

What does Forerunning into Death Disclose?

Eight Theses on Death in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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Edgar Allen Poe brings attention to the finite nature of human existence through his ever repeating words “nothing more” and “nevermore” in his famous poem the “Raven”. Similarly, Martin Heidegger philosophically illustrates the existentiell and existential¹ significance of human mortality in his masterpiece *Being and Time*. We will expand upon Heidegger's concept of death. Before examining Heidegger's views, however, I would first like to make clear that we will disregard several interpretations of Heidegger's notion of death, as they completely overlook the physical and biological aspects of death and consider it as just an analogy to “the closing down of possibilities” (Carmen), “having anxiety attack” (Blattner), “losing an individual's identity” (Dreyfus) or “world-collapse” (Haugeland and White).² While each of these positions will not be refuted here, we will show that what Heidegger means when he says “forerunning into death” can be sought after only from death of the mortal, contrasted with the immortal, which announces the primordial finitude of human existence. These refined trials, which separate Heidegger's concept of death from the literal death of individual humans, might have already been engaged in the everyday interpretation of death, in so far as they identify humane death which is understood authentically with the mere oncoming occurrence of death.

In this paper I will show you, with eight theses, what the forerunning into death discloses. The Forerunning into death means ‘being related of the authentically understood death’. In other words, when one foreruns into death, we can say, he or she is understanding death authentically. The essences in my paper is two points. First, when one understands death authentically, he or she discloses to oneself the indefiniteness of one's own potentiality–for-being[Seinkönnen]. This is what the forerunning into death discloses in view of its existentiell meaning. This will be discussed on the sixth thesis. Second, when one understands death authentically, he or she discloses to oneself the nothingness[das Nichts]. This is what the forerunning into death discloses in view of its ontological meaning. This will be discussed on the seventh and eighth theses. The first five theses are arranged in a gradual way in order to guide us from normal interpretation of death to authentic understanding of death.

¹ The “existentiell” means the factual character of existence in terms of its own life, while the “existential” means the structural character of existence in terms of philosophical and theoretical investigation.

² in Hubert L. Dreyfus' Foreword of the following book, p.xxxi. Carol J. White, *Time and Death - Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude*, Ashgate, 2005.

1st Thesis. Death belongs to existence. (*Being and Time*³, p.277, p.295)

We know we will all die. We know this more certainly than any other facts. But we also know we will not die now. Death is just a far off occurrence. This is how we normally understand death. According to this, death in the remote future cannot positively determine the present being. How could my death be compatible with my being? This everyday way of understanding death originates from the fact that we stick to present-centric thoughts. In this perception of time death is the absolute Other of me. There are innumerable points from the starting point of the present to the ending point of death. If one is to arrive at the ending point, one should go through all the points one by one. Therefore, death is plainly separated from the present being.

Heidegger, however, states that death already belongs to each existence. Existence means the way of our respective being which is moving oneself ahead at all time. As I am ahead of myself, I build the world in such a way that I project myself upon my definite possibilities. The existentiell project is the way of being which is bringing one's future to oneself. The future is not a front point in the extended line of chains of "now", but is arranged only by projecting myself and simultaneously by building the world. We project ourselves upon various possibilities of which there are not only clearly thematized situations but also vague unthematized situations. For instance, a possibility of walking on the street, a possibility of taking a show at evening, a possibility of becoming a lecturer a few years later, a possibility of suffering from parents' death a dozens of years later, and *a possibility of my own death at the end*. When we utter this last possibility, we sense an extreme, incomparable possibility. The extreme possibility already belongs to my existence. Since we are not present, static entities but futuristic, dynamic entities projecting ourselves, death cannot be plainly a remote occurrence but an uttermost possibility that is always presiding over oneself and is rooted in each existence. "My being separated from death" is just a conceived saying to flee from ever presiding death.

2nd Thesis. For Dasein death 'is' as being towards death. (BT 277, 289, 303)

We have confirmed that death is not a far off occurrence but a basic event getting deeply into existence, but we still might think about it like this. Nevertheless death is not yet "real" for us. If so, we could not be here. It becomes clear then that death is inseparably combined to my being and that it may even possibly belong to me. However, that possibility is too premature to be realized. The everyday interpretation of death to separate us from it is too ingrained in common belief. Death is not a point in time when life ends, but a constant event that announces itself in a way of coming to each existence. In this sense, death 'is' as being towards death.

