba Montes Sánchez (Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen)
“Envy as a social emotion”
- (2) 10:45 - 12:00** Christian von Scheve (Freie Universität Berlin)
“The sociality of envy: Similarity and relationality”
- (3) 13:30 - 14:45** Masayoshi Morioka (Ritsumeikan University)
“On the recovery of self-reflective emotion in the therapeutic relationship”
- (4) 15:00 - 16:15** Eisuke Sakakibara (University of Tokyo)
“The pathologization of social anxiety and its treatment by psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy”
- (5) 16:30 - 17:45** Vasudevi Reddy (University of Portsmouth)
“The development of self-consciousness: From feeling to thinking” [on Skype]

July 2:

- (1) 10:45 - 12:00** Mikko Salmela (University of Helsinki) & Gavin Brent Sullivan (Coventry University)
“The intentional structure and rational appropriateness of hetero-induced pride and shame”
- (2) 13:30 - 14:45** Asuka Suehisa (Seijo University)
“Exploring the structure of emotion and the self-conscious emotion of shame through Martin Heidegger’s lens”
- (3) 15:00 - 16:15** Kohji Ishihara (University of Tokyo)
“The role of awareness of emotions in Tojisha-Kenkyu and the Open Dialogue approach”
- (4) 16:30 - 17:45** Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) & Kengo Miyazono (Hiroshima University)
“Being one of us: Group identification, joint actions and collective intentionality”

Access

University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus

- Google Map: <https://goo.gl/maps/fpBpXMCXrAD2>
- Access Map: <http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020133.pdf>
- Campus Map: <http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020146.pdf>

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- Suntory Foundation, Grant for Interdisciplinary Collaborative Research in Humanities and Social Sciences: “Social and Collective Self-Conscious Emotions” (PI: Kengo Miyazono)
 - <http://www.suntory.com/sfnd/>
- The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy
 - http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index_en.php

Abstracts

Alessandro Salice & Alba Montes Sánchez

“Envy as a social emotion”

Within emotion theory envy is generally portrayed as a purely individualistic emotion: the rivalry envy involves, so the thought goes, indicates that the relation between the envier and the rival is exclusively antagonistic in nature and, hence, anti-social. This paper aims at resisting this view by arguing that envy necessarily presupposes a sense of us-ness. To put this claim in more technical terms, envy can be described as a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion, i.e., as an emotion that, although being about the self, is induced by somebody who is perceived by the emoting subject as an in-group member.

The presentation is organized in three parts. In the first part, we argue that envy is always a hostile emotion by focusing on Scheler’s theory of envy and, in particular, on his idea that envy presupposes a sense of impotence on the side of the envier as well as a psychological tendency to compare oneself with others. In the second part, we introduce the notion of “hetero-induced self-conscious emotions” by focusing on the paradigmatic case of being ashamed of somebody else. In the third part we apply this framework to envy and argue (i) that the impotence felt by the subject signals the emotion’s self-reflexivity and (ii) that the target of the comparison is somebody who the emoting subject conceives of as an in-group member. The paper ends by assessing the extent to which envy presupposes a sense of us.

Christian von Scheve

“The sociality of envy: Similarity and relationality”

Envy is usually defined as arising when someone lacks another person’s possession, quality, or achievement, desires it, and possibly wishes the other person lacked it. Qualitatively, envy is thought to encompass unpleasant feelings of inferiority, hostility, or resentment towards the party enjoying the desired possession. Envy is an intriguing social and self-conscious emotion because it is exclusively elicited by a core feature of human sociality, relative social standing of the emoting self. Moreover, there is but one process that elicits envy, unfavorable upward social comparison. Although envy is frequently discredited as an “anti-social” emotion and thus approached from an individualistic vantage point, it is in fact an emotion ridden with substantial social preconditions. First, envy requires some sort of social structure or relational positioning in which desired possessions are unequally distributed. Second, the envier and the envied party need to be similar to each other in some regard. In this talk, I will argue that both of these aspects have often been ill conceptualized in previous theorizing. First, many approaches have framed envy in the context of social structure and social inequality. I will argue that structural inequality, leading to collective longings for possessions of the “better off” in society, is likely to be appraised in terms of injustice as a moral category. Envy, however, is not a moral emotion and appraising these inequalities with reference to concerns for justice elicits anger, resentment, or indignation, rather than envy. Hence, I suggest that this societal aspect of envy is, for analytical purposes, better captured using the concept of (positional) social relationality. This perspective is also in line with the second requirement, similarity or social

closeness. It is usually argued that the envier and the envied party need to be similar in social standing. This similarity is a general precondition for social comparison processes since people tend to compare with others who share comparison-related attributes, for instance gender, age, or social class. Whereas some have argued that similarity may be captured by concepts of social identity or group identification, I rather seek to extend Rinofner-Kreidl's and in part also Neckel's reasoning. Group identification is unlikely to be critical to envy, not least because envy often includes malicious action tendencies that then would harm the alleged in-group, and thus ultimately the self. Instead, I argue that similarity matters in terms of a horizon of possibilities vis-a-vis equal opportunities (Tocqueville). The envied person represents a trajectory of self-development from which the envier is (at least momentarily) barred. Appraisals of the causes of this barring might then further specify the nature of the envious feelings, transformations to other (moral) emotions, and action tendencies.