³ It will be below abbreviated with "BT".

Heidegger distinguishes the several means of “ending,” through terms such as perishing (Verenden), demise (Ableben), and dying (Sterben).⁴ Perishing is a way of ending the lives of creatures. This concept of death is appropriate to all living entities in a physiological and biological aspect. Naturally humans as a kind of creature also perish. Demise indicates a phenomenon when a person becomes the deceased. As a person becomes the deceased, he or she does not become a mere corpse, but also “an object of ‘concern’ in the ways of funeral rites, interment and the cult of graves.”⁵ So when a person demises, he or she does not degenerate into a mere thing, but are still concerned by others. By contrast, dying is “that way of *Being* in which Dasein is towards its death.”⁶ The way of ending of Dasein, namely dying, is not the only relation humans have in terms of death. Humans perish as a biological entity and demises as a social entity. However, the way of human’s *primordial* relation to death is only dying. And only mortal humans are able to die.

Whereas death is usually understood as an ending point in time, it presents itself as what we are continuously engaged in and what we are arriving at. Death is an unstoppable event of possibility coming upon us, which cannot be avoided like other definite occurrences whose realization brings us great fear.

3rd Thesis. Death is impending. (BT, p.294)

Our beliefs of death are not likely to change very easily. A doubt might arise again: although we are towards death (i.e. we are dying incessantly), it is just a displacement of “we are living” with “we are dying”. And this is correct, for we are both dying as well as living. This doubt is based on the thought that we might equate the living process as the dying process. However, when Heidegger emphasizes death as being towards death, his intention is not like that at all. This is because, according to him, death is impending. Death is already impending and does not come gradually. In Tolstoy’s novella “the death of Ivan Ilych”, it is not until Ilych falls under a fatal disease that he perceives his impending death and frees himself from his blind faith for public values, roles and status. We feel our own death impending when we think of our lives coming to an end like this story.⁷ However, in the authentic understanding of death, we are already next door to death.

For any existence its being is always an issue. Even an existence, which does not seem to be concerned with itself at all, makes an issue of its own being in such a state of indifference. The reason why its being is an issue for existence is that it is forced to project itself upon its possibilities in every case by the structure of its being, i.e. care [Sorge]. Which possibility is the biggest issue for existence?

4 BT, pp.281-285.

5 *ibid.*, p. 282.

6 *ibid.*, p. 291.

7 Perceiving one’s own impending death does not guarantee at once the authentic understanding of death. Though one is in the face of death, he or she is not likely to convert a way of understanding the world like Ilych.

Which one is the inevitable possibility of dominating the existence? It is nothing but death that we have evaded in everydayness, i.e. “the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (BT 294). For existence, which in every case makes an issue of its own being, and which in every case projects itself upon a definite possibility, the biggest issue is the possibility of its non-being or of self-annihilation which has been incessantly imposed on itself. If we free ourselves from the tempting detention of everydayness, if we gaze at our own possibility of death without evading it, it arises as the biggest issue and an impending possibility. When we know this, we come to realize that death is not a slowly oncoming occurrence but an already impending event. According to Heidegger, the empirical “fact” that we are not everyday in the face of death cannot be a refutation of this, because the fact is rather only circumstantial evidence that we evade everyday and conceal death.⁸

4th Thesis. Death is certain. (BT, p.302, p.309)

We are certain we will die. No one doubts that man will die some day, but this certainty with which we know of death does not “imply that kind of Being-certain which corresponds to the way death enter into Dasein”.(BT, p. 299) He die, she die and you die. They die and we die. So I also *will* die. The everyday certainty about death is an empirical certainty which results from the empirical facts that every human dies. According to Heidegger, the public interpretation of death endows death with such an empirical certainty, obscures the true certainty corresponding to death, rather alleviates this, and disguises the fact that we are thrown to death.

The empirical certainty that one acquires through the accumulated facts cannot have a necessary certainty. So the everyday knowledge that we all die has also just an empirical certainty, and “such certainty necessarily falls short of the highest certainty, the apodictic, which we reach in certain domains of theoretical knowledge”(BT, p.301) The apodictic certainty is acquired only when “something present-at-hand” is encountered in itself most purely. Then is the certainty with which Heidegger endows death such an apodictic certainty? Not at all, because death itself is not what has character of “something present-at-hand” in front of me.

The empirical certainty does not reach apodictic certainty, but even the latter does not reach ‘being existentially certain of his or her own death’ in the authentic understanding of death, since those kinds of certainty essentially cannot cover something like being of Dasein in their way of apprehension. On the other hand an “object” of *existentiell certainty* is a kind of being of Dasein itself.

Heidegger discerns the twofold sense of certainty. Certainty is in its original sense “Being-certain, as a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein”, whereas certainty in its derivative sense corresponds to “any entity of which Dasein can be certain.”(BT, p.300) For instance when I am certain of ‘ $2 + 2 = 4$ ’, I am certain of it in the original sense of certainty and such calculation is certain in the

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 298.

derivative sense of certainty. This calculation is separated, in some sense, from 'my being' that is certain of the calculation. However, in case of the authentic understanding of death, what I am certain of is neither "entities encountered within-the-world" nor "formal object", but the very existence of his or her own being. In case of death, one who *is* certain *is* certain of *oneself*. What one is certain of is not the last occurrence of demise but one's being itself as being-towards-death. What one is certain of is indistinguishable, in that case, from one who is certain. "Holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behavior in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence."(BT, p.309, 310) Though we are empirically certain of death, we may be already existentially more or less certain of death at the same time on condition that it is concealed because we try to evade it persistently. After all, only in the authentic understanding of death can one be fully certain of it without evading it.

5th Thesis. Death is a possibility of impossibility. (BT, p.299, 307, 354)

That one understands death authentically is tantamount to that one understands oneself fully in a possibility of death, but it seems that death is a limit of my understanding like a wall that cannot be reached by my understanding. It seems that we encounter a paradoxical task that we must understand what cannot be understood. So Heidegger calls death "the possibility of the *impossibility* of existence." This impossibility does not indicate, however, a logical impossibility. Although the authentic understanding of death, i.e. "forerunning into death" is a very special phenomenon, it cannot commit a logical contradiction. Then what does it mean to be the "*impossibility*"? I want to consider it as *a possibility of the factually impossible but existentially and possibly highest possibility*.

"Understanding[Verstehen]", which Heidegger considers as the basic disclosedness[Erschlossenheit] besides "state of mind[Befindlichkeit] ", means "understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection"⁹. So, that one understands death authentically means that he or she projects him- or herself upon a possibility of death and stands it out.¹⁰ Heidegger calls this forerunning into death as well. Various kinds of relation to entities are included in the way of existing of Dasein. When Dasein projects itself upon a definite possibility explicitly, the possibility is meant to be realized factually, and when it is realized, Dasein has a definite relation to entities. A relation to entities is at all times necessary for Dasein which has the structure of projecting incessantly. However, Dasein which projects itself upon a possibility of death cannot find there a relation

9 *ibid.*, p. 307.

10 This implies that in order to understand death authentically, one has to forerun into death by oneself. Barbara Merker indicates that the reason why the Heidegger's investigation on authenticity is hard to verify consists in a difficulty to realize authenticity. Accepting her indication, we can say that the reason why Heidegger's investigation on death is hard to understand fully consists in the fact that in order to do so, we ourselves are required to forerun into death. Barbara Merker, 「Konversion statt Reflexion - Eine Grundfigur der Philosophie Martin Heideggers」, edited by Forum für Philosophie, in Martin Heidegger: Innen - und Außenansichten, Suhrkamp, 1989, S. 234

to entities. Then only an impossibility of all relations to entities is noticed to Dasein, because not an entity but only the nothing is revealed to Dasein which foreruns into death. So death is a mere impossibility of existence. When Dasein projects itself upon the possibility, it does not concern other possibilities to be realized, but makes only the possibility more possible and brings the highest and the uttermost possibility to itself.¹¹ In other words, Dasein then enters into the pure possibility itself. Death is *factically* merely a possibility of 'not-being-there', but paradoxically forerunning into death makes Dasein [Being-there] 'be-there'.