Masayoshi Morioka

“On the recovery of self-reflective emotion in the therapeutic relationship”

The purpose here is to explore a little further into how the self-reflective emotion can be recovered in the psychotherapeutic relationship. The author will discuss on this theme through examining a clinical case vignette of a psychological counseling applied on a female client who had hardly self-injured. The affect regulation, especially anxiety regulation is the central task for the treatment of the self-injury. In the self-injury case the emotion felt before the action seems to be non-reflective. The question is how can we transform non-self-reflective emotion into reflective? The author will investigate on this theme the possibility for the recovery a dialogue within oneself. If the emotion could be given an adequate symbolic expression differed from non-reflective raw emotion, self-reflective emotion guides next action and indicates future direction. It offers the key to an understanding how to make a reflective consciousness and to regulate negative emotion.

Eisuke Sakakibara

“The pathologization of social anxiety and its treatment by psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy”

The emotion of shame has long been considered characteristic of Japanese culture. Recent epidemiological studies, however, revealed that social anxiety disorder, a form of mental illness characterized by exaggerated and debilitating shyness and shame, is more prevalent among western countries than in Japan. I point out that the structure of shyness, which contains hyperreflexivity and self-stigmatization, are causally relevant with the more pervasive pathologization of shyness among western countries, where shyness and introversion is less socially accepted than in Japan. I briefly explain how social anxiety is treated by cognitive behavioral therapy and how selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) like Paxil is effective for alleviating social anxiety and defend the position that SSRIs are really enhancing one's emotion when one suffer from excessive amount of social anxiety.

Vasudevi Reddy

“The development of self-consciousness: From feeling to thinking”

It is often argued that self-conscious affectivity arises as a consequence of an explicit conceptualisation of self. However, there is considerable developmental evidence that the different families of self-conscious affects are in place long before the emergence of an explicit concept of self. Using data from the first year of infancy and from pre-school children with autism and Down syndrome, I argue in this talk that self-conscious affectivity emerges within and serves to regulate, the

intimacy and attraction in friendly relationships. It is the root, rather than the result, of conceptualising the self.

Mikko Salmela & Gavin Brent Sullivan

“The intentional structure and rational appropriateness of hetero-induced pride and shame”

In this presentation, we raise two worries about account of hetero-induced pride and shame by Salice and Montes Sanchez (2016). Our first worry relates to the intentional structure of these emotions. Salice and Montes Sanchez argue that the intentional object of hetero-induced pride and shame is the self rather than the grammatical object of these emotions: a certain quality or action of another person that bears on the subject’s identity. We suggest with Hume that these emotions have two intentional objects: both the self and the grammatical object that merge in an indexical description of the object as “my” or “mine”. Our second worry concerns the rational appropriateness of hetero-induced pride and shame. We first remind that verbal expressions of hetero-induced self-conscious emotion should not be taken at face value (Sullivan 2007). Then we argue that the question of appropriateness concerns both the shape and size of an emotion (D’Arms & Jacobson 2000). Regarding the shape of emotion, we suggest that hetero-induced pride and shame are rationally appropriate in we-mode groups (Tuomela 2013) whose members have collectively committed themselves to their shared concerns. However, many group contexts such as friends and families cannot be understood as we-mode groups in a straightforward sense. Nevertheless, causal contribution to the success or failure of the other may be important for the appropriateness of hetero-induced pride and shame for instance in family contexts. Regarding the size of these emotions, we suggest that the agents in whose achievements we take pride or whose failures we feel ashamed of are justified in expressing these emotions more intensely than ourselves.

Asuka Suehisa

“Exploring the structure of emotion and the self-conscious emotion of shame through Martin Heidegger’s lens”

This presentation examines the self-conscious emotion of shame using Heidegger’s phenomenological theory of emotion (attunement theory) and his analytic of Dasein. In Heidegger’s theory of emotion found in *Being and Time* and other writings, anxiety as a fundamental attunement is a major theme. Because he only analyses this attunement and fear which is derived from anxiety, he does not provide any detailed analyses of shame. However, his analyses of “They,” “Dasein-with of Others,” and the general structure of emotion may provide many clues to how we may think about shame and its collective aspects. After making clear Heidegger’s theory of emotion and its characteristics, I will use Heidegger’s lens to discuss shame in order to demonstrate how this phenomenon is not limited to Japan but can be a defining trait in all cultures.

Kohji Ishihara

“The role of awareness of emotions in Tojisha-Kenkyu and the Open Dialogue approach”

Tojisha-kenkyu refers to a unique activity among people with mental disorders that emerged in 2001 at Bethel House in Hokkaido, Japan. At the beginning of Tojisha-kenkyu and other meetings, members of Bethel House report their “kibun” (mental state, mood, or feeling) and “taicho” (physical state). The disclosure of “kibun” and “taicho” seems to facilitate dialogue within the meetings. In the Open Dialogue Approach that emerged in West Lapland, Finland, in the 1980s, therapists focus on the emotions of clients and other meeting participants (e.g., clients’ family members) to facilitate dialogue

during the therapeutic meeting. Since both approaches make use of awareness of emotions in facilitating dialogue, I focus on this aspect in my comparison of them from a mental health care perspective.

Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono

“Being one of us: Group identification, joint actions and collective intentionality”

Within social psychology, “group identification” refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. Recently, this notion has attracted growing interest in the debate about shared agency, where group identification is appealing to many because it allegedly explains important forms of intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way and without incurring in the costs of ascribing mentality to super-individual group agents. This paper argues that, unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function ascribed to this notion for an understanding of collective intentions remains vacillating at best, but frustrated at worst. The paper offers such a clarification by developing a novel theory of group identification. Group identification is described as encompassing two different mental processes: adoption of the group perspective and transformation in self-understanding. It is claimed that the latter process consists in the production of what Ruth Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu Representations’ and that it is developmentally prior with respect to the ability of adopting the group perspective.