Death cannot be comprehended as something present-at-hand[Vorhandenes] is grasped, but if Dasein stands it out, it makes Dasein understand the uttermost possibility of the possible. This poses the question of what it means to understand this maximized possibility. On sixth and seventh theses, we will investigate the existentiell significance of it, and on the eighth thesis the existential significance of it.

6th Thesis. Death discloses the indefiniteness of one's own potentiality-for-being [Seinkönnen]. (BT, p.356)

By forerunning into death Dasein has the maximized possibility in face of itself. Death, as the impossibility of existence, discloses the indefiniteness of one's own potentiality-for-being. It becomes manifest for forerunning Dasein that its own potentiality-for-being is not definite on the whole. So Heidegger says, "The *indefiniteness* of ones' own potentiality-for-being, even when this potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made *wholly* manifest in Being-towards-death."(BT, p. 356)

It is not determined beforehand what I can be. This can be determined only by a resolution upon Situation [Situation] disclosed authentically. This is what forerunning into death reveals to us. But it seems somewhat self-evident enough not to need such forerunning because they do not think their futuristic actions are already determined and rather they think they are instantly determined by their decision about a certain situation[Lage].¹² What Heidegger conveys to us is not like this. According to him, our understanding of situation in every case defining our actions is determined 'proximally and mostly' implicitly by a public way of interpretation, i.e. by socio-cultural norms, practices and custom of 'they [das Man]'. A public way of interpretation determines in advance what to be and how to be. An example of this public way of interpretation is the very phenomenon in which the public interpretation of death prescribes our ordinary but inauthentic understanding of death which prevents us from forerunning into death. Dasein which foreruns into a possibility of impossibility, however, finds that its own potentiality-for-being is totally indefinite, i.e. that every interpretation on entities determined publicly becomes dropped out in face of death. The more Dasein foreruns into death, the more keenly Dasein

11 In this respect "impossibility" can be interpreted as an extreme possibility. White regards „im“ not as merely negation but as 'enormous', 'vast'. Carol J. White, *ibid.*, p.88.

12 Heidegger distinguishes Situation which is disclosed in authentic existence from situation[Lage] which is disclosed in inauthentic existence. BT, p.346.

realizes its own being, because indefiniteness of the potentiality-for-being disclosed by death announces only the naked fact of being without predicating any words of 'I' in 'I am'. What Heidegger means by "Being-guilty" is essentially nothing but this fact, i.e. the very fact "that-it [Dasein]-is-and-has-to-be" (BT, p.330). Furthermore, as a result of this, Dasein comes to clearly realize that it must be such an entity that cannot pass responsibility to anyone, and must consequently undertake the responsibility that it has passed over 'they'.

Before we proceed further we need to remove some misunderstandings raised in interpretations of Heidegger's concept of death. Although authentic existence for Heidegger looks in the face of the incessant indefiniteness of its own potentiality-for-being, it is distinct from the human subject for Sartre who is condemned to be free because it is in itself the nothing.¹³ Forerunning into death for Heidegger is the equivalent moment with historical recapitulation [geschichtliche Wiederholung] though the latter becomes possible only through the former. "O[o]ne's anticipation[forerunning] of this possibility[death]" "signifies precisely that one is coming back to one's factual 'there'"(BT, p.434) By forerunning into death Dasein does not dig into "death" and sink into it, but comes back to its own Self and hands down factual possibilities that have come down historically as a heritage in resolving upon its own Situation. It is certain not only that "Only by the anticipation of death[forerunning into death] is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out" and so authentic recapitulation arises from forerunning, but also that the choice of factual possibilities of Dasein, i.e. the definite resolution upon Situation does not get accomplished from indefiniteness of death or the nothing, but from the possible in a historical limit.

Furthermore, as a result of this, the misunderstanding that forerunning into death makes Dasein become *solus ipse*, lack solicitude for Others also can prove to be totally false.¹⁴ It is true that death as a "ownmost" and "non-relational" possibility makes Dasein individualize and also true that "all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us" in face of death, because only its own potentiality-for-being itself is an issue for Dasein facing its own indefiniteness which is disclosed by a possibility of death. As it has been already said, however, forerunning helps merely understand possibilities to be chosen factually more authentically by converting a normal situation into a unique Situation. "As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes – but only in such a manner that it makes Dasein have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of Other."(BT, p. 309) Heidegger distinguishes between two positive modes of solicitude for Other. One is the solicitude "which leaps in and dominates" and the other is the solicitude "which leaps forth and liberates" as a way of authentic solicitude for Other which is made possible by forerunning. (BT, p. 159) A way of our everyday solicitude for Other is to take over for Other what he or she has to concern and, as

13 Aho explains well how Heidegger is distinguished from the existentialists including Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Sartre.. Kevin Aho, "Why Heidegger is not an Existentialist : Interpreting Authenticity and Historicity in Being and Time", Florida Philosophical Review, Vol III, Issue 2, Winter 2003, pp.9–11.

14 It is well informed that the critique of Levinas on the concept of death of Heidegger lies on similar context.

a result, to take away it from him or her. On the other hand, Dasein understanding the potentiality-for-being of Other by forerunning does not participate in what he or she has to concern, but participates in only the existence of Other itself and thus helps him or her “to become free for it[his or her own care]”, i.e. to exist authentically. (BT, p. 159)¹⁵ To apprehend Heidegger’s concept of death properly, we need to take notice not only that forerunning into death means projecting upon one’s indefinite potentiality-for-being but also that this brings it out that “for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility[death]”(BT, p.308).

7th Thesis. Being towards death is essentially anxiety. (BT, p.310)

Everyone has a more or less fear of “death”. Some fear death greatly and others fear death to a lesser extent. One might seem not to fear “death” at all although this case is rare. Heidegger distinguishes, however, anxiety of death from fear of occurrence of death. While the latter is something similar to resistance and fright which “death” as an oncoming occurrence brings about, the former is the basic state-of-mind from which Dasein cannot escape because of its finitude which means being essentially thrown to death. Fear arises from definite entities encountered within-the-world. However “a [A]nxiety arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death.”(BT, p.395) Whereas objects of fear are entities like definite intentional objects including a snake, an exam or a public lecture etc, what Dasein has anxiety of is beyond any entities mere being of Dasein itself. Heidegger considers that this anxiety is incessantly presiding over Dasein at bottom, but we do not face it because we oppress it proximally and for the most part by fleeing from death. Above all, publicity, which is an important condition to maintain a society, tries to oppress anxiety of death and invert it onto fear of occurrence of death. “In addition, the anxiety which has been made ambiguous as fear, is passed off as a weakness with which no self-assured Dasein may have any acquaintance.”(BT, p. 298)

As anxiety of death is essentially distinct from fear of “death” which blurs anxiety publicly, a bravery that is said to have overcome fear of “death” must be so distinguished from “the courage for anxiety in the face of death”(BT, p. 298) A brave soldier who is willing to “die”, unlike any other normal persons, is also likely to understand death inauthentically like any other persons, i.e. to consider death just a little more special occurrence in an ambiguous way of public interpretation. What is then “the courage for anxiety in the face of death”? It is nothing but forerunning into death. Heidegger says in 1929 at a famous lecture “What is Metaphysics?” that breath of anxiety quivers “most assuredly in those who are basically daring.”¹⁶

15 See for further analysis of this: Ortega, Mariana, "When Conscience Calls, Will Dasein Answer? Heideggerian Authenticity and the Possibility of Ethical Life", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* Vol.13(1), 2005, p.25.

16 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?”, trans. by David Farrell Krell, in *Basic Writings*, Harper & Row, 1977. p.108.

The “daring” here is nothing but the courage to forerun into one’s own death. One needs such daring, in order to project oneself onto the most alien and the uncanniest possibility man can suffer. Only those who hold out the uncanniness of death are able to awake themselves to breath of anxiety. Only Dasein which takes over its own being as being towards death has the courage for anxiety.

8th Thesis. Forerunning into death reveals the nothing. (BT, p.310)

“In this state-of-mind[anxiety], Dasein find itself face to face with the “nothing” of the possible impossibility of its existence.”(BT, p.310) Dasein encounters the nothing in anxiety, which has already presided but is asleep and can be evoked only in forerunning existence. In other words, forerunning into death reveals the nothing. We have already confirmed, in the sixth thesis, that a possibility of death reveals the indefiniteness of the potentiality-for-being; this is the existentiell description on the way in which death is disclosed in Dasein. The eighth thesis that death reveals the nothing is the existential and ontological description on the same phenomenon.

While Heidegger focuses in *Being and Time* on how anxiety discloses the indefiniteness and the insignificance, he describes, in “What is Metaphysics?”, how anxiety reveals the nothing. It is regrettable that he does not comment about death here at all, but I believe that the close relationship of anxiety to death has already been sufficiently expanded upon. Now I will investigate how the nothing reveals itself in anxiety, and then explain again how this is related to death.

“The nothing reveals itself in anxiety.”¹⁷ How can such a thing happen to Dasein? If the nothing is to reveal itself, it is necessary in advance to negate the totality of beings[Allheit des Seienden]. If it is to do so, in turn, the totality of beings must be given to us in advance. It is impossible, however, for us to have access to the totality of beings. It might be possible just in imagination. So, in this way, we attain “the formal concept of the imagined nothing but never the nothing itself.”¹⁸ Nonetheless, it is certain that we “find ourselves stationed in the midst of beings that are revealed somehow as a whole.”¹⁹ This is state-of-mind, which Heidegger regards as a constructive moment of being of Dasein. He distinguishes “beings as a whole[Seiendes im ganzen]” from “the totality of beings[Allheit des Seienden]” which is the sum of all entities. Beings as a whole attune Dasein at all times and form a mood for Dasein. But Dasein reveals beings as a whole only dimly because we are everyday absorbed in a few definite entities. However there are rare moods revealing beings as a whole prominently. Profound boredom is one of such moods. It makes Dasein break off interests for anything and therefore it reveals beings as a whole to Dasein. Yet, even the profound boredom reveals only beings as a whole with the nothing concealed. The fundamental mood which brings us ahead of the nothing happens only in anxiety

17 *ibid.*, p.104.

18 *ibid.*, p.101.

19 *ibid.*

where beings as a whole slip away. As a result, Dasein cannot find a prop anywhere and it becomes pure Da-sein which is not bound by any definite entities. Then it is robbed of speech. As beings as a whole recede and the nothing comes to the fore, “all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent.”²⁰ Even though the nothing appears, it does not lie *alongside of* beings as a whole. “[i]n anxiety the nothing is encountered *at one with* being as a whole [slipping away].”²¹ “The nothing is essentially repelling” in such a way that it refuses to appear in itself in front of us.²² Repelling of the nothing means, at first, that beings as a whole slip away but, *at one with this*, that the nothing indicates beings as a whole newly, i.e. reveals ‘beings as such’ as the mere Other of the nothing in strangeness. This duplicate operation is the essence of the nothing, namely nihilation[Nichten]. The second operation of nihilation is “the original openness of beings as such”, “bringing[brings] Da-sein for the first time before beings as such.”²³

However, nihilation does not happen only in rare moments of perceived anxiety. In so far as anxiety as the fundamental state-of-mind presides over Dasein at all times, nihilation happens incessantly. It is because opening of beings as such happens constantly that we can encounter this or that entity. “Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence approach and penetrate beings.”²⁴ The nihilation in everydayness happens in a concealed way. In everydayness, (1) slipping away of beings as a whole hardly appears due to persistent repelling of the nothingness, and (2) our interests are confined to encountering this or that entity, not proceeding to the wonderful event of the opening of beings as such.

From this phenomenon of incessant happening of concealed nihilation, we may bring it to mind that Dasein is being towards death, in so far as it exists, but this fact is concealed in everydayness. Although we are towards death ceaselessly, we are engaged, for the most part, only in each entity and cannot see the nihilation in bottom because we are fleeing from death. The primordial nihilation happens to us unconcealed, only when we forerun into death and impose anxiety on ourselves. In later works of Heidegger, we can find the similar relation of death to the nothing, and also to the Being itself. “Death, as the shrine of the nothing, harbors the appearance of the Being[*das Wesende des Seins*] in itself.”²⁵ When existence realizes and takes over its own death, it becomes pure Da-sein and experiences the Being itself. In other words, as it foreruns into death, the Being will inevitably be revealed as such.

20 *ibid.*, p.103.

21 *ibid.* Italicized by me.

22 *ibid.*, p.105.

23 *ibid.*

24 *ibid.*

25 Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Klett-Cotta Verlag, 2004. p.177. “Der Tod birgt als der Schrein des Nichts das Wesende des Seins in sich.”